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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (53367)10/20/2002 7:52:45 AM
From: BigBull  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Woolly Mammoth sized dot ;o}

Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized
U.S. to Ready 5,000 Foes Of Hussein for Combat

By Karen DeYoung and Daniel Williams
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, October 19, 2002; Page A01

washingtontimes.com

President Bush has authorized U.S. combat training for Iraqi opponents of Saddam Hussein, and the Pentagon has identified as many as 5,000 recruits for an initial training phase to begin next month, according to administration and military officials.

Bush authorized the training in a National Security Presidential Directive on Oct. 3 that also approved the expenditure of $92 million in Defense Department funds, officials said. Defense and State Department officials intend to brief Congress next week on plans to instruct the Iraqis in basic combat as well as specialized skills to serve as battlefield advisers, scouts and interpreters with U.S. ground troops in an invasion force.

Others in a force eventually to number about 10,000 will be trained as forward spotters for laser-guided bombs and as military police to run prisoner of war camps inside Iraq. Officials said the recruits, drawn largely from lists of exiles in the Iraqi diaspora that are being provided by the London-based Iraqi National Congress (INC) and vetted by the Pentagon, would be trained together outside the United States. Military officials declined to say where the instruction would take place, but said it would not be in the Middle East region.

Bush's decision marks another major step forward in preparation for a U.S. military assault on Iraq. In recent weeks, the Pentagon has built up equipment stocks in Persian Gulf states, begun dispatching additional combat troops, issued orders to move headquarters units into place and made preparations to facilitate the deployment of tens of thousands of troops should Bush decide to attack. This week, an Army task force of Apache helicopters left Europe for Kuwait.

The Pentagon began serious consideration of an opposition training plan early last month. But long-standing uncertainty about the abilities and cohesion of the often-bickering exile groups had limited discussions to an initial phase of only about 1,000 recruits and a far smaller amount of money.

Bush's new directive appears to have ended that uncertainty. "It's a big deal," said a senior administration official.

Although $97 million for opposition training was first authorized in 1998 under the Iraq Liberation Act, a directive signed that year by then-President Bill Clinton restricted expenditures to nonlethal instruction. Until he signed the new directive early this month, Bush had adhered to Clinton's prohibitions, and only $5 million of the original money was spent, largely on communications and management training for a handful of exiles. The funds will now be spent on both training and arming the Iraqis to serve in specialized capacities alongside U.S. troops

Congress was notified of Bush's determination to draw down all of the remaining money on Oct. 11, as required under the act, but not of the new directive authorizing lethal training.

The Liberation Act and the Clinton directive both stated "regime change" as the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq. But they spoke only of providing assistance to opposition efforts to overthrow Hussein, and the law specifically barred the direct use of U.S. military forces. Although Bush vowed during the presidential campaign that he would "fully implement" the law, he retained the Clinton ban on lethal assistance to the exile groups, angering many members of Congress who urged more aggressive support for the exiles.

As it has built political momentum toward attacking Iraq, the administration has said its immediate goal is to disarm Iraq by finding and destroying its chemical and biological weapons production facilities and stockpiles. But Bush, Vice President Cheney and others have made clear they believe that the threat from Iraq will end only when Hussein is replaced by a new government.

The administration is in the final stages of negotiating a toughly worded United Nations resolution to authorize new U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq and threaten "serious consequences" if Baghdad fails to cooperate. The administration has said it expects the world to join in a multilateral force, if Iraqi defiance makes that necessary, but that it is willing to act alone. Last week, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing Bush to launch a unilateral military attack that the administration has said Hussein would not survive.

The administration's eagerness to spell out a role for the Iraqi opposition, and congressional pressure to outline its plans for a post-Hussein Iraq, have been hampered through much of this year by disorganization among the exile groups. But although some opposition improvements, and the imminence of possible military action, have forced Bush's hand, the training plan has already exacerbated problems among the exile groups.

Opponents of the plan say it is a barely disguised effort to create a power base for Iraqi National Congress head Ahmed Chalabi. The INC is one of six groups officially designated by Washington as eligible for funds, although last week's notice to Congress on the $92 million funding said "other Iraqi opposition groups" may be named.

Although the State Department and Pentagon say they didn't plan it this way, the recruitment program has been largely in INC hands, a situation that pleases Chalabi supporters but that has outraged other groups. "The 5,000 or 6,000 names for the Pentagon are Chalabi's to give," according to an INC official in Europe.

Much of the dispute among the groups is centered on the relative closeness of their leaders to various parts of the administration, and on their various claims of the depth of their support inside Iraq. Although distrusted by the State Department and the CIA, Chalabi is popular at the Pentagon.

"Things are blowing Chalabi's way. He is backed by the Pentagon, so he is in the best shape he has been for a long time, and this is angering rivals," said one long-time observer of opposition maneuverings.

"The INC is toying with making a Praetorian Guard for Chalabi, because he has no following inside Iraq. I don't think this kind of thing should be imposed," said Salah Shaikhly, representative of the Iraqi National Accord, another of the six designated organizations. Although the INC has said it sought recruits among all committed Iraqis outside the country, and those inside who could make their way beyond Iraq's borders, Shaikhly said the other groups feel excluded.

Rivalries over who contributes to the Pentagon recruitment effort constitute just one symptom of continuing disarray among opposition organizations, much of which has centered around efforts to designate a provisional government in advance of Hussein's anticipated ouster -- an idea the administration has discouraged. Plans for a conference to choose a unified leadership fell apart in September, and the gathering has now been put off until at least November.

To a certain extent, the bumps in the road reflect old divisions among fractious Iraqi politicians, some of whom have been out of the country for decades. Uncertainty on just how Hussein will fall and who might emerge as power brokers inside Iraq also cloud preparation efforts. Some Iraqi leaders say they are reluctant to choose an exile government for fear of offending Iraqis inside the country who may be weighing a mutiny against Hussein, something that is being advocated by U.S. officials.

The difficulties of the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan in extending its influence beyond Kabul are regarded as a cautionary tale for a post-Hussein Iraq. Five of the six designated groups are key to the current squabbling: the INC, an amalgam of parties; the Iraqi National Accord, an organization traditionally linked with the CIA and fashioned to represent Iraq's large Shiite Muslim population; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which administer parts of northern Iraq under the protective umbrella of U.S. and British warplanes; and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, another Shiite group whose leadership is based in Iran.



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (53367)10/20/2002 2:38:58 PM
From: Hawkmoon  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
This is how war is waged inside the CIA: The upstarts who are challenging the agency's long-standing and deeply flawed analysis of Iraq are being accused of "politicizing intelligence," a label that is a reputation-killer in the intelligence world. It is also a protective shield for analysts who do not want, any more than the rest of us, to acknowledge that they have been profoundly and damagingly mistaken.

Bingo!!

Hawk



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (53367)10/21/2002 9:25:02 AM
From: BigBull  Respond to of 281500
 
Yes the Hoagland piece is quite fascinating. It is probably, unfortunately true that the CIA tailors it's reports to the filters of any incoming Administration. OTH some policies just don't work as time passes and need to be changed. We have elections for this very reason. Is Tenet too wedded to some Clinton policies that just don't work? This makes me seriously question why Bush has retained Tenet. Pollack has sure realised this problem. But the larger question raised by the piece applies to all administrations - Republican or Democrat - can any administration get truly reliable information out of this agency anymore? Can the "mirroring" problem be overcome? Also can such a large and politicized bureaucracy quickly spot and adapt new techniques to new conditions?

Rumsfeld has already voted no and elected to go his own way - more or less. Of course Rumsfeld has the distinct advantage of having bodies on the ground via the Special Forces in addition to whatever the Air Force is giving him. So even though he is excoriated by many as being too doctrinaire, my tendency is to believe him more than Tenet.

So were are we going with all this? My view is that if Bush gets re-elected, more and more intelligence work will be thrust in the direction of the Pentagon and the military. Caleb Carr has put forth the proposition in "The Lessons of Terror" that the CIA should just be scrapped outright and that the best talents there should be folded into the military whilst the military itself should evolve into a force much more capable of waging "small wars." Then of course, you have the problem of how to integrate military intelligence with domestic law enforcement so that it can act pro-actively rather than reactively in a democracy. I don't expect Carr's ideas to happens nearly as fast as he would like. They will occur more slowly and in a more "evolutionary" manner with big spurts of change dusted in along the way.

If the CIA is to remain in existence it will have to become a much smaller institution and more focused on humint with limited tasks. It's analytical aspects should be populated by brilliant iconoclasts who are well paid for their work. (yes I know finding geniuses ain't that easy:o}) These types may be independent enough to defend an unpopular report.

Then, of course, there is the problem of outmoded "international laws"/(agreements between sovereign nations) the faults of which terror orgs expressly tailor themselves to exploit. Adjustments will simply have to be made in this department. I expect these will eventually come to fruition as terror orgs and state sponsors up their national and ethnic targets.

I expect some variants of the above to coalesce to the degree so that the right intelligence can be placed in the right hands at the right time so that effective pro-active actions can be taken. Question is, is there enough time for all this to come together to prevent the truly catastrophic?



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (53367)10/21/2002 11:17:51 AM
From: jcky  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
...multiple trips to Prague made by Mohamed Atta, the head of the Sept. 11 suicide squads,...

You can stick a fork in this one, Nadine.

The wild speculation and disinformation can end with the official acknowledgement from the Czech government that there is no credible evidence to suggest Atta visited Prague in April 2001. American intelligence had traced Atta to Virginia Beach, VA during this same period of time. What is even more revealing is that both Czech and German intelligence believe the mostly likely explanation for Atta's visit to Prague in June 2000 was to "get a cheap airfare to the United States."

But Debka swears it's still true. <smile>

Message 18137627



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (53367)10/22/2002 10:25:56 PM
From: tekboy  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500
 
One year before Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the agency produced a National Intelligence Estimate saying that Iraq was too exhausted and internally occupied to think about war. A supervisor's request to analysts to take a second look at those findings triggered accusations of "politicizing intelligence," says a former CIA official involved in that debate. The mistaken view prevailed and guided the CIA's assessment in July 1990 that no invasion of Kuwait was about to occur.

Such misjudgments have continued until today. After four months of inconclusive debate following Sept. 11, the agency produced a new analysis last spring titled: "Iraq and al Qaeda: A Murky Relationship." It fails to make much of a case for anything, I am told. It echoes the views of Paul Pillar, the national intelligence officer for the Middle East and South Asia, and other analysts who have consistently expressed doubts that Iraq has engaged in international terrorism or trained others to do so since 1993.


One reason I recommend the Pollack book so highly is for its accurate portrayal of how actual serious professionals view things such as Iraq policy, intelligence, and so forth. In his chapter on the history of Iraq policy during the 1990s, for example, he takes one through not just the events but how different schools of thought within the professional community viewed those events. He himself identifies with a group he calls moderate hawks, or something like that--folks who included Martin Indyk, Mark Parris, Bruce Riedel, and some others.

Serious, unpoliticized analysis of policy questions comes so naturally to Pollack that he notes--in the chapter's first footnote--that he had to be told by somebody else that lay readers of his book would need to be alerted to the fact that the internal divisions over Iraq policy bore little or no relationship to the kind of trash talking BS one hears on TV, the web, and in most newspaper columns. That is, despite what outsiders think, Iraq policy was NOT a battle among virtuous Churchillian Cassandras and vile Chamberlainian appeasers; it was not a matter of character or pure domestic politicking; etc.

The reason I bring this up is because this attitude does not come easily to nonprofessionals, even someone like Hoagland, who is no dummy and not some conspiracy-theory-peddling third-rate hack. His column simply does not give an accurate picture of what has gone on with regard to the intelligence connecting Iraq and terrorism. Paul Pillar--who Hoagland cites above as a major part of the problem and (implicitly) some kind of careerist politicized appeasing wimp--is one of the smartest, most knowledgeable, and wisest experts on terrorism in the country. He published the best book on the subject prior to 9/11 ("Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy," Brookings, 2001), and happens to be an Iraq hawk, although one would never gather that from the Hoagland piece. I was chatting with him (Pillar) the other day, for example, and he told me that he thought the Pollack book was outstanding and far and away the best thing out there on the subject, and that he agreed with Pollack nearly 100% across the board.

tb@settingtherecordstraight.com