Senate Testimony: Phebe Marr - Part 2
Shi'ah
The shi'ah population of the south has been in a constant state of decline over the past two decades. It was hit hard from the Iran-Iraq war which saw major fighting near a number of cities; the shelling of Basra; the shut down much of its oil industry and its ports; and the closure of the Shatt al-'Arab, its main artery to the Gulf. It then took the major brunt of the Second Gulf War, which was fought in the area. Even more important was the shi'i rebellion of 1991 and its brutal repression by the regime. This rebellion, which spread through all of the major shi'i cities and towns of the south, revealed the extent of shi'i disaffection for the regime, and the fear and distrust of the regime for the shi'i population. (The same was true for the Kurdish rebellion in the north.) The death toll in that rebellion has been estimated at at least 30,000. While the central government has restored control over the cities of the south, constant unrest and continuous, though ineffective, attacks on roads and government and party installations indicate a cowed but sullen and alienated population. There has been some economic revival under the oil-for-food program, but in general the south has been neglected, while Baghdad and the "sunni center" has benefited. One evidence of this is the decline in the population of Basra. Once Iraq's second city and its major port, Basra is now fifth in size and greatly reduced in influence. Another evidence is the growth of the Iraqi exile population in Iran, variously estimated at anywhere from 250,000 to 1 million, many of them forcibly deported from Iraq by the regime, and still others who have fled repression. The draining of the marsh areas of the south by the regime in an effort to remove a refuge for dissidents, is another indication of the depth of distrust between the shi'i community and the government.
Nonetheless, despite this alienation, the shi'ah inside Iraq, unlike the Kurds, have no discernible local leadership or organization to support their efforts. The most notable shi'i opposition organization is SCIRI (The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), but it is headquartered in Tehran and is largely controlled by Iran. This organization, established in 1982, was originally intended to be an umbrella for various Iraqi shi'i organizations committed to an Islamic government in Iraq, but despite its organizational growth since that time, it has suffered from splits and defections, and has essentially become a vehicle for the leadership of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, a cleric from a well known Iraqi clerical family. SCIRI has a military arm, the so-called Badr Brigade, of about 4,000 or 5,000 foot soldiers ready to cross the border. However, SCIRI suffers from serious difficulties. It labors (indeed chafes) under the domination of Iran, and the suspicion and distrust this engenders among shi'ah in Iraq. Moreover, the main constituency for SCIRI is the Iraqi exile community in Iran; it is not clear how much support SCIRI or its shi'i Islamic agenda has among shi'ah in Iraq. In 1991, when SCIRI sent forces into Iraq during the rebellion, raising Hakim's picture and shi'i Islamic slogans, the move backfired, turning a number of potential supporters against the revolt. The clerical leadership of the shi'ah, centered in Najaf and Karbala' is usually its strongest source of leadership, but the regime has systematically executed or assassinated most of its leading members in the last decade, greatly weakening the shi'i religious establishment. While the pilgrimage traffic with Iran has been reopened, it is carefully controlled by Baghdad. In fact, the shi'i seminaries have declined and the repression visited on these cities during and after the 1991 rebellion, where fighting was fierce, has been severe. The emergence of charismatic clerical leadership among the shi'ah cannot be ruled out in the future, but at the moment there is none on the horizon.
In recent years, the regime has strengthened tribal influence and leadership in the south (and elsewhere) especially among the Arab tribes and clans from which it might expect support in return for benefits. While this support is thin and based on calculations of interest, tribes or more properly clans, with their built-in kinship constituencies, may provide a potential source of leadership among the shi'ah in the future. While tribal leaders are good at rebelling, however, they are notoriously poor at constructing governments.
The Arab shi'ah of Iraq are a large, diverse and heterogeneous population. A substantial educated middle class lives in Baghdad and other cities and many work for the government. This population has never unified behind a shi'i cause, and there is now no leadership or organization in Iraq which could accomplish anything this purpose. However, the repression of the past two decades; the deepening alienation from a sunni dominated government; and economic deprivation and neglect have unquestionably deepened a sense of shi'i identity. There is, however, no expressed desire for separation or self-government; rather shi'ah clearly want a greater--indeed dominan-- share of power in Baghdad, commensurate with their numbers. In any future government, they are unlikely to accept continued sunni dominance. Their problem will be their inability to field domestic leaders and organizations to further their interests and their aims in any new political dispensation.
The Center: The Issue of Alternative Leadership
It is generally assumed that if new political leadership is to emerge inside Iraq, it will have to come from the Center. That term can be construed as political, to denote the central government in Baghdad, but is it is also used in a geographic and demographic sense to refer to the "Arab sunni triangle" which stretches from Baghdad to Mosul and to the borders of Syria and Jordan in the West. This region includes the small, but growing, cities and towns of the Tigris and Euphrates valley north and west of Baghdad, dominated by Arab sunnis (often with strong tribal and clan ties) from which the regime recruits its leadership. (Baghdad, with a population of over 4 million, has an Arab shi'ah majority and substantial numbers of Kurds, Turcoman, and Christian communities, as well as Arab sunnis.)
The issue of alternative political leadership is critical, indeed, probably "the" critical issue in the post-Saddam period, and needs to be addressed. If new leadership is to come from "inside" Iraq, it is fair to say that there at present there is no visible alternative leadership. There may be a number of potential leaders--from within the military, the clan structure, the educated elite--but they cannot emerge and demonstrate their leadership under this regime. Numerous coup attempts have been made but all have been cut down. Hence we can speculate on sources of leadership, but it is not clear what capacity putative leaders would have or what constituencies they could mobilize. One conclusion may be drawn, however. If leadership emerges from inside the regime--or its support system--the change this leadership will bring--in orientation, political culture and even foreign policy--may be too little to be supported by the bulk of the population or to meet US demands and expectations. For example, will a sunni general, raised and trained under the Ba'th, be willing to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction? Will he and the centrist coalition he may assemble be friendly to the US government? Above all, will such leadership be acceptable to Kurds, shi'ah, and even educated sunni civilians who are hoping for real change and more inclusiveness? Will he be able to mobilize sufficient support to keep law and order, or will a struggle for power erode his control at the center?
The outside opposition, on the other hand, has a multitude of leaders who have been vying with one another for years. The key figures and groups are fairly well known in Washington. These include Ahmad Chalabi, leader of the Iran National Congress, originally an umbrella group that included a number of opposition organizations, but is now mainly a vehicle for his leadership; Sharif 'Ali, a member of the Hashimite family, advocating a constitutional monarch; the Iraq National Accord, led by Ayad Allawi, and composed of many ex-Ba'thists claiming to have ties and contacts with army officers and Ba'thists inside; SCIRI, the main shi'ah component, already mentioned; various individual generals who have defected over the years, and the two Kurdish parties who are already in control of their own real estate in the north. The main problems with the outside opposition are clear. They have been competing and squabbling for years, and have been unable to coalesce, even around a mainstream candidate such as Ahmed Chalabi. Most have narrow constituencies, and little or no organization inside. The Kurds, the strongest component, do have organization, some military force, and a strong constituency in the north of Iraq. But the Kurds are unable, and unwilling, to take on a leadership role in Baghdad. To the contrary. The two Kurdish parties, and in particular the KDP, have illustrated time and again that their main aim is self-government in the north; not greater control or even change in Baghdad. The weaknesses and political liabilities of SCIRI have already been dealt with. As for the other groups, their main difficulty is that they are outside Iraq, and it is not clear what, if any, constituencies they have inside. Their main constituency is, in fact, inWashington.
This raises a policy paradox. Many of the outside opposition leaders have demonstrated leadership skills (Ahmed Chalabi, for example). They are westernized, and generally support US aims, including the elimination of WMD. They are more familiar with western democratic processes and are most likely to bring change in Iraq. But they will have to be put in by the US, and will likely have to be supported by us over some considerable period, if the changes they--and we--envisage are to be maintained. And as western supported elements, their legitimacy will soon be questioned.
The outside leadership--its benefits and pitfalls--are accessible and well known to us. It is the potential "inside" leadership that is most uncertain. To understand where this leadership may emerge, it is worth taking a look at what we will find, once Saddam and his inner circle are removed.
The Iraqi regime today is supported by three pillars: a kin and clan network that dominates security, the military and the decision-making apparatus; broader based institutions (the Ba'th Party, military organizations, the bureaucracy): an economic "mafia", backed by state controlled resources.
The kin and clan network. Saddam has maintained power largely by placing his own tribe and clan(the Albu Nasr/ Begat) in key decision making, security and military positions. (For all intents and purposes these two groups are synonymous). The Albu Nasr, hailing from the area around Tikrit, probably number only about 25,000, with several thousand active members available for political recruitment, but they have gradually come to occupy the strategic heights of the political system. Allied with them are a numerous, neighboring clan and tribal groupings--the Duris, the Tikritis, the Juburis, the Ubaidis, and the larger tribal confederation of the Dulaim. Almost all are Arab sunni and overwhelmingly come from the cities and towns of the Arab sunni triangle. Numerous studies have focused on this phenomenon, charting the numbers and kinds of positions occupied by these clan groups; intermarraige between and among key political families; and the relationship of various members to Saddam's own extended family. All point to one overwhelming trend. Beneath a façade of modern institutions--a political part, a military and a bureaucracy--an ever thickening network of kin and clan relations has governed the country, deeply penetrating leading institutions, especially the military. One author has posed a hierarchy of clans, led by the Begat, and followed by the Tikritis, the Duris, and the Dulaimis, and shown how they dominate the military. As kin and clan relations have grown, these primordial ties have come to replace ideology and party organization as the glue that holds the regime--and the government together. In the countryside as well, tribal leadership and organization has come to play an increasing role in providing local government services. This net work has been referred to as ahl al-thiqah (the people you can trust)
Even when Saddam's immediate family and the core of his supporters are removed, these clan groups will remain, and so too will the kinship ties that bind them. Alternative leadership may, indeed, rise from related clans--some of whom have already attempted coups--imbedded in the military or even the security system. In this case, the leadership is bound to be Arab sunni, and a key issue is whether such a leader will be willing or able to go beyond clan politics; whether we will simply get another clan in power; and above all, whether such a change will be acceptable to the non-sunni population and the urban, educated middle class that functions outside the clan system.
The Institutions of State The second pillar of the regime rests on the institutions of state: the Ba'th Party, the various components of the military, the bureaucracy and the educational establishment. These are recruited from a broader base and include both shi'ah and Kurds as well as other communities. At secondary levels, these institutions are peopled by educated professionals; they constitute the ahl al-khibrah (the people with expertise) or the technocrats. Some are potential pools of future leadership.
The Ba'th Party has a narrow cadre at the top but a broad base at the bottom. Full party members may constitute no more than 25,000, but applicants and candidate members may number a million. While the party's importance has diminished as the power of Saddam's family has risen, its main function as a mechanism of recruitment and mobility (joining the party is essential for advancement in most professions); indoctrination at a mass level; and enforcement of regime demands is still intact. While commitment to ideology is no longer dominant, the upper levels of the cadre are infused with a sense of elitism and entitlement that comes from enjoying the privileges of rule. While the party organization is not likely to survive Saddam's collapse, much of the party cadre--which populates most institutions needed to run the state--will. While few will remain loyal to Saddam and his family, deeply ingrained attitudes toward power and authority will persist. So, too, will the strong nationalist attitudes that have been the backbone of Ba'thist ideology.
The military is not a single institution. The regular army is an institution as old as the state and is probably the military component with the greatest sense of independence and distance from the regime. Unfortunately, it is also the weakest having suffered the greatest from war, sanctions and attrition. The Republican Guard units are fewer, more carefully recruited, and, presumably more loyal to the regime. They are better trained and tougher. However, despite their privileges, many may welcome a change of regime. Within the RG, as is well known, are the units critical to regime survival--the Special Republican Guard, deployed to protect Baghdad, and the Special Security Organization and the Protection unit--designed to protect Saddam Husain and his WMD. The latter three units--dominated by his family and clan are not only likely to remain loyal but to tie their survival to his. Republican Guard members and officers in Regular Army units may well provide alternative leadership, but here the question will be, how much change they would bring and how willing they would be to embrace US requirements.
The Bureaucracy and the Educational Establishment will inevitably provide leadership for any new regime, but only at secondary levels; they are unlikely to provide the necessary leadership at the top political levels. They do not have the muscle to affect a change, and they both represent a cadre that is used to obeying orders, not giving them. The education establishment, in particular, has been Ba'thized, including teacher training even at elementary levels. However, it is important to emphasize that, despite a decade of sanctions, and a deterioration of economic, social and intellectual life, Iraq still possesses an educated, professional middle class--embedded in the bureaucracy and in higher education--capable of running the state. Many members of this class--those in the middle to late 40s or older may be educated in the West and familiar with Western ways. A larger number may have been educated in Iraq in "Saddam University", a college system designed to pick the best students, vetted for loyalty, and train them for elite positions, in government and the professions. Both cadres can be expected to be competent, disciplined and culturally Westernized. (A younger generation, it should be noted, are turning to Islam, so this may not be true of the next generation). This bureaucracy can be used by whatever political leadership is installed; indeed, it will have to be used, but it may need several years of redirection and even reeducation.
The Economic Elite The third pillar of the regime is the economic elite, often referred to as an economic "mafia". It is a product of the state's control over oil and other resources, which it distributes through a patronage system, controlled by Saddam's family and clan. But the largesse is spread into all communities, tying important Kurdish, shi'ah, and sunni elements to the regime. Most are contractors who owed their wealth to government patronage; a smaller number are industrialists. While this group can provide the support, the contacts and some of the know-how to revive the economy, it cannot be expected to provide alternative political leadership. In fact, it is not a true private sector independent of the state. Indeed, one of the best changes that could be introduced would be to separate this economic class from the state, and to move toward the creation of a true, and more independent, private sector.
This brief survey on what we can expect in Iraq the day after, leads to the following conclusions, albeit tentative:
O In the past decade, Iraq's sense of national identity has eroded, but it has not disappeared. Kurdish aspirations for self government, shi'ah self-awareness and even Arab sunni identity have increased. In any new political order, few Iraqis will be willing to tolerate a continuance of rule by a narrowly based Arab sunni minority, like the present regime. The good news is that after years of repression, Iraqis are ready for change; they seek preservation of their state and its future development as a nation. However, they have had no experience of democracy; only of a mukhabarat (secret police) state, which has created distrust, corruption and bitterness among communities. The building blocks of democracy will have to be created, including a reorientation of attitudes and practices, and this will take time.
O Without firm authority at helm the "day after", and a clear enunciation of future constitutional procedures pointing to new directions, retribution and a struggle for power are likely in the short term. Erosion of the central authority could, in a worst case scenario, allow parochial interests to emerge in the north and the south. This will induce meddling and interference from neighbors, most likely Iran and Turkey.
O Providing alternative political leadership, and the process by which it is installed, is the most critical and difficult problem faced by the US as an outside power.
O A "coup" or change of government from within--absent US forces on the ground--is the scenario most likely to be destabilizing. While this is the least expensive option for the US in terms of troops and political investment, it could lead to a struggle for power in Baghdad and the erosion of central control, and a gradual "break down' of national unity. Inside leadership is most likely to move against Saddam if it decides the US is serious about occupation but it will need US support to prevent fracturing.
O If the US is unsure of the new leadership or unsatisfied because it appears too close to the previous regime, a period of probing and exploration could ensue, during which the US will have to make demands before providing support and recognition. In the interim the US could lose control of the situation. Identifying potential inside leaders and making US requirements clear and public, before hand, would help avoid this slippery slope.
O Introducing the outside opposition as alternative leadership would produce the most change inside Iraq in the direction the US desires. But this is the most difficult and most costly option. This opposition lacks clear indigenous support; the US would have to be prepared to install and support this opposition with troops, over a considerable period of time.
O If the US finds itself in occupation of Iraq, it will have the best opportunity, in the short term, to provide law and order, prevent retribution; and begin the processes by which Iraqis (both those outside and those inside) can refashion their political system and move toward democratic reforms. Most Iraqis would welcome that prospect, but it represents an expensive, long term commitment by the US over several years, and some troops on the ground, preferable in conjunction with allies. And before too long, if the US is not careful, it will be viewed as a foreign occupier by those inside and outside. Thus, the institution of new leadership and the procedures for establishing a new government, need to be fairly expeditious. After a short period (six months) a US--even and international presence--could be greatly reduced. Nonetheless, if the US is determined to replace the regime, it is better that it take a firm hand in the beginning to help in providing the building blocs for a new, more democratic regime; support its efforts; and plan to keep some forces and a strong advisory team in place to assure the new regime gets a solid footing.
O Among the steps needed will be:
Removal of the of security system and the training of a new police force
Establishing a new system of justice
Re-education and redirection of the bureaucracy
Assembly of a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution
Developing the building blocks of civil society (a free press, civic
Institutions, reform of education)
O Iraq has a military and a bureaucracy on which the US can rely to provide defense and help develop the country, but as this list of tasks indicates, it will require considerable effort to reorganize and reshape Iraq's institutions in the desired direction. This is no small, or short term task. If the US is going to take the responsibility for removing the current leadership, it should assume that it cannot get the results it wants "on the cheap". It must be prepared to devote some troops on the ground, advisors to help create new institutions, and above all time and effort in the future to see the project through to a satisfactory end. |
