To: smolejv@gmx.net who wrote (25480 ) 11/17/2002 10:31:19 PM From: Haim R. Branisteanu Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 74559 "Great trust in government managing wealth" was even then On 23rd November 1938 the executives of Berlin's major banks - the Reichskredittgesellschaft and Berliner Handelsgesellschaft additional to the three banking houses, that are still active today,the Dresdner, Commerz and Deutsche, - met in the Ministry of Economic Affairs to discuss "the situation resulting from the Jew legislation" and to hear about of the decision onthe "complete transfer of real-estate properties and securities out of Jewish hands, first into state and possibly later into private hands". Additional six billion Reich marks were thus expected, a steady stream of additional income for years to come. German banks granted no more loans to Jews, because technically speaking they became a bad risk. Therefore, in order to come up with the obligatory dues, they had to sell securities, jewelry and real estate. That made the bankers nervous, since they feared an "uncontrolled and unprofessional run-up" in sales of equities and thus the danger of a "stock market dislocation". After all the subject was for those times a " gigantic block of securities" at the market value of 1.5 billion Reich marks. They wanted, that the goods were to be sold "slowly and under appropriate cultivation of the market", with the restriction however, that "the course risk of any kind is not to be shouldered by the banks". Regarding the technical execution they stated: "We suggest, that to avoid any unnecessary work in the public trust offices, where the stock certificates are deposited at the moment, they be put in trust for the Reich Treasury and be later sold in the name of the Reich financial administration in an orderly and professional manner, depending on the situation in the capital markets." But the Hitler state was broke. Reich bank board of directors has already been warning for a long time against "unlimited swelling of the public expenditures", which",in spite of tremendous squeeze of the tax screw,"... forced ..." the state finances to the edge of the collapse" . In this situation the banks offered " to grant the Reich finance administration the option of appropriate prepayment for (Jewish , author) securities, under conditions, which should not be that difficult to agree upon" . That's also what also happened.. The heads of major German banks in this case did not act as robbers,however very much as a the robber's sidekick, as the accommodating organizers, who made sure, that the process of expropriation unraveled in a most effective fashion. Furthermore they exposed their hypocritical side. They transformed the take of the robbery into cash. For this breach of trust and betrayal of their customers Deutsche bank for example deducted half a per cent of sales commission plus transfer expenses, payable by their Jewish customers. Also, the additional trade with securities, temporarily put under state control, animated the business and opened up the possibility of privileged trading for their own account. The main point however was, that the proceeds flowed into the German treasury and reduced the load for the public. The same applied naturally also to life insurances, whose contractually specified buy-back values were also transferred to the Reich treasury.