To: tekboy who wrote (62694 ) 12/22/2002 5:09:30 AM From: stockman_scott Respond to of 281500 US has insatiable need for weaponry By DOUG BANDOW ANALYSIS / READYING FOR WAR Friday 20 December 2002 US President George W. Bush wants Nato's other members to ``come with us [the United States]'' to help disarm Iraq, but the alliance is a security black hole. The new members offer more problems than resources, while old allies like Germany are cutting defence outlays. In contrast, the Bush administration is planning a $14 billion increase in military spending for 2004, on top of the extra $34.4 billion recently approved for next year. That was the largest hike in two decades, but the president originally proposed a $46 billion increase _ more than any nation other than Russia devotes to the military. For some American hawks no amount will ever be enough. Charles Revie of the Veterans Voting Block worries about ``our neglected military''. The editors of National Review magazine argue: ``Even after last year's reminder, we are still short-changing defence.'' Without much higher spending _ an extra $100 billion a year _ we might lose ``control of the most dangerous world situation we have faced in many years'', wrote historian Fred Kagan. What world is this? America's great Cold War antagonist, the Soviet Union, is gone, along with its gaggle of Eastern European allies. Russia has joined with Nato in a cooperative relationship. Inter-superpower competition has disappeared from the Third World. South Korea far outranges the North, possessing an economy 40 times as strong and a population twice as big. Japan is the world's second-ranking economic power, capable of helping to constrain potential Chinese adventurism. India is becoming a more significant power and better friend of America. Potential adversaries of Washington are pitiful and few: Cuba, Iraq, North Korea. Only the threat of terrorism is significant and dangerous, but it is highly diffuse and not amenable to solution through manifold army divisions, navy carrier groups, and abundant air wings. Emphasising traditional military assets risks diverting attention from the reformed forces and less meddlesome foreign policy necessary to combat terrorism. Indeed, the fundamental issue is foreign policy, not military outlays. For defence spending is the price of America's foreign policy. Today's most volatile situations implicate few vital US security interests and few of Washington's current deployments are devoted to defence. For instance, the 100,000 soldiers in Europe, and especially more than 11,000 on station in the Balkans, are wasted on non-existent dangers and peripheral interests. Europe faces no threat and, with an economy and population greater than America's, is well able to arm for the future. Japan similarly faces no imminent security threat and can adopt a more vigorous defence policy. Deploying 37,000 soldiers in South Korea is a waste. Seoul is capable of deterring the decaying regime in the North. The closest to a traditional geopolitical antagonist is China. Yet Beijing remains poor with a weak military. China is a potential peer competitor in the future, but not soon. Anyway, it is likely to threaten American predominance in East Asia, not vital security interests closer to home. To this the East Asians should respond. Taiwan, with the wherewithal to deter Beijing, should be encouraged to purchase whatever weapons it deems necessary for its defence. Japan should guard regional sealanes. India should match Chinese influence throughout Southeast Asia. Then there's Iraq. Baghdad is a nasty actor, but is not the only thuggish state that violates human rights and might like to develop weapons of mass destruction; in any case, it can be deterred, without war, as over the last decade. Israel alone possesses overwhelming military strength in any confrontation with Iraq or other nearby state. No country since Rome has possessed America's dominance. The US plus its allies and friends account for about 80% of all military spending. Washington spends as much as the next eight countries combined, six of which are allies. Yet advocates of a bigger military seem unlikely to be satisfied as long as anyone outside of the American coalition spends even a baht on defence. Or sets a policy independent of the US. The Cold War forced America into the unnatural role of global superpower. Washington will remain one almost in spite of itself for years to come. But with the collapse of the primary threat, hegemonic communism, and rise of the allied capabilities in Asia and Europe, America need no longer intervene everywhere to protect everyone. Instead of being the immediate meddler in every conflict, no matter how local, Washington can be the distant balancer, acting only when a potential hegemonic threat arises which allied states cannot contain. The lesson of Sept 11, 2001 is not that Washington should reflexively lavish money on the military but that it should adjust its foreign policy to more accurately reflect American interests. Once it does so, the US can cut total military outlays by spending money more wisely and effectively. - Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington DC. He is a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and the author and editor of several books.bangkokpost.com