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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (72681)	2/9/2003 8:35:13 PM
From: Hawkmoon	Respond to of 281500

Here's how we could have won in Vietnam (this model was briefly tried, then abandoned In part I can concur with the usefulness of such a program in Afghanistan. But I believe it's efficacy would be lost on the primarily urban Iraqis.. Power must flow from a Federal government, in which the various parties/interest are represented fairly in the political system. We MUST NOT encourage decentralization of political/economic power, as this will only encourage factional fighting, not unification. Vietnam was a different case because the North launched an insurgency against the South.. And the southern government was unable to protect it's outlying territories. Thus, regional and local militias were absolutely a requisite to preserving political order. For instance, the village chiefs should be given the power to arrest, try, and execute U.S. soldiers who rape local women. And I'll be damned in a local chief is given that kind of power. Let him make his case to a higher court. A US presence in any small village is a profound challenge to the authority of the local politicians, who's personal agendas don't always match the central governments. But all of this will be outlined in an SOF agreement anyway... Let the civil affairs folks handle it.. Hawk

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (72681)	2/14/2003 2:50:47 AM
From: Bilow	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Hi Jacob Snyder; Re your fascinating observation on strategies against guerilla warfare: "Here's how we could have won in Vietnam (this model was briefly tried, then abandoned even though it worked, because it was too strange to be accepted by the military/civilian decision-makers) ..." I think the reason this wasn't used is not because it is so strange, but instead because it leads to very high American casualties. You end up with huge numbers of easily overrun targets, and it provides the enemy with an opportunity to obtain local advantages. Even in Vietnam it was the constant objective to minimize the body bag count, even if that meant losing the war. The real problem for us in Vietnam was that it was not a place that was important enough to justify the losses that holding on to it would require. I think the military knew what was needed for victory, and so did the civilian leadership. But no one wanted to pay the butcher's bill, so instead they only tried to postpone defeat. (And therefore put the onus of the inevitable loss onto a different administration.) -- Carl