I don't have the time or the patience to sit through two hours of RealPlayer of Scott Ritter on my computer, but let me share with you something I just found - Ritter's entire testimony to the House National Security Committee in September, 1998. He says repeatedly that Iraq possessed WMD.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT RITTER, Former UNSCOM Inspector (Part One)
MR. RITTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Skelton, for the kind introduction.
Thank you very much for inviting me to appear before you to discuss important issues
pertaining to U.S. policy towards Iraq. I chose to resign from my position with the Special
Commission in hope that in doing so I will precipitate a general debate concerning the
direction of U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq, whether the stated policy furthered the goals of
disarming Iraq in accordance with Security Council resolutions, and whether the policy toward
Iraq as practiced matched those stated objectives.
Recently the U.S. policy goal towards Iraq was stated as seeking to deny Iraq the capacity
ever again to threaten international peace and security. To achieve this end, the U.S.
supported a two-pronged approach, with one prong seeking to support inspections by the
United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, to carry out
disarmament, monitoring and verification inspections in Iraq; and the other prong seeking to
maintain economic sanctions, because such sanctions create an incentive for Iraq to comply
with weapons inspections and monitoring activities. This policy of the United States is
praiseworthy. Its implementation, however, is inconsistent and ineffective.
As I speak to you today, Iraq has suspended cooperation with the inspectors of the Special
Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a result, there are no
meaningful inspections taking place in Iraq. Iraq is not being disarmed, as required by the
United Nations at the end of the Persian Gulf War.
In response to this illegal Iraqi action, the Security Council, after more than one month of
deliberation, unanimously adopted a new resolution last week, number 1194, condemning
Iraq's actions and suspending all sanctions review until such time as Iraq rescinds its decision
to suspend cooperation. However, this resolution also contains language which offers Iraq a
light at the end of the tunnel, to the promise of a comprehensive review of Iraq's compliance
with its disarmament obligations. Such a review conducted under the auspices of the
secretary general will result in the investigators becoming the investigated, all at the behest of
Iraq. This is fundamentally wrong, and provides a formula for continued compromise leading
to the dangerous illusion of a disarmed Iraq.
Equally disturbing is the impression given by many in the U.S. national security team that this
resolution has real teeth, because of the suspension of sanctions review, despite its unspoken
olive branch. The reality is that Iraq is winning its bid to retain its prohibited weapons.
Continuation of sanctions as a sole means of enforcing Security Council resolutions is a
self-defeating policy. Iraq has demonstrated its resolve to survive, and even prosper, under
sanctions. Combined with its ability to adapt to the rules of the oil-for-food program
exception, Iraq scoffs at the Security Council resolutions suspending sanctions review as a
mere continuation of a waiting game which Iraq believes that time is on its side.
Iraq is not disarmed. Iraq still poses a real and meaningful threat to its neighbors, and nothing
the Security Council or the United States is currently doing will change this back. I am
concerned that it is the United States has put itself into a strategic box, outwitted by an
intransigent Iraq and those Security Council members whose objectives in Iraq are less than
honorable. Something needs to be done to change the current course of affairs, and I am
ready to answer any questions you may have of me. Thank you.
REP. SPENCE: Mr. Skelton?
REP. SKELTON: Mr. Ritter, you used the phrase "intentions less than honorable." Would you
tell us to whom you refer, and explain your usage of that phrase?
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir. Specifically the Security Council members who I refer to are primarily
France and Russia. France has economic goals with Iraq which will be derived from contracts
which will be beneficial to French companies once sanctions are lifted. France, while stating it
has a desire to see Iraq disarmed, is doing everything in its power to position Iraq so that
sanctions will be lifted and these economic contracts with French companies can be signed
and carried out. I feel that the French foreign policy, while stating they want Iraq disarmed,
yet pushing for a less than total disarmament of Iraq in accordance with Security Council
resolution, is indeed a policy that is less than honorable. It is disingenuous.
Secondly, Russia. Russia has a multi-billion dollar outstanding debt with Iraq, and it has been
Russia's intent from the very beginning to get Iraq returned to where its economic life would
allow it to repay the debt. This has been one of the sole driving factors behind Russian
foreign policy objectives in Iraq -- getting sanctions lifted so that Iraq can repay its debt.
In addition, the current regime in Russia has positioned itself so that it will oppose United
States foreign policy objectives in the Middle East as a means of positioning itself favorably
with nationalist and ultranationalist elements within Russia. So again Russia is opposing the
United States on several fundamental points in the Middle East, to include the American
policy on Iraq. And Russian policy objectives with Iraq do not point towards disarmament,
but point towards a rapid lifting of sanctions so that Russia can establish itself as a
counterpoint to America in the Middle East and like France achieve an economic situation
where it can get its debts repaid.
REP. SKELTON: Along that line, Mr. Ritter, has the presence of French and Russians on the
inspection teams affected the work of the inspection teams?
MR. RITTER: Sir, the United Nations Special Commission is a United Nations organization,
and as such it draws its membership from all nations. We have French inspectors with the
Special Commission who have served with distinction and with honor, who have put their
lives at risk in carrying out the job that they have been given to do. We have Russian
inspectors who have likewise performed in an honorable manner. As long as the executive
chairman, whether that was Rolf Ekeus from 1991 to 1995 -- or 1997 -- or Richard Butler, from
1997 to today -- has the authority to select the personnel that he sees fit to carry out the job in
Iraq, whether these personnel be drawn from the United States, Great Britain, France or
Russia, he would pick the world's best experts, and he will pick those people whom he has the
confidence will carry out the provisions of Security Council resolution. It doesn't matter what
the nationality is; it matters what their level of honor is in terms of carrying out the tasks given
to them.
However, we have a situation today where France and Russia are placing pressure on the
executive chairman to bring in personnel not of his choosing -- to bring in personnel whom he
doesn't want on the commission. What are the goals and the objectives of these personnel if
it is not to do the mission given to them by the executive chairman? Who is tasking them?
And it's our concern that the work of the Special Commission, which was to be devoted solely
to carrying out the provisions of Security Council resolution, is becoming somehow
politicized, and that through the inclusion of French and Russian personnel with the staff of
the Special Commission, and with the inspectorate in Iraq, we will be having a dual-track
policy -- one which the executive chairman thinks is furthering disarmament aims; but the
other one in which personnel are working behind the scenes to make the Special Commission
less effective and defer to their own national agendas, which is to come up with the illusion of
disarmament and the lifting of sanctions prior to Iraq fulfilling its disarmament obligations.
REP. SKELTON: Mr. Ritter, in your considered opinion, based upon your work and your
knowledge of Iraq and the threats that it poses, what option or options would you recommend
that we here in Congress consider?
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir. Keeping myself to my agreement -- that is, at a weapons inspector, I
concur with people who say that the coalition that was assembled in 1991 is not the same
coalition or it does not carry the same force that it has today.
What we have been trying to do through the weapons inspection process is to create a
situation which the world would rally around the just requirements of Iraq to disarm. Through
the inspection process we have tried to uncover Iraq's lies, to uncover their deceit, and to
expose their retained prohibited capabilities. In doing so we believe strongly that once the
extent of Iraq's lies has been put on the table, once we have exposed the weapons, there
would be therefore just cause for the coalition to rally around. If you denigrate the inspection
process, if you make the inspection process less than meaningful, there is no cause -- the
coalition will not rally. As a weapons inspector, I believe you cannot get adequate
consensus, meaningful consensus in the Security Council unless they -- there is unanimous
consent on what it is they are supporting. When you have a fractured Security Council with
some members of the Security Council trying to denigrate the work of the Special Commission
and move towards sanctions removal, other members of the Security Council elevating the
work of the Special Commission or misusing the work of the Special Commission to keep
sanctions on, you are not going to have a situation where a coalition can be formed. The
Special Commission has tried to keep the process pure. We've tried to keep the process
focused on the disarmament task given to us by the Security Council. In my opinion, only
through that process can you get a coalition built, where you can get 15 nations united on a
single objective -- that is, the disarmament of Iraq.
Congress should in my opinion seek to have the United States fully support the inspection
process in Iraq, allow the inspectors to get back to task so that we can expose these weapons,
and in doing so rally international support around an honorable cause, which is the
disarmament of Iraq. If you don't support the inspection regime fully it's an illusion -- you
create the illusion of arms control and you also create a situation where you will have the
inspection process denigrated and misused and used in a manner which allows for sanctions
maybe to be prematurely lifted.
REP. SKELTON: Mr. Ritter, thank you for your thoughts and your testimony. I applaud your
forthrightness here. Thank you very much. MR. RITTER: Thank you, sir.
REP. SPENCE: Mr. Hunter?
REP. HUNTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, any tough foreign policy -- and I think
our foreign policy initially with respect to Iraq, postwar Iraq, could initially be described as at
one time a tough policy. Any tough foreign policy requires a strong military capability behind
it to serve as a foundation of that policy.
I don't know if you've been following the reductions that we have made in force structure, but
for practical purposes we've almost halved American military strength since Desert Storm. Do
you have any opinions on the effect that that reduction of American military capability has
had on our Iraq policy and the perception of our ability to carry out that policy by the Iraqis?
MR. RITTER: Again, sir, I have to respectfully remind you that I only feel comfortable
responding in my role as a weapons inspector. As such, how a member nation of the Security
Council chooses to constitute or reconstitute its armed forces and deploy them is the
business of that member nation.
What I can say, based upon my experience as a weapons inspector, is that Iraq does not hold
the Security Council and the members of the Security Council in fear. Iraq believes today that
it will get away with these actions and will not be held subject to any meaningful punishment;
that whatever the Security Council or individual members of the Security Council choose to
do to Iraq in the form of military or economic punishment, Iraq today is confident -- and these
are words that come from minister-level people in Iraq -- they are confident they can absorb
this punishment and outlast the will of the Security Council or any of its individual members
to inflict such punishment. So it's the perception as a weapons inspector -- it's my perception
of Iraq's perception that they can outlast whatever it is the Security Council or any individual
members will be willing to dish out.
REP. HUNTER: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SPENCE: Mr. Sisisky?
REP. NORM SISISKY (D-VA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by saying I thank you for what you did, and I think it took a lot of courage and
devotion to your country and your duty, and I thank you personally.
I'm sure one of the things that concerns all of us, and I am sure it concerns you -- has been
talked about in the press -- is how this issue to some extent became focused on personality
issues instead of what you were after, the policy issues that we should have focused on.
I think everyone is aware of some of the unkind and, to my mind, unfortunate things that
have been said over the past few weeks. And of course, the barbs going back-and-forth
between the secretary of state and the assistant secretary of state.
There's another thing that stands out, and I wish you'd comment. And that's the reaction and
response from your fellow inspectors, without means or anything else. But also, I would like
for you to comment -- and I don't know if you've done this already, I read so much material last
night. That I quote what the secretary of state has said: you "did not have a clue about U.S.
policy towards Iraq." I would like for you to comment on those two things. Thank you.
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir. Let me start off by saying that I have nothing but the highest respect
for the secretary of state, the national security adviser, for all the people who are doing the
very important work of formulating and implementing foreign policy, national security policy
for the United States of America.
Madeleine Albright has been one of the foremost supporters of the Special Commission, and
she has worked very, very hard to get America's foreign policy on Iraq back on track -- on
track -- so that we can achieve the disarming of Iraq. I think people have said here that it's a
very complicated situation. It's an extremely complicated situation, and one that does not offer
any immediate solutions.
I felt, in August the 26th, that the situation had reached a point where the foreign policy was a
failure. This does not reflect -- I mean, it does reflect badly on some of the people in the
foreign policy team. That doesn't mean that they behaved less than honorably. They were
trying to carry out a task, a very difficult task. They just weren't succeeding.
So, my resignation wasn't a personal attack against the secretary of state, or any members of
the national security team. I had nothing but highest esteem, and today I still have the
highest esteem for them. They have a tough job to do, and they have to get on with doing it.
I had hoped that by talking about it in this forum, that through public debate, maybe some
options could be provided to them, or some guidance could be given to them, that could get
the policy back on track.
There's no doubt that my resignation put the national security team in a tough situation. It
wasn't expected. It wasn't something that was closely coordinated with them. They had been
reliant upon me and other inspectors to carry out the difficult job of disarming Iraq. And in
resigning in the manner that I did, I was holding them accountable for a failed policy. They
might have spoken out defensively.
But I do not believe that we should take these unfortunate comments out of context.
Madeleine Albright wants to disarm Iraq. Madeleine Albright wants to hold Iraq accountable.
And I certainly understand why she would say that I "don't have a clue" about the foreign
policy of the United States. I did not sit in on her policy coordination meeting. I was not at
the table when she and the other members of the national security team made the hard
decisions that they had to make. She's absolutely correct on that point.
However, as an inspector, especially a senior inspector, I was very closely involved with
personnel who did sit in on the foreign policy coordination meetings, with personnel who did
have input to these meetings, and who were aware of the conclusions that came out of these
meetings. And I coordinated very closely with them, to ensure that the work that I was doing
as a chief inspector, the work I was doing on behalf of the executive chairman, was indeed in
concert with the foreign policy and national security policy objectives of the United States.
I believe that Madeleine Albright was under pressure when she made these statements. It is
not reflective of a personal attack by her against me. And I believe that she and everybody
else on this administration, wants to get down to the hard task of holding Iraq accountable for
their illegal behavior. And I'm hoping that through general debates such as this, the Congress
will be able to provide guidance and assistance to her, to help her formulate a just and wise
policy..
REP. SISISKY: (Inaudible) -- you did not answer about your colleagues. Have you heard
much from your colleagues? I --
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir --
REP. SISISKY: Because I know four of them protested -- (inaudible) -- is what I heard last
night.
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir. My resignation also put them in a very difficult position.
I think, as committee members, you're aware there are many times a person will come here and
they have personal opinions but because of bureaucratic restraints, chain of command
problems, a person though can't speak freely. It doesn't mean that they're lying, it means they
can't speak freely.
I right now have been liberated from any gag that may have been in my mouth when I was an
inspector.
The Special Commission is a United Nations body. It is a body that has to be conscious of
the political realities that it exists in. It would be impolitic of the executive chairman to come
out and say some of the things that I have been saying, whether he agrees with them or not.
And I believe that it's unfortunate that some people have put pressure on both executive
chairmen, Richard Butler and Rolf Ekeus, to come out and make public statements that sought
to distance themselves from me, because that it is not in concert with the understanding that I
have about some of the issues that I have been discussing and what their stance it.
But it's unfair, I think, to go down that track. It puts Richard Butler in a very difficult
situation. And he's an honorable, he's trying to do an extremely difficult task. And the United
States should be focused on how they can formulate a policy that allows him to continue to
carry out the important task of disarming Iraq.
REP. SPENCE: Mr. Weldon.
REP. CURT WELDON (R-PA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ritter, thank you for coming in today and thank you for your courage. You have
crystallized an issue that has been the focus of this Congress for the past several years
dealing with proliferation and Iraq's new emerging technology.
In fact, I say it on the record, 37 specific instances since 1982 -- or 1992 of arms control
violations by Russia and China, most of them to Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and India. And yet we've
only imposed sanctions three times and we've waived them in each of the three cases.
My question to you is, do you think that there is proliferation still going into Iraq involving
chemical, biological, nuclear or missile technology?
MR. RITTER: Thank you, sir.
One of the difficult tasks that the Special Commission's been faced with is that when it was
created it had a mandate to operate only within the borders of Iraq. It was a conventional
disarmament task that we were given.
REP. WELDON: I understand.
MR. RITTER: But over the years we found that Iraq has no intention of complying with its
requirements and that the task has become much complicated. This now includes Iraq setting
up covert procurement companies around the world to procure dual-use equipment -- that is,
equipment that can be used for civilian purposes but also for prohibited purposes -- as well as
procuring prohibited materials, chemicals used in ballistic missiles, solid composite fuel,
material used to produce liquid propellant engines -- (word inaudible) -- control equipment,
and perhaps even the chemicals that can be used for precursors in chemical agents.
We have ample evidence of this taking place. Our problem is we don't have a mandate which
allows us to operate outside of the borders of Iraq. So we're in a difficult position, where a
United Nations body is put in a position where it's investigating a member nation who is not
covered by Security Council resolutions.
But the short answer is, we do have evidence of this. It's significant evidence. And the
commission is trying its best within the framework of the rules governing how it behaves to
come --
REP. WELDON: I thank you for your answer.
And I would submit to my colleagues that, to further bolster the comments by Mr. Ritter, if
you would ask your respective members on the Intelligence Committee to give you reports of
intercepts that this country has, just between July and August, to monitor not just the lack of
ability to do what Mr. Ritter was doing, but the continued effort to send technology into Iraq
is continuing today. And this administration is not stopping it. |
