SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Technology Stocks : Nokia Corp. (NOK) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: scratchmyback who wrote (2705)12/1/2002 2:24:34 PM
From: Eric L  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 9255
 
Vertu: Frank Nuovo & the $19,450 "Instrument"

>> The $19,450 Phone

Mark Levine
The New York Times
December 1, 2002

nytimes.com

Although the Beverly Hills retail outlet of a newly christened company called Vertu is situated on a stretch of Rodeo Drive whose storefronts are occupied by Chanel, Cartier, Harry Winston, Bernini, Van Cleef & Arpels and Lladro, Vertu is, by design, concealed from the sights of window-shoppers. You can reach Vertu either through a rear alley or by walking straight through the Hugo Boss showroom, past the scrutinizing gaze of that store's nattily dressed sales crew, to the back entrance of the building, which is marked by an austere gray banner bearing nothing more than the name of the company and a logo that looks like an abstract rendering of a raptor's outstretched wings. Vertu is one flight up. It is generally open to the public by appointment only, and the hushed vacancy of its 3,500 square feet is broken only by the strains of ethereal New Age music. One corner of the room displays commissioned art from the British photographer Christopher Bucklow -- ghostly silhouettes of human figures that resemble vividly tinted M.R.I.'s. The art is not for sale. It does, however, prepare the visitor for an encounter with Vertu's specialized and highly self-conscious vocabulary of shopping. Initiates refer to the store as a ''client suite,'' to the service that Vertu's product delivers as ''the experience'' and to the product itself -- the world's first custom-built luxury cellphone -- as ''the instrument.''

''Sometimes even I slip up and call it a phone,'' says Frank Nuovo, 41, a founder of Vertu and its creative director, after he greets me in the client suite. ''Yes, in its core functionality, it is a phone. But once you understand the experience, you'll see that it is -- well, obviously, an instrument.''

Along one side of the room's expanse of white wall are three mounted glass cases, vaguely reminiscent of panels in a religious altarpiece. At the center of each case is a black void, a little smaller than a shoebox, where, beneath fiber-optic spotlights and behind electromagnetic locks, lies the instrument, looking rather like the well-appointed offspring of a remote control and a slender electric shaver. In the left display case is a model built from white gold, which sells for $13,000; in the center, an $11,350 yellow gold version; and on the right, the top-of-the-line platinum Vertu, which can be purchased for $19,450 and, for the first 1,000 buyers, comes with a certificate of ownership signed by Nuovo. (Not on display: the most basic Vertu, encased in proletarian stainless steel. Price tag: $4,900.) All of the phones feature a sapphire crystal face, a sheath of soft Italian leather for comfortable gripping and a backing and pillow -- which your ear rests against -- fashioned from aerospace-grade ceramics. ''This is an experience in exquisite design and craftsmanship,'' Nuovo assures me. ''If the instrument were made out of copper, it would still be worth what it's worth.''

Nuovo settles into a boxy leather couch. He is wearing a black leather jacket, an olive green mesh crew-neck shirt and pleated black pants -- all designed by his friend Jhane Barnes -- and a pair of black lace-up loafers made by a Finnish company, the Left Shoe, from laser-digitized measurements of his feet. He shields his eyes from the light, since he has just come from the ophthalmologist and his green eyes are dilated. Nuovo has some of the physical bearing of a younger Al Pacino, and despite having managed just three hours of sleep the previous night -- rather than his usual five or six -- he speaks in a rapid proselytizing stream. He directs my attention to the coffee table in front of us, where a module covered in black fabric stands on its end, like the slipcase for a rare reference book. This is the Vertu packaging, out of which, Nuovo says, ''we unfold the story of Vertu.'' He slides out the box's top shelf. The instrument rests snug and gleaming in a leather-lined molding. Nuovo and I stare at it admiringly for a moment. Its six rows of platinum function keys are set in a shallow V shape, reinforcing the brand's logo, which appears at the top of the phone nestling a tiny V-shaped speaker. Nubs of raised platinum protect the sapphire face from damage and, according to Nuovo, add an ''edge'' to the design, so that the phone ''has a character that is both flowing and elegant and slightly on the aggressive side.'' Its curving metallic lines nod toward Art Deco; the brash straightforwardness of its elements recalls post-World War II Italian modernism. It is just under five inches long and two inches wide -- common dimensions for a cellphone -- but it weighs in at a hefty half-pound. ''We're not going to simply coat the instrument in metal, which would make it lighter,'' Nuovo says. ''We made it the way it needs to be for robustness. There's a size-to-proportion balance that has a calming effect, like Chinese health balls. It fits perfectly in the hand.''

The instrument's keys are set on jeweled, rubylike bearings, which both produce a pleasant clicking sound with each touch and ensure that the keys will outlive those of ordinary cellphones by many thousands of repetitions; in the dark, the bearings also radiate a warm pinkish glow. The ring tones are polyphonic, have names like Raindrops, Constellation and Sandpiper and sound like motifs from Philip Glass compositions. ''What if,'' Nuovo muses, ''instead of buying a plastic phone, you purchased something that patinates beautifully?'' He removes his own Vertu from his pocket. ''Look at the metal,'' he says. ''There are no little dings or scratches. I've been using it for nine months, and I've drop-tested it onto concrete six times, and it's absolutely bulletproof for me. It wears well. Its surface builds character. It becomes a friend.'' Nuovo produces an elegant butterfly key from the packaging and opens the newer phone's ceramic backing. He empties the case of its battery and the subscriber identity module card that links the phone to its service provider. The platinum recess that holds the phone's guts is hand-tooled. The mechanical workings -- more than 400 parts, compared with about 50 in a typical cellphone -- are assembled in a factory adjacent to Vertu's headquarters near London by tradespeople who were largely plucked from the jewelry and watch-making industries. ''It takes hours to produce each instrument,'' Nuovo says, declining to be more specific than that. He points out an engraved hallmark on the back, which certifies the authenticity of the precious metal and identifies the phone as production No. 0032. ''I have prototype No. 1,'' he tells me. ''A gentleman whom I won't name offered me so much money for it that if I had any debts, they'd be gone. But I'd never part with it.''

Since the advent of cellular technology, Nuovo's phones -- as opposed to his instruments -- have found their way into the hands of more people than virtually any other technology product on earth. In 1989, Nuovo was working at Designworks/USA, an industrial-design shop based in Los Angeles, honing his skills on sewing machines, patio furniture, dashboards and exercise equipment. (The firm has since been bought by BMW.) He was assigned to a new client, the Finnish company Nokia. Nuovo has worked on almost every Nokia phone in the past 10 years -- more phones than he can count, he says, and each one, he adds, a notable commercial success. (Nokia hired him full time in 1995 as chief designer, a position he still holds.) During Nuovo's association with Nokia, the company has come to dominate the cellphone market, selling more of its product in 2001 -- about 140 million phones, representing more than one-third of handset sales worldwide -- than its three closest competitors combined. (Sales exceeded $30 billion.) For Nokia, Nuovo designed phones in splashy colors and phones with removable faceplates and phones the size of makeup compacts and phones with high-tech graphics. He demonstrated a gift for addressing the image-consciousness of funky teenagers and that of sober businessmen alike. In 1995, while working on designs for Nokia's highest-end phone -- the slick, palm-size 8800 series, coated in materials like titanium and aluminum but still assembled by robots on mass-production lines -- Nuovo began to fantasize about taking a 180-degree turn in phone design. ''If you look at watches, pens and eyewear,'' he says, ''those are technological products that are essential personal items. I thought that a communications device was ready to mature into something exquisite. It made so much sense to me that it hit me like a freight train.''

In 1997, Nuovo and a team of colleagues from Nokia presented the case for a luxury cellphone company to Nokia's president, Pekka Ala-Pietila. Nuovo's group had studied the ever-increasing -- and surprisingly recession-proof -- market for luxury items, including watches, jewelry, pens, fashion and cars. They noted that of one billion watches sold worldwide each year, three-tenths of 1 percent -- three million -- could be considered high-end. They pointed to the enormous success of Nokia's costly 8800 series, especially in Asia, and to the fact that many high-income consumers were replacing their cellphones once or twice a year. They observed, indignantly, that a small number of pirates were encrusting counterfeit Nokia phones with diamonds and selling them for tens of thousands of dollars to a responsive circle of Asian businessmen and Middle Eastern sheiks, regardless of the fact that the diamonds might impede the phones' reception and would, in time, fall out of their casings. And they argued that technology products have a standard life cycle: in their infancy, the sheer cost of new technology makes products prohibitively expensive and available only to elites; as a technology develops, prices are driven down, allowing products to be widely adopted; and finally, the product differentiates to serve the tastes of narrow market segments. Nuovo maintained that it was time to enter this final stage. The idea had an appealing simplicity. As Nigel Litchfield, Vertu's president and formerly Nokia's senior vice president for Asia-Pacific operations, says during a phone interview: ''My wife will go out for dinner in the evening and put on an expensive dress, expensive jewelry, an expensive watch and pick up a cheap plastic phone to put in her expensive handbag. What we're saying is, Why should the mobile phone be different from any other luxury accessory?''

The timing of the nascent Vertu group's pitch could not have been better. Through much of the 90's, Nokia's business grew at an annual rate of 40 to 50 percent. In 2000, the company agreed to finance a wholly owned subsidiary that would make luxury products under a different brand with entirely separate manufacturing and sales operations, much as Toyota does with Lexus. According to Wojtek Uzdelewicz, a telecommunications equipment analyst at Bear Stearns, the profit margins on Nokia's standard cellphones are a healthy 35 percent; the profit margin on a Vertu phone, he estimates, would be ''an order of magnitude higher.'' But Uzdelewicz notes that since Vertu is aiming for such a small market niche, profits aren't the major objective. What, then, is? A burnished marketing image. Uzdelewicz explains: ''If they can convince us that 10 of the key, hip, glamorous people are willing to pay $20,000 for a Nokia phone -- you can call it a Vertu, but everyone will know that it's a Nokia -- then maybe an average consumer like me will be willing to pay $10 more for a $100 phone. That's where they'll make their money. And they only have to find 10 stars to buy their phones.''

Nokia set up the new company under a code name to avoid tipping off potential competitors, and Nuovo and Litchfield charged a team of engineers with creating a luxury phone whose reception would not be compromised by a metal casing. Nuovo knew that even wealthy customers would be wary of the risk of technical obsolescence, so he required a phone that could accommodate upgrades. Ground was broken on the 65,000-square-foot corporate headquarters and workshop near London. Despite the high costs of manufacturing in England, proximity to the European jewelry industry -- and its vendors of precious metals and suppliers of precision mechanisms -- was considered essential. A sales staff raided from the luxury-goods industry cultivated relationships with specialty retailers like Neiman Marcus, Selfridges in England and jewelers in Switzerland, Germany and the United Kingdom. Plans were laid for ''client suites'' in London, Singapore, Hong Kong and New York, in addition to Beverly Hills. And in 2001, more than two years into the start-up, a name was chosen. ''Vertu'' is derived from the Latin word virtus, which means ''excellence.'' But, Litchfield says, it has another meaning as well: ''In the 18th and 19th centuries, wealthy individuals began to have small, personalized, highly crafted items designed for themselves -- typically cigarette cases or snuff boxes. They were known as 'vertu.' We see ourselves as the modern version of that tradition.''

Vertu made its debut this year on Jan. 21, at a reception at the Museum of Modern Art in Paris. Some 900 guests attended; Gwyneth Paltrow was photographed holding the instrument. Vertu began taking deposits for the phones, which would not be delivered until August, and Litchfield says that the response exceeded expectations, though he declines to cite sales figures. Vertu's marketers began to mount soft-sell events for target audiences -- a dinner for a group of Swiss bankers; a reception at the Andy Warhol exhibit at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles, of which Vertu is a corporate member; a tour of the Richard Avedon exhibit at the Metropolitan Museum of Art for a group of subscribers to The New Yorker, in which Vertu has advertised. The aim was to generate a buzz among Vertu's most likely customers, members of a rarefied market segment that Ekaterina Walsh, an analyst at the consulting firm Forrester Research, who studies high-net-worth consumers, calls ''splurging millionaires.'' Of the four million millionaire households in the United States, Walsh says, 41 percent tend, to one degree or another, to spend beyond their means. (Vertu's surest audience, Walsh confides, is the 3 percent of millionaire households that she characterizes as ''high-asset delegator splurging millionaires,'' with assets of more than $2.5 million, little interest in managing their own money and an inclination toward self-indulgence.) ''If any technology product were to be marketed as a luxury product, the cellphone is it,'' Walsh surmises. ''A large number of millionaires aren't technology savvy, and the cellphone is an established, unthreatening technology. Everyone has one. Vertu doesn't even see itself as a technology company. Pretty much all the splurgers among millionaires will be interested in a luxury phone. Vertu's timing is perfect.''

In some quarters, though, Vertu's timing has been questioned. In a recessionary economy, a platinum phone provides an easy target of ridicule. BusinessWeek captured the spirit of the media coverage with a short article on Vertu under the headline ''Wretched Excess.'' Much mockery was reserved for the phone's round-the-clock ''concierge'' service, which is accessed by a push of a button and which, according to British Vogue, ''is ready and waiting to organize everything for you, from a table at Nobu to a holiday in St. Barts.'' Nuovo was wounded by the coverage. ''Vertu isn't about conspicuous consumption,'' he maintains. ''It's about a craftsman trying to make the very best thing he can. What do you say to an artist who spends hundreds of hours making a sculpture and then sells it for $2 million? Is that ostentatious? I'm an artist. This is my art. The Frank Nuovo element is the Vertu brand.''

Nuovo and I walk over to Spago for lunch. We are seated at a corner banquette, on the other side of a glass wall from Nancy Reagan and her entourage. Nuovo tells me about a concept he calls romancing the phone. ''It's about relationship-building with objects,'' he says. He glances at my wrist. ''Look,'' he continues, ''the functionality of a $5 Timex is likely on a par with a $50,000 luxury watch. But you can't compare the story of the two. You can't compare the emotional gratification of wearing something that was crafted over so many hours. People care about objects. In some ways, our objects are us.'' Nuovo makes no apologies for his own attachments. At his home in West Los Angeles he keeps a Porsche Carrera and a 1952 Bentley and a BMW and a Honda minivan, and he says that each of these vehicles allows him to exercise a different part of his spirit. When he started designing cellphones, ''black plastic was all we had, and phones all looked like business tools,'' he recalls. ''I would try to explain to people that phones needed to add color, and they would say: 'Why? It's a phone. It's pure functionality.' And I would think, No, it's not a phone!'' In Vertu, Nuovo ''wanted to take something as unlikely as a communications technology and present it as art.'' And why not? His artistic hero is Leonardo da Vinci, for whom the marriage of art and technology made perfect sense. Nuovo's expressive medium just happens to be the cellphone. Still, Nuovo realizes that a $20,000 cellphone might not gain an easy acceptance in a society as ambivalent about technology as it is about wealth, and he knows that he may not be able to convince skeptics. ''I'm not a marketing department,'' he says. ''I'm a vision department.''

We walk back to the client suite. I give in to curiosity. I ask to make a phone call to my girlfriend, Emily. The answering machine picks up. I whisper urgently into the phone: ''Are you there? Pick it up. I'm calling on a $13,000 white gold phone.''

Emily picks up. For a moment, we chat about our days. Then we talk about the quality of the sound, which I find to be crisp -- not without a hint of everyday cellphone quaver but surely a few notches clearer than the reception on my $99 plastic cellphone. The gold is pleasantly cool on my cheek, and the leather grip is plush, and the weight in my hand feels rather -- luxurious. ''What do you think?'' Emily asks. ''How does it feel?'' I consider the instrument. I consider the experience. ''It feels good,'' I say. <<

- Eric -



To: scratchmyback who wrote (2705)12/5/2002 10:56:53 AM
From: Eric L  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 9255
 
re: Matt Hoffman of WitSoundview on Nokia Strategy Update

NOK: Year-end Strategy Review Dashes Inflated Expectations

research.soundview.com

A few Excerpts:

Year-end Strategy Review

Nokia held its Year-end Strategy Review meeting yesterday in Dallas. The company surprised the market with below-expectation guidance for both the infrastructure and handset markets in 2003. The company also chose not to issue 2003 financial guidance, reinforcing the perception that the market has not yet recovered enough to support extended visibility. Although the company did attempt some damage control on the handset guidance later in the session, expectations coming into the meeting still were not met.

In spite of the early surprises, Nokia used the bulk of the meeting constructively, updating the Street on its strategic initiatives, prospects by major business unit, and the company’s impressive product roadmaps.

We were surprised by the heavy focus on infrastructure in the general Q&A; usually those sessions are dominated by handset questions.

Nokia Mobile Phones - Product Momentum Continues

Nokia disputed the widely held notion that the company lowered its outlook for the worldwide 2003 handset market on Tuesday. The confusion probably arose from the fact that at a conference last month Nokia indicated the handset market was likely to see 10%-15% growth next year. Nokia has officially been on the record stating it sees long-term growth for the handset market at 10%-15%, but the company had not formally extended that to 2003 in print. Tuesday’s guidance of 10% growth in 2003 (or 440 million units) struck many investors as a fade because previous commentary had included the possibility of 15% growth in 2003. Without the higher number included for 2003, we see the company essentially keeping a lid on expectations for next year, not wanting to promise too much in the current environment. We would also point out that the 440 million number was actually the number we thought the company would issue, but there were higher hopes built into the stock after its latest run.

On ASPs, Nokia says it sees flat pricing for the oreseeable future. Nokia did point out that ASPs have slightly decreased over the past two years, while margins have improved.

We remain impressed with the overall strength of the Nokia handset roadmap. We are especially impressed with the Nokia 6800 GSM/GPRS phone that will carry the Blackberry software client. Most likely this phone will convince smaller PDA-centric vendors that they will have a difficult time profiting in the handset equipment market and should encourage their market exit. Nokia believes the entry tier is 70% of NOK unit volume (as well as the market volume), the mid-tier is about 20% and the high tier is about 10% - although the company did indicate that high-end volume is slightly higher this year than last year. The high end is responsible for a higher proportion of its profits this year than last year. The company has dedicated an entire business unit to attacking the low-end markets.

Nokia also remained characteristically feisty about the cdma2000 1X handset market, saying the company had learned its lesson over the past two years. The company took an indirect swipe at Qualcomm, saying the CDMA market is monopolistic. Attaining Nokia’s long-term share goals of 40% still hinges on success in CDMA where Nokia will be launching a low-end CDMA model, the 2100, in China next year in addition to the 1X models currently launching in North America. If all of Nokia’s new product introductions go smoothly, our handset estimates for 2003 could prove conservative.

Nokia Networks - Not Quite Seeing The Turn In Operator Investment

On infrastructure, Dr. J.T. Bergquist went through the company’s Nokia Networks business at some length. The company highlighted the stunning progress that MMS, or picture messaging, has made over the past six months. With the launch of 70 networks in 30 countries since the spring of 2002, the progress of MMS has been much faster than we saw GPRS networks rolled out. The company, at the same time it was promoting MMS, tried to tamp down expectations for mobile data as a contributor to operator revenue. Nokia says that instead of looking at an operator’s mobile data ARPU, investors should gauge the spread of platforms to assess the strength of mobile data. We will continue to track operator data ARPU for indications on the success of mobile data.

Nokia is still forecasting overall ARPU to trend down in 2003, even with a stronger proportion of revenue coming from data as voice ARPU slides further. Nokia cited statistics that showed network traffic has increased by 60% over the last two years while capital expenditure has decreased, and believes that sometime after 2003 that situation will reverse. The company sees 40 W-CDMA networks deployed by the end of 2003 and sees EDGE rolling out widely as EDGE-capable hardware is shipping to 23 operators not solely in the United States. The company echoed our belief that the compelling reason why these networks will be deployed is on the cost side, as EDGE and W-CDMA network exponentially lower the cost to deliver a megabyte of data. We concur with this assessment, believing a data call on a W-CDMA network will cost 80% less to deliver on a W-CDMA platform than a GSM/GPRS platform.

Nokia stressed it believes the mobile network will become an all-IP network by 2005. We found the most interesting part of the presentation to be the company’s introduction of the G-WCDMA standard. Nokia believes G-WCDMA will be the technology operators in the Americas adopt, regardless of whether they currently run a GSM or cdma2000 network, because it will be a wideband 5Mhz technology. G-WCDMA is to be deployed in the virgin 1700 and 2100 Mhz bands soon to be auctioned off here in the United States. Nokia called G-WCDMA a "beautiful" solution; one that will allow cdma2000 operators to move almost seamlessly to the 5Mhz technology from the narrower-band, and thus slower, cdma2000 standard. We view Nokia’s G-WCDMA initiative as the latest attempt by the GSM camp to try to lure cdma2000 operators like Verizon and Sprint PCS away from the Qualcomm-driven standards. Nokia stated the downlink transmission speeds of G-WCDMA will have peak data speed of 10mbps. G-WCDMA will also be available in both 1900 and 2500 Mhz spectrum.

Nokia briefly touched on the prospects for wireless local loop (WLL) services in countries like India. Nokia emphasized it is still trying to get operators there to put GSM 800 infrastructure into India and other markets in Southeast Asia for WLL. Nokia is not just conceding the market to the CDMA OEMs. Nokia’s central pitch will revolve around the operators’ need for guaranteed access to low-cost handsets. The CEO insists CDMA infrastructure is not a business Nokia wants to be in as U.S. investments are completed and the initial phases of the China Unicom contract are in process.

Company Guidance and Changes to Estimates

Nokia issued the following guidance yesterday:

• Reiterated 400 million units in 2002.

• Issued 2003 unit guidance of 10% year-over-year growth or slightly higher, or about 440 million units next year, about where we expected Nokia to size the market.

• Expects 1.1 billion subscribers by year-end 2002, growing to 1.5 billion subscribers in 2005. We estimate 1.13 billion in 2002 and 1.4 billion exiting 2004.

• Reiterated that the wireless infrastructure market is expected to be down 20% in 2002, though Nokia expects its addressable market will be down 15%.

• Issued 2003 wireless infrastructure guidance of down 10%, though the company’s addressable market will decline 5%-10%.

At a strategic level, the company offered no change to its prior comments on capital structure. Nokia will be assessing uses of its 7 billion euro stockpile including a stock buyback, though it sees the need to maintain adequate levels of liquidity so as not to risk downgrades from the rating agencies.

We remain unwilling to value the shares on 2004 earnings estimates given limited visibility the company continues to cite. We maintain our price target of $16 (Neutral).

###

- Eric -



To: scratchmyback who wrote (2705)12/9/2002 10:10:48 AM
From: Eric L  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 9255
 
re: The Globe and Mail on Nokia "Prudence"

globetechnology.com

>> Prudence Adds To Nokia's Value

Amanda Lang
The Globe and Mail
Canada
December 9, 2002

It isn't that unusual for a company to disagree with the forecasting made by Wall Street analysts. Despite criticism of too-close relationships between analysts and the corporations they cover, there is often divergence on points of conjecture. But normally, the roles are pretty clear: corporate executives complaining that analysts are overly downbeat, and analysts wary of company hype.

It is less typical to find a company expressing pessimism, the analyst starry-eyed optimism. But so it is with Finland's Nokia Corp.

The world's largest mobile phone maker offers a mid-quarter update Wednesday. At that point, perhaps it will become clearer to investors whether they should believe the company when it says sales of its mobile phones will rise 10 per cent next year, or whether they should believe Merrill Lynch, which sees much higher growth.

In a research note to clients published last week, Merrill raised its investment rating on Nokia stock to "buy" from "neutral," and cited two reasons. First, Merrill expects mobile phone sales worldwide will be higher than it had previously forecast, and second, that Nokia will take an even bigger share of that growing market.

It's significant that Merrill isn't just raising its view of how many people will buy new phones -- it's actually changing the way it thinks about new phone sales. Merrill now estimates 474 million new phones will be sold worldwide next year, compared with other analysts' predictions of 435 million.

Early expectations for cellphone purchase rates have been ratcheted back, partly because of economic weakness, but also because three years ago many people thought mobile phone users would update their devices more frequently. Now that 70 per cent of Europeans and more than 50 per cent of North Americans own such phones, those forecasts have been reduced sharply.

But Merrill says perhaps the reductions went too far.

For one thing, new technology, such as picture capability, will help drive existing phone users to upgrade at a rate faster than anyone else has calculated. And Merrill believes that even as the industry -- and analysts -- became overly optimistic about the rate of phone sales back in 2000, now forecasts are overly gloomy, suggesting far worse than will materialize.

The biggest market for replacement phone sales will be in Europe, Merrill's analysts say, where adoption of new technologies will push the upgrade cycle along. And in new colour-screen and built-in-camera technologies, Nokia has a commanding share. It also has new products due out in the next few months that could drive its market share even higher.

Adding up all these positive factors, Merrill predicts Nokia's profit estimates could go up by 40 per cent next year from their previous targets. Will Nokia agree, and raise forecasts on Wednesday?

What makes this so interesting for investors is that if Merrill forecasters are right, they are virtually alone. The expectations of other analysts are much closer to the previous, lower forecasts for growth.

But why shouldn't Nokia have a better view of its own industry than does a research firm?

For one thing, the company is conservative. Good thing, too; unlike most cellphone firms, it is still profitable, and even in its infrastructure business it is able to maintain positive cash flow in the face of a devastated market. Still, when the phone giant spoke to analysts last week, it said its sales growth in its mobile business would be 10 per cent next year, not the 15 per cent it had implied earlier.

It also warned that its infrastructure business would continue to suffer.

Therein lies the opportunity.

Merrill gets a particular view of the business that Nokia might not -- a high-level look not only at consumer trends but also at Nokia's rivals. And its analysts know Nokia well enough to look past certain characteristics of management, including prudence. As Nokia chief executive officer Jorma Ollila told reporters last week, the company believes that the uncertainty in the global economy and the possibility of war in Iraq means that a 10-per-cent forecast makes sense. It's a base, in other words.

Although the wireless equipment business is in a dismal state, with sales to telecom firms dropping quarter after quarter, that can't continue. Usage is still growing -- one estimate is by 50 per cent a month -- so, at some point, network buildout will have to resume. Meanwhile, many analysts suggest Nokia might stand to benefit in a survival-of-the-fittest scenario.

There is another bonus for investors in addition to the opportunity to buy into an industry ahead of an inflection point, where weakness turns into strength. It's the opportunity to buy shares in a company run by prudent managers. No other kind deserves the investing dollars.

Amanda Lang is the host of AM Business on Report on Business Television and CTV. <<

- Eric -