STATEMENT OF SCOTT RITTER, Former UNSCOM Inspector (Part Three)
REP. PICKETT: Is it your thought that the United States is not exercising enough effort to
influence the other four members in the direction of providing additional support for your
group?
MR. RITTER: There's two aspects to this. One is that I agree totally with what Madeleine
Albright and others have said, that they are the foremost supporters of the Special
Commission. The United States stepped into the breach in 1991, when Iraq chose not to
cooperate with the Special Commission, and when our arms control tasks were redefined from
conventional verification tasks to missions of discovery. The United States stepped in, took
the lead, and said, "we will support you in carrying out these difficult tasks."
Having set us down the path, I believe the United States has taken on its shoulders the
responsibilities to back us up in carrying out these important tasks, which they have, in many
ways, pushed us to do. So they have a preponderance placed on them that's perhaps greater
than other members of the Security Council.
REP. PICKETT: Well, now, are you suggesting that the United States proceed unilaterally in
this matter, or do you feel that it's appropriate that the United Nations be the sponsor of the
inspections?
MR. RITTER: Of course the United Nations must be the sponsors of the inspections. What
I'm saying is that the United States, as -- and I don't think there's anybody here that will
dispute the fact -- the sole remaining superpower in the world, the United States being the
nation upon which the world looks to for leadership, and the United States having chosen to
exercise that leadership in sponsoring the kind of difficult inspections the commission was
taking place, it's -- the onus is on the United States to provide leadership within the framework
of the Security Council to get the Security Council to enforce the laws that it passed. That's
what I'm saying, sir.
SEN. PICKETT: Well, hasn't it led to problems in the past, where the United States has gotten
out ahead of its alliance members in doing things, and they have felt that the United States
has exceeded its role in the United Nations framework by proceeding unilaterally to take
certain actions?
MR. RITTER: Sir, this is what I would call a failed foreign policy and that's what I've been
saying is taking place in Iraq today. Whether the United States is ahead or behind or
somehow not in step with the other members of the Security Council isn't my problem. My
problem is that the Security Council has given us a task to carry out and the United States has
sponsored that task, and therefore it's incumbent upon the United States to formulate a
foreign policy which will allow us to achieve those stated objectives.
REP. PICKETT: Well, what you're saying, as I understand it, is that you're suggesting that the
United States should proceed unilaterally here, notwithstanding the other members of the
Security Council. Is that correct?
MR. RITTER: No, sir.
If you recall the answer I gave to Congressman Harman, what I said is that if the United States
cannot or does not feel that they have a consensus in the Security Council toward decisive
action or towards achieving the disarmament goals, then they need to inform the Special
Commission that it must stand down from these kind of inspections. And they must formally
inform the Special Commission, so that we are not putting inspectors in harm's way without
the backing, the full backing of the Security Council and its most important member, the
United States.
REP. PICKETT: Well, are suggesting, when you said "they," are you talking about the United
States giving notice to the inspection teams not to continue inspecting; is that your point?
MR. RITTER: The United States is a member of the Security Council, and as has been said by
Richard Butler and other personnel, provides guidance to the executive chairmen, in their role
as a member of the Security Council. He receives similar guidance from Russia, France, China
and other members of the Security Council.
In their role as providing guidance, and because the United States took upon itself the burden
of the Special Commission, especially in terms of pushing for these kind of inspections, I feel
it's incumbent upon the United States to inform the executive chairman if they have made a
policy decision not to support these kind of intrusive inspections because they do not have
the level of support required in the Security Council to enforce these resolutions, these
inspections. Yes, sir.
REP. PICKETT: Mr. Chairman, could I ask just one follow up question just -- here, because I
don't fully understand the response that I'm getting, because I get the impression that you're
saying that the United States has -- and I may agree with you, but I'm just trying to
understand -- that you're suggesting the United States has a special role different from the
role of other Security Council members insofar as inspections in Iraq is concerned. Is that
your point?
MR. RITTER: Absolutely. When Madeleine Albright says that the United States is the
foremost supporter of the Special Commission's role, you have to understand what that
means.
It means it's not only the provision of personnel, of material support, of technical support, of
information support, but it's the provision of political support. Therefore, the United States
has assumed a special role in terms of getting the Special Commission to accomplish its task in
Iraq. There's no other country that has stepped into the forefront of doing this as the United
States. Therefore they carry a greater share of the burden in terms of getting us back on track
to do our job.
REP. PICKETT: So you're saying the United States should proceed unilaterally.
MR. RITTER: No, sir. I'm saying --
REP. PICKETT: That's exactly what you just said.
MR. RITTER: -- (inaudible) -- the United States should be the leader, a leader in the multilateral
--
REP. PICKETT: -- (inaudible) -- thank you.
REP. SPENCE: Miss Fowler.
REP. TILLIE FOWLER (R-FL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Ritter, for being here with us today. I really admire the courage and
integrity that you've displayed in taking the steps did in your resignation, and appreciate your
being here.
It's my understanding that when you were testifying in the other body, in the Senate, that you
made a statement that you believe that Iraq could develop their nuclear weapon capability,
reestablish it, within about a three-year time frame. And while I know the nuclear part hasn't
been officially under the UNSCOM inspection part, I know there's information that you've
been coming forth with on that.
I just have three questions in relationship to that statement I'd like to ask you.
Is your estimate based on Iraq's use of existing infrastructure and equipment that you know it
has covertly retained, or on the utilization of Iraq's current level of technological knowledge
combined with the acquisition of replacement infrastructure and equipment?
Two, how much replacement infrastructure or equipment would be needed to reestablish their
nuclear-weapon-building capability?
And three, is UNSCOM or you or IAEA aware of nuclear weapons- related technologies that
have been made available to Iraq since the end of the war; and if so, by whom?
MR. RITTER: Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much.
Again, I'll preface my response by saying that the nuclear disarmament requirements in Iraq
are the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Special Commission
and myself became involved in this area because when we made the decision to go after the
systemic mechanisms used by Iraq to conceal retained capability from the United Nations, this
included both the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. So we
started a close cooperation with the IAEA on this issue.
What I was referring to in the Senate testimony was information which we had passed on to
the International Atomic Energy Agency which was of what we believed to be sufficient
quality to be of concern that held that components of an implosion devise -- that is, the
lenses, the explosive lenses, the detonators, and other materials used to create an implosion
device -- was still in the possession of Iraq today and they were under the protection of the
presidential security forces and being moved around as part of the systemic mechanism of
concealment. However, the information stated that these devices lacked the fissile core, so it
wasn't necessarily a nuclear weapon but it was components of a nuclear weapon. This is what
we were trying to track down through some of our inspections. So in this way, I think you
would call this existing infrastructure.
Eight years have passed, this material has been moved around in conditions other than of
laboratory quality. One would have to be realistic in assessing what its current viability is as
an implosion device. However, you can say, to answer another aspect of your question, Iraq
has the technical knowledge to build an implosion device, and we believe they are developing
-- or retaining dual-use infrastructure that could be converted in the future to build explosive
lenses and maybe the initiators in other aspects of a device.
But the International Atomic Energy Agency is -- or was, until Iraq suspended cooperation --
monitoring these sites in a very effective manner.
In order to produce the fissile core, it requires the enrichment of nuclear material, which means
Iraq has to acquire the feedstock and then enrich it. This is a significant infrastructure
requirement, one which has been effectively dismantled by the International Atomic Energy
Agency. I gave an estimate of three years to rebuild. That, again, is my informed opinion but
it is not an expert opinion and I would hesitate to say that I would be speaking on behalf of
the International Atomic Energy Agency. They are actually the ones who should be asked
that question, if Iraq is given full wherewithal to acquire infrastructure development, how long
would it take them to rebuild their enrichment program. I said three years, other people might
say something different.
The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Special Commission have been working
hard to try and identify prohibited materials before they get into Iraq, and I know that the
IAEA has had some successes in having material of that nature interdicted. Our problem is
that the Iraqi procurement, covert procurement network is so massive and is protected by the
mechanism of concealment to avoid penetration by the Special Commission and foreign
intelligence services, that we just don't know to what extent Iraq is procuring material today.
We do know that material is going to Iraq. I can't say that nuclear-specific material is going
into Iraq. But because we don't know what the totality of the covert procurement, I would be
-- it would irresponsible for me to say that we know that nuclear-related material is not going
into Iraq. We just don't know the answer to that.
REP. FOWLER: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SPENCE: Mr. Reyes.
REP. SILVESTRE REYES (D-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize for having had
to run out and attend another meeting. So if I go over some previously covered area, I hope
you will bear with me.
But it seems to me that reading and studying what has gone on with the inspections, we are
having to walk somewhat of a diplomatic tightrope on this issue and on the issue of whether
the United States can still count or foster the support of the same countries that helped us in
the Gulf War.
And so my question -- I have a number of questions, but the first one is, in your opinion, if
Iraq continues to defy this inspections process in the many different ways that you have
testified they have successfully done, what are the implications for US credibility in the
region? And do you think that our influence in particular in the Middle East has been greatly
reduced?
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir.
I'll answer the question this way, again, because I have to be careful to keep myself contained
to my experience as a weapons inspector and not be seen as speaking on behalf of US policy
makers.
The implications of Iraq retaining weapons of mass destruction should be clear to everybody.
This is a nation that has shown a propensity to use these weapons in the past, both against
its neighbors, in terms of actual employment of weapons, or through blackmail. They
employed weapons against Iran, they have blackmailed Israel.
They have also used these weapons to suppress internal dissent. And I think everybody
should be concerned about the propensity of this regime to behave in this manner.
The regime suffered a defeat in 1991 because a coalition of 28 nations was brought together to
liberate Kuwait after Iraq invaded Kuwait. However, we have a situation today where the
world body, the 28-nation coalition and the Security Council, have said that there is a
requirement, pre-conditions have to be met before that war can end. And the pre-conditions
are disarmament of Iraq of these weapons of mass destruction. It's 1998, seven years later,
and Iraq has not been disarmed. In fact, the situation is occurring where it appears as though
Iraq may win; sanctions may be lifted and Iraq may be allowed to retain these capabilities. If
you took an Iraq that prior to the Gulf War had a proclivity towards using these weapons, and
you've emboldened them by allowing them to stand up to the world, to the world's sole
remaining superpower, to a coalition of 28 nations, and to the Security Council, stand up and
emerge victorious, at least in their mind victorious, I can't see how that has improved the
situation any from what existed prior to 1991.
So I would say the implications of backing down are dire indeed. It will be other experts, I
believe, who would have to talk about what the exact nature of that implication is. But I can
also say that as an inspector dealing with senior Iraqis on a day- to-day basis over the course
of seven years, they are more confident now than they have ever been. They feel that their
influence, once they emerge from this crisis, their influence will be greater in the region. They
will hold more sway over their neighbors. And I think then you would have to say if Iraq
holds more sway over their neighbors, one would have to infer that perhaps the sway of the
United States would have been diminished somewhat.
So, I think the consequences of backing down would be disastrous indeed.
REP. REYES: One of the concerns that I have, and you made mention that in resigning from
your position, that you wanted to precipitate a general debate concerning the direction of U.S.
policy towards Iraq.
And my question is this. You know, oftentimes, an individual becomes a lightning rod,
because of whatever issue is at stake. It's my perception that you have become a lightning
rod in terms of the process. And I'm curious to learn your opinion about, first, being a
lightning rod. Secondly, if it's not more useful for the individual to step aside and allow the
diplomatic process, or a combination of diplomacy and military strategy to proceed. And I'm
just curious to get your opinion on that.
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir. It was something I had to factor in on August 25th, prior to writing my
letter of resignation. I had two drafts in front of me. One said "Dear Mr. Butler, I quit," end of
story, then turn it in. That would have been me shaking his hand, saying, "Thank you very
much, and going home, and disappearing. And this way I wouldn't have become a lightning
rod.
But I'm here to tell you today, that I don't think people would be discussing the foreign policy
failure of the United States in Iraq, had I chosen that route. I think people would have
accepted Resolution 1194 at what appears to be face value, and wouldn't understand the
sickness that exists behind this resolution, the real problems of Iraq's non-compliance. So, I
took the decision to submit my other resignation letter, that I would publicly resign, that I
would bring this issue to the forefront. With every decision, there's unintended
consequences. And there's no doubt that by stepping forward, I have done some harm to the
national security of the United States. I have perhaps preemptively exposed or interfered with
some diplomatic initiatives that may have been taking place, with some military options that
might have been taking place.
I wasn't aware of these. And if I interrupted them prematurely, I'm sorry. But my position as a
weapons inspector, led me to believe that such activities were not taking place. And if they
were taking place, they were being done in the framework of an illusion of arms control,
creating the illusion of arms control where a diplomatic solution would exist, where the Special
Commission was allowed to carry out pretend inspections which really didn't disarm Iraq, and
the world body would close files prematurely, allowing Iraq to get credit for disarmament
which it had not been held to task for.
So, in order to expose this, I had to become a lightning rod. Now, if one of your questions
about a lightning rod are am I coming under just attack, or anything of that nature, I'm not
concerned about that. I have big-enough shoulders to take such attacks.
And I don't think that such attacks are taking place. I mentioned before, people are under
pressure, they may say things that are not reflective. I know that I have the highest respect
for Madeleine Albright and the national security team, and I believe in their words, they have
exhibited the fact that they respected me for the work I did with the Special Commission. So, I
don't believe that I'm coming under any sort of smear campaign or attack.
REP. REYES: All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SPENCE: Mr. Bateman.
REP. HERBERT BATEMAN (R-VA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before asking some
questions, I want to make some observations. Mr. Ritter, I think you are a remarkable citizen,
and I mean that in the most positive context. I think you have set an example that a number of
others, in my humble opinion, should well emulate in principled resignation, when you see the
national security interests of this country being embarrassed.
You've also set another example. Abraham Lincoln said, in his Second Inaugural Address, the
phrases "With malice toward none, and charity for all." I believe you've exhibited that today in
a very fulsome measure. And I commend you for it.
Someone has made reference to things being above your pay grade. I am persuaded that the
context in which any such phraseology should be employed, is that others are performing
below their pay grade. Having gotten that off my chest. You indicate that the United States,
from time to time, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has communication with the
chief arms inspector on matters of policy and significant decisions that must be made, as do
other members. And you mentioned among them Russia and France.
You've also mentioned Russia and France in other contexts in your testimony this morning.
To the extent that you're aware, and it violates no confidence that you are not privileged to
disclose, what kind of guidance, what type of influence, have the Russians or the French
sought to bring to bear upon the inspection regimen?
MR. RITTER: Sir, in short, what both Russia and France have been urging the Special
Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency to do over the past two years, is to
close the files. They've come up with the term "the file." "We have files open on Iraq." They
want us to close the files, and transition into monitoring. They want us to sweep aside some
of the serious concerns we have about Iraqi compliance. And they have been pressuring the
executive chairman to minimize issues which we feel are of deep concern, and to get these files
closed as a political gesture to Iraq, to encourage Iraq to accept long-term monitoring, and
keep the process of inspections moving forward, although it would not result in meaningful
disarmament.
And their pressures have taken a number of modes. Again, visitations by their permanent
representatives, asking the executive chairman to travel to their capitals, where he meets with
distinguished bodies. But the message is the same: "Let's cut a deal with Iraq. Let's give them
a clean bill of health that, yes, we know they don't deserve."
REP. BATEMAN: I don't mean to cut you off, and I wish I had lots of time to have you
expound further on that. But I get the drift.
MR. RITTER: You get the point. |
