To: frankw1900 who wrote (68287 ) 1/24/2003 5:01:57 PM From: frankw1900 Respond to of 281500 CFR Memorandum TIMELINE and MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUP [I had to put the Timeline table's three parts on end. They are separated by the single lines. Note that duration of the phases is not fixed. In both the memorandum and and discussion the members very strongly emphasized that the approach was "objectives-driven." I think the Timeline is a pretty good rack on which to hang discussion of what needs doing in post-Saddam Iraq and its various kinds of costs and risks.I forgot to hit the <publish> button before I went to bed. Sorry about that. ]THE THREE-PHASED APPROACH =========================================================I. Short-Term Emergency Transitional Government with Iraqi Advisers Duration* : Up to 2 months following cessation of hostilitiesLed by : Commander U.S./coalition forcesKey Security Objectives: WMD disarmament Implementation of cessation of hostilities agreement Establishment/maintenance of law and order Defense of Iraq's territorial integrity: protection of borders/key energy production centers Deploy coalition forces to key population center Obtain UNSCR outlining post-Saddam broad objectives Continue close consultations with Iraqi leaders inside and outside the country Identification and detention of senior-most supporters of regime Develop criteria for de-Saddamization Lay groundwork for the assembly of UN-supervised Iraqi interim administration Establish Iraqi advisory committees throughout Baghdad and provinces, to include members of the external opposition Distribution of humanitarian assistance Reconfigure oil-for-food distributive mechanism Resumption of basic services Protection of refugees and control of refugee flows Open/protect key lines of communication and transportation Staunch decreasing oil production, led by Iraqi experts Clarify existing oil production agreementsKey Economic Objectives: Open/protect key lines of communication and transportation Staunch decreasing oil production, led by Iraqi experts Clarify existing oil production agreementsKey Governance Objectives: Obtain UNSCR outlining post-Saddam broad objectives Continue close consultations with Iraqi leaders inside and outside the country Identification and detention of senior-most supporters of regime Develop criteria for de-Saddamization Lay groundwork for the assembly of UN-supervised Iraqi interim administration Establish Iraqi advisory committees throughout Baghdad and provinces, to include members of the external opposition Distribution of humanitarian assistance Reconfigure oil-for-food distributive mechanism Resumption of basic services Protection of refugees and control of refugee flows ____________________________________________________II. Medium-Term Internationally and UN- Supervised Iraqi Government Duration* : 3-24 monthsLed by : Iraqi leadership working closely with UN secretary-general arepresentative and senior U.S. deputyKey Security Objectives: Finalization of arrangements for long-term monitoring and dismantling of WMD capabilities Internationally supervised re-training of Iraqi military Internationally supervised re-training of Iraqi police forceKey Economic Objectives: Support the establishment of an Iraqi-led international consortium to address Iraq's oil industry needs Support Iraqi efforts to reach pre-1990 oil production level Identification and prioritization of reconstruction and rehabilitation projects Reschedule foreign debt Redesign formula for reparationsKey Governance Objectives: Support removal of senior Ba'ath leaders (led by Iraqis and international community) Support resumption of government operations Conduct census Preparations of legal proceedings, with Iraqi and international participation, for those accused of crimes against humanity Appointment of Iraqi Consultative Assembly Preservation of internal cohesion/territorial integrity Local and parliamentary elections _______________________________________________________III. Long-Term Sovereign Iraqi Government Duration*: 2 yearsLed by: Fully sovereign Iraqi leadershipKey Security Objectives: Iraq free of WMD No longer threatening neighbors Routinization of WMD disarmament monitoring programs Consolation of Iraqi security arrangements Integration into international communityKey Economic Objectives: An economy based on free market principles A rehabilitated oil sectorKey Governance Objectives: A government based on democratic principles A government representative of Iraq's diverse population True power- and revenue-sharing Upholding fundamental individual and group human rights An all Iraqi-led government A more binding Iraqi constitution Security Council resolution acknowledging completion of the process and allowing for full re-entry into the international community ========================================================= * The Working Group advocates pursuing an objectives-driven approach to Iraq. Achieving key objectives is more important than the estimated duration. Note: All activity must be accompanied by an active U.S. public diplomacy campaign to explain to the Iraqi people and the international community what is happening in Iraq along with U.S. objectives and intentions. MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUP RAAD ALKADIRI, PFC Energy JAMES K. BISHOP GRAHAM M. DAY, Deputy High Representative, Banja Luka Region ROBERT P. DEVECCI, Council on Foreign Relations MICHAEL SCOTT DORAN, Princeton University HELENA KANE FINN, Council on Foreign Relations F. GREGORY GAUSE III, University of Vermont AHMED HASHIM, Naval War College ARTHUR C. HELTON, Council on Foreign Relations YOUSSEF M. IBRAHIM, Council on Foreign Relations MARTIN S. INDYK, The Brookings Institution AMY MYERS JAFFE, The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy DAVID KAY, The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies JUDITH KIPPER, Council on Foreign Relations RICHARD W. MURPHY, Council on Foreign Relations WILLIAM L. NASH, Council on Foreign Relations DAVID L. PHILLIPS, Council on Foreign Relations THOMAS R. PICKERING, The Boeing Company JAMES A. PLACKE, Cambridge Energy Research Associates KENNETH M. POLLACK, The Brookings Institution RAY TAKEYH, Yale University PUNEET TALWAR, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations BERNARD E. TRAINOR, Council on Foreign Relations While not necessarily agreeing with all the particulars, the signatories endorse the overall conclusions of the report. Particular thanks goes to Rachel Abramson, Deputy Director of Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. NOTES [1] Remarks to joint session of Congress, November 18, 1943.