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Politics : Attack Iraq? -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Scott Bergquist who wrote (6591)	6/18/2003 1:54:39 PM
From: Scott Bergquist	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 8683

The War is not "over". Bush goofed. Until the final demolition of the Iraqi HQ central command, no WMD either. From Stratfor.com Iraq: Questions Surround Resistance Movement Summary Forty U.S. soldiers and more than 100 Iraqis have died in guerrilla attacks and the subsequent U.S. counteroffensive operations. These activities point to a major resistance movement under way, despite the fact that U.S. President George W. Bush announced the end of combat operations in Iraq on May 1. The thrust of this resistance appears to be centered northwest of Baghdad, in an area primarily inhabited by Sunni -- but it is yet to be seen whether this resistance is a significant threat to U.S. plans for postwar Iraq. Analysis About 40 U.S. soldiers have been killed in guerrilla attacks in Iraq launched by forces loyal to ousted leader Saddam Hussein -- attacks that have intensified since U.S. President George W. Bush announced the cessation of combat operations. To quell this resistance, U.S. forces have launched "Operation Peninsula Strike" and "Operation Desert Scorpion," which have left more than 100 Iraqis dead. These attacks mostly have targeted U.S. forces in and around a large radius of the Sunni heartland, northwest of Baghdad. Judging from the geography, this is a complex organization consisting of a multi-cell resistance force. Moreover, the precision attacks suggest a decent command and control apparatus equipped with a functioning intelligence network. These revelations confirm what Pentagon officials have acknowledged -- that these attacks are not only well organized, but also are executed in a sophisticated manner. This might confirm speculation that most of the Iraqi military corps survived the U.S. air and ground assault. During the campaign, identified Iraqi military casualties were relatively light; during the war, the greatest damage to Iraq's military capability involved the abandonment and destruction of hardware. Two theories currently exist for this outcome. One is that the Iraqi army simply collapsed under U.S. military pressure. The other, more recently emerged theory is that the Iraqi command opted in favor of a strategic withdrawal -- as opposed to staying and resisting the overwhelming odds -- in preparation for guerrilla operations. Under this theory, the Iraqi army executed a maneuver similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Rather than engaging in extended conventional operations it could not win, the Taliban abandoned Afghanistan's urban areas, dispersed its forces and then regrouped a portion of the most loyal and motivated elements of those troops in remote regions to engage in the kind of war in which it had experience and felt would offer the greatest long-term hope of success. Under this theory, the Iraqi military -- which early on used Mujahideen irregulars to harass advancing U.S. forces in the Euphrates basin -- executed a similar plan. It is this force that might be regrouping and opting for guerrilla attacks. However, a successful guerrilla war depends on the ability of Hussein -- who still is unaccounted for -- or designated commanders to lead the troops that remain. While a large number of Hussein's ruling elite have been captured or have turned themselves in, stalwarts such as former Vice Presidents Taha Yassin Ramadan and Izzat Ibrahim, former Information Minister Mohammed Said al-Sahhaf and Gen. Ali Hassan al-Majid -- who previously was reported dead -- have not been located. The whereabouts of Hussein's sons, Odai and Qusai, also are unknown. The potency of the guerrilla force also depends on the extent to which these troops exhibit their loyalty to the deposed Baath regime. Then there is the question of logistics: What is the size of the armory at the guerrillas' disposal, where are supply dumps located and -- in the long run -- what is the resupply source? There also is a question of manpower. Even if it is accepted that the core of the guerrilla movement originated in the Iraqi military, all of the military have not become guerrillas. Just how many active operatives there are is unknown to the United States and may not even be clearly known by the Baath command structure. Uncertainty of that sort is inherent in guerrilla war. there are also unconfirmed reports of the presence of non-Iraqi Islamic fighthers-- perhaps tied to the al-Qaeda network--operating in Iraq. The manpower issue is crucial. The United States cannot defeat the guerrillas unless they know the size and distribution of forces. Those forces are inherently dynamic. They can contract under pressure and then expand, drawing on a pool of trained personnel, as military and political conditions permit. Currently, judging from the geography of the attacks against coalition forces, it appears this activity is confined to the central Sunni region. What can catapult this guerrilla force to a major resistance movement is whether the Shiite majority concentrated in the south will join the Baathists in an insurrection, or at least in demonstrations designed to destabilize the U.S. occupation. Given the experience of the Shiites under the Baath Party, this seems unlikely. At the same time, an unintended consequence of Shiite politics could be to increase stress on U.S. forces, indirectly accomplishing the same end. The United States has serious problems in occupying Iraq. The Hussein regime's neglect of infrastructure and the inability of the United States to dramatically improve living conditions -- coupled with internal Iraqi political forces seeking to exploit public dissatisfaction with the U.S. occupation -- have created a difficult environment for U.S. forces and a classic circumstance for guerrilla operations. On the other hand,some factors favor the United States. The Baath command structure is opposed by large sectors of the Iraqi public, which perceives the movement as an attempt to return to an unacceptable status quo ante. This increases the United States' opportunities for intelligence-gathering. Its operations thus far have been limited to very small unit operations, since massing into larger units in the Sunni terrain is extremely difficult. Larger, coordinated operations can reveal the command structure, opening it to counterattack. The United States did not expect the guerrilla war -- there is no question about that. And it is increasingly likely that Hussein planned this phase of the war from the beginning. We had speculated about a national redoubt in Stratfor's War Plans series. This seems an extension of the idea that the war would not end with the occupation of Baghdad. The key variable from now on will be intelligence identifying and liquidating the guerrilla force without waging war on the Iraqi public. That is the United States' goal -- and it is more easily said than done.

To: Scott Bergquist who wrote (6591)	6/18/2003 2:45:42 PM
From: Orcastraiter	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 8683

I don't think that the temperature argument holds water, unless the cakewalk argument does too. But really neither argument holds up to scrutiny. The major combat is over, but now we will be involved in a guerilla war, possibly for years. And US forces still have their gas masks and chem suits at the ready, just as always. If there are WMD, and there is Iraqi resistance, do you suppose that they might use WMD? Will US forces take a chance that they won't? The war as conducted was the wrong tactic to begin with. There is no redemption. Orca