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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Bilow who wrote (100433)	6/5/2003 6:54:50 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) experts concluded that Iraq's declarations on biological agents vastly understated the extent of its program, and that Iraq actually produced two to four times the amount of most agents, including anthrax and botulinim toxin, than it had declared. UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council in April 1995 that Iraq had concealed its biological weapons program and had failed to account for 3 tons of growth material for biological agents. Chemical Weapons Gaps identified by UNSCOM in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains stockpiles of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard. Iraq has not accounted for hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud variant missile warheads. Iraq has not accounted for at least 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred vehicle for delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent. Nuclear Weapons Iraq has withheld documentation relevant to its past nuclear program, including data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, experimental data, and technical documents. Ballistic Missiles Iraq is believed to be developing ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers - as prohibited by the UN Security Council Resolution 687. Discrepancies identified by UNSCOM in Saddam Hussein's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads. Iraq continues work on the al-Samoud liquid propellant short-range missile (which can fly beyond the allowed 150 kilometers). The al-Samoud and the solid propellant Ababil-100 appeared in a military parade in Baghdad on December 31, 2000, suggesting that both systems are nearing operational deployment. The al-Rafah-North facility is Iraq's principal site for testing liquid propellant missile engines. Iraq has been building a new, larger test stand there that is clearly intended for testing prohibited longer-range missile engines. At their al-Mamoun facility, the Iraqis have rebuilt structures that had been dismantled by UNSCOM that were originally designed to manufacture solid propellant motors for the Badr-2000 missile program. efreedomnews.com

To: Bilow who wrote (100433)	6/5/2003 7:00:25 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Saddam Hussein's Defiance of United Nations Resolutions Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated sixteen United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) designed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. In addition to these repeated violations, he has tried, over the past decade, to circumvent UN economic sanctions against Iraq, which are reflected in a number of other resolutions. As noted in the resolutions, Saddam Hussein was required to fulfill many obligations beyond the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Specifically, Saddam Hussein was required to, among other things: allow international weapons inspectors to oversee the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction; not develop new weapons of mass destruction; destroy all of his ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers; stop support for terrorism and prevent terrorist organizations from operating within Iraq; help account for missing Kuwaitis and other individuals; return stolen Kuwaiti property and bear financial liability for damage from the Gulf War; and he was required to end his repression of the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated each of the following resolutions: UNSCR 678 - November 29, 1990 Iraq must comply fully with UNSCR 660 (regarding Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait) "and all subsequent relevant resolutions." Authorizes UN Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area." UNSCR 686 - March 2, 1991 Iraq must release prisoners detained during the Gulf War. Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War. Iraq must accept liability under international law for damages from its illegal invasion of Kuwait. UNSCR 687 - April 3, 1991 Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities." Iraq must "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material" or any research, development or manufacturing facilities. Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and production facilities." Iraq must not "use, develop, construct or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction. Iraq must reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs. Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Iraq must cooperate in accounting for the missing and dead Kuwaitis and others. Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War. UNSCR 688 - April 5, 1991 "Condemns" repression of Iraqi civilian population, "the consequences of which threaten international peace and security." Iraq must immediately end repression of its civilian population. Iraq must allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance. UNSCR 707 - August 15, 1991 "Condemns" Iraq's "serious violation" of UNSCR 687. "Further condemns" Iraq's noncompliance with IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iraq must halt nuclear activities of all kinds until the Security Council deems Iraq in full compliance. Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass destruction, and related materials and facilities. Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors to conduct inspection flights throughout Iraq. Iraq must provide transportation, medical and logistical support for UN and IAEA inspectors. UNSCR 715 - October 11, 1991 Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors. UNSCR 949 - October 15, 1994 "Condemns" Iraq's recent military deployments toward Kuwait. Iraq must not utilize its military or other forces in a hostile manner to threaten its neighbors or UN operations in Iraq. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors. Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern Iraq. UNSCR 1051 - March 27, 1996 Iraq must report shipments of dual-use items related to weapons of mass destruction to the UN and IAEA. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. UNSCR 1060 - June 12, 1996 "Deplores" Iraq's refusal to allow access to UN inspectors and Iraq's "clear violations" of previous UN resolutions. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. UNSCR 1115 - June 21, 1997 "Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "clear and flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview. UNSCR 1134 - October 23, 1997 "Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview. UNSCR 1137 - November 12, 1997 "Condemns the continued violations by Iraq" of previous UN resolutions, including its "implicit threat to the safety of" aircraft operated by UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring equipment. Reaffirms Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of UN inspectors. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. UNSCR 1154 - March 2, 1998 Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the "severest consequences for Iraq." UNSCR 1194 - September 9, 1998 "Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with" UN and IAEA inspectors, which constitutes "a totally unacceptable contravention" of its obligations under UNSCR 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. UNSCR 1205 - November 5, 1998 "Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation" with UN inspectors as "a flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions. Iraq must provide "immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation" with UN and IAEA inspectors. UNSCR 1284 - December 17, 1999 Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon inspection team (UNSCOM). Iraq must allow UNMOVIC "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to Iraqi officials and facilities. Iraq must fulfill its commitment to return Gulf War prisoners. Calls on Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods and medical supplies to its people and address the needs of vulnerable Iraqis without discrimination. Additional UN Security Council Statements In addition to the legally binding UNSCRs, the UN Security Council has also issued at least 30 statements from the President of the UN Security Council regarding Saddam Hussein's continued violations of UNSCRs. The list of statements includes: UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 28, 1991 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 5, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 19, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 28, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 6, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 11, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 12, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, April 10, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 17, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, July 6, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, September 2, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 23, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 24, 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 8, 1993 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 11, 1993 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 18, 1993 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 28, 1993 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 23, 1993 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, October 8, 1994 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 19, 1996 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 14, 1996 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, August 23, 1996 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 30, 1996 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 13, 1997 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, October 29, 1997 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 13, 1997 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 3, 1997 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 22, 1997 UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 14, 1998 efreedomnews.com

To: Bilow who wrote (100433)	6/5/2003 7:11:28 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Congress and Weapons of Mass Destruction Congress facing a serious problem with this weapons of massive destruction business. That is the subject of this evening's Talking Points Memo. Unfortunately, the WMD situation is now been politicized. Fanatics on the left are screaming about lies and conspiracies. Fanatics on the right are yelling it doesn't matter if any deadly weapons are found in Iraq. Both sides are wrong as usual. The truth is the WMD issue does matter, and President Bush needs to explain it. Talking Points believes the Iraq war was just, and the progress now being made between Israeli and the Palestinians would never have happened if Saddam Hussein was still in power. Just that alone makes the war worthwhile. We are not even mentioning the mass graves and other horrors of Saddam Hussein. So, there is no question that America has done a good thing for the world. However, when the president of the United States tells the American people that U.S. intelligence has pinpointed deadly weapons and those weapons don't turn up, the President has an obligation to explain. All Americans must have confidence that the CIA and other intelligence agencies are honest and effective. If the CIA told Mr. Bush there were weapons, did it make a mistake? If so, how did that mistake come about? These are logical questions that have to be answered in order for Americans to feel confident about their government. That being said, it is fair to all the hunt for the weapons to continue without these hysterical accusations of lies and deceit. People making those charges are being irresponsible and hurting the country. Let's face it, there is a good chance that deadly weapons are hidden in Iraq. It is beyond belief that both President Bush and British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, would conspire to lie to the world about this issue. Simply inconceivable. Thus, reasonable people are faced with two conclusions -- one, that the intelligence was wrong, or, two, that more time is needed to find the weapons. Talking Points just asks one thing from President Bush, an update on the situation in the next few weeks. That's a very reasonable request and one the President must take seriously if he wants to advance the cause of the USA throughout the world. In the end, if the intelligence was faulty, some people have to be fired. If, God forbid, the intelligence was contrived, and I don't believe that, but if it is proven, then Congressional action must be taken. We will have more on this with two members of the House Intelligence Committee coming up later. And that's The Memo. Thursday, June 05, 2003 By Bill O'Reilly foxnews.com

To: Bilow who wrote (100433)	6/5/2003 7:18:48 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 281500

Time.com Thursday, Mar. 27, 2003 Iraq’s WMD: How Big a Threat? A U.N. inspector assesses the danger posed by Baghdad's biological and chemical weapons and ponders where they may be hidden By STEWART STOGEL/THE UNITED NATIONS “U.S. troops in Iraq will not find any facilities with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I am sure of that," says a former chemical and biological weapons expert of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) who remains close to and intimately informed about the recent U.N. arms inspection effort in Iraq. The expert (who requested anonymity) says that Baghdad “most likely” has shut down any WMD operations. He added that any munitions it may still possess “are most likely now in the field and being moved around the country.” “They (the weapons) could be in railroad cars, barges or refrigerator trucks. They are being kept on the move,” explained the former arms inspector. The arms expert says by keeping the weapons on the move, they make an attack by coalition forces more difficult. Furthermore, he explained they could be shifted around the country as “conditions warrant.” The Pentagon has repeatedly complained to the U.N. about suspected bio agents being shuffled around Iraq in “refrigerator vans.” Chief U.N. arms inspector Dr. Hans Blix told the Security Council in February that his teams “had been unable to track down the refrigerator vans in question.” The U.N. inspector says that the Pentagon must be careful not to fall into an Iraqi trap. He suspects that the movement of substantial numbers of Iraqi Republican Guard units southwards from Baghdad to confront advancing U.S. forces may be an attempt to create a battlefield situation favorable to the use of weapons of mass destruction. “If Iraq still has chemical weapons it wants to use,” he says, “it would want to cause as much damage as possible in one short attack. Therefore, the U.S. needs to be careful not to amass large numbers of troops in any central location.” The most likely attack, he says, would come from more than "800 unaccounted for 155mm artillery shells which may contain mustard gas.” However, says the U.N. inspector, “the Iraqis have problems delivering their WMD in a militarily effective manner.” He reveals that more than 70% of Baghdad's declared and suspected WMD were in “aerial” form—meaning they were designed to be delivered by aircraft. Since Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi Air Force has almost ceased to exist. The U.N. inspector also added that any biological weapons that Iraq might still possess would “not cause much of a problem for the U.S. forces.” He explained that the Pentagon is familiar with most or all of Baghdad's suspected bio weapons and has procedures to protect its soldiers against such an attack. He added that Iraq's exotic weapons programs also involved the use of psycho-tropic agents similar to LSD. “They were not meant to kill, just incapacitate, confuse,” says the inspector. This had been designed, he says, as a means to fight off rag-tag Iranian forces in the late 1980’s during the long war between Baghdad and Tehran. The other WMD weapons Iraq may still have were initially designed to “fight off Iranian human wave attacks, they really weren't meant against a force like the U.S. military.” He adds that biological weapons in this war at this time are of little use. Iraq’s suspected bio-weapons (anthrax, botulism) take days to weaken the human body and would do little to blunt a fast moving force. He also says coalition troops have biological and chemical weapons detectors and decontamination units in the field, making it tough for bio-weapons to be much of a factor. “My guess is that the probability of a WMD attack is small,” says the UN official. “Right now, Saddam has 80% of the world supporting him. If he used WMD, that support would dissolve. So, he has no incentive. Even if he did, it would not cause enough damage to change anything. About the only thing he may accomplish is to scare you reporters.” time.com

To: Bilow who wrote (100433)	6/5/2003 7:23:12 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 281500

Blair and Bush Aren't That Stupid By Max Boot (2003-06-05) Opponents of the war in Iraq must be chagrined to see pretty much all of their arguments discredited by events. The invasion did not cause greater regional unrest; instead it led to a resumption of Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. There have been no massive refugee flows or other humanitarian disasters. U.S. troops did not encounter a Stalingrad on the Euphrates. And so on. Not able to forgive George W. Bush and Tony Blair for being right, the naysayers are now emphasizing what looks to be their strongest argument: the failure so far to find weapons of mass destruction. The European press is in a frenzy about the "lies" that led to war. New York Times columnist Paul Krugman is already suggesting this may be "the worst scandal in American political history." Those who make this argument must think that the U.S. and British governments are not only deeply venal but also stupid. Their theory, essentially, is this: The president and prime minister deliberately lied about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction to justify an invasion that they knew would show that no such weapons existed. It is indeed puzzling that U.S. forces haven't found more evidence of WMD, but this hardly shows that Bush and Blair lied. It does show how imperfect our intelligence about Iraq was, which actually makes the case for preventive war that much stronger. Critics of preventive wars (those undertaken to head off a future danger) suggest that we should wait to hit back until just before we're going to be attacked (preemption) or just after (retaliation). But how are we going to find out about an attack just before it happens, or even how are we going to assign blame afterward? The CIA's long history of failures in Iraq -- the agency was surprised by the extent of Hussein's nuclear program in 1991 and again in the mid-1990s -- suggests that we can have very little hope of figuring out exactly what closed societies are up to. The safer course when dealing with rogue states that have demonstrated a capacity to manufacture and use WMD is to stop them before it's too late. Iraq, despite the paucity of "smoking guns" (aside from two possible mobile bioweapons trailers), fits this category. No one -- except a discredited former CIA analyst -- doubts that Hussein used chemical weapons against the Iranians and Kurds. Neither can there be any serious doubt that he kept WMD long after he was obliged to give them up by United Nations resolutions. <font size=4>It wasn't just the U.S. government (under presidents Bush and Clinton) that accused him of stockpiling WMD; so did other governments, including France. A senior French official recently told some American visitors that his government continued to believe that Hussein had WMD. Which makes sense. Why else would the French push so hard for inspections unless they thought there was something to inspect?<font size=3> Nothing since the war discredits the casus belli, which was Hussein's failure to fully cooperate with weapons inspectors -- a failure that continued until the end, even though it cost the regime billions of dollars in lost oil revenue. <font size=4>Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix's last report, released this week, found "the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for, and as such resulting in unresolved disarmament issues, was neither shortened by the inspections nor by Iraqi declarations and documents." Was Blix too part of Bush's pro-war conspiracy? The mystery, in light of the postwar failure to find any WMD stockpiles, of course is why Hussein was so uncooperative.<font size=3> The simplest answer is that he did have something to hide -- and we'll still find it. The more unlikely but possible explanation is that he destroyed his stockpile (or smuggled some of it out of the country) but didn't want to definitively declare his lack of WMD because this would dispel his aura of power. Hussein may well have been playing a canny game by destroying his stockpiles but keeping the capacity to manufacture more as soon as the world's interest faded. In 1998, after all, he stopped cooperating with U.N. weapons inspectors and suffered no serious consequences. He provided limited cooperation this time only because of the presence of hundreds of thousands of U.S. and British troops on his borders -- a deployment he knew could not be maintained indefinitely. He probably hoped to outlast the international community again. That strategy failed, of course, because of the determination of Bush and Blair to hold him to account. They decided that, even if Hussein was not about to strike now, it made sense, based on his long record of violating international law, to remove him from power rather than wait for him to augment his WMD capacity in the future, possibly even by acquiring nuclear weapons. It is reasonable for critics to find this rationale for war unconvincing. It is not reasonable for them to accuse Bush and Blair of lying. Whatever the details of his WMD program, the fact that Hussein was a dangerous monster is no lie. Copyright (c) 2003 Los Angeles Times Distributed by Los Angeles Times Syndicate © Copyright 2003, Los Angeles Times publicbroadcasting.net