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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Maurice Winn who wrote (72884)	2/10/2003 3:12:30 PM
From: michael97123	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Don’t Open a Credibility Gap Fareed Zacharia Newsweek If it turns out the president is bluffing about ‘serious consequences,’ what will happen the next time the United States makes threats? CREDIBILITY, THEY CONCLUDED, was a meaningless idea. But right now with Iraq, the need to maintain resolve seems obvious. Whatever one’s initial views about taking on Iraq—and I have been for it—I cannot see how America can back down without damaging its, well, credibility. Imagine the situation. A week from now, pressured by France, Germany and Russia, the United States decides to give the inspectors more time. It announces that, come to think of it, Saddam isn’t that much of a threat. Though the president of the United States has said repeatedly that he would have “zero tolerance” for Iraqi deception, he didn’t really mean it. When Colin Powell persuaded the United Nations to pass a resolution telling Saddam that he had a “final” opportunity to disarm or face “serious consequences,” it was a bluff. (The “serious consequences” turn out to be that the United Nations sends in a few dozen more inspectors.) What would happen the next time the United States makes threats? And what about America’s allies? Washington has pushed countries like Kuwait, Qatar and Turkey to stick their necks out and support it in a very dangerous neighborhood. European states like Spain, Italy and Poland have dared to break with the Franco-German juggernaut, a move that could cost them dearly within the European Union. All these leaders have taken risks abroad but even greater risks at home, where the war is deeply unpopular. Tony Blair has supported American action despite the fact that a majority of his cabinet, his party, his Parliament and his country oppose a war. If now the administration were to cut and run, what would America’s reputation be with these leaders? If a year from now Washington went to them and said, “We must come together on a policy. This time we’re really serious,” would anyone listen? Think also about the effect it would have on countries like France and Russia. Would they not decide that undermining American policy works? All they have to do is wait it out and eventually the United States will change its mind. And leaving aside allies, consider the effect on the adversary. Saddam Hussein has already made clear what he believes. In his November 2002 interview with the Egyptian weekly Al Usbou, he explained, ”[T]ime is working for us. We have to buy some more time, and the American-British coalition will disintegrate because of internal reasons and because of the pressure of public opinion in the American and British street.” Beyond Saddam Hussein, what will other adversaries think of American threats? At this very moment the United States is trying to persuade another rogue regime not to acquire nuclear weapons. One of America’s foremost East Asian experts, Thomas Christensen of MIT, says, “There’s no doubt that North Korea is watching what we do in Iraq very closely. It would be incredibly dangerous to back down now.” In Vietnam, America had staked its reputation in a guerrilla war against an utterly determined enemy consumed with nationalist passion. It could not win and should have come to that realization more quickly. But even in Vietnam there was a case for credibility—though it got greatly exaggerated. In Henry Kissinger’s new book, “Ending the Vietnam War” (really a compilation of everything he’s written on the subject), he points out that after World War II the United States proved—in places like Greece, Berlin and South Korea—that it stuck by its friends. It could not simply abandon South Vietnam after four presidents of both political parties had declared that its survival was crucial to American national security. When America did leave, the international climate was affected. As Kissinger notes, within six months of Saigon’s fall, a Cuban expeditionary force appeared in Angola. Soviet and Cuban adventurism across the Third World picked up substantially. Three years later the Shah of Iran was toppled. Then U.S. diplomats were taken hostage in Tehran. Of course, local politics contributed to all this, but Kissinger wonders how much these developments were influenced by the fact that America’s enemies were increasingly convinced “that the wave of history was on their side.” A senior Asian diplomat told me recently that prior to this month he had never fully understood the saying “When you have drawn your sword you must use it.” “I always thought the phrase didn’t make any sense,” he said. “One could always just put the sword back in. But watching the current confrontation between the United States and Iraq, it’s clear. You’ve drawn your sword. Now you must use it.” © 2003 Newsweek, Inc.

To: Maurice Winn who wrote (72884)	2/10/2003 3:50:55 PM
From: Elsewhere	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Maurice, <With the high unemployment in Germany, are there any moves or suggestions to "Put them in uniform"?> I haven't seen indications that violent extremism is on the rise. Yes, there's always a core of Nazis and of anarchists and communists but they have always been there. <Young, male Germans seem not to be thrilled by immigrants and the overall political situation.> The majority of the immigrants are Turkish, and they in turn have been in Germany in the second or even third generation. The ones who were born in Germany have two mother languages and mix with German youth. For every fist fight between a German and Turkish guy you can probably find ten German-Turkish love affairs. <Is East Germany more or less fully reabsorbed and culturally acclimatized?> East Germany continues to have major economic problems, beyond 20% unemployment. Partially it is "solved" by a migration of young people to the West. Strange pictures of ghost towns where sometimes blocks of buildings have to be demolished because nobody is living in them any more! <Nervously waiting for Germany to once again do their thing.> I am sorry to report that Germany is no longer what it used to be. The "roaring 20ies", the Germany of Max Planck, Albert Einstein, Fritz Lang, Kurt Tucholsky, Marlene Dietrich is gone. Fortunately there is no Hitler either. Those posters who had the fantasies of France/Germany potentially pre-empting Bush's pre-emption have no idea of the extremely limited capabilities of today's German army. Any decent third-world dictator like Saddam would probably beat the Bundeswehr. So there's nothing to fear militarily from any German activities. The role of the anti-war protests is equally overestimated. In the 80ies there were rallies of half a million people against deployment of short-range nuclear missiles. This weekend a mere 20,000 were protesting Rumsfeld during his Munich visit - that's nothing. Basically there's a lot of indifference, no sense of urgency towards Iraq and terrorism. I ordered Unclewest's "How I prepared my family to survive a terrorist attack" booklet soon after he published it. I tried to talk with a number of people about it - nobody is interested. jj@cassandra.de