STATEMENT OF SCOTT RITTER, Former UNSCOM Inspector (Part Two)
Second question: Are you aware of an article or the results of an article that ran in the Arabic
Daily News on August the 31st where Egypt has alleged that diplomatic sources in Cairo say
they expect the US to direct a military strike at Iraq in October directly to proceed the
November elections, should Baghdad continue to refuse to cooperate with the special
international committee, UNSCOM?
This article further goes on to state, and I quote, "The USA has informed France, Russia,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt that expects to be supported in military operations against
Iraq if Baghdad continues its current status," end quote, and they expect this to take place in
October.
Many of us who supported the president with the last strike did so with a great deal of
concern about timing. And I can tell you, I am outraged to think that this administration
would be planning a retaliatory response because of the resignation of you and the lack of
success we've had, just because it's a couple of weeks before November election and just
because this president's in deep problems at home.
Are you aware of that?
MR. RITTER: No, sir, I'm not aware of that article.
REP. WELDON: Mr. Chairman, I would ask this committee to respectfully request the
administration to respond to this article, which ran on August the 31st in the Arabic News,
and specifically to ask the administration to respond to the allegation that this countries in
fact have been informed of a strike that is planned for mid-October.
REP. SPENCE: Ms. Harman. Mr. -- (inaudible) --
(Aside regarding order of questioning.)
Mr. Spratt, I'm sorry, Mr. Spratt.
REP. JOHN SPRATT (D-SC): Mr. Ritter, thank you very much for your testimony, and thank
you also for your diligence and your dedication. I think you've done your country a great
service.
And I think you have also done an honorable thing because you sincerely believe the
position you've taken and you've taken it in a forthright way. I also thought you were
magnanimous in the response about the statement made about understanding of Iraqi policy.
Let me ask you, it appears that -- if I'm wrong correct me, but you would agree that we don't
have much chance of going it alone, we have to do this in a multilateral manner. Would you
agree with that or disagree? Do you think there's a way for us, if we don't like what the
Security Council is decreeing or the cooperation we're receiving from our former allies in the
coalition, that we can break out and go it alone?
MR. RITTER: Sir, with all due respect, again, I'm here before based upon my seven years as a
weapons inspector. I would say that we can't do weapons inspections without the support of
the Security Council. We are an organ of the Security Council, working under laws
established by the Security Council, and in passing these laws under Chapter 7 the Security
Council gave us a promise that they would enforce these laws.
So without Security Council support, it's impossible for the Special Commission to carry out
its work. So, the concept of the Special Commission being able to carry out disarmament
inspections in Iraq without the full support of the Security Council, it's impossible, it will never
happen.
REP. SPRATT: You have said that what we need to do is, if I understood what you were
saying correctly, expose the lies, focus on the lies and deceit of Saddam Hussein and his
regime and do a better job of exposing the weapons caches, different kinds of weapons
capability that he has and that he is still harboring.
Are you saying we've failed to focus enough attention on this and failed at the argument of
convincing the Security Council, the UN and the world as a whole that this man still
constitutes a major menace?
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir, that would be my assessment. We -- I think there's general agreement,
even among the members of the Security Council who are not in support of the kind of
intrusive inspections that the Special Commission is taking -- that the Special Commission is
conducting in Iraq, that Iraq has across the board lied to the world about its prohibitive
programs. It doesn't take anybody by surprise anymore when we say Iraq is lying.
Iraq has requested comprehensive reviews in the past of its disarmament obligations. Some
were called technical evaluation meetings that were proposed in January. We carried these
out using a panel of international experts not directly associated with the Special
Commission. And the results of these panels were unanimous: Iraq is lying, they're deceiving
in all areas of categories of weapons of mass destruction, and that the Special Commission's
case is a just one, a sound one, based upon sound scientific and technical facts.
We published these reports, we presented these reports to the Security Council, and nobody
cared. Nobody cared. In June the Security Council put pressure on us, despite the fact that
we exposed the extent of Iraq's lies, to narrow the focus again through a process of
comprehensive review, to narrow the focus to major outstanding disarmament issues. And
the executive chairman, under pressure, agreed to a schedule for work requested by the Iraqis.
Even with this Iraqi-driven program, Iraq could not live up to its obligations and the Special
Commission exposed again its lies, its deceits and the fact that it hasn't disarmed. It is this
exposure that led to the August 3rd decision by Iraq to discontinue cooperation with the
Special Commission.
One of the reasons why we've been focused on going after weapons is that we need
something that will generate enough shock value to get the Security Council to rally around
the cause of disarming Iraq. It doesn't seem to be enough anymore to say that Iraq is lying,
that Iraq has not provided the data required so that we can verify that it has rid itself of these
prescribed weapons. The potential for weapons no longer seems to be enough to generate
support within the Special Commission. We have demonstrated the potential for weapons.
Through the inspection process we were trying to demonstrate the reality of weapons, that
these weapons do exist, they pose an immediate and real threat, and this is why the Security
Council must again rally behind the cause. Stopping the inspections terminated that effort.
We're not back to the area where all we can show is that Iraq is lying.
And again, as I've mentioned, this new resolution, which is touted as a diplomatic success, in
fact contains a hidden olive branch, a comprehensive review to be carried out by the secretary
general. And this will allow the disarmament obligations to be further narrowed and redefined
in a manner which will be conducive to closing the files prematurely and moving Iraq into an
ongoing monitoring and verification regime that is not effective and not capable of detecting
its retained weapons. In effect, Iraq will be given a clean bill of health when it is in fact in
violation and has these capabilities.
REP. SPRATT: Thank you very much.
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir.
REP. SPENCE: Mr. Ritter, we've been inspecting now for a good while. How long you say
you've been our chief inspector on our side?
MR. RITTER: I've been associated with the Special Commission since September of 1991 and
since --
REP. SPENCE: I've been reading in the paper the -- about on and off the shutdowns of the
visits and the run-around we've been getting from Saddam Hussein and the other people there
in Iraq.
And I just wonder what ,if anything, in the way of evidence have you found in these
inspections so far, as to the storage or capability that -- that weapons of mass destruction that
Saddam Hussein has?
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir.
The inspection process does two things. One, it uncovers the lies that Iraq tells. Iraq is
supposed to provide a declaration and then we verify the declaration. So through the process
of verification we have exposed the lies, we have shown Iraq that their declarations are
incorrect. This is done through the inspection process, where we scientifically, logically,
technically dispute, are able to refute the Iraqi claims. And it's been a long and difficult
process.
To give you two examples, recently, though, of successes undertaken by inspections, and
these were inspections that weren't -- that I was not involved in; you know, we're a team, I'm
just a small part of a greater disarmament team.
In April of 1998, United Nations inspectors excavated a pit in Iraq where they had unilaterally
destroyed -- that is, destroyed without supervision of the Special Commission -- chemical and
biological warheads for Al-Hussein missiles, long-range ballistic missiles. These parts were
removed from Iraq, taken to a laboratory here in Edgewood (sp), in Aberdeen, and tested.
They were found to have been -- contained VX, weaponized VX. Iraq has denied they ever
had a VX program. They said they never weaponized VX, they never stabilized it.
And yet we found the chemical evidence, through examination of the degradation products,
that indeed, Iraq not only produced stabilized VX but had weaponized it, put them in
warheads for use on long-range ballistic missiles. This was the inspection process that
achieved this success. In July inspection teams found a document which shows that Iraq has
grossly lied about how it has accounted for chemical bombs, air- delivered bombs filled with
chemical agents. They claim that they have accounted for a large number of these weapons
during the Iran- Iraq war. But we found a document which proves that Iraq has falsely
accounted for over several thousand aerial bombs and 730 tons of chemical agent. They gave
us one accounting for it, we exposed that that is a lie. We now have several thousand bombs
which are unaccounted for and 730 tons of chemical agent unaccounted for. This was
exposed by the inspection process.
So the inspection process, if allowed to go forward, is a good process, one that can and will
achieve results.
REP. SPENCE: Mr. Reyes -- Mr. Reyes, Mr. Snyder.
REP. VIC SNYDER (D-AR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Semper Fi, Mr. Ritter.
MR. RITTER: Thank you, sir.
REP. SNYDER: I had a college professor years ago that flew planes off of carriers in World
War II, and he always thought that wars should be conducted with cottonballs in the South
Pacific, so that when the big cottonball hit the carrier, it would be knocked out of the war, but
the planes could come back, land safely, and then go on back home and be out of the war.
I need you to help me. When you're in Iraq as a weapons inspector, and you're trying to be
taken seriously in what you do, specifically, what's the problem? Is it that you feel like you're
lacking the international moral authority in a united fashion standing behind you? Or is it
specifically that what was once a strong military threat has turned into a cottonball threat?
MR. RITTER: If you examine the history of the Special Commission, you'll find that the kind of
confrontations that the Special Commission had in 1998, 1997, 1996, existed in 1995, 1994, 1993,
1992, and 1991. This is not a new situation. From the very beginning, Iraq has refused to
cooperate with weapons inspection teams in Iraq. that's part and parcel of the problem.
In 1991, in June of 1991, when International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors were stopped
outside of Presidential Security Force barracks, which were holding vehicles loaded with
nuclear enrichment material -- equipment, machines, et cetera -- the Security Council
responded with a resolution, 707.
In that resolution, they used the terms "We find Iraq to be in material breach." Now, that
phrase, "material breach," meant a lot to Iraq. It meant that they were going to be held
accountable for their actions. And Iraq immediately rescinded its orders, declared certain
aspects of its nuclear program, and allowed inspections to resume. In 1996, when inspection
team were outside a facility, again, a Presidential Security Force facility, and were denied entry
-- these facilities we likewise believed contained materiel prohibited by Security Council
resolution. The inspection teams were withdrawn. There was no resolution. There was no
threat of condemning Iraq, and finding them to be in material breach. That's what happened.
That's what's taken place.
Starting in 1996, whenever Iraq confronted the Special Commission, there was a stand-down
by the international community, and Iraq was rewarded with a concession. Because in
addition to stopping us, Iraq achieved a concession. They were able to redefine certain
facilities in Iraq as being sensitive. And the Special Commission had now to subject itself to
special procedures for inspection of these sites, called the Sensitive Site Modalities. And it's
that kind of confrontation and concession, that pattern, that cycle, that's been taking place
since 1996, that's put us in the difficult position where we are today.
REP. SNYDER: So, if I understand what you're saying, as you're in the country, you don't
have the sense, or there's not this implied threat when things are working well, that if you all
don't comply, a cruise missile is going to come in. What you're really saying, is, if the world is
united, and the Iraqis have this sense of being united through the resolutions, that's where
your authority comes from. Is that a fair statement? And of course, certainly a part of that
would be a potential military action.
MR. RITTER: Our authority comes from the Security Council, and our strength comes from the
Security Council's determination to enforce this law. It's a Chapter 7 resolution. We are in
there doing a very difficult job, which does impinge on the national security and sovereignty
of Iraq, but they've foregone that, because the world found them to be a threat. They passed
a resolution under Chapter 7.
The Security Council has an obligation, in sending forward these international inspection
teams, putting them in harm's way, to give them not only the moral authority to carry out their
job, which is contained in the resolution, but also the means of enforcing the resolution,
should Iraq not comply. And it's very difficult for us to do our job when we go into Iraq, and
we confront Iraq, and get ourselves in these very difficult situations, when Iraq feels that by
stopping the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, there will be
no price to pay.
REP. SNYDER: Now, when you say you go in and confront Iraq, I assume that you do your
work. But you come in contact with just a variety of different people at different levels of
authority. Has it been your impression that -- how do I want to say it? -- that the fact that Iraq
doesn't take you so seriously as they used to be is a top- to-bottom effect? When you're
dealing with Iraqi officials at all levels, is that the impression you're getting, or is it just the
people at the uppermost levels that you feel are not responding appropriately to the mandate
of the U.N.?
MR. RITTER: Iraq is a dictatorship. It's ruled by one man and one man alone, and that is
Saddam Hussein. There is no wherewithal within Iraq for individual thought or individual
initiative. What Saddam Hussein chooses, is what Iraq does. We saw in March of 1998, when
Saddam Hussein embraced the Memorandum of Understanding and the Security Council
resolution which endorsed that, that when we tried to get into sites in Iraq, that we had
hithertofore been denied access to, gates were open, doors were open, and we could do what
we wanted to do. That was because a decision was made at the top to let the teams in.
We also found when we tried to get into sites where the decision was made not to let us in,
that the doors were closed, the guns were out, the threat of force was applied to us, if we tried
to push our luck. So, it's --
REP. SNYDER: The signals are getting from top to bottom very rapidly, is what you're saying.
MR. RITTER: Absolutely.
REP. SNYDER: Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SPENCE: Ms. Harman.
REP. JANE HARMAN (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr. Ritter. I think our
country is better off for your service, and I want to thank you for it. And I want to tell you
one member's impression of you, which is that you are forthright, that you engaged in an act
of personal courage, and that a lot of people are focusing on a situation because of what you
did.
Having said that, I am concerned about the fact that you sit here alone, and that we're asking
you military-strategic and diplomatic- strategic questions about what our policy should be for
Iraq. And I think that may be a little above your pay grade. And I'm concerned that there's a
vacuum -- I think that's what this points to -- and very concerned that there's a vacuum, and
I'm sure that these are questions that will be put to the next panel. But I thought I would ask
you, since you are a thoughtful person, about this. In a more perfect world, how would you
see policy being made in which UNSCOM and you --the generic you -- would play a role?
MR. RITTER: Thank you very much. First of all, I want to reiterate and support what you
have said. I'm a weapons inspector. I'm not the secretary of state, I'm not the national security
adviser, and I make no pretensions of being such. I've tried my best, in answering questions
to contain myself to my experience as a weapons inspector. And if I step outside of those
bounds, I should be brought back in. It's not my intention to speak on behalf of the national
security team of the United States.
As a weapons inspector, again, we work for the Security Council, and we work to implement
the law set by the Security Council. And we can achieve our tasks, only if backed by the
Security Council.
Now, what's taking place, in my opinion, is that people have said "this law is too difficult to
enforce. So, we're going to stop the commission from trying to implement the law, but get the
Security Council united in the theory of disarmament."
REP. HARMAN: Now, "people," you mean U.S. people.
MR. RITTER: Yes, ma'am. And again, if you listen to the words of Martin Indyk, who testified
yesterday before the International Relations Committee, they're very concerned about
building consensus in the Security Council, as they should be.
However, if you take a look at the most recent example of consensus-building, which is
Resolution 1194, you see words that speak of a comprehensive review. What price have we
paid for building a consensus? How is building this consensus going to achieve the Special
Commission getting back into Iraq to carry out its difficult disarmament tasks?
I can say that my experience with the Special Commission shows that any time you talk of a
comprehensive review, it is the Iraqis who are pushing for such a review. And the Iraqis, in
pushing for such a review, are trying to denigrate the role of the Special Commission, its
executive chairman, and its staff members. And this comprehensive review that's being
proposed now, under the auspices of the secretary- general, while getting your consensus,
will achieve the opposite effect, in terms of getting Special Commission teams back in country.
REP. HARMAN: So, if I can paraphrase your answer, you're saying that in a more perfect
world, the generic you would be given full authority to complete your job, while other people
might be building consensus on more general issues, or maybe the overarching strategic
policy. But to build consensus first, undermines your ability to do your job, at which point we
don't achieve any objectives that are in the strategic interests of the United States.
MR. RITTER: To build consensus while having the illusion that inspections are taking place,
is wrong. If it is indeed the policy to hold back inspection teams while you are building a
consensus, then so state this policy. You cannot ask me, or other chief inspectors, to go to
the executive chairman, and put 40 to 50 inspectors' lives at risk, in country, doing a
confrontational task, if there is no will to back up those inspectors.
If the job of the inspectors is too difficult for the Security Council or its members to deal with,
then hold the team back. But say so. Don't say that you want us to carry out the job of
disarming Iraq, while at the same time doing something behind the scenes which prohibits us
or prevents us from carrying out the job.
REP. HARMAN: I thank you. That was a clear answer, and my response to that, is more
leadership is needed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SPENCE: Mr. Pickett.
REP. OWEN PICKETT (D-VA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, we appreciate
very much your being here today, and the sacrifice you've made to come here and talk with
us. As I understand your comments, you feel strongest about the support that your group
gets from the Security Council. Is that correct?
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir. We work for the Security Council, so that's the body that needs to
support us.
REP. PICKETT: And that's made up of what? Fifteen members, as I recall?
MR. RITTER: Five permanent members, and then a rotating body of 10 non-permanent
members, yes, sir.
REP. PICKETT: So, our country constitutes one member of that group.
MR. RITTER: One-fifth of the permanent members of the Security Council. |
