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To: Win Smith who wrote (549)7/8/2003 2:11:06 PM
From: Win Smith  Respond to of 603
 
The Rise and Fall and Rise of the Domino Theory nytimes.com
New York Times; New York, N.Y.; Mar 23, 2003; Sam Tanenhaus;

[ I don't know if it's time to declare the "hope" part of this one ironic, or to note again that hope is not a plan. ]

AS the war in Iraq began last week, some prominent members of the Bush administration were repeating their hope that the removal of Saddam Hussein will be the catalyst for a wave of democratic reform throughout the Middle East. In making their case these planners have revived a staple of cold-war thinking, the domino theory: the idea that sudden change in the leadership of one nation can set off a chain reaction in its neighbors, transforming an entire region.

In its original formulation, the domino theory was invoked fearfully. At the time, the most active agent of wholesale change was thought to be Soviet Communism. America's job was to keep the dominoes from falling, all over the globe. But in today's unipolar world, a so-called positive or reverse domino theory has emerged. It envisions democracy as the great insurgent movement of our time, with the United States leading the revolution.

Either way, the image of nations as falling dominoes, each toppling into the next, has proved remarkably durable, shaping the policies of presidents from Dwight D. Eisenhower on.

Eisenhower, who was not generally known for his vivid formulations, introduced the concept, shortly after French forces were overwhelmed by Communist guerrillas in Dien Bien Phu, a valley in Vietnam, in 1954. Asked at a press conference to explain the significance of this distant conflict, Eisenhower said that one Communist victory in the region could set off a ''possible sequence of events,'' including ''the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand'' and perhaps Indonesia as well.

All this ''might follow from what you might call 'the falling domino' principle,'' he said. ''You had a row of dominoes set up, and you knocked over the first one, and what would happen to the last one was the certainty that it would go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.''

The idea made sense to many who had strong memories of the calamitous prelude to World War II. The Western powers had stood by as Hitler annexed Austria and grabbed Czechoslovakia, putting him into position to invade Poland and pursue further conquests. Eisenhower drew this parallel in an exchange with Winston Churchill, citing the failure of the great democratic powers ''to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler'' when they had the opportunity.

John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower's successor, reportedly expressed skepticism about the theory's logic in the first year of his presidency, partly because it reduced the complex tangle of regional forces to a single tug of war between Washington and Moscow.

BUT Kennedy knew that the formula had already taken root in Southeast Asia. As the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., a Kennedy adviser, later observed, ''Whether the domino theory was valid in 1954, it had acquired validity seven years later, after neighboring governments had staked their own security on the ability of the United States to live up to its pledges to Saigon.''

Faced with a crisis in Laos two months into his presidency, Kennedy, echoing Eisenhower, warned that ''the security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence.''

But Indochina proved a troubling test case once the United States became mired in Vietnam. In 1966, an early critic of the war, Sen. J. William Fulbright, pointed out that the domino theory obliged the United States to ''fight in one country to avoid having to fight in another, although we could with equal logic have inferred that it is useless to fight in one country when the same conditions of conflict are present in another.'' Worse, as the war dragged on, policies meant to prop up wobbly dominoes instead had the effect of shoving them in the opposite direction. South Vietnam grew so dependent on American support that when aid was cut off in 1975 it was unable to ward off the invading North. President Richard M. Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia destabilized that country, clearing the way for the Khmer Rouge under its brutal dictator, Pol Pot, to take charge.

When the fall of Saigon failed to initiate a regionwide Communist insurgency, the domino theory looked discredited for good. Still, it continued to influence foreign policy, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. Unable to dislodge Fidel Castro in Cuba, the United States intervened repeatedly in nearby conflicts -- in Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Grenada -- in the belief that every additional foothold gained by Communists increased the threat in the hemisphere.

Today, the domino theory is so ingrained in American foreign policy that it is often the subject of sophisticated analysis. The Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis has written about the ''psychological domino effect'' that causes smaller nations to align themselves with great powers. In his revisionist history, ''Vietnam: The Necessary War,'' Michael Lind identified three versions of the domino theory: ''a regional domino effect, a global revolutionary wave effect or a global bandwagon effect.''

THE haunting memory of the old theory and its failings is still with us today, even as the image of falling dominoes is being reformulated in the optimistic vision embraced by Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, and others who suggest that the war in Iraq might be the first step toward establishing democracy in the Middle East.

In a recent appearance on Capitol Hill, George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, cautioned against making the Iraq war the basis of ''a big domino theory about what happens in the rest of the Arab world.''

And shortly before President Bush flew to the Azores a week ago, The Los Angeles Times reported that a classified State Department document, presented to top government officials, made a strong case that the fall of Mr. Hussein is unlikely to unleash democratic change in the region. The report was pointedly titled, ''Iraq, the Middle East and Change: No Dominoes.''



To: Win Smith who wrote (549)8/11/2003 5:44:46 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER  Respond to of 603
 
Prodi looks to Europe's future while watching U.S.
Craig S. Smith NYT Monday, August 11, 2003

UCCELLINA NATIONAL PARK,
Italy Sitting on a hilltop overlooking the sun-yellowed Tuscan countryside, Romano Prodi, the most visible representative of the European Union, can almost see the future for which he has worked long and hard - a day when Europe speaks with one voice on world affairs and is listened to by Washington.

But for the clouds.

There are gathering ones like a brewing accounting scandal at the European Union's statistics bureau in which more than E900,000, or $1 million, has disappeared. Distant ones like Turkey, whose proposed membership in the European Union could make unity on foreign policy difficult to attain. Finally, dark ones: the fact that the United States shows little interest in a Europe united behind a common foreign policy, and today often seems to find it in the U.S. interest to work against such a policy.

Prodi, 64, has come to Tuscany to relax and reflect before beginning the final year of his five-year term as president of the Union's executive body, the European Commission. He sat, sipping water and talking outside an ochre villa where he and his wife, who have two grown sons, were staying.

The Italian press has nicknamed him "the mortadella," after the bland sausage (known as baloney in the United States) made in Bologna, where he was an economics professor before entering politics. Born in Reggio Emilia, 80 kilometers, or 50 miles, from Bologna, he has little of the stiff formality of many Italian politicians - he is known as an enthusiastic bicyclist - and was dressed on this occasion in a wine-colored polo shirt and pale-green linen pants.

But he is a man of sharp opinions, given to emphatic Castro-like enunciation when speaking on subjects about which he feels passionate. European unity, and its importance not only to this continent but also to the United States, is one of them.

"In this complex world, nobody alone is able to dictate a policy, even a country so strong and so powerful like the United States," he said, his voice alternately gruff and purring. "The great risk of great powers is overstretching."

A unified Europe as America's partner would only increase global stability, he maintains. But Prodi worries that Americans understand neither the value of a united Europe nor the difficulty in securing that unity.

"Their prevalent doctrine today is to have a divided Europe," Prodi said of the United States, adding that he sees the doctrine as part of a "deep wave" in American history that goes beyond the current administration and is driven by the country's self-confidence, particularly after its post-Sept. 11 victories in Afghanistan and Iraq.

"It is so strong that I don't think that this wave will stop in a short time," he said, "remembering that in American history there have always been alternate periods of isolationism and international cooperation."

Meanwhile, Prodi says, Europeans are building something new and different.

"From our side there is a deep feeling that no European member state can have any voice in the future staying alone," he said. "But, how to aggregate, this is the challenge of today."

Prodi, a former Italian prime minister, likens 21st-century Europe to 15th-century Italy, whose component city-states, though individually powerful, had no significant impact on the world after the European discovery of the Americas. "The city-states didn't merge, they were divided, and Italy disappeared from the world map," he said. Today's Germany and France "are like Florence or Venice or Milan at that time."

That may suit the United States just fine, he acknowledged, because internal bickering keeps Europe from presenting a unified challenge to Washington's foreign policy, as in the months before the recent Iraq war.

But Prodi maintains that it is in the Americans' long-term interest to have a united Europe that can share the political and economic costs of world affairs.

"Look how difficult it is to invent a new policy for the postwar Iraq," he said.

In any case, Prodi says, it will be "decades, not years," before Europe has a totally united foreign policy because "it will be the last piece of sovereignty the member states will pool together." In the nearer term, he says, his hope for European unity - already complicated by competing national interests - could be difficult if Europe decides to include Turkey, a Muslim country that would be one of the largest members.

He says U.S. pressure to accelerate Turkey's application for membership - on the basis that having Turkey in the European Union will enhance regional security - overlooks the longer-term consequences of bringing the country into the Union.

"When they said the process is too slow, I told them, 'Look I was born in a country where when you were a kid to describe something frightful, you said, 'Mama, the Turks!'" Prodi said, adding, "We have to fight against this deep prejudice."

Last year, the European Union decided that Turkey had not yet met the standards to begin formal membership talks but promised to make another assessment by the end of next year. Prodi said he would deliver a "complete, fair and objective" opinion before the Nov. 1, 2004, end of his term as president.

He said that he accepted the strategic importance of Turkey as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, but worried that the country's size, the peculiarities of its political institutions and its cultural ties to the Middle East could complicate European efforts to forge a common policy.

He said the matter of Turkey's membership was too politically sensitive to rush into because it would require approval from all of the Union's member states - 25 after the addition of 10 East European countries next year.

The New York Times

iht.com