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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: JohnM who wrote (109876)8/4/2003 12:22:52 PM
From: bela_ghoulashi  Respond to of 281500
 
Try to tame this rampant will-to-boss of yours, John.

It would greatly enhance your aura of serene, olympian charm.



To: JohnM who wrote (109876)8/4/2003 3:32:08 PM
From: Graystone  Respond to of 281500
 
the fighting will the heaviest in the middle
or
the battlefield

<<There is a line in our time, and in every time, between those who believe all men are created equal, and those who believe some men and women and children are expendable in the pursuit of power. There is a line in our time, and in every time, between the defenders of human liberty and those who seek to master the minds and souls of others. Our generation has heard history's call, and we will answer it.>>

This is the type of statement that sounds good, as long as it is clear which side you are on. If you are an American or a Briton do your own DD. Some key phrases to consider in light of things now revealed <<pursuit of power>> <<master the minds and souls>>. I look around the world and I see that, oh yes, I see that.



To: JohnM who wrote (109876)8/4/2003 4:47:25 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Sinking ever-deeper into Iraq sand

____________________________________


James O. Goldsborough
Columnist
THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE
August 4, 2003

signonsandiego.com

I have, in recent months, compared the Bush administration's war in Iraq to the Spanish-American and Vietnam wars and heard it compared to the Mexican and Persian Gulf wars.

But as the quagmire deepens, it becomes clear Iraq is unlike anything this nation has undertaken (though there are foreign parallels). The situation's uniqueness explains why public concerns are rising as President Bush's approval rating declines. Bush's war has produced the hostile, hegemonic occupation of a sullen nation bent on killing Americans until we have departed.

It is the job of soldiers to kill or be killed, some would say, and if the cause is right, it is a price any brave nation is willing to pay.

But what was the cause of Bush's war? If it was Iraq's weaponry (the term weapons of mass destruction is meaningless), where are they? If it was to satisfy Iraqis' hunger for democracy, why are they killing us?

It is these paradoxes that make this war unlike anything before, and why it is so extremely risky. They are paradoxes born of Bush's doctrine of "pre-emptive" war, and the deepening quagmire should be reason to jettison that flawed doctrine for good. Pre-emptive war is war a la carte, and no victim will take it kindly.

Looking back over history, Bush's war in a way resembles the Spanish-American war – also fought over trumped-up charges magnified in the press to create war fever and leading to a long U.S. foreign occupation.

The difference is that, in principle at least, we were liberating Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines from a decadent Spanish monarchy. Filipinos would show no more love for the new rulers than for the old, and 20,000 Filipino fighters and 4,000 U.S. soldiers would die before the islands were subdued.

With Vietnam, the main difference is that Americans were, some thought, defending a nation seeking help in repelling foreign aggression. Our mistake was that South Vietnam was not a nation, but a part of a nation fighting a civil war, and however good our intentions, we should have stayed out.

The Mexican war has little in common with Iraq. It was a border war over Texas. Rep. Abraham Lincoln and much of Congress opposed the war over fears Texas would enter the Union as a slave state, which it did. The war, called "Mr. Polk's war," resembles "Mr. Bush's war" only in that Polk wanted war as badly as Bush.

Bush's war bears little resemblance to the 1991 Gulf War, which was waged by a broad coalition of nations operating under U.N. mandate to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. A central difference is that the coalition stopped after driving Iraq from Kuwait, rejecting armed occupation of Iraq because of the very dangers Bush has now assumed for America mostly alone.

It should be noted that U.S. deaths from hostile fire in Bush's war already exceed those in the Gulf War, and there will be many more to follow.

The word quagmire suggests Vietnam, and if the differences between Iraq and Vietnam are fundamental, the common point is that quagmires suck you in and don't let go. The longer the Iraq occupation lasts, the more it will resemble Vietnam – soldiers being killed, treasure being drained, no exit strategy, rising discontent at home.

The conflict Iraq most resembles today comes not from America's past, but from France's and Britain's, the imperial powers Bush would emulate.

Think of Algiers, 1954-57. There is a scene in Pontecorvo's great film, "The Battle of Algiers," where the colonel in charge meets the press after crushing Arab street protest.

"They want us to leave Algeria," he says. "But we want to stay."

The French would be swept away.

Think of Baghdad in the 1920s with the British bombing the people into submission. Military government would give way to a pro-British Arab regime under King Faisal I, a Hashemite imported from Arabia.

The occupation was a huge drain on British resources, but London got Iraq's oil, as it got Iran's. Things would unravel in the 1930s, and, in 1940, Iraq sought to join the Axis powers to oppose the now hated British. In 1958, Iraqi nationalists took control, murdering Faisal II and his family, and eventually leading to Saddam Hussein.

There is only one way Bush can avoid dragging America into the same swamp that drowned the British:

If American troops are not to become shooting ducks as our nation is drained of $3.9 billion a month in occupation costs for years to come, we need help from the United Nations.

Yes, that United Nations, the one Bush scorned, insulted and deceived as he planned his war. The administration of Iraq must be turned over to the United Nations so that occupation costs, in lives and treasure, are transferred to a broad group of nations.

Bush won't do it. He'll accept money, and a few nations are offering a few troops (paid for by us), but he will not hand power to the United Nations. Because of that, big nations that could help – India, Russia, France and Germany – won't sign on.

It is another Bush mistake. At this point, we need the United Nations more than it needs us, and until Bush is willing to eat a little crow, we will all pay – our troops more than most.

_______________________________

James O. Goldsborough is foreign affairs columnist for The San Diego Union-Tribune and a member of the newspaper's editorial board, specializing in international issues.

Goldsborough spent 15 years in Europe as a correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune, the International Herald Tribune and Newsweek Magazine. He is a former Edward R. Murrow Fellow at the Council on Foreign relations and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment.

Goldsborough's column is syndicated nationally by Copley News Service.



To: JohnM who wrote (109876)8/4/2003 4:59:43 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Career officer does eye-opening stint inside Pentagon

By Karen Kwiatkowski, a recently retired Air Force Lieutenant colonel.

Posted on Thu, Jul. 31, 2003

After eight years of Bill Clinton, many military officers breathed a sigh of relief when George W. Bush was named president. I was in that plurality. At one time, I would have believed the administration's accusations of anti-Americanism against anyone who questioned the integrity and good faith of President Bush, Vice President Cheney or Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

However, while working from May 2002 through February 2003 in the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Near East South Asia and Special Plans (USDP/NESA and SP) in the Pentagon, I observed the environment in which decisions about post-war Iraq were made.

Those observations changed everything.

What I saw was aberrant, pervasive and contrary to good order and discipline. If one is seeking the answers to why peculiar bits of ``intelligence'' found sanctity in a presidential speech, or why the post-Hussein occupation has been distinguished by confusion and false steps, one need look no further than the process inside the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I can identify three prevailing themes.

• Functional isolation of the professional corps. Civil service and active-duty military professionals assigned to the USDP/NESA and SP were noticeably uninvolved in key areas of interest to Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld. These included Israel, Iraq and to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia.

When the New York Times broke the story last summer of Richard Perle's invitation of Laurent Muraviec to brief the Defense Policy Board on Saudi Arabia as the next enemy of the United States, this briefing was news to the Saudi desk officer. He even had some difficulty getting a copy of it, while receiving assignments related to it.

In terms of Israel and Iraq, all primary staff work was conducted by political appointees, in the case of Israel a desk officer appointee from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and in the case of Iraq, Abe Shulsky and several other appointees. These personnel may be exceptionally qualified; Shulsky authored a 1993 textbook Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence.

But the human resource depth made possible through broad-based teamwork with the professional policy and intelligence corps was never established, and apparently, never wanted by the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld organization.

• Cross-agency cliques: Much has been written about the role of the founding members of the Project for a New American Century, the Center for Security Policy and the American Enterprise Institute and their new positions in the Bush administration. Certainly, appointees sharing particular viewpoints are expected to congregate, and an overwhelming number of these appointees having such organizational ties is neither conspiratorial nor unusual. What is unusual is the way this network operates solely with its membership across the various agencies -- in particular the State Department, the National Security Council and the Office of the Vice President.

Within the Central Intelligence Agency, it was less clear to me who the appointees were, if any. This might explain the level of interest in the CIA taken by the Office of the Vice President. In any case, I personally witnessed several cases of staff officers being told not to contact their counterparts at State or the National Security Council because that particular decision would be processed through a different channel. This cliquishness is cause for amusement in such movies as Never Been Kissed or The Hot Chick. In the development and implementation of war planning it is neither amusing nor beneficial for American security because opposing points of view and information that doesn't ``fit'' aren't considered.

• Groupthink. Defined as ``reasoning or decision-making by a group, often characterized by uncritical acceptance or conformity to prevailing points of view,'' groupthink was, and probably remains, the predominant characteristic of Pentagon Middle East policy development. The result of groupthink is the elevation of opinion into a kind of accepted ``fact,'' and uncritical acceptance of extremely narrow and isolated points of view.

The result of groupthink has been extensively studied in the history of American foreign policy, and it will have a prominent role when the history of the Bush administration is written. Groupthink, in this most recent case leading to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, will be found, I believe, to have caused a subversion of constitutional limits on executive power and a co-optation through deceit of a large segment of the Congress.

I am now retired. Shortly before my retirement I was allowed to return to my primary office of assignment, having served in NESA as a desk officer backfill for 10 months. The transfer was something I had sought, but my wish was granted only after I made a particular comment to my superior, in response to my reading of a February Secretary of State cable answering a long list of questions from a Middle Eastern country regarding U.S. planning for the aftermath in Iraq. The answers had been heavily crafted by the Pentagon, and to me, they were remarkably inadequate, given the late stage of the game. I suggested to my boss that if this was as good as it got, some folks on the Pentagon's E-ring may be sitting beside Hussein in the war crimes tribunals.

Hussein is not yet sitting before a war crimes tribunal. Nor have the key decision-makers in the Pentagon been forced to account for the odd set of circumstances that placed us as a long-term occupying force in the world's nastiest rat's nest, without a nation-building plan, without significant international support and without an exit plan. Neither may ever be required to answer their accusers, thanks to this administration's military as well as publicity machine, and the disgraceful political compromises already made by most of the Congress. Ironically, only Saddam Hussein, buried under tons of rubble or in hiding, has a good excuse.

ohio.com

© 2003 Beacon Journal and wire service sources. All Rights Reserved.
ohio.com



To: JohnM who wrote (109876)8/5/2003 12:12:43 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Everything Is Political
_________________________________

By PAUL KRUGMAN
OP-ED COLUMNIST
THE NEW YORK TIMES
August 5, 2003

The agency's analysts find that they are no longer helping to formulate policy; instead, their job is to rationalize decisions that have already been made. And more and more, they find that they are expected to play up evidence, however weak, that seems to support the administration's case, while suppressing evidence that doesn't.

Am I describing the C.I.A.? The E.P.A.? The National Institutes of Health? Actually, I'm talking about the Treasury Department, but the ambiguity is no coincidence. Across the board, the Bush administration has politicized policy analysis. Whether the subject is stem cells or global warming, budget deficits or weapons of mass destruction, government agencies are under intense pressure to say what the White House wants to hear. And the long-term consequences are likely to be dire.

Traditionally the Treasury, like the C.I.A., stands somewhat above the political fray. Externally, it is supposed to provide objective data that Congress and the public can use to evaluate administration proposals. Internally, long-serving Treasury analysts traditionally ride herd on political appointees, warning them when their proposals are ill conceived or irresponsible.

But under the Bush administration the Treasury takes its marching orders from White House political operatives. As The New Republic points out, when John Snow meets with Karl Rove, the meetings take place in Mr. Rove's office.

To the general public, the most obvious consequence of this subservience has been Treasury's meek acquiescence in an economic policy that hasn't produced any jobs, but has produced a $450 billion deficit. Insiders, however, are if anything even more dismayed by the erosion of Treasury's intellectual integrity — an erosion exemplified by its denial and deception on the subject of tax cuts.

Here's the story: Treasury has an elaborate computer model designed to evaluate who benefits and who loses from any proposed change in tax laws. For example, the model can be used to estimate how much families in the middle of the income distribution will gain from a tax cut, or the share of that tax cut that goes to the top 1 percent of families. In the 1990's the results of such analyses were routinely made public.

But since George W. Bush came into power, the department has suppressed most of that information, releasing only partial, misleading tables. The purpose of this suppression, of course, is to conceal the extent to which Mr. Bush's tax cuts concentrate their bounty on families with very high incomes. In a stinging recent article in Tax Notes, the veteran tax analyst Martin Sullivan writes of the debate over the 2001 cut that "Treasury's analysis was so embarrassingly poor and so biased, we thought we had seen the last of its kind." But worse was to come.

For his June 22 interview with Howard Dean, Tim Russert asked the Treasury Department to prepare examples showing how repealing the Bush tax cuts would affect ordinary families. Presumably Mr. Russert thought Treasury would provide a representative selection — that is, like many in the media, he doesn't yet understand the extent to which Treasury has become an arm of the White House political machine.

In any case, the examples Treasury provided to Mr. Russert and others in the media were wildly unrepresentative. To give you a sense: the Treasury's example of a "lower income" elderly household was one receiving $2,000 a year in dividend income. In fact, only about one elderly household in four receives any dividend income, and only one in eight receives as much as $2,000. Not surprisingly, the "Russert families" gained far more from the Bush tax cuts than a representative sample. As Mr. Sullivan put it, "If this continues, the Treasury's Office of Tax Policy may have to change its name to the Office of Tax Propaganda."

As I've said, this is only one example of a broad pattern. Still, why does politicized analysis matter? One answer is that it undermines democracy: how can Congress or the public make informed votes if both are fed distorted information?

And even if you aren't bothered by an administration that systematically misleads the public, you ought to be worried about the decisions of an administration that systematically misleads itself. A leader who is told only what he wants to hear is all too likely to make bad decisions about the economy, the environment and beyond.

nytimes.com