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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tekboy who wrote (75984)2/20/2003 12:59:11 PM
From: paul_philp  Respond to of 281500
 

So I think this whole issue is really, really important, that we'll be grappling with it for a long, long time, and that we don't yet really have an appropriate conceptual or policy framework for handling it.


The elephant head on the dinner table that nobody is talking about. I think it is going to be very hard on a practical level to eliminate proliferation. Knowledge is hard to contain and innovation in the hands of the desperate is a potent weapon.

Just a 9-11 woke us up to the dangers of Islamist terrorism, I am afraid that it will take a worst case scenario to muster the courage and momentum to deal with proliferation.

Paul



To: tekboy who wrote (75984)2/20/2003 1:21:22 PM
From: carranza2  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
I think we're going to need at least one big terrorist-made BOOOM someplace other than in the US before any meaningful activity towards preventing whack-jobs like Saddam, OBL, etc., from obtaining nukes takes place. The global political climate shows an appalling lack of concern on the issue. Many countries seem more interested in selling the means to a nuke than in facing up to their responsibility to prevent proliferation.

Very few have first-hand experience or memory concerning the calamitous consequences visited by even a small nuke. Until the world again sees what a nuke can do, the whack-jobs are going to be allowed to continue to pursue them. Only after one is used will the shock of the devastation they create fuel appropriate non-proliferation measures.

c2@anddon'tgemtmestartedonwhySaddamhastobekeptfromgettingone.com



To: tekboy who wrote (75984)2/20/2003 2:23:46 PM
From: Bill Ulrich  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
This is a bit dated (Jun '00) but still an interesting look at "nuclear math" — some of the factors and decision-making behind the size of our arsenal. (Blair is President of the Center for Defense Information. According to their mission statement, "a non-partisan, non-profit organization committed to independent research on the social, economic, environmental, political and military components of global security."):

cdi.org

Trapped in the Nuclear Math

By Bruce Blair, New York Times Op. Ed., June 12, 2000

Both President Clinton and Gov. George W. Bush would like the Pentagon to get along with fewer nuclear warheads, and the Russians are eager for talks to push the numbers down. But top American military officers insist that current nuclear policy prevents them from shrinking our arsenal to fewer than 2,000 to 2,500 strategic weapons -- and that going lower would threaten our security. The reason for their position is a matter of simple arithmetic, buried in the nation's strategic war plan and ultimately linked to presidential guidance.

Defense officials do not talk openly about the nuclear targets in the strategic plan. But for 25 years, beginning with a background in the Strategic Air Command, I have studied strategic policy and operations and have had extensive contacts with officials who are knowledgeable in these areas. I have been able to develop current estimates, and they lead inexorably to a conclusion that our leaders are clinging to outdated planning that helps keep an unnecessarily large number of American and Russian missiles pointed at one another on hair-trigger alert.

The strategic war plan consists of a very long list of targets in Russia and a shorter list of targets in China. The Pentagon says the United States must be able to destroy these targets to meet current presidential guidance on nuclear war planning, a directive issued in late 1997 to get the number of warheads down from even higher levels required in earlier plans.

Oddly enough, the target list has been growing instead of contracting since the last strategic arms reduction treaty, Start II, was signed in 1993. The list has grown by 20 percent over the last five years alone, according to top military and former administration officials. The vast bulk of the targets are in Russia. Three other former republics of the Soviet Union -- Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan -- were dropped from the strategic plan in 1997, yet the list of sites the Pentagon says we must be ready to destroy has grown from 2,500 in 1995 to 3,000 now.

My research and interviews indicate that there are about 2,260 so-called vital Russian targets on the list today, only 1,100 of them actual nuclear arms sites within Russia. By this calculation, we have nuclear weapons aimed at 500 "conventional" targets -- the buildings and bases of a hollow Russian army on the verge of disintegration; 160 leadership targets, like government offices and military command centers, in a country practically devoid of leadership; and 500 mostly crumbling factories that produced almost no armaments last year.

American strategic planners have historically set the level of damage that they wish to inflict on vital targets at 80 percent. This is tantamount to requiring our forces to be able to destroy 80 percent of the 2,260 Russian targets, which in turn requires the ability to deliver nearly 1,800 warheads to their targets. It is no accident that we have about 2,200 strategic warheads on alert, according to numbers provided by Strategic Command officers. Virtually all of our missiles on land are ready for launch in two minutes, and those on four submarines, two in the Atlantic and two in the Pacific, are ready to launch on 15 minutes' notice, officers say. The land-based missiles must leave the ground fast enough to be sure of being in the air before Russian missiles can destroy them.

If 1,800 warheads have to be delivered quickly, the Pentagon says, we need a larger arsenal because of the
demands of maintenance. For instance, typically 6 to 7 of the 18 nuclear-armed submarines are port-bound
at any time and cannot be counted on to survive and deliver nuclear warheads if we are attacked. Thus the
United States needs one-third more sea-based strategic weapons than it can expect to deliver in wartime.

And Russia is not our missiles' only target. Responding to the 1997 presidential guidance, the Pentagon put
China back into the strategic plan after a hiatus of about 20 years. For China, we now have two so-called
limited attack options, involving a handful of nuclear weapons on submarines and bombers, for striking
nuclear targets, leadership sites and critical industries. Compare this with scores of limited attack options
against Russia, each using from a handful of weapons to more than 100, as well as a few major attack
options, the smallest of which would send more than 1,000 strategic warheads to attack Russia's nuclear
complex.

There are also many hundreds of secondary targets in China, Iran, Iraq and North Korea that have weapons
assigned to them, though not on immediate alert, further driving up the size of the arsenal.

Add it all up, and at least 2,500 American warheads are deemed necessary to carry out nuclear war against
Russia and China, countries that Al Gore recently said represent our vital partners, not our enemies.

Getting to below 2,000 warheads will be difficult unless the target requirements are eased by new
presidential guidance. Of course they could be, if our leaders would bring our war plans up to date. No
thoughtful American general, much less any political leader, really believes that deterrence depends on the
scale of nuclear bombing with which Russia and the United States now threaten each other.

Almost without exception, our leaders regard the attack options that unleash thousands of nuclear warheads
as absurd and grotesque. They do not believe that a cold-blooded, deliberate nuclear strike by either Russia
or the United States is remotely plausible. The only circumstances for nuclear war that they do consider
plausible involve the use of one or a handful of nonstrategic weapons, like nuclear-tipped cruise missiles,
against a country other than Russia.

Deterrence would remain robust with far smaller arsenals on far lower levels of alert. The United States and
Russia should aim to cut the numbers of their nuclear weapons to the low hundreds and to take all of them
off hair-trigger alert, with a view to eventually eliminating them under existing treaty obligations. As a first
step, the United States could drop to 1,500 warheads, the ceiling the Russians are pushing for.

Such a force could consist of 10 submarines armed with a total of 480 warheads; 300 Minuteman III
land-based missiles with one warhead apiece; 20 B-2 bombers with 16 weapons apiece, for 320; and 50
B-52 bombers modified to carry 8 warheads apiece, for 400.

A better option would be to retire the B-2 and B-52 nuclear bomber force from the arsenal and have the
submarines in this mix carry 1,200 warheads. But planners cringe at the thought of removing a leg from the
vaunted triad -- the mix of missiles, submarines and bombers carrying nuclear weapons -- a vestige of cold
war rivalry between the Navy and the Air Force.

Even without relying on launch on warning, 1,500 warheads would be more than adequate to destroy 250
targets of any choice in retaliation for any surprise attack under normal conditions, and to destroy 1,000
targets in retaliation to an attack in a crisis. If the threat of this much nuclear retaliation does not deter a
prospective adversary, it is difficult to conceive of anything that would.



To: tekboy who wrote (75984)2/20/2003 3:40:40 PM
From: JohnM  Respond to of 281500
 
Thanks for the commentary on the Schell piece. It's a terrific think piece, able to do just as you've done, get one to thinking about how to categorize various positions and what the policy alternatives might be.



To: tekboy who wrote (75984)2/20/2003 4:51:23 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500
 
tb: Charlie Rose had a great interview with Stanley Hoffman last night...This Harvard professor seems to be 'a realist' and in the Mearsheimer camp...I could really connect with many of his comments.

Here are some of Hoffman's points...

-U.S. influence, prestige, and soft power are being damaged significantly by the way we are conducting foreign policy.

-There are too many 'Rosy Scenarios' coming from Bush's War Hawks -- we heard the same things before getting into VietNam...The consequences of invading have NOT been fully explored.

-This 'elective war' in Iraq is unnecessary and the nation building in Iraq will be very difficult and expensive...In S. Korea things were more predictable than in the Arab and Muslim world.

-Clinton had his faults BUT he developed a great deal of respect abroad -- he listened and often treated other nation's leaders as equals (even if that wasn't the case)...The Current Administration is damaging the North Atlantic Alliance and U.S. reputation and respect overseas is clearly at risk.

-Saddam may not be the most pressing threat right now - unless his back is put up against the wall and he knows he is going to war...Iraq can be contained and military intervention should ONLY be used if inspectors AND The U.N. say nothing else can be done to disarm Saddam.

-Al Qaeda and North Korea are much larger threats than Iraq and they deserve more attention, funding, global cooperation, etc.

-The last SuperPower in the world must use its power very carefully...By going to war in Iraq now we could easily trigger a spread of terrorism that might completely demoralize and upset Americans (this is a big fear that Hoffman has).

Here is the most recent article Hoffman wrote for The American Prospect magazine...
_________________________________________

The High and the Mighty

Bush's national-security strategy and the new American hubris

By Stanley Hoffmann
The American Prospect
Issue Date: 1.13.03
prospect.org

Every nation sees itself as being in some way exceptional. Only the United States, though, has tried to develop foreign policies that reflect its exceptionalism. While other countries are content -- or obliged -- to practice a balance-of-power politics in the world, from the beginning most American leaders have argued that the United States, by dint of its unique geography and the superiority -- indeed, the universality -- of its democratic values, can and should pursue a loftier policy.

This sense of special mission has always left ample room for contradiction. It never, for instance, stopped the United States from pursuing national advantage just as fiercely as any other country did. And it drove American policy in two different directions at once. One, which became less tenable as the United States' might grew, was toward isolationism. The other, more crusading impulse was toward making the world safe for democracy, which entailed working in concert with other nations, though not relinquishing American distrust of cynical European-style alliances.

But until now, the debate over what kind of foreign policy American exceptionalism demands was always conducted in those terms: geography and democracy, distance and engagement, realism and idealism. With the coming of the Bush administration, American exceptionalism has become something entirely new and particularly troubling.

The first indication that America's strategic thinkers were working on a radically new foreign-policy doctrine for the post-Cold War world came in 1992 with the Defense Planning Guidance draft, a tract that's been called "Dick Cheney's masterwork." It produced such an outcry that it had to be toned down before it was published. The draft, however, assumed that the most important of America's unique qualities was its military dominance. The Cheney draft also introduced the idea that unilateral military action, the preemptive use of force and the maintenance of a U.S. nuclear arsenal strong enough to deter the development of nuclear programs elsewhere were now appropriate U.S. policies. This was a major departure from anything exceptionalism had meant before. It called on the United States neither to cultivate its own garden nor to pursue a world mission through multilateral organizations that would define and legitimize common goals. Instead, it demanded of America only that it be, remain and act as the world's sole superpower.

It was a doctrine with puzzling gaps. For instance, it proposed to deter challengers and carry out interventions but provided little guidance about where the more dangerous challenges and the more necessary interventions might occur. Nor did it explain how the unilateralism it favored could be reconciled with the many international agreements the United States had reached over the previous 40-plus years. Nonetheless, the Cheney approach found a great deal of support in the present administration.

When George W. Bush came to power, the doctrine that seemed to be in favor among his advisers was realism: a concentration on those conflicts that could impair the global balance of power or important regional balances, and a retreat from involvement in conflicts either devoid of such significance (as in Africa) or entirely hopeless (such as the Palestinian issue). However, the Republican mood was not calculating so much as it was deeply distrustful of others. This was the mood that brought us the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the scuttling of the Land Mine Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The extraordinary vendetta conducted (largely but not exclusively by John Bolton, Bush's controversial undersecretary of state) against the International Criminal Court revealed not just the administration's paranoia -- conjuring nightmares of a malevolent United Nations indicting innocent American soldiers and officers -- but also how punitive it could be against countries (allies or not) unwilling to meet its demands.

The "new exceptionalism" perfectly suited this mood, and four types with significant clout in the Bush administration have pressed the doctrine forward. There are, first of all, the sheriffs, such as Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who see the world as a High Noon struggle between foes and friends. They were disappointed when Ronald Reagan turned from his evil-empire days to embrace Mikhail Gorbachev, which they felt softened the Soviet Union's fall.

Second, and with an equally black-and-white view of international actors and events, there are the new imperialists -- the pundits Charles Krauthammer and William Kristol, for instance -- who believe that the good the United States does for the world justifies all means. These were the thinkers who were frustrated by the (in their eyes truncated) ending of the Gulf War in 1991.

A third and less important group sees in everything a contest between America's traditional political and religious values and all who attack them, be they secular and dissolute liberals or Islamic terrorists. This group I call the American fundamentalists.

And finally there is a loose collection of friends of Israel, who believe in the identity of interests between the Jewish state and the United States -- two democracies that, they say, are both surrounded by foes and both forced to rely on military power to survive. These analysts look at foreign policy through the lens of one dominant concern: Is it good or bad for Israel? Since that nation's founding in 1948, these thinkers have never been in very good odor at the State Department, but now they are well ensconced in the Pentagon, around such strategists as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith.

A discerning reader might object that many of my new exceptionalists are no more than realists drunk with America's new might as the only superpower. This is true, but that headiness makes all the difference. Whereas the hallmark of past realists -- theorists and diplomats such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, even Henry Kissinger -- was the kind of discerning prudence and moderation that Thucydides once praised, the new voices are nothing if not excessive and triumphalist.

What are the new exceptionalists' main arguments for liberating the United States from the constraints imposed by allies and treaties? Most bizarre may be the claim that the U.S. Constitution allows no bowing to a superior law, such as international law, and no transfer, pooling or delegation of sovereignty to any international organization. Also far out there is law professor W. Michael Reisman's argument that because the United States, as a result of its strength, is responsible for world order, it is justified in rejecting whatever parts of international law it decides would make order more difficult.

Somewhat subtler is the claim of benevolent imperialism, developed in particular by the policy analyst Robert Kagan, who has called the United States "a Behemoth with a conscience." In an article in which valid criticisms of current European policy are mixed with a great deal of condescending hubris, Kagan explains that Europeans think they approach problems with "greater nuance and sophistication" than the United States, but their concentration on "challenges" such as "ethnic conflict, immigration, organized crime, poverty and environmental degradation," rather than on the kinds of "threats" that preoccupy the United States, demonstrates their weakness -- and their reliance on the protection of American military power.

And then there is the argument of brute force: We have it in abundance, others do not. Hence allies, when they do not bend to our will, are both nuisances and unnecessary, and international laws and organizations that stand in our path can be ignored. This case has been made by Bolton and Rumsfeld.

It should be noted that these voices, though they all agree about the prerogatives of American power, offer no consensus concerning its mission. In Bolton and Rumsfeld's view, U.S. might should be deployed only on behalf of a very narrowly defined national interest (and not squandered in humanitarian flings), while some of their colleagues would make the United States responsible for maintaining order throughout the world.

Indeed, until September 11, the new exceptionalism was a doctrine in search of a cause. But after that traumatic day, Americans were called to wage a "war" on global terrorism, a cause as compelling as any administration could ask for. This was a mission that would define the Bush presidency; it would be the great simplifier. It also had the advantage of providing a lever for domestic mobilization (and diversion from controversial domestic issues). It flattered exceptionalists of all tendencies by emphasizing the indispensable role of the United States. And it appealed especially to the more idealistic among them by stressing that America's cause -- the defense against terrorism -- was also the world's. As they had been in the Cold War, self-interest and morality, power and values, the sheriff and the missionary were back together again.

But there are signal difficulties. Just as many issues in the Cold War-era could not be squeezed into the corset of the Soviet-American conflict, it is unlikely that all important problems now can be fitted into this new straitjacket. And even those that can may not be best addressed by primarily military means. The phenomenon of terrorism is extraordinarily heterogeneous. If terrorism is defined as deliberate, deadly attacks on the innocent, it must encompass not only "private" suicide bombers but also state terrorism -- from carpet bombings to totalitarian police tactics. And it must encompass the multiplicity of reasons for the resort to terrorism: a will to self-determination (as in the case of the Palestinians or the Chechens), a fight over territory (as in Kashmir), a form of domestic action against a repressive regime (in the Sudan, in the Algeria of the 1990s), a religious holy war (al-Qaeda) and so on. Obviously one size doesn't fit all, yet responding to acts of terrorism and ignoring their causes could well contribute to the global destabilization sought by the terrorists.

Moreover, when the enemy is so ill-defined, there is the danger of continual extensions of the "war." Since September 11, the Bush administration has widened it from a fight against transnational terrorists to a fight against the regimes that give them shelter. (Never mind that al-Qaeda has found hiding places in many nations, the United States included.) More controversially, the administration has since expanded the target from countries that aid terrorists to countries with weapons of mass destruction (so long as they are also hostile to the United States -- unlike, say, Israel, Pakistan or India).

The result is a world order rendered even shakier than it was before, as other countries are incited to use the capacious new American doctrine for their own ends: the Indians against the Pakistanis, the Russians against the Chechen rebels (and occasionally the Georgians), Ariel Sharon's government in Israel against not only Palestinian terrorists but the Palestinian Authority and Yasir Arafat. The war on terrorism has become a vast tent under which all kinds of settlements of accounts can fit -- including our own quarrels with the bizarre "axis of evil."

Bush, during the campaign of 2000, spoke about the need for modesty in foreign affairs. How far from this we are now can be seen in the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America, dated September 2002. This is the final avatar of Cheney's 1992 defense draft. It is something of a hodgepodge, speaking about primacy and balance of power, as well as using traditional Wilsonian language ("We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world."). It talks about organizing coalitions but also about not hesitating to act alone in self-defense.

Still, in the main, the 2002 strategy statement codifies all the new aspects of exceptionalism: It adopts the doctrine of preemptive action -- while warning others not to use preemption as a pretext for aggression -- and, making no mention of the United Nations in this context, presumes that the United States is the sole judge of the legitimacy of its own or anyone else's preemptive strikes. The document emphasizes the deadly threat posed by weapons of mass destruction -- should they fall into the hands of rogue states that "reject basic human values and hate the U.S. and everything for which it stands." It promises to maintain whatever military capability is needed to defeat any attempt by any state to impose its will on the United States or its allies, and to dissuade potential adversaries from building up their own forces to equal or surpass ours. Last but not least, it reaffirms the determination to protect U.S. nationals from the International Criminal Court.

In sum, the Bush doctrine proclaims the emancipation of a colossus from international constraints (including from the restraints that the United States itself enshrined in networks of international and regional organizations after World War II). In context, it amounts to a doctrine of global domination.

There is something breathtakingly unrealistic about this grand exceptionalism -- what the French scholar Pierre Hassner has called "Wilsonianism in boots." Take the promise that American leaders are now making under the rubric of "regime change," the promise that we will try to replace the tyrannical regimes of the world with democracies. If actually attempted, this would topple friendly tyrants on whom the same U.S. policy makers rely. But in any case, we don't have the skill or the knowledge it would take to manipulate the domestic politics of many countries, or even to choose the right leaders for other people. It is blind hubris to assume that we will "improve" the world by projecting on others a model of democracy that has worked -- not without upheavals -- in the rich and multicultural United States but has little immediate relevance in much of the rest of the world. The successful "regime change" in Germany and Japan after World War II is no model. It required a prolonged occupation and followed a devastating total war. These are not the circumstances today. Today what we would see as a selfless or benevolent policy of democratization would be received as a policy of satellitization and clientelism.

And how long would the American public support a strategy of frequent preemptive uses of force -- and concomitant "wartime" restrictions on liberties at home? Sooner rather than later, Americans would suffer from battle fatigue, especially if officials continue to tell them that their nation is both the most powerful in history and the most threatened.

A world that is tamed by American might but whose imperial master has little enthusiasm for peacekeeping operations and little patience with nation building would be doomed. To have a chance of stability, an international system dominated by one superpower would require a code of cooperation among its states, with restraints on the mighty as well as the weak. Otherwise, the United States will appear more threatening to the rest of the world than the enemies we hope to defeat. But, alas, all the new exceptionalism offers is a mix of force and faith -- a huge force that is often unusable or counterproductive and a grandiose faith in the appeal of an American model that is actually as widely resented as admired.

Iraq is seen by the new exceptionalists as the best place to test the new doctrine: It has a horrid regime, a record of aggressions and violations of UN demands, and a history of relentless questing for weapons of mass destruction. Where better to demonstrate what the journalist Mark Danner has called an "evangelical" determination "to remake the world" and deal with the "evil of terror" by making new "the entire region from which it springs"? (Iraq also has oil, which is certainly a potent factor at a time when our alliance with Saudi Arabia is in trouble.)

But while the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to his neighbors and to U.S. interests is undeniable, is this a threat that calls for and justifies preventive action? After all, we contained the Soviet Union, its huge army and its enormous arsenal of weapons for almost 50 years without preemptive military action.

In truth, our attempt to eliminate Hussein and his weapons may well provoke the very disaster that we say we want to prevent. The optimism of those who tell us that we'll win easily, that Hussein's regime will crumble and democracy will then prevail in a liberated nation, is eerily reminiscent of the disastrously wishful thinking of the Vietnam War. And even if militarily victorious, a U.S. administration with deep doubts about nation building and very little help from other nations would then be stuck running a vast Muslim country racked by ethnic and religious divisions and aspirations for revenge -- a sure formula for further anti-Americanism and terrorism in the Muslim world. Meanwhile, our unilateral action would have shaken many of our carefully built alliances in Europe and the Middle East.

These are alliances that even a sole superpower needs. What the unilateralists forget is that we cannot achieve any of our new goals -- from finding terrorists to creating democracies -- alone. But if we want those alliances to last, it is in our interest to concentrate on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the war on terrorism before we turn on Iraq. (Indeed, for some of the hawks in the Bush administration, one of the attractions of an early war on Iraq is that it would postpone and render even more difficult an evenhanded solution to the Palestinian problem.)

As for the "the moral clarity" that Bush's supporters say he wants to impose on world politics and believes a confrontation with Hussein's regime will provide, I quote the valuable words of Bryan Hehir, the former head of the Harvard Divinity School: "The invocation of moral reasoning for any contemplated policy decisions is to be welcomed as long as the complexity of moral issues is given adequate attention. Moral reasoning can indeed support military action, at times obligate such action. It also, equally importantly, can restrain or deny legitimacy to the use of force. To invoke the moral factor is to submit to the full range of its discipline."

The questionable moral character of a preemptive strike, an intervention and a unilateral action is compounded by a policy that involves all three. Moreover, the fact that great powers set precedents in world politics means that each choice they make must be measured by the consequences of the precedent they set. Eroding at one stroke the established international principles of deterrence, nonintervention and international authorization of military action is -- at the least -- morally reckless.

After all, there is an alternative available for dealing with Iraq: It is a collective, UN-supported policy of containment, including a strong border-monitoring system and thorough weapons inspectors. The United States, in other words, could present itself not as the lone sheriff but as the trustee of the society of states. And it should do just that. The greatest chance of success in the task of eliminating Iraq's arsenal lies not in attacking Hussein now (and thereby activating his capacity to destroy quasi-hostages -- Iraq's Kurds -- and neighbors) but in creating a coalition that will press for this elimination. The Bush administration, obviously divided, does show signs of understanding this, but it still insists on preserving the possibility of unilateral action.

Empire, or the dream of empire, has invariably gone to the heads of the imperialists. Today's American dream of a benevolent empire is sustained by an illusion of the world's gratitude, but in fact it rests only on America's ever more flattering self-image. Given its preponderance in all forms of power, hard and soft (to use Harvard University Dean Joseph Nye's useful distinction), the United States is bound to remain the most important state actor in the world. But it does have a choice. In the words of Pierre Hassner, "The choice is between an attempt at authoritarian, global U.S. rule tempered by anarchic resistance, on the one hand, and, on the other, hegemony tempered by law, concert and consent."

Copyright © 2003 by The American Prospect, Inc.