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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: greenspirit who wrote (99274)5/28/2003 12:50:50 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Passion for Peace
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN - NEW YORK TIMES

Now Friedman finally agrees that what Bush has done in the Mid East was right. But, he doesn't think they can do the next part right. And we are still wrong on Koyoto. It is funny to watch him being dragged along, kicking and screaming.

For years I believed that when it came to Middle East peacemaking, America couldn't want peace more than the parties themselves. I no longer believe that. In fact, I now believe just the opposite. For there to be any progress, America must want peace more than the parties themselves, in Israel and the West Bank, and in Iraq. And the question I have going forward is whether that will be the case with President Bush.

First a word about Mr. Bush. He deserves a tip of the hat for having his principles right. His conviction that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was necessary to build a different Iraq and a different Middle East, which are both critical for drying up terrorism, was right. And his convictions that the Palestinians had to move beyond Yasir Arafat to a responsible leadership and that the Israelis had to come to terms with the inevitability of a Palestinian state and an end to settlements, if there was to be any progress toward peace, are also right.

But ? you knew there was a "but" coming, the question I always have about members of the Bush team is, How good are they at translating principles into practice? When it comes to breaking things they are very, very good, whether it is the ABM treaty, the Kyoto accord, Afghanistan, Iraq or the old way of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. The Bush people believe in power and are not afraid to wield the wrecking ball. But how good are they with a hammer and a nail? How good are they at the detail work of building real alternatives, to Kyoto, Saddam or the Arab-Israel peace process? This is still the most important unanswered question about this administration. Can it reap the harvest of the principles it has sown?

Don't get me wrong, ultimately it is up to Israelis, Palestinians and Iraqis to liberate themselves. They have to want it. But at this stage, we have to use our power to help create the context for them to do it. And that is hard. It means taking hits politically and militarily, which is why if we are to do it right we really have to want it bad.

"In both Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict," says the Middle East expert Stephen Cohen, "there is such a struggle of wills within the competing parties, and between the competing parties, and the forces for and against change are so evenly balanced, that only a third party, with a clear vision ? can swing things toward compromise. That is America's role. [Also] the parties themselves are always going to be focused on the immediate costs of doing something because the positive outcomes seem remote or even unlikely to them. Which is why they'll need our push."

In Iraq, it's still not clear to me how much the Bush team wants to do nation-building there. The Rumsfeld doctrine of small-force, high-tech armies may be great for winning wars, but you need the Powell doctrine for winning the peace: a massive, overwhelming investment of soldiers, police and aid. We should be flooding Iraq with people and money right now. Start big and then build down, not the other way around. Ditto on the politics side. In destroying the Iraqi Army and Baath Party, we have destroyed the (warped) pillars of Iraqi secular nationalism. We need to start replacing them, quickly, with alternative, progressive pillars of Iraqi secular nationalism; otherwise, Shiite religious nationalism will fill the void.

We will have to do the same in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, has said some remarkable and important things lately, most notably: "You may not like the word but what's happening is occupation. Holding 3.5 million Palestinians is a bad thing for Israel, for the Palestinians and for the Israeli economy." The newly elected Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas, recently gave a talk detailing what a disaster the last two years of Palestinian uprising had been, an uprising encouraged by Yasir Arafat.

But translating these changes in Israeli-Palestinian principles into real changes in quality of life, for both communities, will be a full-time job for the Bush team. Because for both Israelis and Palestinians, forging a two-state solution will require some level of civil war within each community, between moderates and extremists.

And we should want that more than they do (or at least as much), because if we've learned anything since 9/11, it's that the spreading flames of Middle East conflicts have, in a world without walls, begun affecting our quality of life. Their madness has become our metal detectors, and we've had enough of it.

nytimes.com



To: greenspirit who wrote (99274)5/28/2003 4:24:20 PM
From: Jacob Snyder  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500
 
A translation, from NeoCon-speak into English:

<Rumsfeld's words>, mine:

<Because of the speed of the execution of the war plan, the regime did not attack its neighbors with SCUD missiles>
Or, perhaps, because they didn't have any SCUDS. Or chemical weapons. Or biological weapons. Or nuclear weapons.

<the infrastructure of the country is largely intact>
Sometimes I wonder what planet Rumsfeld lives on. Even Fox and CNN had endless reports of destroyed infrastructure, and a long list of basic services down.

<for the most part the people of Iraq do not have to rebuild from war>
Except for the war with Iran, and two wars with us, and the rebellions in the Shiite and Kurd areas, and the chaos and looting after. Other than that, there is no rebuilding required.

<Our first effort at a governing charter--the Articles of Confederation--failed miserably, and it took eight years of contentious debate before we finally adopted our Constitution and inaugurated our first president.>
Another similarity between post-RegimeChange Iraq, and post-Revolutionary America, is that both governments were controlled by Americans, and both nations were conquered by an American army. And, like the American Constitution, the Iraqi Constitution will be written by Americans. And both nations, after the war, had American ex-Generals in charge. So many similarities, it's amazing.

< In Central and Eastern Europe, the process has taken time, but it is succeeding.>
Another bogus analogy. The E. Europeans freed themselves, set up their own governments (without the "guiding hand" of a foreign army), and then, years later, voluntarily joined NATO.

<We have a stake in their success.>
Unlike Afghanistan, they have oil.

<We are committed to helping the Iraqi people get on that path to a free society.>
We will use whatever force in necessary, to make sure a pro-American government stays in power.

<The coalition will seek out Iraqis who support these principles, and who desire to have a role in their country's future.>
The U.S. will seek out Iraqis who do what we tell them to do, and who desire power as our proxies.

<provides opportunities for its people through a market economy...The Coalition will encourage moves to privatize state-owned enterprises.>
Sell off the choicest parts of the economy, to U.S. multinationals

<The Coalition....will not tolerate self-appointed "leaders.">
The coalition will manage "top-down", and arrest/imprison/silence/kill anyone who opposes the foreign army of occupation. Any leader who has the support of lots of Iraqis, but no support in Washington, will be defined as "undemocratic".

<Promote Iraqis who share the goals of a free and moderate Iraq>
Promote Iraqi Quislings, who share our goals of an Un-Islamist client state, from which the U.S. Army can threaten all the neighboring nations.

<Contracts--promoting Iraq's recovery. Whenever possible, contracts for work in Iraq will go to....countries that supported the Iraqi people's liberation>
To the victors go the spoils.

<Iraq's neighbors: assistance, but not interference.>
We won't allow any interference with our interference. Only the Hegemon gets to ignore other nation's sovereignty.

<interference in Iraq by its neighbors or their proxies--including those whose objective is to remake Iraq in Iran's image--will not be accepted or permitted.>
Any Iraqi who favors an Islamist State, will be defined as an Iranian agent, and we will make war on them.

<In assisting the Iraqi people, the U.S. will play its role but should not be considered the funder of first and last resort.>
As in Afghanistan, our open-ended unlimited committment to Regime Change is not followed by the same level of committment to Nation Building. The Crisis Management will continue.

<Core Principles for a Free Iraq>
Core Principles for the American Colony of Mesopotamia

<The transition from tyranny to liberty is always difficult.>
The tyranny will continue indefinitely.

<liberation>
colonization