Washington Retreating on Iraq
Summary
The Bush administration has begun to back down from plans
for a near-term attack on Iraq. The controversial plan
was shredding the coalition against al Qaeda, which
Washington needs in battling the group. But the Bush
administration's retreat from Iraq, although necessary,
forces it to manage a political and psychological defeat.
Analysis
The Bush administration in the past few days has begun
backing down from its single-minded commitment to
attacking Iraq. This was forced in part by broad
opposition in the Middle East and Europe to such a plan
and dissension at home.
The White House's wavering reflects the tortuous
political and military complexity of containing a war on
Iraq and its aftermath. But the Bush administration,
unilateralist chest-thumping aside, also realizes that it
needs the assistance of many countries if it is to keep
al Qaeda and its sympathizers in check.
A reversal of policy on Iraq was necessary in terms of
both long-term U.S. anti-terrorism goals and short-term
preparedness for new al Qaeda attacks. However, the
retreat is a strategic psychological defeat for the
administration, particularly in the Middle East.
Washington inadvertently stumbled into exactly the trap
al Qaeda hoped to set for it.
Its Iraq policy united the Muslim Middle East across
border, racial and sectarian lines against the United
States. And that opposition appears to have thwarted a
major U.S. attack in the region. Washington will need to
exercise damage control in its relations with individual
Muslim countries, and despite the drawdown on Iraq, could
face increased resistance in the region in the near
future.
U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice began the
administration's message-tempering last week. In an
interview with the BBC, she continued to lambaste Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein as an evil man and argued that
the case for regime change was very powerful. However,
she also acknowledged that President George W. Bush had
not yet chosen the method for Hussein's ouster.
Presidential communications director Dan Bartlett
highlighted the ambiguity of the White House's Iraq
policy on Aug. 18, when he announced that Bush had not
yet decided what to do in Iraq but would articulate a
plan when he had one and would certainly receive the
support of Americans and their allies.
Washington already has begun searching for alternative
strategies. The London-based Sunday Times reported Aug.
18 that the Pentagon would for the first time begin
funding covert operations by Iraqi opposition groups. The
State Department reportedly also is freeing up money
earmarked for the Iraqi opposition that had been tied up
until now.
Support for an attack -- which was never particularly
strong to begin with -- has been crumbling at home and
abroad.
For instance, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal
announced Aug. 7 that Riyadh would not allow the United
States to launch an attack on Iraq from Saudi territory.
Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Oman have all stated their
opposition to an attack on Iraq.
Two more countries joined the opposition Aug. 18. After a
meeting with Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa of Bahrain --
where the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet is based -- said his
country opposes unilateral U.S. military action against
Iraq. The same day, after a meeting in Jeddah with Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah
Saleh declared his opposition to a war as well.
There is also little enthusiasm for an Iraq campaign in
Europe, including in countries with bases and forces
needed for a major campaign. German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder has openly rejected participation by his
country, which was a key staging area for operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Even British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, one of the few supporters of an
attack, is facing major opposition from within his own
party over the plan.
Taking it one step further, the European Union reportedly
is pressuring Turkey -- a critical ally in any attack
plan -- to help thwart Washington's goals.
At home, congressional Republicans have begun breaking
ranks, arguing that the administration has failed to
prove that an attack is needed at this time or even to
provide a coherent plan. Brent Scowcroft, national
security adviser to former President George Bush during
Operation Desert Storm, recently warned in the Wall
Street Journal that an attack on Iraq could destroy the
global anti-terrorism coalition. And within the
administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell felt
confident enough to go against the administration openly
and meet with Henry Kissinger to discuss options other
than war for dealing with Iraq.
The administration's about-face indicates that it
recognizes the grim reality on three counts. First,
despite the increasingly strident assertions by
unilateralists within the administration that the United
States could attack Iraq without the support of a
coalition, the need for friendly bases in the Middle East
argued otherwise. The United States literally was running
out of room to maneuver. Second, given its battlefield
constraints, Washington could not be sure it could
contain a war on Iraq within that country's borders or
manage the war's aftermath.
Finally, the administration accepted that Iraq is
peripheral to its primary strategic concern: al Qaeda.
And while the United States may have the firepower to
defeat the Iraqi army, it needs intelligence as much as
rifles to defeat al Qaeda. That intelligence comes from
allies in the Middle East, and the United States cannot
afford for it to dry up.
Aside from some small skirmishes in Afghanistan and a few
thwarted solo efforts, al Qaeda has been inert since
Sept. 11. With elections approaching and the market
psychology uneasy in the United States, now would be an
opportune time from its standpoint for an attack.
Moreover, al Qaeda has placed itself under pressure to
demonstrate that it remains intact and effective, after a
spokesman announced in June that the group would strike
again soon. And as Al Qaeda cannot afford the perception
that it was crushed by the United States, Washington
cannot afford to be expending all its political capital
on a war with Iraq, only to be blindsided by an al Qaeda
attack in the United States.
While there may have been a logic behind the Iraq
campaign, it failed when it came at the expense of the
war on al Qaeda. The question is not whether Washington
can back down from its Iraq policy. It must. The question
is how can it manage the political retreat?
This shouldn't be too difficult at home. CNN's broadcast
over the weekend of al Qaeda's video library -- showing
chemical gas experiments and explosives-making -- is
perfectly timed to help begin refocusing the American
public. The Democrats will have to think twice before
adopting a pro-war stance as a campaign issue while
Republicans will find it easy to again rally around the
anti-al Qaeda campaign.
There may be some squabbling within the administration
itself, as the unilateralists attempt to defend their
positions against Powell and the resurgent coalitionists,
but nothing too drastic will emerge.
Overall, a policy reversal should play well for domestic
politics. It should not pose much of a problem for U.S.
relations with its European allies either, as they will
see this as a rare case of Washington knocked to its
senses by reality.
However, for those who hope to challenge U.S. hegemony,
Washington's retreat on Iraq will be seen as a major
victory. Al Qaeda's strategic goal was to pit the United
States against all of Islam, in the process giving the
Islamic world a common enemy against which to unite.
Washington stumbled into that trap with its Iraq policy,
with Arabs and Persians, Sunnis and Shiites uniting
against the campaign and thwarting U.S. intentions.
Washington must now counteract this precedent in its
relations with individual Muslim states. Though the Iraq
issue may subside temporarily, Washington should expect
increased resistance on other issues from countries
across the region emboldened by their success. A series
of confrontations over the next few months -- like the
recent and as-yet unexplained dispute between Washington
and Cairo that led to a withholding of future U.S. aid to
Egypt -- can be expected.
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