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To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)1/5/2003 8:50:49 PM
From: PartyTime  Respond to of 15516
 
Ever hear of this place?

www-scf.usc.edu

umd.umich.edu



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)1/6/2003 1:28:13 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
Takeover of oil fields part of U.S. plans for Iraq

chron.com

By DAVID E. SANGER and JAMES DAO
New York Times

WASHINGTON -- President Bush's national security team is assembling final plans for
administering and democratizing Iraq after the expected ouster of Saddam Hussein. Those
plans call for a heavy American military presence in the country for at least 18 months,
military trials of only the most senior Iraqi leaders and a quick takeover of the country's oil
fields to pay for reconstruction.


The proposals, according to administration officials who have been developing them for
several months, have been discussed informally with Bush in considerable detail. They
would amount to the most ambitious American effort to administer a country since the
occupations of Japan and Germany at the end of World War II.
With Bush's return here
Sunday afternoon, his principal foreign policy advisers are expected to shape the final
details in White House meetings and then formally present them to the president.

Many elements of the plans are highly classified, and some are still being debated as
Bush's team tries to allay concerns that the United States would seek to be a colonial power
in Iraq. But the broad outlines show the enormous complexity of the task in months ahead,
and point to some of the difficulties that would follow even a swift and successful removal of
Saddam from power, including these:

o Though Bush came to office expressing distaste for using the military for what he called
nation building, the Pentagon is preparing for at least a year and a half of military control of
Iraq, with forces that would keep the peace, hunt down Saddam's top leaders and weapons
of mass destruction and, in the words of one of Bush's senior advisers, "keep the country
whole."

o A civilian administrator -- perhaps designated by the United Nations -- would run the
country's economy, rebuild its schools and political institutions and administer aid
programs. Placing those powers in nonmilitary hands, administration officials hope, will
quell Arab concerns that a military commander would wield the kind of unchallenged
authority that Gen. Douglas MacArthur exercised as supreme commander in Japan.

o Only "key" senior officials of the Saddam government "would need to be removed and
called to account," according to an administration document summarizing plans for war
trials. People in the Iraqi hierarchy who help bring down the government may be offered
leniency.

o The administration plan states that "government elements closely identified with
Saddam's regime, like the revolutionary courts or the special security organization, will be
eliminated, but much of the rest of the government will be reformed and kept."

o While publicly stating that Iraqi oil would remain what one senior official calls "the
patrimony of the Iraqi people," the administration is debating how to protect oil fields
during the conflict and how an occupied Iraq would be represented in the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, if at all.

o After long debate, especially between the Pentagon and the State Department, the White
House has rejected for now the idea of creating a provisional government before any
invasion.

Administration officials involved in the planning caution that no matter how detailed their
plans, many crucial decisions would have to be made on the ground in Iraq. So for now they
have focused on legal precedents -- including an examination of the legal basis for taking
control of the country at all -- and a study of past successes and failures in nation building,
reaching back to the American administration of the Philippines after the
Spanish-American War.

The plans presented to Bush will include several contingencies that depend heavily, officials
say, on how Saddam leaves power.

"So much rides on the conflict itself, if it becomes a conflict, and on how the conflict starts
and how the conflict ends," said one of Bush's top advisers.

Much also depends on whether the arriving American troops would be welcomed or shot at,
and the CIA has been putting together scenarios that range from a friendly occupation to a
hostile one.

Yet under all of the possibilities, the American military would remain the central player in
running the country for some time. The Pentagon has warned that it would take at least a
year to be certain that all of Saddam's weapons stores are destroyed.

Notably, the administration's written description of its goals include these two objectives:
"preserve Iraq as a unitary state, with its territorial integrity intact," and "prevent unhelpful
outside interference, military or nonmilitary," apparently a warning to neighboring
countries.

Administration officials insist American military forces would not stay in Iraq a day longer
than is necessary to stabilize the country.

"I don't think we're talking about months," one of Bush's top advisers said of the planned
occupation. "But I don't think we're talking a lot of years, either."

THE COMMAND: MILITARY JOINED WITH CIVILIAN

When administration officials first began publicly discussing the idea of an American
military administration for Iraq, the reaction in the Arab world was swift: They wanted no
American Caesar in Iraq, no symbol of a colonial governor or commander. "The last thing we
need," a senior official said, in an allusion to MacArthur, "is someone walking around with a
corncob pipe, telling Iraqis how to form a government."

As a result, the steering group on Iraq policy is now discussing a hybrid command with an
American military commander in charge of security and some kind of civilian administrator
-- of theoretically equal influence -- to get the schools running, the oil fields pumping and
the economy jump-started.

It is not clear whether that administrator would be an American or if the United Nations
would take the lead in that part of the operation.

It is widely assumed that in the first chaotic months, the military commander will have
unquestioned authority. "Remember, you will have decapitated the command and control
for the Iraqi military forces," a senior administration official said. "Who is going to make sure
that score-settling does not break out, that there is not fights between the various ethnic
communities? It is going to have to be the U.S. military for some period of time, and if there
is a military command, there will certainly be a military commander."

But the handover of more and more responsibility from the military administration to an
international civilian administration -- and several years down the road to an Iraqi-run
government -- is still murky. Officials, referring to the ruling Baath Party, say
"de-Baathification" of the country will be at least as complex as de-Nazification was in
Germany.

"We know one thing," said a diplomat involved in the planning. "Things will have to come
together a lot faster than they have in Afghanistan."

THE OIL: PROTECTING IT FOR THE IRAQIS

There is no more delicate question for the administration than how to deal with Iraq's oil
reserves -- the second largest in the world, behind Saudi Arabia's -- and how to raise money
from oil sales for rebuilding without prompting charges that control of oil, not disarming
Iraq, is Bush's true aim.

Administration officials have been careful always to talk about Iraqi oil as the property of the
Iraqi people. But in the White House, the major concern is that Saddam may plan to
destroy the oil infrastructure in the first days of any war, while trying to make it appear as if
the destruction was the work of American forces.

"What happens if he started systematically destroying the fields?" a senior official said. "It's
a big source of concern, and we are trying to take account of it as we plan how to use our
military forces."

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, speaking on Dec. 29, hinted at such a military plan when
he said, "If coalition forces go into those oil fields, we would want to protect those fields and
make sure that they are used to benefit the people of Iraq, and are not destroyed or
damaged by a failing regime on the way out the door."

The White House has already concluded that the United Nations' oil-for-food program,
under which Iraq is permitted to sell a limited amount of oil to buy civilian goods, will have
to be amended quickly so oil revenues can be used more broadly in the country. But it is
unclear how the administration plans to finesse the question of Iraq's role in the OPEC
countries and who would represent occupied Iraq at the organization's meetings.

The administration is already anticipating that neighboring Arab nations may accuse
occupied Iraq of pumping oil beyond OPEC quotas. One official said Washington "fully
expects" that the United States will be suspected of undermining the oil organization, and it
is working on strategies, which he would not describe, to allay those fears.

THE LEADERSHIP: PLANNING BOTH TRIALS AND INCENTIVES


Bush has been warning since October that Iraqi generals who obeyed any orders to use
chemical or biological weapons against American troops would be punished, perhaps as war
criminals.

Now, as part of the effort to undermine Saddam's government and get evidence that has so
far eluded U.N. inspectors, the White House is putting a slightly different spin on that kind
of talk.

Those who have helped build Saddam's weapons stockpile, officials say, may win some
redemption by helping inspectors -- and American forces.

That approach appears to be part of a strategy to encourage a coup and persuade military
leaders and scientists to give up the country's chemical and biological stockpiles and its
nuclear research efforts. "The politics of Iraq are so opaque that it's just hard to know what
is or isn't rumbling under the surface," one of Bush's most senior advisers say. The result is
that the president is looking to create "maximum pressure" on the top leadership.

Already the CIA and others have drawn up lists of Saddam's top command and the heads of
his security forces who would probably be put on trial.

One State Department working group is studying a kind of "truth and reconciliation"
process, modeled after the one in South Africa, which could publicly shame, but not
necessarily punish, human rights violators.

THE TRANSITION: NO TO INSTALLING PROVISIONAL RULERS

Few issues have divided the administration more bitterly than how to create a transitional
Iraqi government that could serve as a bridge between the American military occupation
and a permanent, democratic government. The issue reflects the administration's
ideological fault lines, and in recent months Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza
Rice, has stepped in, as one senior aide said, "to make sure there was not a public food
fight on this one."

White House officials say that those divisions have now been resolved, and that while
planning is going forward, the United States will not overtly install a provisional government
or designate its leaders.

The division was a familiar one. Senior civilian officials in the Pentagon and some advisers to
Vice President Dick Cheney argued for the creation of a provisional government even before
Baghdad falls. It would be led, at least initially, by Iraqi exiles. The proponents argue that
such a government in exile would speed creation of a permanent government if Saddam was
removed, allowing U.S. forces to withdraw sooner. Among the reported advocates were
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, who wants the military's role to be brief.

"The quicker you get a transition from military victory to transitional government, the
better," a senior Pentagon official said. "We want to be there as long as necessary, but as
short as possible."

On the other side of the debate are advocates of giving more power to Iraqis now living in
Iraq. These advocates, mainly in the State Department and CIA, say the Iraqi exiles have no
legitimacy among the Iraqi people. One proposal favored by State Department officials calls
for having an international civilian agency, advised by Iraqis and protected by allied
peacekeeping forces, run the nation while Iraqis elect local governments, create a new
constitution and eventually select a national legislature, somewhat along the postwar model
of Afghanistan.

The White House has tried to finesse those differences by saying it favors a government
formed by "free Iraqis" both inside and outside Iraq. But inside the Pentagon there are
doubts. "The argument that you have to leave seats at the table for people inside Iraq has
one problem: there is no one inside," said a senior official who supports the Iraqi National
Congress.

An official close to Bush acknowledged that "there are not a lot of free Iraqis inside Iraq."
Pausing, he added, "But there will be."



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)2/4/2003 11:33:12 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
Afghan judge outlaws 'immoral and smutty' cable television

Rory McCarthy in Islamabad
Wednesday January 22, 2003
The Guardian

Afghanistan's most senior judge outlawed cable television
yesterday, saying it was against Islam, a decision reminiscent
of the Taliban regime.

Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a cleric and the new government's chief
justice, said cable television, which now provides foreign news,
movies, sports and entertainment channels in Afghanistan, was
filled with "prostitution" and "nudity".


"I don't want such TV in this country," he said yesterday in
Kabul. Some of the programmes shown were "clearly contrary to
Islam and against morality", he said.

The chief justice also wants to outlaw coeducation. "I want
education for women, but we want men and women not to sit
together," Mr Shinwari said yesterday.

In Herat, western Afghanistan, men have been banned from
teaching female students.
The move has been strongly opposed
by aid agencies and human rights groups who say that many
girls will miss out on classes because of the shortage of women
teachers.

Cable operators were told to shut down their service on Sunday,
although direct satellite transmissions, which the Kabul
government cannot control, continue unhindered.

Mr Shinwari comes from the same Pashtun ethnic group as the
Taliban and he taught for many years in a madrassah, or
religious school, in a conservative area of Pakistan.

Yesterday he said he was unhappy with the "smut" shown on
foreign television channels. Television programmes showing
women and men together were acceptable only if they were
informative and entertaining, he said.

Afghanistan's information and culture minister, Makhdom
Raheen, said none of the cable operators had broadcast
anything objectionable. He said he hoped the judge's decision
would be reversed at a cabinet meeting next week.

"The freedom of cable is a part of the freedom of our press," he
said.

The extremist religious students who made up the Taliban
regime banned music and television in Kabul shortly after
seizing the capital in 1996, but both resurfaced once the Taliban
regime crumbled under the weight of a US military onslaught in
November 2001.

Televisions, most of them smuggled from Pakistan, immediately
appeared in the bazaars and entrepreneurs began producing
makeshift satellite dishes made from old tin cans. Five cable
television networks were then licensed by the government
andprovided a series of channels.

Mr Shinwari's decision is an indication of how difficult it is to
liberalise Afghanistan's deeply conservative cultural and religious
beliefs.

Although sections of the capital, Kabul, have had a reputation for
open-mindedness, much of the countryside remains firmly
attached to its traditions. As a result many Taliban laws have
survived into the new regime. Legal punishments still include
stoning for adulterers.


guardian.co.uk



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)2/12/2003 2:09:41 AM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
April 1997: Ken Lay to Gov. Bush
Ken Lay asks Gov. Bush to meet with the visiting ambassador from Uzbekistan where Enron had
aspirations of oil and gas ventures.

thedailyenron.com

>>>>>>>>>>>

(Go to website. Click on first line and you'll see the document Ken Lay wrote to George W. Bush.



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)2/23/2003 6:10:08 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
US released al-Qaeda terrorists to Pakistan
: Report

timesofindia.indiatimes.com

PTI [ SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2003 07:29:14 PM ]


WASHINGTON: Playing a "losing game", the US allowed many Interservice Intelligence (ISI) agents it had captured during the war on terror in Afghanistan to go back to Pakistan and they took with them thousands of al-Qaeda terrorists, who later spread into Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir, media reports said.

After surrounding ISI operatives and "the cream of the crop" of al-Qaeda near Konduz during the early phase of the war, US allowed the ISI to escape, in order to prop up Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh revealed on the Public Broadcasting System network in the weekend.

By letting them go, "the US is playing a losing game, because Musharraf is certainly much more interested in his own survival than ours," Hersh said.
He added that the US military allowed 3,000 to 4,000, perhaps 8,000, ISI and al Qaeda.


The initial plan, said Hersh, was to take out the Pakistani military from the trap in Afghanistan.

"What happened is that they took out al-Qaeda with them. And, we had no way of stopping it. We lost control. Once their planes began to go, thousands of al-Qaeda got out and we were not able to stop it and screen it," he said.

"The intent was not to let al Qaeda out, but to protect the Pakistani military," he added.
"What else can you do? We need the idea of some sort of a country as a bulwark."
He said the reality in Afghanistan today "is that probably from Kandahar to Jalalabad and all of the southern part of Afghanistan is ISI. It is Taliban. Afghanistan is smoking today."
Noting that there aren't many US troops in northern territories, he said, "We are really at square one even in Afghanistan. We have about 8,000 American troops facing some of the heaviest fighting they have seen in a year."
Hersh also said that the Saudis have put a lot of money into Pakistan's religious establishments.
"Saudis are still a supplier of a great deal of funds to Pakistan. We have got a country that is teetering on the edge. We don't want Pakistan to go Islamic. We don't want the (nuclear) weapons to get out of control," he said.

He also estimated that Pakistan at present has up to 40 nuclear warheads.

Asked as to who is in charge of the switch, Hersh said: "Well, we would like to think that the military and Musharraf is in charge of the switch. The issue is making sure and reinforcing Musharraf is in charge of the switch."



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)3/14/2003 4:39:43 AM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
Afghan prisoners beaten to death at US military
interrogation base



'Blunt force injuries' cited in murder ruling


Duncan Campbell in Los Angeles
Friday March 7, 2003
The Guardian

Two prisoners who died while being held for interrogation at the
US military base in Afghanistan had apparently been beaten,
according to a military pathologist's report. A criminal
investigation is now under way into the deaths which have both
been classified as homicides.

The deaths have led to calls for an inquiry into what interrogation
techniques are being used at the base where it is believed the
al-Qaida leader, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, is now also being
held. Former prisoners at the base claim that detainees are
chained to the ceiling, shackled so tightly that the blood flow
stops, kept naked and hooded and kicked to keep them awake
for days on end.

The two men, both Afghans, died last December at the US
forces base in Bagram, north of Kabul, where prisoners have
been held for questioning. The autopsies found they had suffered
"blunt force injuries" and classified both deaths as homicides.


A spokesman for the Pentagon said yesterday it was not
possible to discuss the details of the case because of the
proceeding investigation. If the investigation finds that the
prisoners had been unlawfully killed during interrogation, it could
lead to both civil and military prosecutions. He added that it was
not clear whether only US personnel had had access to the
men.

One of the dead prisoners, known only as Dilawar, died as a
result of "blunt force injuries to lower extremities complicating
coronary artery disease"
, according to the death certificate
signed by Major Elizabeth Rouse, a pathologist with the
Washington-based Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, which
operates under the auspices of the defence department. The
dead man was aged 22 and was a farmer and part-time
taxi-driver. He was said to have had an advanced heart condition
and blocked arteries.

Chris Kelly, a spokesman for the institute, said yesterday that
their pathologists were involved in all cases on military bases
where there were unusual or suspicious deaths. He was not
aware of any other homicides of prisoners held since September
11. He said that the definition of homicide was "death resulting
from the intentional or grossly reckless behaviour of another
person or persons" but could also encompass "self-defence or
justifiable killings".

The death certificates for the men have four boxes on them
giving choices of "natural, accident, suicide, homicide". The
Pentagon said yesterday that the choice of "homicide" did not
necessarily mean that the dead person had been unlawfully
killed. There was no box which would indicate that a pathologist
was uncertain how a person had died.

It is believed that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, described as the
number three in al-Qaida, is being interrogated at Bagram. He is
said to have started providing information about the possible
whereabouts of Osama bin Laden whom he is said to have met
in Pakistan last month. Most al-Qaida suspects are being held
outside the US which means that they are not entitled to access
to the US judicial system.

Two former prisoners at the base, Abdul Jabar and Hakkim
Shah, told the New York Times this week that they recalled
seeing Dilawar at Bagram. They said that they had been kept
naked, hooded and shackled and were deprived of sleep for days
on end. Mr Shah said that American guards kicked him to stop
him falling asleep and that on one occasion he had been kicked
by a woman interrogator, while her male colleague held him in a
kneeling position.

The commander of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, General
Daniel McNeill, said that prisoners were made to stand for long
periods but he denied that they were chained to the ceiling. "Our
interrogation techniques are adapted," he said.

"They are in accordance with what is generally accepted as
interrogation techniques, and if incidental to the due course of
this investigation, we find things that need to be changed, we
will certainly change them."

In January, in his state of the union address, President George
Bush announced that "3,000 suspected terrorists have been
arrested in many countries" and "many others have met a
different fate" and "are no longer a problem to the United
States".

The other death being investigated is that of Mullah Habibullah,
the brother of a former Taliban commander. His death certificate
indicates that he died of a pulmonary embolism, or a blood clot
in the lung.

guardian.co.uk



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)3/14/2003 4:46:35 AM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 

Forsaken at Guantánamo

March 12, 2003
The New York Times
Editorial


It has been 14 months since the first prisoners from the Afghanistan
war were taken to a naval base at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. The Bush
administration says it can hold the detainees indefinitely, without allowing
them access to family or legal counsel. Yesterday, a federal Court of
Appeals threw out a challenge by some of those detainees to their confinement.
The administration and the court are wrong. The detainees may not
have the same rights as American citizens, but they are entitled
to more due process than they are being given.

The United States military is holding hundreds of prisoners
accused of Taliban or Al Qaeda ties at Guantánamo. Many were seized in the heat of
battle, but others were turned over in exchange for rewards or bounties.
Advocates for the prisoners maintain that one-third or more are being held
on the basis of bad intelligence, or simply for being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

The Guantánamo detainees are in legal limbo. The Bush administration
refuses to designate them prisoners of war, a label that would entitle them
to immunity from prosecution for acts committed during a lawful war, among other things.
Nor is the administration treating them as ordinary
criminal defendants, entitled to know the charges against
hem and allowed to contest their confinement in court. The government's position is that
the detainees are "unlawful combatants" who can be held incommunicado indefinitely.

Whatever their legal status, the Guantánamo detainees
must be given a chance to contest their confinement. Those who were wrongly caught up in
the military's net must have an opportunity to make their case.

As noncitizens captured in wartime, they may not have the
right to have their claims heard in United States courts. But they must be given some
forum, like a military tribunal, in which to contest their continued imprisonment.
The rules of evidence, and the standard of proof for holding them,
may be different from those in ordinary criminal trials.
But there must be rules, and at least some individualized proof,
for the detentions to be proper.

The ruling, from the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in a suit filed by Kuwaiti, British and Australian detainees,
said that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear claims by the Guantánamo
prisoners who contend that they are being wrongfully held. It is a
disturbing decision that gives the administration essentially
unchecked power to imprison foreigners. The court abdicated its role by not exercising
any oversight in this important matter.

In refusing to let the Guantánamo detainees challenge their confinement,
the administration is trampling on their rights. It is also damaging
America's reputation for fairness. The administration
should rethink its policies, and the Supreme Court should reverse yesterday's unfortunate
decision.


nytimes.com

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company | Privacy Policy



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)3/17/2003 4:47:36 AM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 


Iraq War May Incite Terrorists

[*] Saudi authorities fear increased attacks. They cite
Al Qaeda's presence and a rise in arms smuggling and violence against
Westerners.


latimes.com

By Michael Slackman, Times Staff Writer
March 15, 2003

E-mail story


.

By Michael Slackman, Times Staff Writer

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia -- The terrain toward the foot
of the Arabian Peninsula is unforgiving: jagged, rocky
hills and barren deserts that make life difficult but
smuggling easy. Handguns, machine guns,
shoulder-launched rockets, plastic explosives, all styles
of weapons are the contraband of choice.

The pace of smuggling into Saudi Arabia from
neighboring Yemen has quickened in recent times. That
has authorities here worried because the increase
coincides with a rash of killings, shootings and bombings
aimed at both Westerners and local Saudi officials.

In a country where weapons reportedly are common
and the people increasingly hostile to the West, and with
the knowledge that Al Qaeda cells are operating here,
there is widespread fear that a U.S. invasion of Iraq
would spark an outbreak of terrorist strikes.

"Al Qaeda has the ability to commit spectacular acts
here," said a Western security expert with close ties to international intelligence
agencies and years of experience in the Middle East. "Thousands of people have
weapons."

The strikes might be simple and random, such as an attack on a Westerner stopped
at a traffic light. That's how Robert Dent, 37, a British citizen with two young
children, was killed last month -- shot in the head and chest.

Or they could be of the Sept. 11 variety, with mass casualties, such as the downing
of a passenger jetliner with missiles. Authorities say they have found
shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles in the kingdom, and they expect that
more are hidden and ready for use. Terrorists with missiles tried but failed to shoot
down an Israeli charter jet taking off in Kenya last fall.


"There are many indications that terrorist groups are looking at a U.S. attack
against Iraq as a convenient trigger" for a strike in Saudi Arabia, said a Western
diplomat based here who requested anonymity.

Saudi officials fear that a terrorist attack could undermine their regime and at the
least cause Westerners to flee, hurting the economy by scaring away foreign
workers and investment.

The environment has become so tense that Canada has ordered families of its
embassy employees to return home. The American telecommunications equipment
maker Lucent Technologies has issued a mandatory evacuation call for all
Western dependents, nearly 300 families in all. The U.S. and British embassies
have issued an "authorized departure," which is voluntary, for nonessential
employees and family members. Many more companies and embassies have not
yet made the call to leave, but all are paying close attention to current events.

Authorities can't say for sure how extensive Al Qaeda's reach is in Saudi Arabia
or the region, but government officials, diplomats and security experts have said
the terrorist network has active members here and in other Persian Gulf nations.
Saudi officials declined repeated requests for comment,
but the government says that it has put 90 Saudis on trial for alleged links to Al
Qaeda and that 250 of its citizens are under investigation. Recently, it has stepped
up internal security efforts in both dramatic and subtle ways.

Saudi newspapers, for example, have largely stopped referring to suicide bombers
in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as martyrs, as part of a concerted effort to stop
motivating recruits. Men who have been to Afghanistan in the last few years are
being questioned by authorities and in some cases held. And Saudi security agents
have begun locking up those who inspire hate and who call on people to commit
crimes in the name of religion.

"The new thing is to go after the motivators," said Jamal Khashoggi, deputy editor
of the English-language Arab News in Jidda. "Even though they are not involved in
the violence, the ideological link is dangerous enough."

The crackdown has been problematic for the kingdom, politically and strategically.
The Western-leaning government does not want to be seen as doing the bidding of
the U.S., especially at a time when anti-American sentiment is rising on the street

in reaction to the Iraq crisis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it does not
want to create an environment that will inspire more terrorism recruits. In fact,
security analysts believe that Al Qaeda has grown so frustrated with the
crackdown that it has tried to step up its strikes within the kingdom.

The suspect arrested in connection with the Feb. 20 shooting of Dent told
investigators that he went to a supermarket called Panda because it was
frequented by foreigners. Sources said the suspect first considered shooting a man
who was shopping with a woman and a child. Then he decided on Dent.

The U.S. Embassy informed Americans here that Dent's killing was "a terrorist act
directed at a Westerner selected as a target of opportunity." The embassy also
said the suspect "has associations with known terrorist elements."

By itself, the killing of Dent might be written off as a hate crime, but the strikes
against Westerners and others have been piling up. Just last month: A deputy
governor was shot to death in Al Jawf province in the north; a van full of Egyptian
and Philippine doctors and nurses was sprayed with gunfire, though no one was
injured; a Briton suffered minor injuries when he was shot while driving in Riyadh,
the capital; an Australian man was fired on while jogging in the southern town of
Khamis Mushayt; a McDonald's restaurant in Eastern province was the target of
an attempted firebombing.

The events shocked a nation that bases its legal system on the Koran and prides
itself on being free of street crime.

"Saudi Arabia, so long held up as a place of great safety for all, now has to face up
to the brutal reality of so much of the rest of the world," the Arab News wrote
shortly after Dent was killed, in a striking admission rarely seen here. "An age of
innocence has gone."


More troublesome are recent arrests that suggest the problem has soaked deep
into the fabric of the country. Authorities in the holy city of Mecca arrested seven
young men, some of them high school students, on suspicion of belonging to
outlawed groups.

Last year, officials arrested several Saudi employees of Saudi Aramco for plotting
to sabotage the state-owned oil company's computer network. Even more
damning, according to security experts in the kingdom, was the discovery last year
that border guards had conspired with would-be terrorists to smuggle guns and
explosives into the country from Yemen.

The Yemen connection is a major problem. Yemen's borders are nearly impossible
to seal, with rocky, barren mountains near the coast and deserts stretching across
a plain to Saudi Arabia. Arms smuggling has mushroomed, according to a
high-placed government official from the region, who said many Saudis are paying
top dollar in Yemen to secure weapons. The official said authorities are certain
that some weapons are being purchased for terrorists.

"They are offering $1,000 for a weapon worth $100," said the official, who spoke
on condition he not be identified.

In some cases, the official said, arms merchants are loading mules and camels with
weapons and sending them unaccompanied across the border. If the animals are
not caught, they are met on the other side by Saudi dealers.

Even as the U.S. declares success against the top levels of Al Qaeda -- such as
the recent arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged architect of the Sept.
11 attacks -- authorities here say the terrorist network has become so diffuse and
fractured that individual cells pose serious threats throughout the Persian Gulf
region.

Security experts point to a suspected attack plot that was foiled last spring in a gulf
state as an example of the kind of strike terrorist groups have tried -- and may try
again. Details of the incident were disclosed under the condition that the names of
the country and the individuals involved not be revealed.

The plot was uncovered when an American former narcotics agent living and
working in the Middle East was shopping in two of the largest malls in the region.
Over a two-day period, the former agent -- trained in surveillance -- noticed groups
of men who were clean-cut and well-built and carried themselves like paramilitary
fighters. They seemed to be staking out the malls, he said.

"It just looked wrong," he said. "They were cleanshaven men walking in military
style, and they weren't looking at girls or shopping."

He contacted local law enforcement. A short while later, counter-terrorism
authorities detained about 50 men suspected of planning to attack the malls, said a
security expert with firsthand knowledge of the case. The target apparently was
Westerners, but the goal was to undermine the local economy and thus the
government.

Saudi Arabia's relationship with Al Qaeda dates back many years, to the days
when the country's intelligence service worked closely with the Taliban
government in Afghanistan.

The kingdom was one of only three countries, along with Pakistan and the United
Arab Emirates, to recognize the militant Afghan regime. The Saudi government
looked to the Taliban as a Sunni Muslim bulwark against neighboring Iran, which is
mostly rival Shiite Muslim, and poured hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and
services into Afghanistan, all while that country's leadership was providing a haven
to Osama bin Laden and his followers in Al Qaeda.

The Sept. 11 attacks caught the Saudis off guard. Deep suspicion, even rejection,
greeted the suggestion -- driven in part by the fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers were
Saudis -- that the country's system had played any role in nurturing, inspiring or
financing terrorism.

But over the last two years, authorities say, Saudi Arabia has recognized some of
its errors -- perhaps not directly, but implicitly -- and has worked closely with U.S.
intelligence services to combat terrorism.

"The Saudis have done a great job," said the Western security expert. "That has
gotten Al Qaeda very angry at them. They have wrapped up lots of cells. Lots of
people are in jail."

But it is a complicated situation for the Saudis. They can try to stop big, organized
terrorist strikes, but they are largely helpless in heading off individuals acting on
their own and striking at so-called soft targets, such as supermarkets and schools.
Security experts, diplomats and civic leaders agree that for now, the number of
people seeking to strike is a small percentage of the population.



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)3/19/2003 7:55:50 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
US lifts sanctions against Pakistan

Times of India

AP[ SATURDAY, MARCH 15, 2003 06:26:19 AM ]

Excerpt:

WASHINGTON: "President George W Bush continued the waiver of
sanctions against Pakistan, clearing the way for that country to receive
hundreds of millions of dollars in US economic aid.

Pakistan had been under sanctions that barred US economic and
military assistance because of the bloodless 1999 military coup that
brought President Pervez Musharraf to power.

But after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when Musharraf
sided with the United States in the war on terror and in ousting the
Taliban from Afghanistan, Bush lifted the sanctions that had been
imposed against Pakistan and India after the two countries tested
nuclear weapons in 1998. The next month, Congress removed the last
remaining sanctions, which barred all foreign aid to Pakistan."



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)3/28/2003 8:14:54 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
US launches Afghan air assault

Staff and agencies
Friday March 28, 2003

American soldiers have launched a second major operation in
Afghanistan, with an air assault on mountains in the north-east.


US military officials told Reuters that Operation Desert Lion had
begun, as hundreds of troops continued to comb mountain
caves and villages in the former Taliban stronghold of southern
Kandahar in Operation Valiant Strike.

The latter began a week ago, launched almost simultaneously
with the war on Iraq.

Soldiers from the 505th Parachute Infantry Battalion began
Desert Lion yesterday and found two weapons caches that
included rockets and mortars, a military spokesman told
reporters. So far, no arrests have been made.

Thousands of US and British troops are still searching
Afghanistan for Osama bin Laden and members of his al-Qaida
network. Valiant Strike has resulted in several arrests and the
discovery of large amounts of weapons and ammunition.

Meanwhile, also in Kandahar, relief operations by the
International Committee of the Red Cross were put on hold after
a Swiss water engineer was shot by unidentified gunmen.

Ricardo Munguia, 39, was the first foreign aid worker killed in
Afghanistan since the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001.

The Red Cross, who has since suspended its operations across
Afghanistan, said gunmen intercepted two ICRC cars at midday
yesterday on the dirt road to Kandahar.

The cars were returning from Tarin Kot in Uruzgan province,
where Mr Munguia was developing water wells.

The gunmen shot him in the head, burned one of the cars and
freed the two Afghans accompanying him with a warning not to
work for foreigners again, according to residents of Tarin Kot.

"He was shot in cold blood," said Red Cross spokeswoman
Annick Bouvier in Geneva.

Several aid organizations have pulled out or scaled back
operations in northern Afghanistan after repeated attacks and
threats, including the rape last year of an American aid worker.

guardian.co.uk



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)4/10/2003 2:23:31 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 

(CBS) An American warplane mistakenly bombed a house, killing 11
civilians near Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan, the U.S.
military said Wednesday.


cbsnews.com

The killings in Shkin, 130 miles south of Kabul, happened after unidentified assailants attacked a checkpoint of Afghan soldiers allied with American forces near the town, the military said in a written statement.

Two Harrier attack aircraft were called in and spotted two groups of five to 10 enemy fighters each. The jets attacked one of the groups with their cannons.

One of the planes then dropped a 1,000-pound laser-guided bomb. "Unfortunately,
that weapon missed its intended target," Central Command spokesman
Lt. Ryan FitzGerald told CBS News Radio.


"We do not target civilians intentionally," he said. "It's a tragic accident when things like this happen."

Four Afghan fighters were injured in the initial fighting and evacuated to a nearby U.S. base, the U.S. military said. They were in stable condition.

No U.S. soldiers were injured. It was not clear what happened to the enemy fighters.

The last major civilian casualties caused by American-led forces in Afghanistan occurred on July 1, when an Air Force AC-130 gunship attacked several villages in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province. Forty-eight civilians were killed and 117 were wounded, Afghan officials said.

Survivors said most of the dead were women and children who were attending a wedding in the town of Deh Rawood. They said the only gunfire from the area came from celebrants shooting their rifles into the air.

More than 10,000 foreign troops - 8,000 of them American - have been hunting down rebel fighters from the former Taliban regime, the al Qaeda network and their allies, including former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

There have been several rocket attacks and ambushes in recent weeks near Shkin, a key border crossing point from Pakistan. U.S. military officials believe rebel groups are launching incursions into Afghanistan from Pakistan.

Afghan authorities say Taliban remnants are reorganizing in an effort to destabilize the fledgling government of U.S.-backed President Hamid Karzai.

Southern Afghanistan in particular has been wracked by attacks in the last few weeks by suspected Taliban fighters. An International Red Cross worker was killed, and a U.S. military convoy ambushed. Two U.S. servicemen died in that attack.

Also Wednesday, Afghan authorities dispatched a team of mediators to northwestern Afghanistan to defuse tensions between two rival factions that clashed the day before.

Forces loyal to ethnic Uzbek warlord Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum and those of his Tajik rival, Gen. Atta Mohammed, battled with automatic weapons for four hours Tuesday in Maimana, the capital of Faryab province, said Sayed Noor Ullah, one of Dostum's senior officials.

There were no immediate reports of casualties and it was not clear what sparked the fighting, Ullah said by telephone from the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Maimana was quiet on Wednesday, he said.

Dostum and Mohammed agreed to work together after the Taliban government fell in 2001, but battles have broken out repeatedly between the two sides.

Ullah characterized Tuesday's skirmish as a "local dispute" between two commanders - Dostum's Mohammad Hashim and Mohammed's Gulam Farooq.



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)4/14/2003 1:25:02 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
Conquest and Neglect
The New York Times

April 11, 2003

By PAUL KRUGMAN

Credit where credit is due: the hawks were right to say that a whiff
of precision-guided grapeshot would lead to the collapse of Saddam
Hussein's regime. But even skeptics about this war expected
a military victory. ("Of course we'll win on the battlefield, probably with ease" was
the opening line of my start-of-the-war column.) Instead,
we worried - and continue to worry - about what would follow. As another skeptic,
Michael Kinsley of Slate, wrote yesterday: "I do hope to be proven wrong.
But it hasn't happened yet."

Why worry? I won't pretend to have any insights into what is going on
in the minds of the Iraqi people. But there is a pattern to the Bush
administration's way of doing business that does not bode
well for the future - a pattern of conquest followed by malign neglect.

One has to admit that the Bush people are very good
at conquest, military and political. They focus all their attention
on an issue; they pull out all
the stops; they don't worry about breaking the rules.
This technique brought them victory in the Florida
recount battle, the passage of the 2001 tax
cut, the fall of Kabul, victory in the midterm elections,
and the fall of Baghdad.


But after the triumph, when it comes time to take care of what they've won,
their attention wanders, and things go to pot.

The most obvious example is Afghanistan, the land
the Bush administration forgot.
Most of the country
is back under the control of fundamentalist
warlords; unpaid soldiers and policemen are deserting in droves.
(Remember that the Bush administration forgot to include
any Afghan aid in its
latest budget.)


President Hamid Karzai's brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai,
told an Associated Press reporter: "It is like I
am seeing the same movie twice and no one is
trying to fix the problem. What was promised to Afghans
with the collapse of the Taliban was a new life of hope and change.
But what was delivered?
Nothing. Everyone is back in business."

The same pattern can be seen on the economic front.

President Bush won a great triumph in 2001 when he pushed through a huge tax cut -
claiming that his plan was just the medicine to cure the economy's ills.
What has happened since?

The answer is that things have gradually fallen apart.
There was one quarter of good growth, early in 2002 - and there were cries of triumph over
the policy's success. After that, however, things went steadily wrong.
Growth was too slow to create jobs: at the end of 2002, after a year of
"recovery," fewer people were working than at the end of 2001.

And in the last two months the situation has deteriorated rapidly.
In February and March the U.S. economy lost 465,000 jobs, bringing the total job
loss since the recession officially began in March 2001 to more than two million.

At this point the employment decline has been bigger, and has gone on longer,
than the slump that took place during the first Bush administration.
And there's no sign of an upturn: new claims for unemployment
insurance are still running well above the level that would signal an improving labor
market.

Some hope that the economy will turn around
of its own accord - that consumers and businesses, relieved that
the war has gone well, will begin
spending freely. But hope is not a plan. What is the plan?

The answer seems to be that there is no plan for
the economy. Instead, the White House is fixated on
achieving another political triumph - the
elimination of taxes on dividends - that has little or no
relevance to our current economic troubles.

I could demonstrate this irrelevance by going through
an economic analysis, but here's a telling political clue:
USA Today reports that faced with
concerns in Congress about budget deficits,
the administration has indicated that it is
willing to consider a phase-in of its dividend plan.

That is, it's willing to forgo immediate tax cuts - the one piece
of its proposal that might actually help the economy now - in order to be able to pass
its long-run proposal intact, and hence claim total victory.

The scary thing is that this slash-and-burn approach
to governing may continue to work for Mr. Bush's people
because the initial triumphs get all the
headlines. Unfortunately, the rest of the world has
to live in the wreckage they leave behind.


nytimes.com
Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)7/8/2003 10:44:02 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
Kandahar berates Straw for a leftover life of gun law and broken promises


" The Taliban are still a menacing presence in Kandahar province,
travel is hazardous, corruption is endemic, opium production
dominates economic life and a warlord, Gul Agha Sherzai, not
the central government, is the provincial governor."


Ewen MacAskill in Kandahar
Wednesday July 2, 2003
The Guardian

guardian.co.uk

The foreign secretary, Jack Straw, having completed a round of
diplomatic talks in Kabul on Monday, said he wanted to confront
the reality of life in Afghanistan. He got his wish yesterday.


He left the relative stability of the capital to fly to Kandahar, the
country's second-biggest city and the former heartland of the
Taliban, to check reports that the country outside Kabul is in a
state of lawlessness.

In Kandahar he came face-to-face with the scale of the problems
the US and Britain have to deal with 18 months after the Taliban
were overthrown.

The Taliban are still a menacing presence in Kandahar province,
travel is hazardous, corruption is endemic, opium production
dominates economic life and a warlord, Gul Agha Sherzai, not
the central government, is the provincial governor.


The night before Mr Straw arrived in Kandahar a grenade
exploded in the Abdurrab mosque, injuring 19 people. The
provincial government, the police and Mr Straw blame the
Taliban. The mosque is the base of Mullah Abdullah Fyaz, an
arch-critic of the Taliban.

Mr Straw stopped to visit a US base where six of the most
seriously wounded were being treated. He spoke briefly to one:
the others were unconscious. He said afterwards: "It is strange
again that the victims of the Taliban extremists are always likely
to be fellow Muslims."

Lack of law and order was the main complaint at a meeting
between Mr Straw and 100 tribal leaders held in the open air in
Mr Sherzai's compound.

In comments echoed by other leaders, one said: "The promises
and commitments that Blair made and that are in the Bonn
Accord (the framework for Afghanistan's political future agreed in
December 2001) have not been met yet.

"There is no security, there is unemployment, we are still living
under the gun, and majority rights are trampled underfoot."

The UN and most aid organisations have not returned to the city
since a fatal attack on a Red Cross worker on the road from
Kandahar earlier this year. An attempt to assassinate President
Hamid Karzai and Mr Sherzai was made in the city last year.

Mr Straw told the tribal leaders: "I promise I will take away these
important messages and that they will be acted upon. Everyone
has named security as the number one issue and we fully
accept that."

He added: "You need a well-trained police force and, sadly, an
army, and good equipment and guns."

As he was leaving the meeting, one of the tribal leaders alarmed
Mr Straw's bodyguards by standing in front of him, shouting
excitedly and waving his arms about, forcing the Foreign
Secretary to lift an arm in protection.

A spokesman for the provincial government, Khalid Pashtoon,
said the tribal leader had been emotional rather than hostile on
the security issue.

Mr Straw encountered Afghan reality again later when he visited
a clinic run by women to help overcome the country's desperate
child mortality rate. Of the nine midwives he spoke to, at least
four had lost a husband or father or other close relative during
the 23 years of war.

According to Afghan journalists, Mr Straw is the first senior
western politician to visit Kandahar since the fall of the Taliban.



To: Mephisto who wrote (5777)7/8/2003 10:53:24 PM
From: Mephisto  Read Replies (7) | Respond to of 15516
 
Afghanistan's Future, Lost in the Shuffle

"Why are the Americans helping President Hamid Karzai
and helping his enemies, the warlords, too?"


By SARAH CHAYES

The New York Times
July 1, 2003

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan
Ten miles outside this dust-blown city, the historical capital of Afghanistan,
gunmen belonging to the local warlord guard the airport, which
American forces use as a base. The hefty fee the guards
get from the United States has allowed them to build
a marble-faced barracks nearby.


Kandaharis, baffled, keep asking me,
"Why are the Americans helping President Hamid Karzai
and helping his enemies, the warlords, too?"
To
them the problem with this practice is clear: United States
policy is in danger of failing because America won't stop hedging its bets. At stake is not
just the future of Afghanistan, but a whole region's hopes
of escaping a 30-year nightmare. And ultimately, what happens in Afghanistan will shape
relations between the Muslim world and the West.

The hedging of bets has taken many forms since the fall
of the Taliban a year and a half ago: a dizzying succession of officers at the United State
Embassy for the first six months; the lack of any reconstruction
projects outside Kabul until after the grand council chose Mr. Karzai as
transitional president; and later, international donors' obsession
with quick-impact projects, known as quips, that didn't cost much and wouldn't be
much of a loss if they failed.

Afghans, meanwhile, have been waiting for major reconstruction
that would make a real difference. The Kabul-Kandahar road, on which work has
only just begun, has become a cause célèbre. What was
once a six-hour trip to the capital to deliver, say, Kandahar grapes, and the exquisitely
fragrant raisins they dry into, is now a three-day trek - and 72 hours on
the road means grape mash. A good road to Kabul would make all the
difference to Kandahar's merchants, and jumpstart a whole region's economy.

And what about other projects that would substantially improve Afghan lives?
There's the road to Urozgan, an isolated town that is easy prey to
Islamic extremists and is at minimum a nine-hour drive from Kandahar
along a ribbon of iron-hard dirt. The Helmand Province irrigation system,
built by American engineers in the late 1950's, now lies crippled
after years of neglect and Soviet sabotage. Donors, however, are loath to commit
their money to big projects like these.

But the most dangerous form of bet-hedging has been American
support for local strongmen. Eager for Afghan forces to help fight the Taliban, the
United States brought these warlords back from exile after 9/11.
What began as a relationship of convenience was cemented in a brotherhood of
arms, as United States troops fraternized with the exotic fighters
they had bivouacked with. Because they had reaped weapons and cash in the
bargain, the warlords were able to impose themselves as provincial governors,
despite being reviled by the Afghan people, as every conversation
I've had and study I've done demonstrates.


Their positions have been reinforced by international donors who,
for convenience's sake, distribute much of their reconstruction assistance
through the warlords. The donors' reasoning sounds plausible:
"So-and-so is the governor," numerous United States officials have told me. "The day
President Karzai removes him, we will support that decision.
But until then, we have to work with him." It's a bit disingenuous, since this
explanation ignores the way these men became governors.

It also begs the truth. In late May, President Karzai summoned
to Kabul the 12 governors who control Afghanistan's strategic borders.
For the previous fortnight, Afghan and international officials say,
he had been preparing to dismiss the most egregious offenders: four or five governors who
are running their provinces like personal fiefs, who withhold vast
customs revenue from the central government, who truck with meddlesome
foreign governments, who oppress their people, who turn a blind eye
to extremist activities while trumpeting their anti-Taliban bona fides. United
States officials, saying they were taken aback by the scope
of the Afghan government's plan, discouraged him. The plan was scrapped, and the
Afghan government made do with an agreement in which the recalcitrant
governors promised to hand over customs revenue owed the central
government.

Washington, in other words, wouldn't stop hedging its bets.
The United States backs Mr. Karzai, but it can't relinquish
its alliances with the
enemies of all he stands for.


But President Karzai bears part of the blame. He, too,
has been hedging his bets. His endlessly polite interactions with his predator governors are
confusing his constituents. Although Washington thought firing half
a dozen governors was too much, it would have supported the dismissal of one
or two, and Mr. Karzai wasted a golden opportunity by refusing to do that.

The problem is, no matter what they say, these warlords aren't going to behave.
They are not reformable, because it is not in their interest to
reform. The warlords' livelihood depends on extremism and lawlessness.
That's how they draw their pay; that's what allows them to rule by the gun
in an unofficial martial law, looting villages under the pretext of mopping-up operations,
extracting taxes and bribes, crushing opponents.

The American alliance with warlords also discourages ordinary Afghans
from helping rebuild their country. And without the people, the process is
doomed.


Afghans I have met and worked with share a fierce desire to live
in a normal country. They have demonstrated that desire. In the face of
tremendous adversity, they have managed to open schools,
clean irrigation ditches, plant trees and dig sewers. But seeing warlords regain power is
making people waver. I have found in my work that more and
more Afghans are withdrawing to the sidelines, subtracting their life force from the
battle to reconstruct Afghanistan.

They are also increasingly wary about the elections next year.
At a recent meeting here with representatives from the commission that's drafting a
new constitution, a nursing student asked, "How can we freely
elect our representatives with warlords controlling the countryside?"

Despite American officials' misgivings, it would not be so difficult
to remove the warlord-governors. Their lack of popular support means no one
would fly to their defense were they dismissed. The mere display
of American backing for a plan to oust them would be enough to cow their paid
liegemen. In the interest of offering Afghanistan a chance at a future,
and opening the door to a new kind of relationship with the Muslim world,
the United States should back any future decision to remove the warlord-governors.

For despite the rocky start to reconstructing postwar Afghanistan,
an ember of hope for the country's future is still burning. Several high-caliber
diplomats are now at the American embassy. American military commanders,
who by training focus on battle plans, have begun to realize that their
activities can have unintended political consequences if they
do not have intimate knowledge of the people they are dealing with. These officers
have grown more alert to the ways in which local warlords may be using them.
In Kandahar, the base commander has begun meeting with tribal
elders to forge links with the population. In other words, the United States
is finally positioned to do a good job here.

When President Bush decided to invade Iraq, he promised that Afghanistan
would not be forgotten. If that promise is to mean anything, America's
accumulated experience in Afghanistan must be acted upon, unequivocally.
It's time to stop hedging bets.

Sarah Chayes, a former NPR reporter, is field director of Afghans for Civil Society,
an organization that sponsors democracy initiatives.


nytimes.com Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company