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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (96983)4/30/2003 5:24:55 PM
From: Jacob Snyder  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500
 
my comments on "road map"

It purports to be both "performance-based" and have "target dates". Can't have both. What do you do, for instance, if your target date is reached, but one or both sides haven't done what they were supposed to do by then? Do you wait till everyone is in compliance, or do you stick to the schedule?

<In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence>

So..... who is going to take on Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the parts of the PLO that don't answer to Abbas (or to Arafat)? Those groups have explicitly said they are going to coninue attacks on Israelis. The PA can't stop them, they have neither the will nor the ability. The road map calls on the PA security apparatus to take on these rejectionist Palestinian groups, but it is wishful thinking, to believe they can. If the Israelis are going to take "supportive steps" and do "steps to help normalize Palestinian life", that means less, not more, military activity in Palestinian areas.

Israel, in Phase 1, undertakes "lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods". I can't see them doing this, until after Hamas has been militarily destroyed. If the Israelis get arm-twisted into doing it, it will only last a few days, till the next terrorist attack.

< Israel immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001....Israel freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).>

This is supposed to happen in Phase 1, which lasts only from now till end-of-May. Not enough time, to even see if the terrorist attacks have stopped. Also, it doesn't say anything about the Walls currently being built.

<As comprehensive security performance moves forward, the Israeli Army withdraws progressively from areas occupied since Sept. 28, 2000>

This, and all further steps, only happens after a cessation of attacks on Israelis. Unfortunately, the mechanism proposed for doing this, is not workable. If the Israelis can't stop Hamas and Islamic Jihad, how can the PA be expected to?



To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (96983)4/30/2003 5:54:21 PM
From: epsteinbd  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Interesting map, dangerous road, many ambushes to be expected by non concerned neighbors of the dispute.

Friends of the Road Map:
Egypt, Jordan, the Coalition.

Enemies of the Road Map: Syria, Lebanon, Iran.

Ambushed for the kill: France, Saudia.

Unknown status: Russia.

Irrelevant: UN.

And the hardest, late in phase II: "just, fair and realistic solution to the refugee problem..."



To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (96983)4/30/2003 11:24:17 PM
From: Jacob Snyder  Respond to of 281500
 
Comment on roadmap by Yossi Beilin (justice minister in the 1999-2001 Israeli government of Ehud Barak)
Thursday May 1, 2003

The road map which was placed yesterday on the table of the prime minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, and the Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) has been awaiting publication for many long months. It has now been taken out - from the bottom drawer, it would seem - as a result of the unequivocal commitment of Tony Blair to present it to the parties after the war in Iraq.
This is an attempt to resume the political negotiations which ceased on January 27 2001 when talks between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations ended at Taba. Will this attempt be any more successful than the long list of other attempts to resume the negotiations?

It may well be. If the commitment of George Bush is resolute, rather than mere lip service to Blair, there is a chance that the two parties will be forced to relate seriously to this new outline and to put it into practice - or, alternatively, to find a way to courteously undermine it, while purporting to make every possible effort to put it into practice.

The road map lengthens the process begun in Oslo in 1993, which was supposed to have culminated in the final status settlement in May 1999, but is now due to come to an end in late 2005.

It adds a new element which was not contained in the original agreement: a Palestinian state with provisional borders, which will hold negotiations with Israel concerning its permanent borders.

The problem is that Ariel Sharon is not ready to pay the price of the final-status settlement, Mr Abbas will be wary of embarking upon the adventure of a provisional state, out of fear that the provisional borders will remain a permanent fixture for many years to come, and they will both find it difficult to comply with the confidence-building measures required, given their respective support groups: the rightwing in Sharon's government will object to the dismantlement of any settlements, and the militants in the Palestinian camp will be in no hurry to put down their weapons.

However, both leaders need the support of the US. Both leaders see the road map as a danger, rather than a solution, and both are responding to it with the aim of gauging the seriousness of Bush's intentions.

If the road map is to entail serious international monitoring, to track the performance of the two sides, it will be difficult for them both to avoid implementation of the first part - and if that happens the situation on the ground will undergo a drastic change.

In order to implement the second part, the Palestinians will need to receive a guarantee that the provisional state will indeed pave the way for a permanent state in 2005, so that the political solution will not be a form of Bantustan of isolated Palestinian enclaves without contiguity.

Sharon will need the opposite to be guaranteed - that the final-status settlement will not be implemented automatically, but will be made contingent upon a long list of conditions which will enable him to avoid reaching it at all. In this respect, the Israeli-Palestinian peace camp prefers to view the road map as if it were a book with a good beginning and a good end, but whose middle should be skipped.

The first phase - enabling Israelis and Palestinians to return to a normal and secure way of life - must be realised.

The final goal - ending the occupation and achieving a final-status settlement on all issues - must also be realised. To meet this daunting task will require an unrelenting international commitment. The one man who has chalked up such a major achievement by getting the road map published must continue to remain at the forefront, all the way to the end.

guardian.co.uk



To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (96983)4/30/2003 11:36:18 PM
From: Jacob Snyder  Respond to of 281500
 
Jerusalem Post Editorial: Don't stop fighting terror
Apr. 30, 2003

Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas walked into the meeting of Palestinian legislature together, sat next to each other, and were otherwise as inseparable as their long histories as comrades in arms. Now the latter, known as Abu Mazen, has been forced on the former as prime minister, a powerless position in most Arab regimes.

The international community, including the United States, has accepted the notion that Abbas should be given a chance. He has, after all, for some time been calling amorphously for an end to the "military" attacks against Israel, on the grounds that they have become counterproductive.

The order of the day has become to help Abbas in his power struggle with Arafat, so that Abbas can end the Palestinian offensive that has taken so many Israeli and Palestinian lives with so little result. But the drive to "help Abu Mazen" only makes sense if that help will produce a positive result, rather than wasting further time and lives on propping up what is essentially a fa ade for real change.

Let us work backwards for a moment from the goal, and see if Abbas's appointment fits the goal. The immediate goal, Israel and the international community generally agree, is either that all Palestinian organizations end their terror offensive on their own, or the Palestinian Authority forces and end to terrorism against Israel.

Let's further take the Hamas and Islamic Jihad at their word that they will not voluntarily lay down their arms, let alone give them into to the Palestinian Authority. Why should they? Neither Arafat, nor Abbas, nor Muhammad Dahlan, who some think might implement a crackdown, have given any indication that they intend to confront Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or even Fatah (which took responsibility for the suicide bombing in Tel Aviv yesterday morning) by force.

On the contrary, the widespread expectation is Abbas and Dahlan plan to reopen the failed inter-Palestinian talks that began in Cairo. It seems unlikely that such talks will yield any agreement, but if they did, it would be to suspend suicide bombings within Israel proper while continuing terrorist attacks beyond the Green Line. Obviously, no diplomatic process can begin while such attacks continue. Further, even if the terror ceased, all the terrorist organizations would remain armed and intact, waiting for the "cease fire" to fall apart.

There is a reason that even the "best case" scenarios under the circumstance turn out to be dead ends. Call it the Gorbachev or Khatami syndrome.

Just before the Soviet Union collapsed, Mikhail Gorbachev was hailed as a great reformer who must be helped. In retrospect, it is clear that Gorbachev was trying to save the system, not destroy it, that the system was unreformable, and that only after complete collapse could real change begin.

In Iran, Mohammad Khatami was also hailed as a reformer, and the West was thrilled by his talk of a "dialogue of civilizations." After years of experience, it is now clear that Khatami supports Iran's terrorist foreign policy and, despite his popularity and title of "president," that domestically he is powerless to implement real reform, and that the only solution in Iran is regime change.

Another example, from a different angle, is Iraq, where even after Saddam has lost power, the lack of proof that he is dead and gone could complicate the formation of an new constructive Iraqi government.

The point of all these examples is that in dictatorships, particularly those long dominated by a single, untouchable leader, half-way regime changes don't real exist and certainly don't work.
So let's be generous and say this is a transition period to real, full regime change. What's the problem with that?

The problem is that this transition period, assuming it is one, will not be benign, but a period of continuing and perhaps increased terror.

Over seven days during the recent Passover holiday, seven suicide bombers attempted attacks including the one who did blow up in Kfar Sava train station, killing the security guard who stopped him. Yesterday's suicide bombing at a Tel Aviv night spot killed three and wounded 26.

Further, Israel is now under pressure to "help Abu Mazen," which is taken to mean easing up on its military operations. If Israel unilaterally eases up on its constant pursuit of terrorists, the result will be to give those much depleted organizations a chance to recover, as IDF [Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon] just told a Knesset committee. Yaalon, incidentally, also said this would be the result if Hamas and Islamic Jihad did agree to a temporary cease fire.

The objective of Israel and the US, therefore, should not be to "help Abu Mazen," unless what is meant by that is to hold him to the only effective standard, which is the complete dismantling of all terrorist organizations.

In the meantime, the US has no moral right to request, nor Israel to accede, to any diminution in the IDF campaign to protect Israelis from Palestinian terrorism.

jpost.com