Yes, the tactics to get the Terrorists are different than the ones we need to do "Slum Clearance" in the ME. We know how to take down these ME states, but we are "Babes in the Woods," I fear, at setting up the right structure to take out the Terrorists. So we will bumble through to some sort of a conclusion with the ME states, but we need to do some long term evaluation of the Terrorist fight.
It’s dangerous, I think, to assume that we know how to deal with the State actors. So far we have showed only one method, a crude and extreme one that will not be useful in many of the more complicated situations. It worked in Afghanistan, where it was appropriate. It may accomplish something in Iraq, where its appropriateness is debatable. Beyond those, there are very few places where it will do us much good.
We have situations to manage in Saudi Arabia, in Pakistan, in Iran, in many others. If we do not manage them well, our war on terror will be seriously compromised. In most of these cases, invasion and forced regime change will not be high on the list of practical options. We will need more subtle methods, and so far we have shown little command of those. Methods of similar subtlety will be required to manage our activities in areas where military force has been brought to bear, in Afghanistan and eventually, it seems likely, in Iraq.
Whether we like it or not, our success or failure in the post-Iraq phase of the War on Terror and Middle East Policy (they overlap a good deal) will probably not depend on our ability to bring massive military force to bear. Once Saddam is down, we will have done most of what we can do with muscle. The next stage will be won or lost with brains, and will require, above all, the ability to ditch ideological convictions and focus on pragmatic goals. I’m not sure, frankly, that our team is up to that. I don’t think “bumbling through” is going to cut it.
I think we need a well thought out "Clearing House" that gathers up info on all of these people, processes it, and keeps tabs. We are going to have to do a constant, world wide, "sifting" of possible terrorists, their friends and relatives, etc, from now on long, long, into the future. Probably forever.
It should not be based on present Police Forces, because it is not going to be an "arrest, try and sentence" program. It is going to be an "capture, detain, or kill" program. We don't need Lawyers and Police, we need hunters and killers.
I’ve been saying this for a long time. I’ve also been saying that if it is to be effective, such an effort will ultimately have to be deployed inside the US and inside our close allies. Whether we like it or not, liberal democracies are ideal shelters for terrorists, and I suspect that many of our most dangerous enemies are not in the Middle East at all.
This type of program can go "rogue" easily, so the oversight will need to be tight, and the longer the program goes on, the more pressure that will be exerted to stop it.
I worry less about it “going rogue” than about its potential for abuse by government. Not a sort of apparatus I’d want in the hands of someone like Mr. Ashcroft.
My ideal vision for this effort is not one of a permanent institution. If I had my way, purely in the realm of fantasy, the first and by far the longest phase of the operation would be surveillance and penetration. I would have us do nothing but watch and wait, even to the extent of bypassing opportunities to snatch or kill key players. It would help to put on a show of ineffectual flailing.
All the while, though, we would be putting the puzzle together, and when the puzzle was complete, we would move. The idea would be to almost simultaneously roll up the entire network outside the ME and as much as possible of the networks in the ME. The emphasis, though, should be on degrading the terrorists’ offensive capability, and that means taking out their people outside the ME. Even if we kill Osama and the other leaders, cells outside the region can still attack us, and there will be new titular leaders quickly enough. Take away the cells outside, and Saddam can sit in his cave forever. It sounds backwards, but it’s not: there’s an infinite supply of would-be leaders in the ME, and a very limited supply of followers that are in a position to hurt us at home. The latter are the ones we need to remove.
One huge advantage of this sort of operation is that it could be quietly, and hopefully permanently, disbanded once the rollup was concluded. The idea of a permanent or long-lived Government entity tasked with capturing, detaining, and killing people is not one I like; the potential for abuse is just too great.
Of course it won’t happen – for one thing, we will never accomplish the necessary level of secrecy – but it’s a nice dream. |
