To: Hawkmoon who wrote (53564 ) 10/20/2002 11:06:27 PM From: Hawkmoon Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500 And I just happened to browse over at Stratfor.com and they seem to agree with my view... But that scares me since they have been having a miserable time in political predictions.. :0)stratfor.com North Korea: Admission Aimed at Drawing U.S. Into Talks 18 October 2002 Summary North Korea's reported confession about its ongoing nuclear program is part of a broader strategy to push Washington into final peace talks. Pyongyang has successfully used crises in the past to force dialogue with Washington, and North Korea's leadership has been building up to a confrontation in 2003, the 50th anniversary of the armistice that ended the Korean War. Analysis North Korean officials reportedly admitted to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly during his Oct. 3-5 visit to Pyongyang that Pyongyang has an active nuclear program. According to a U.S. State Department report, North Korea blamed the United States and said U.S. actions had nullified the 1994 Agreed Framework that promised internationally financed light water reactors in exchange for Pyongyang's pledge to end its nuclear program. STRATFOR's Russian diplomatic sources added more detail to the recent exchange, claiming Pyongyang said it was natural for North Korea to have a nuclear program since Washington had labeled the country part of the axis of evil. North Korea's confession has sent shockwaves throughout Northeast Asia and beyond. Japan and South Korea have called on Pyongyang to adhere to previous nuclear accords, and both countries now face a serious domestic dilemma in their ongoing negotiations with North Korea. The European Union is questioning its commitment to fund the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the consortium overseeing the construction of light water reactors. And the United States is pointing to North Korea's ongoing nuclear program to bolster its case for an attack on Iraq. For North Korea, however, the admission of having an active nuclear program was not an isolated event but part of a carefully orchestrated strategy to push Washington into talks. Pyongyang has successfully exploited security crises in the past to extract international benefits: The initial 1994 Agreed Framework followed a standoff that nearly led to another war on the peninsula. By raising the specter of a nuclear-armed North Korea, one with an active and developed weapons program, Pyongyang intends to leave Washington little choice but to come to the negotiating table. North Korea's leaders have been building up to a confrontation in 2003, a symbolically important year which marks the 50th anniversary of the armistice that ended the Korean War. Pyongyang already has claimed that, because 2003 was the original date set for the completion of the light water reactors, the United States is in default on the deal because little progress has been made in the construction of the reactors and the project already is running years behind. Pyongyang has implied that the collapse of the reactor deal would leave North Korea a de facto nuclear state, something the latest revelation about its weapons program seems to verify. And with its self-imposed moratorium on long-range missile tests ending in 2003, Pyongyang, by extension, also would have an available delivery system for its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang has carefully monitored the actions of the current U.S. government and feels that the Bush administration's "hard-line" stance may in fact make it an easier negotiating partner since it is more predictable than previous administrations. And, as the United States has tacitly revealed that it does not consider a pre-emptive military strike an option for dealing with a state already in possession of nuclear weapons -- as opposed to one still developing them like Iraq -- Pyongyang is fairly confident that Washington will engage in negotiations rather than military brinksmanship.