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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (4533)5/24/2003 7:02:37 AM
From: orkrious  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 5423
 
I completely understand the logic of this. So what happens to our stock market? do we just stay bloated until the economy disintegrates and like argentina, we have hyperinflation? or does the market finally give way and contract first?



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (4533)5/27/2003 9:37:14 AM
From: 4figureau  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 5423
 
As economic fears creep higher, dreaded 'D' word lurks in wings
By John Waggoner and Adam Shell, USA TODAY

>>Until recently, talk of deflation and recession has been the domain of doom-and-gloom newsletter writers and fringe economists. But mainstream economists are starting to talk about deflation with dead seriousness. "I haven't been writing about this for 14 months to stand out from the crowd," growls Roach. Says Dalio: "It's no longer viewed as a kooky point of view."<<

The four horsemen of the Depression aren't here yet, but you can hear the faint hoofbeats of at least three of them. Unemployment, now 6%, is up from 3.8% in April 2000. Prices for many goods and services are falling, both here and abroad. Japan is in a decade-long deflationary recession, and Germany is close to joining it. Financial collapse, of course, is conspicuously absent.
The odds for depression are still long. Ver-r-r-r-y long. It's the worst-case economic scenario. But economic news this year has suddenly put it on the minds of economists and investors alike. Should you be worried? Probably not. Most economists are forecasting economic growth this year, and the nation has far more financial safeguards than it did in the 1930s. But even the remote possibility of depression sends shivers up and down the financial markets.

Death by 1,000 price cuts

Depression is an economic slowdown accompanied by falling prices. Its hallmarks: Rising inventories. Falling demand. Rising unemployment. Lower wages.

Let's be clear: The economy has been growing the past six quarters. No one is predicting a return to the Great Depression, when a quarter of the nation was out of work. But even the slightest chance of a deflationary recession gives economists the shivers. Deflation "is a very serious issue and an issue which we at the Federal Reserve are paying extensive attention," Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan told Congress Wednesday. "Even though we perceive the risks as minor, the potential consequences are very substantial and could be quite negative."

Greenspan sent tremors through the markets April 30 by saying, "substantial further disinflation would be an unwelcome development." He's not the only one worried about the potential for deflation. "I'd say the odds have gone up to about 30%," says David Jones, economist at DMJ Advisors.

What is it about deflation that worries economists so? Deflation is particularly insidious because consumers and businesses tend to postpone buying, on the assumption that prices get cheaper. That just makes the economy weaker and pushes prices down further in a deflationary spiral.

Some prices are already falling. The stock market is down more than 40% since March 2000. The producer price index, which measures inflation at the wholesale level, fell 1.9% in April, its largest monthly decline ever. Even stripping out the volatile food and energy sectors, the PPI was down 0.9%. The consumer price index has risen 1.8% the past 12 months, but many economists feel that overstates inflation by a percentage point or more.

Pushing prices down:

•Too little demand. Consumer spending has kept the economy afloat, but it's growing at half the rate it did in the 1990s, says Stephen Roach, chief U.S. economist at Morgan Stanley. Slowing demand: Personal bankruptcies rose to 1.5 million the 12 months ended March 31, a record. And consumers normally ratchet down spending when unemployment has been rising — as it has been this year.

•Too much capacity. Companies invested too much in new plants and equipment in the 1990s: U.S. manufacturers are operating at just 72.5% now, down from 82.4% in 2000. Too much capacity usually augurs price-cutting. "It's a breeding ground for pressures on pricing," Roach says.

•Too much global competition. Countries such as China can produce goods much more cheaply than the USA can. "The big impact from China is still to come," says Ed Yardeni, chief investment strategist at Prudential Securities. And some companies are shifting information workers, such as software designers and even stock analysts, to low-cost countries such as India.

Another worry: Deflationary pressures in Japan and Germany could drag the USA down with them. Japan has been in a deflationary recession for a decade, and the International Monetary Fund says the likelihood of mild deflation in Germany is high. "Germany is starting to look a lot like Japan," says John Lonski, chief economist for Moody's Investor Services.

What's particularly disturbing is that the Fed's efforts to jump-start the U.S. economy don't seem to be working.

The Federal Reserve has slashed interest rates 12 times the past three years to kick-start the economy, to little avail. Under normal conditions, when the Fed cuts rates, it stimulates the economy by lowering borrowing costs for consumers, increasing the demand for goods and services and boosting the value of assets such as stocks, bonds and real estate. But with short-term rates at 1.25%, the Fed has little firepower left.

"When lower borrowing costs are no longer enough to stimulate demand, prices have to come down," says Ray Dalio, chief investment officer at Bridgewater Associates, an investment firm that manages $40 billion. Lower prices cut into corporate earnings. It's a vicious cycle. The nightmare scenario that wakes economists in a cold sweat:

• Deflation and recession in Japan and Europe reduce demand for U.S. exports, weakening the U.S. economy further. This is already happening: The U.S. trade balance, the broadest measure of our international transactions, hit a record 5% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product the fourth quarter, as exports fell and imports increased.

• The value of the U.S. dollar plunges. A weak dollar is supposed to help U.S. exporters because U.S. goods become cheaper abroad. But it also could discourage foreign investors from buying U.S. Treasury securities, which we use to fund our deficit. The Treasury would then have to raise interest rates to attract investors, which could slow growth further and collapse the housing market — so far, one of the few areas of price inflation in the economy. "Housing will be a mess, and it will start when rates rise," says Richard Russell, editor of Dow Theory Letter, a La Jolla, Calif. newsletter.

• Companies begin defaulting on debt. Deflation means that corporate revenue falls, profit falls — but debt payments remain the same. Each payment gets progressively more difficult, and is paid in progressively more valuable dollars. Bankruptcies mount, unemployment soars, and the financial system, particularly banks, starts to crumble. "Debt deflation is the most lethal strain," says Morgan Stanley's Roach.

Some worry that current federal economic policy could make matters worse. Although the Treasury department denies it, most of Wall Street believes that the White House has abandoned its strong-dollar policy. A weaker dollar will help U.S. exporters, but it would hurt European exporters. In other words, any U.S. economic gains would be at the expense of our major trading partners.

One of the most prominent worriers about a weak dollar: Greenspan. The Fed chairman was recently reported to have assured the Germans that the U.S. was not deliberately trying to push down the dollar. Greenspan specifically referred to the damage a weak dollar did to the economy during the Depression.

President Bush's tax cuts could make matters worse, because they would increase the federal budget deficit. That, in turn, could drive up interest rates as the government floods the market with bonds to finance the deficit. "For every $100 billion in deficit, you get a 0.25% percentage point increase in long-term Treasuries," says DMJ's Jones.

How likely?

Fortunately, most economists don't think depression is faintly possible — particularly one like the Great Depression, with its apocalyptic connotations of soup kitchens as ubiquitous as Starbucks stores and a jobless rate at 25%.

Bridgewater's Dalio believes there is a one in four chance of what he calls a "deflationary depression." He describes that as more of a Japan-like problem: a long period of low growth, periodic recessions, high unemployment, and poor stock performance.

Prudential's Yardeni doesn't even think that full-blown deflation is likely. Lower oil prices, tax cuts, low interest rates and the weaker dollar should all provide enough stimulus to get the economy moving again, he says. The IMF agrees: It says deflation is unlikely in the USA, Great Britain, and China. Nevertheless, any risk of deflation is alarming — far more so than inflation, which ravaged the country in the 1970s. "When you're faced with deflationary risk, you have to treat it as a certainty and hope you're wrong," says Morgan Stanley's Roach. "You have to err on the side of being overly stimulative."

How can you protect yourself? Treasury securities are one time-tested deflation cure. They have no risk of default, and the interest payments they make become more valuable every year. And the Fed may try to buy long-term Treasuries to lower rates and stimulate the economy.

Until recently, talk of deflation and recession has been the domain of doom-and-gloom newsletter writers and fringe economists. But mainstream economists are starting to talk about deflation with dead seriousness. "I haven't been writing about this for 14 months to stand out from the crowd," growls Roach. Says Dalio: "It's no longer viewed as a kooky point of view."

usatoday.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (4533)5/27/2003 9:39:28 AM
From: 4figureau  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 5423
 
Central Bank Expected to Cut Interest Rate in Euro Union
By MARK LANDLER

FRANKFURT, May 26 — It has become a consuming question for economists and corporate executives across Europe, discussed and disputed with the fervor of a theological debate: When will the European Central Bank cut interest rates?

The conventional wisdom is that the bank, which sets monetary policy for the 12 European nations that use the euro, will reduce its key rate by at least one-quarter of a percentage point at its regular meeting next week. Given the recent surge in the euro and the tide of grim economic news in Europe, some experts predict it will cut by even more, perhaps half a point.




"My general feeling is that they will move in June," said Allan Saunderson, the chairman of EuroZone Advisors, a consulting firm in Frankfurt that follows the central bank. "With the currency moving so fast, I don't know how they can hold on without people laughing at them."

The euro hit another four-year high against the United States dollar today, trading at $1.1852. The currency has soared 12 percent against the dollar this year and 22 percent in the last 12 months.

Officials at the bank said the euro was merely reclaiming its proper value, set at $1.18 when it began trading four years ago. But the rapid rise has unnerved corporate executives here, who fear it could strangle Europe's economy by pricing their exports out of the American market.

Critics were already complaining that the bank, with its single-minded focus on curbing inflation, has paid little heed to the continent's more pressing problems, which include two years of near-stagnation, soaring unemployment and, in Germany at least, the specter of deflation.

Three countries that use the euro — Germany, Italy and the Netherlands — are on the brink of a recession, while Germany risks falling into a deflationary spiral, according to a report by the International Monetary Fund. Inflation here fell to 0.7 percent in May, its lowest level in four years.

"The E.C.B. has been overly restrictive in its monetary policy for the last two years because it has paid too much attention to inflation in smaller European countries," said Hans-Werner Sinn, the president of the Ifo Institute, a leading German economic research organization.

"Inflation rates in Europe are very divergent," he added. "Ireland has a higher rate than Germany because of its lower wage base."

The critics acknowledge that setting a uniform policy for 12 countries was never going to be easy. But they say the bank's bias toward Europe's smaller, faster-growing countries has left the two largest countries in the monetary union, Germany and France, with even deeper problems.

Mr. Sinn said he believed there was a one-in-three chance that Germany could lapse into deflation, a cycle of falling prices familiar in Japan and China, which can cause lasting economic damage.

Not all the indicators are negative. Mr. Sinn's institute issued its monthly survey of German business confidence today, which showed an unexpected improvement in sentiment in May. The Ifo index, as it is known, rose to 87.6 from 86.6 in April, which had been its worst showing in 16 months.

The index still reflects persistent weakness in Germany's current condition. Mr. Sinn said the improvement in corporate confidence was likely to have been a reaction to the speedy end of the war in Iraq.

"The Americans ended the war more quickly and effectively than anyone could have hoped," he said. "That led to a dramatic improvement in confidence, which gives hope for the business cycle."

The trouble is, stimulating growth has never been at the heart of the European bank's deliberations in setting interest rates. Founded on the principles of Germany's Bundesbank, it has always focused on inflation — aiming to keep it at an annual rate of no more than 2 percent.

Defenders of the bank note that it has cut interest rates twice in the last year: in December and March. Its benchmark rate of 2.5 percent is already close to a post-World War II low in Europe. Some say it would have been unwise to cut rates again, while war was still raging in Iraq.

"They've done a better job than people are giving them credit for," said Ralph Solveen, an economist at Commerzbank.

Now that the war clouds have dispersed, the bank is sending out signals. Today the bank's vice president, Lucas Papademos, played down the risk of inflation in Europe, saying it is likely to hover around 2 percent for the rest of the year because of the strong euro and lower oil prices. It has already fallen to an average rate of 2.1 percent in April across Europe, from 2.4 percent in March.

Mr. Papademos, speaking to reporters here, also acknowledged that the strength of the euro would make it difficult for Europe to rely on exports to lift it from its malaise. After a rocky first year, in which the bank was faulted for confusing the market, it now carefully telegraphs changes in monetary policy.

Set against that, however, are comments made by the bank's influential chief economist, Otmar Issing. Speaking to a German news channel last weekend, he dismissed the threat of deflation in Germany and said he still expected the economy to recover in the second half of the year.

"The message seems very confused at the moment," Mr. Saunderson said. "But I can't believe, in my heart of hearts, that even the Germans in the bank would resist those who are worried about these trends."

nytimes.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (4533)5/27/2003 9:43:36 AM
From: 4figureau  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 5423
 
US declares war on the euro

America's policy of competitive deflation poses a real threat to the Eurozone, writes William Keegan

Sunday May 25, 2003
The Observer

Although the current political and economic debate in Britain is dominated by the relationship between the pound and the euro, the more imminent problem is the relationship between the euro and the dollar.
The crux of the matter is that, while the US economy was booming and the dollar was strong, the Eurozone enjoyed not so much a free lunch as an easy ride, which served to disguise its underlying macro-economic problem. That problem, put quite simply, is that there is a deficiency of what economists call 'aggregate demand' in the Eurozone. Economic policy - both budgetary and monetary - has been too restrictive, but as long as the US was happy to serve as 'importer of last resort' to the rest of the world the magnitude of the potential crisis was not appreciated.

In the second half of the 1990s the US economy expanded by some 4 per cent per annum in real terms. In 2001 and 2002 its average growth rate more than halved to 1.3 per cent. Successive efforts to talk the economy up have had meagre results. History suggests that, after an investment boom on the scale experienced in the US in the late 1990s, it can take years for confidence to revive.

This is why President George W Bush, desperate to achieve the re-election that eluded his father, is throwing everything into a desperate attempt to revive the economy. The ending of the Iraq war has not triggered a serious revival of economic confidence. So Bush is trying to buttress the Fed's cheap money policy (the key Fed funds interest rate is down to 1.25 per cent) with tax cuts, and US Treasury Secretary John Snow has effectively declared the outbreak of 'currency war' with the rest of the world in general and the Eurozone in particular.

While the dollar was strong and the euro weak, the Eurozone was protected from the full disinflationary impact of its own policies. Thus, having been at around $1.17 when launched in 1999, the euro declined to a point where it averaged $0.85 in June 2001. It was still $0.89 in 2001 on average, and $0.94 in 2002. But it strengthened over last year to $1.02 in December, and leapt to $1.15 by the middle of this month. It has recently hit its inaugural $1.17 level.

While the period of the 'weak euro' was considered politically and presentationally unfortunate, it was extremely good news for Eurozone companies, whether they were exporting or competing in domestic markets with foreign companies. Now they are feeling the pinch of an uncompetitive currency. Yet the adjustment in the dollar is rightly regarded as necessary to correct a major disequilibrium in the world economy. The US may have accounted for two thirds of global economic growth since the mid-1990s, but it has been feeding its consumption habit by borrowing $1.5 billion a day from the rest of the world.

There is something very odd about the world's mightiest economy borrowing on such a scale. Many economists have acknowledged for some years that a major realignment of the dollar against other currencies was necessary to correct this imbalance. And last year the currency fell 14 per cent against a weighted average of other major currencies. Some currencies, such as the Chinese renminbi, are rigidly tied to the dollar; and the Japanese, with massive economic problems of their own, have been doing their best to resist a rise in the yen against the dollar.

It is the euro that has borne the brunt of the impact of the dollar devaluation. The rise in the euro has recently brought squeals of pain from French and German exporters at a time when the German economy is in recession and the French economy perilously close.

But if Treasury Secretary Snow has his way, this will not be the end of the story. Last weekend, on the occasion of a meeting of the Group of Seven leading finance Ministers in Deauville, France, Snow departed from the traditional Washington 'strong dollar' policy, saying that its devaluation had been 'helpful to US exporters' and that so far there had only been 'a modest realignment'. The danger is that, while an adjustment was necessary, Snow's statement is tantamount to a declaration of currency wars. As John Llewellyn and Russell Jones say in the latest Global Letter from Lehman Brothers: 'The industrial economies are awash with excess capacity, most are experiencing disinflation, and some are threatened by outright deflation. With unfortunate echoes of the 1930s, policy-makers are being tempted to use exchange rates to maximise their share of manifestly inadequate global demand.'

The US declaration of a 'beggar my neighbour' policy of competitive devaluation arises from frustration with the demand-management policies, or lack of them, in Europe. Snow says: 'A healthy global economy needs multiple engines of growth. Our G7 partners [half of whom are in the Eurozone] must immediately take their own steps, appropriate to their own circumstances, to spur growth, create jobs and contribute to global prosperity.'

While Snow referred to 'structural reforms' (supply-side policies to make labour markets more flexible) they were not his real targets. The obvious bone of contention is the way the Stability and Growth Pact constrains the fiscal policies of European governments, and the European Central Bank remains obsessed with fighting the last inflationary war.

Even the International Monetary Fund has warned that Germany is on the verge of outright deflation, a probability that would become a certainty if the markets push the euro much higher. The economists at Lehman Brothers warn: 'We are concerned that the rapidly rising euro could consign the Eurozone to an extended period of stagnation.'

While not wishing to push the parallels with the 1930s too far, Llewellyn and Jones make the point that 'during a period of competitive currency depreciations, the first country to devalue gains an initial advantage. But this will prove temporary, as others follow suit.' They say that 'the mechanism through which successive devaluations are achieved - typically looser monetary stances - can lead to broad-based reflation and recovery. It is just a roundabout way of reaching that end. Coordinated expansion in the face of a slowdown would appear a more sensible policy prescription.'

But with the dollar and sterling depreciating against the euro, and the Japanese and Chinese doing their best to avoid a rise in their currencies against the dollar, the euro stands out as the one that is being made too strong for its own good.

The situation is potentially so serious that Eurozone policy-makers may be forced to make the changes to their macro-economic policies that would suit a British Government contemplating joining the euro. But for the moment it would be difficult to sell the Eurozone economy to the British electorate.

observer.co.uk