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To: Rascal who wrote (444)	2/10/2003 6:30:54 PM
From: Win Smith	Respond to of 603

Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq By: Frank G. Wisner, Jr., Edward P. Djerejian cfr.org [ This seems somewhat familiar. I will clip this part relevant to past arguments I've had elsewhere. I would cross reference this article with the Langewiesche Atlantic article about US troops in Bosnia, Peace is Hell theatlantic.com . Somehow, I don't think things will work out anywhere near as simply as the war architects would have it. ] THE LURE OF IRAQI OIL: REALITIES AND CONSTRAINTS There has been a great deal of wishful thinking about Iraqi oil, including a widespread belief that oil revenues will help defray war costs and the expense of rebuilding the Iraqi state and economy. Notwithstanding the value of Iraq’s vast oil reserves, there are severe limits on them both as a source of funding for post-conflict reconstruction efforts and as the key driver of future economic development. Put simply, we do not anticipate a bonanza. The U.S. approach should be guided by four principles: • Iraqis maintain control of their own oil sector; • a significant portion of early proceeds is spent on the rehabilitation of the oil industry; • there should be a level playing field for all international players to participate in future repair, development, and exploration efforts; and • any proceeds are fairly shared by all of Iraq’s citizens. If depoliticized, the UN oil-for-food distribution mechanism is a useful starting point for distributing oil revenues throughout the country. It is important to stress that Iraqis have the capability to manage the future direction of their oil industry. A heavy American hand will only convince them, and the rest of the world, that the operation against Iraq was undertaken for imperialist, rather than disarmament, reasons. It is in America’s interest to discourage such misperceptions.While Iraqi technocrats are likely to be attracted to American technology and assistance, the United States should be prepared that negotiations with future Iraqi representatives on foreign participation will be prolonged and hard-fought. In addition, Iraq’s highly experienced, nationalistic oil executives will be motivated by Iraqi national interests and are unlikely to agree to one-sided terms that transfer effective control of Iraq’s oil reserves to foreigners. How quickly Iraq’s oil production capacity of between 2.6 and 2.8 million barrels per day (bpd) can be increased depends on several variables, such as the political environment that develops after the war and the price of oil. U.S. policy should be informed by a realistic assessment of how Iraq will attract the estimated $30 billion to $40 billion in new investment it needs to rehabilitate active wells and to develop new fields. Iraq’s oil industry is unlikely to be able to immediately deliver recovery in oil production and, depending on damage sustained during hostilities, may find its ability to export oil reduced. It is in dire straits with existing production levels declining at a rate of 100,000 bpd annually. Significant technical challenges exist to stanching the decline and eventually increasing production. Returning to Iraq’s pre-1990 levels of 3.5 million bpd will requireX massive repairs and reconstruction of major export facilities, costing several billions of dollars and taking months, if not years. Service contractors are likely to secure most initial oil-sector contracts. The best-case projections of 6 million bpd will take several years to achieve and depend on a multitude of factors, including ongoing international oil-market conditions. Any damage done to the industry during conflict will have to be addressed immediately in order to ensure that oil revenues continue to flow back to the Iraqi people. American military planners must be well briefed on Iraq’s oil infrastructure, in order to avoid inadvertently harming Iraq’s recovery. Finally, the legality of post-sanctions contracts awarded in recent years will have to be evaluated. Prolonged legal conflicts over contracts could delay the development of important fields in Iraq and hamper a new government’s ability to expand production. It may be advisable to pre-establish a legitimate (preferably UNmandated) legal framework for vetting pre-hostility exploration agreements. THE BURDEN OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY Leaving aside immediate humanitarian needs, experts estimate that reconstruction will cost between $25 billion and $100 billion. Repairing existing oil-export installations will require $5 billion, and restoring Iraq’s electrical-power infrastructure to its pre-1990 capacity could cost $20 billion. Given that Iraq’s annual oil revenues are currently in the neighborhood of $10 billion, significant financial support will have to be generated by neighboring states, multilateral institutions, and Western partners. The scale of Iraq’s problems makes it essential that the administration move to swiftly integrate development planning by the UN Development Programme and the World Bank with its plans for immediate humanitarian assistance. Mindful that the new Iraqi regime could be crippled by its foreign debt of upwards of $60 billion, the administration should seek to lighten that burden by convening the earliest possible meetings of Iraq’s creditors in the London and Paris Clubs. Likewise, the United States should encourage delays in making reparations payments and repayment of other debts, including those owed to Russia and other major debt holders.

To: Rascal who wrote (444)	2/11/2003 2:17:18 PM
From: Win Smith	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 603

A Failure of Skepticism in Powell Coverage fair.org Disproof of previous claims underlines need for scrutiny [ So, I had to crib this from your post on that other thread, now that the normal ethnic slurage campaign there has expanded to include France and Germany, I think I'm going to avoid it for a while. Personally, I always assumed that Powell presented something between a prosecution brief and the next stage of the war marketing plan, the details I was familiar with seemed to be a rehash. Buildings in a satellite photo could be anything, it's impossible to judge from the outside. Good to see somebody looked a little closer. ] Journalists should always be wary of implying unquestioning faith in official assertions; recent history is full of official claims based on satellite and other intelligence data that later turned out to be false or dubious. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the first Bush administration rallied support for sending troops to Saudi Arabia by asserting that classified satellite photos showed the Iraqi army mobilizing on the Saudi border. This claim was later discredited when the St. Petersburg Times obtained commercial satellite photos showing no such build-up (Second Front, John R. MacArthur). The Clinton administration justified a cruise missile attack on the Sudan by saying that intelligence showed that the target was a chemical weapons factory; later investigation showed it to be a pharmaceutical factory (London Independent, 5/4/99). In the present instance, journalists have a responsibility to put U.S. intelligence claims in context by pointing out that a number of allegations recently made by the current administration have already been debunked. Among them: # Following a CIA warning in October that commercial satellite photos showed Iraq was "reconstituting" its clandestine nuclear weapons program at Al Tuwaitha, a former nuclear weapons complex, George W. Bush told a Cincinnati audience on October 7 (New York Times, 10/8/02): "Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of his nuclear program in the past." When inspectors returned to Iraq, however, they visited the Al Tuwaitha site and found no evidence to support Bush's claim. "Since December 4 inspectors from [Mohamed] ElBaradei's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have scrutinized that vast complex almost a dozen times, and reported no violations," according to an Associated Press report (1/18/03). # In September and October U.S. officials charged that conclusive evidence existed that Iraq was preparing to resume manufacturing banned ballistic missiles at several sites. In one such report the CIA said "the only plausible explanation" for a new structure at the Al Rafah missile test site was that Iraqis were developing banned long-range missiles (Associated Press, 1/18/03). But CIA suggestions that facilities at Al Rafah, in addition to sites at Al Mutasim and Al Mamoun, were being used to build prohibited missile systems were found to be baseless when U.N. inspectors repeatedly visited each site (Los Angeles Times, 1/26/03). # British and U.S. intelligence officials said new building at Al-Qaim, a former uranium refinery in Iraq's western desert, suggested renewed Iraqi development of nuclear weapons. But an extensive survey by U.N. inspectors in December reported no violations (Associated Press, 1/18/03). # Last fall the CIA warned that "key aspects of Iraq's offensive [biological weapons] program are active and most elements are more advanced and larger" than they were pre-1990, citing as evidence renewed building at several facilities such as the Al Dawrah Vaccine Facility, the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, and the Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Plant. By mid-January, inspectors had visited all the sites many times over. No evidence was found that the facilities were being used to manufacture banned weapons (Los Angeles Times, 1/26/03). The Associated Press concluded in its January 18 analysis: "In almost two months of surprise visits across Iraq, U.N. arms monitors have inspected 13 sites identified by U.S. and British intelligence agencies as major 'facilities of concern,' and reported no signs of revived weapons building." Regarding the number of allegations made by the Bush and Blair governments that have washed out on inspection, former U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Iraq Hans von Sponeck told the British newspaper The Mirror (2/6/03) following Powell’s U.N. presentation: "The inspectors have found nothing which was in the Bush and Blair dossiers of last September. What happened to them? They are totally embarrassed by them. I have seen facilities in pieces in Iraq which U.S. intelligence reports say are dangerous. "The Institute of Strategic Studies referred to the Al Fallujah Three castor oil production unit and the Al Dora foot and mouth center as 'facilities of concern.' In 2002 I saw them and they were destroyed, there was nothing. All that was left were shells of buildings. This is a classic example of manipulating allegations, allegations being converted into facts." Responsible journalists should avoid playing a part in such a conversion by making a clear distinction between what has been alleged by the U.S. government and what has been independently verified.