War Plan: Scenarios
Mar 15, 2003
Both the U.S.-led military coalition and Iraq have their war plans, which have been described in some detail in this series. The Iraqi war plan is more traditional, because Iraq must fix its deployments prior to war. Mobility is not likely to be an option. The Americans, highly mobile and, they believe, much clearer on events on the battlefield, go into the war with a framework for operations and the belief that the battle will evolve along some general lines, with numerous surprises and opportunities during the course of the war. They have less a war plan than a library of war options.
That said, wars are not fought by plans. They are fought by military forces guided by plans; the intersection of those plans with each other, and the natural friction, unintended consequences and failures that constitute the battlefield ultimately constitute the war. What would have happened at the Battle of Midway had U.S. aircraft not accidentally stumbled onto the Japanese fleet? This is not to say that wars are wholly unpredictable, particularly in the broadest sense. But wars are surprising processes, and it is essential to remember the number of wars in which the outcome surprised everybody, including the winners.
Somewhere between randomness and fortune-telling, there are a range of reasonable scenarios that describe what might happen in a war. Some are more probable then others, and many overlap or complement each other. The usefulness of scenarios is not so much their predictive as their instructional value. They identify variables that might influence a war's outcome. They identify the significant and insignificant variables. After the war, these are "what ifs" -- before a war, these are guideposts.
We will present, simply as models, nine possible outcomes of the war. These are in no particular order and, to emphasize, they are not mutually exclusive -- in terms of either outcome or implementation.
1991 Redux
The essence of the 1991 experience was that the Iraqis, attacked on multiple levels by U.S. airpower, collapsed completely on the Kuwaiti battlefield, posing very little effective resistance at that time. There were several causes: The troops deployed in Kuwait were generally of poor quality and unmotivated; Iraq had no effective plan for the devolution of command; there was an extended, counterforce air campaign; Iraqi troops had no intelligence on U.S. force movements once the war was under way.
In the 2003 scenario, the planned counterforce bombardment will be more limited; the terrain will be much larger, more varied and will contain Baghdad; the quality of troops is uncertain; the Iraqis have a plan for devolution and a war plan that minimizes the need for intelligence by minimizing maneuver and counterattack options.
In this scenario, the key elements are:
1. Iraqi troop capabilities must be universally and appallingly low.
2. Iraqi plans for devolving command must fail, and troops must be effectively leaderless.
If these two things -- which really amount to one thing, a very bad army -- hold true, then we might see a repeat of 1991. However, if there is any substantial improvement in one or both of these variables, then is not going to happen.
We regard this outcome as moderately likely, but far from certain.
The Italian Campaign
What made the Italian campaign of 1943-45 interesting was that it was without successful, decisive breakouts -- Anzio proving the point. It was a campaign of yards, not miles, and it dragged out for an extensive period of time. German resistance in Italy was made possible by the terrain, the superb quality of the German troops on the defensive and the quality of German command under Mannstein.
The Iraqi terrain is only suitable for this sort of war in the northeastern quadrant; it would be a long reach to compare the best Iraqi troops with ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers, and there are probably no Mannsteins in the Iraqi army. However, between the urban areas and river lines south of Baghdad, to Baghdad itself and the mountains in the northeast, the willingness of Iraqi forces to take casualties over an extended period of time potentially could extend the war dramatically. Iraq does not have the internal industrial base to sustain a multi-year war effort, but it can sustain a war for months. We regard this as a low-probability outcome -- and it must be remembered that, in the end, the Germans lost in Italy.
Cease-Fire
There are multiple cases of partial victories in which the attacking force could not complete the mission for a variety of reasons -- military and political -- wound up taking territory and then being forced to accept a cease-fire in place, with the new frontier being the point where the forward line of troops ended. Israel in 1967 is a case where the best that could be achieved was a redefinition of borders without regime change or armistice. The Korean War was a case in which both sides had to concede that their war aims were unattainable, accepting a cease-fire that became a border.
The dependency in this scenario is troop quality and devolution of command. It also requires Iraq to be able to inflict substantial casualties on U.S. and coalition forces, while being able to sustain high-intensity operations. The latter is the greatest bottleneck to the ability to sustain high-intensity conflict from the Iraqi point of view. It is not clear that Iraqi forces have the logistical basis for conducting the kind of extended war of attrition that would be required to impose a cease-fire. The key variable is political. If the U.S. threshold for casualties is low, then the ability to use, for example, chemical weapons coupled with urban warfare to attrite U.S. troops could create a situation wherein the United States might have limited appetite for continuing the campaign in the northeast. Under those circumstances, the United States might accept a cease-fire.
In another scenario, the ability of Iraqi special forces to penetrate the United States, and allied countries to carry out a range of high-intensity operations against civilian populations, potentially could create a domestic political situation in which the United States is forced to accept a cease-fire. However, if the Iraqis were in a position to create this situation, it is not clear that they would accept a cease-fire.
The key for this scenario is that Iraqi resistance is sufficiently capable and sustained to create a situation in which the lines have become relatively stable, and casualties are acceptable on the Iraqi side but unacceptable on the American. The center of gravity of this plan is Baghdad. If the United States finds that the battle for Baghdad has drained U.S. resources, Washington might accept a cease-fire, rather than victory, as the battle’s conclusion.
We regard the probability of this outcome as moderately low.
Stalingrad
The Battle of Stalingrad was a massive confluence of forces in an urban environment. Neither side expected this to be a decisive battle, but it evolved into one. Stalingrad had two phases: One was the German offensive, the other was the Soviet counteroffensive. The German offensive was characterized by a highly mobile force of inferior size that was drawn into an urban environment in which mobility declined and in which numbers were critical. The Germans were drained by the battle, opening the opportunity for counterattack. The key variable is a massive urban environment in which all variables except numbers and urban fortifications become irrelevant.
At Stalingrad, the key was the ability of the Soviets to feed forces into the battle faster than the Germans could. The Iraqis do not have this ability -- probably not from a morale level, and certainly not from a numeric standpoint. Nor will the United States commit the German error of feeding mobile, trained forces into a meat grinder. The United States will decline combat in this environment, and the Iraqis will not be able to sustain it.
The more likely outcome to a Stalingrad in Baghdad would be an American probe into the city, possibly by airmobile or airborne forces. These forces become surrounded and defeated; the United States tries to break through to these forces and either makes the linkup and withdraws or fails to link up and withdraws. The United States is much more likely to shift attention elsewhere, or even accept a cease-fire, than go into a well-defended Baghdad. The Iraqis' ability to pose such a defense is also doubtful.
However, the unexpected happens -- and the search for incremental solutions to problems that are not recognized for what they are is a trap for all commanders. There, we will regard the odds of this scenario as moderately low, rather than simply low, because in war, accidents do happen.
WMD
There is no precedent for this scenario. Assume for the moment that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein actually had operational weapons of mass destruction -- including not only chemical weapons, which Iraq certainly has, but nuclear and biological weapons as well, including battlefield nuclear weapons. In other words, assume that the worst fears of the United States already have been realized.
The most rational usage of these weapons is preemptive, simply because the moment prior to war is the time of highest concentration of forces and because the damage is being inflicted in another country. Deploying biological weapons in Kuwait prior several days before a U.S. attack is launched will allow the toxins to take effect. This could delay or even prevent a war. If it were possible to deliver nuclear weapons into northern Iraq, this would be the second blow. Any attack that materialized at this point would result in chemical and tactical nuclear attack.
The United States at this point would face a dilemma. If it called off its own attack, it would leave Hussein in command of the region. If it pressed the attack, it would have to destroy all WMD. Now, since this originated in an intelligence failure, there would be no reason to believe that WMD could be fully destroyed. Therefore, the United States' only options would be to continue the war, using WMD of its own and accepting follow-on casualties; to abandon the war, since the point was to occupy Iraq and that might seem undesirable at that point; or nuke all of Iraq, which would be satisfying but fairly pointless.
We regard this as a very low-probability event, both because we don't think Hussein has nuclear weapons or effective biologicals, and because if he did he wouldn't have enough for sustained combat. On the other hand, if we are wrong and he does have substantial nuclear and biological weapons, this would be quite a scenario.
Vietnam
In Vietnam, the United States fought two wars. One was a guerrilla war against indigenous forces supplied by local supporters; the other was a war against a regular military force that was deployed on discontinuous and irregular fronts -- the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. The Viet Cong were effectively defeated by 1966. The North Vietnamese army was never defeated because it had lines of supply that were politically beyond the reach of the United States. The NVA could continue to feed forces into the battle.
In this scenario, the United States would readily occupy Iraq. Underneath that occupation, an insurrection supported from outside -- Saudi Arabia or Iran -- would develop. The insurrection would be designed to impose an extended guerrilla war on the United States, while making use of Iraq as a base of operations outside the country impossible. In order for this model to work, as the United States suppresses the indigenous rising, external forces must be available to infiltrate Iraq in small groups, reform into larger groups and engage the United States in an extended war.
The northeastern highlands and the southern marshes would make reasonable terrain for guerrilla warfare and, depending on how the United States manages the political evolution after the war, there potentially could be a political foundation for such a war. The key variables for this are, first, an outside country prepared to play the role of North Vietnam with the trust of the guerrilla forces in Iraq. Second, the political configuration must be such that the United States would be unable to act militarily to close off lines of supply from these countries.
We find the latter difficult to imagine. Under current circumstances, U.S. behavior is becoming more, not less, aggressive. Nevertheless, this is not an inconceivable scenario. We regard this as a moderately possible outcome -- although not on the scale of Vietnam, given the nature of the terrain in most of the country.
Coup d'Etat
U.S. leaders hope that the need to conduct the war into Baghdad and beyond will be mitigated by a non-military event -- a political shift in Baghdad. The problem faced here is twofold. First, any potential coupster must be convinced that the United States will carry the operation to a conclusion -- an issue after 1991. Second, he must be convinced that Hussein won't kill him before the coup can be carried out.
The fundamental difficulty with this strategy is that Hussein has an excellent counterintelligence and security service. Discussions carried out prior to a war could readily be detected. The result would be unacceptable to the Iraqi general planning the coup. Moreover, Hussein would not deal with him immediately, which would let the United States know that the plot had been discovered; he would wait until the last possible moment, leaving the United States without options. There has been intense chatter in the media about contacts with generals who have agreed not to fight and so forth. We find this highly unlikely, precisely because it has been reported. If it were true, it would never be permitted to leak. But it has leaked, and that means not only that it is not true, it means that it is probably U.S. psychological warfare designed to rattle Hussein and have him kill some innocent commanders.
At the same time, a coup is not at all an unreasonable scenario. Substantial discussions are not required for a commander to know that Washington would welcome the overthrow of the regime in Baghdad. In fact, there don't have to be any discussions. The general who would carry out the coup would never have contact with the United States. He would wait to see that the United States is actually committed irrevocably to the war and then, at some appropriate moment, would try to act.
This is certainly a scenario being hoped for in Washington -- and it is a possible one, particularly if it is clear that the Iraqi army is collapsing. Of course, that will be the point at which the United States least needs the coup. We regard this scenario as reasonably probable.
Iraqi Covert Counterattack
The Iraqis have no reason to confine the war to their own territory. Quite the contrary, being able to open a front in the enemy's territory is logical. The issue is ability. Obviously, Iraq has no conventional force projection capability. It does have some unconventional capabilities, particularly if working in alliance with international paramilitary groups like al Qaeda.
Under this scenario, the Iraqis would attempt to preserve their regime either through deterrence or through imposing high pain in attacking countries while sustaining resistance at home. From Hussein's point of view, the second problem is the key. If he begins the paramilitary campaign early, it provides justification for a U.S. attack. If he starts it after the attack, he must survive long enough to reap the rewards.
This strategy works only if the Iraqis and allies have pre-deployed special operators in target countries -- including all those who participate in the U.S. coalition. Immediately upon war initiation, these groups would have to strike in such a way that they can influence the war. In other words, they must calibrate their attacks to demonstrate their capabilities but not use up their resources. They must demonstrate that the attacks will occur as long as U.S. forces continue advancing or remain on Iraqi soil.
Calibration of the attacks to achieve these ends, along with calibration of timing, will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. Moreover, if this is done in alliance with al Qaeda, there will be profound strategic tension. Hussein's interest is in preserving himself and his regime. He has a high ability to absorb risks toward this end, but a low tolerance for delay. Al Qaeda wishes to preserve itself as well, which leads it to high tolerance for delay and low tolerance for risk. Synchronizing these views and also calibrating the attacks to achieve their ends will prove overwhelmingly complex.
We think there is a reasonably high probability of some attacks within the territory of coalition partners, but a low probability of success in deterring the continuation of the war.
Iraqi Victory
This is the least likely scenario. As a military matter, Iraq's direct defeat of the United States is difficult to envision. Even nuclear weapons would lead only to retaliation. Outright victory is implausible, given relative force structures.
At the same time, there are potential strategies, many already discussed, in which Iraqi action does not defeat U.S. military forces but creates political pressures that might lead to war termination. In our view, the United States has a higher tolerance for casualties and military reverses than the Iraqis might think. Even in Vietnam, it took more than four years for a serious anti-war movement to begin, and it never did command a majority, as the 1972 election demonstrated.
The greatest threat to the United States is not Iraq but the outbreak of another, more threatening war in some other area, causing the United States to break off combat and transfer its forces elsewhere. In our view, this is not likely to happen. Neither the North Korean threat nor any other issue is likely to deflect the United States from Iraq.
We regard the possibility of Iraqi military victory as extremely low.
Conclusion
These scenarios are not meant to be either exhaustive or thorough-going examinations of the possibilities. They are designed to provide a range of possibilities and tracks along which this conflict might move. The essential conclusion we have reached is that:
1. There is no single, obvious path this war will take.
2.: The most important variables are the capabilities of the Iraqi soldier and his officer. This is simply unknown at this point.
3. The higher the quality of Iraqi forces, the more options open up for the Iraqis and the more paths the war might take.
4. Time, in the short run, is Iraq's ally. In the long run, it is America's. In the short run, time increases political pressure on the United States. In the long run, Iraq cannot compete with the United States.
5. If speculation about Iraqi forces is correct, the war could end almost immediately upon beginning. A somewhat higher capability still would bring war termination within a month. Unexpectedly high capabilities could extend the war for several months.
We expect the United States to win. We would be surprised by neither the collapse of the Iraqi army nor by strong resistance by some elements of it. We would be very surprised to see broad resistance, the ability to establish a sustained guerrilla movement beyond random terror attacks, or to find that the Iraqis have nuclear weapons. We think it most likely that we will see a war lasting between two and four weeks. But once the first shot is fired, all guesses become meaningless. |
