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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: epicure who wrote (114006)9/5/2003 5:26:07 PM
From: Rascal  Respond to of 281500
 
Operation Flight Suit

September 5, 2003
The China Syndrome
By PAUL KRUGMAN

A funny thing happened this week: the Bush administration, with its aggressive unilateralism, and its contempt for diplomacy and international institutions, suddenly staked its fortunes on the kindness of foreigners.

All the world knows about the Iraq about-face: having squandered our military strength in a war he felt like fighting even though it had nothing to do with terrorism, President Bush is now begging the cheese-eaters and chocolate-makers to rescue him. What may not be equally obvious is that he's doing the same thing on the economic front. Having squandered his room for economic maneuver on tax cuts that pleased his party base but had nothing to do with job creation, Mr. Bush is now asking China to help him out.

Not, of course, that Mr. Bush admits to having made any mistakes. Indeed, Mr. Bush seems to have a serious case of "l'état, c'est moi": he impugns the patriotism of anyone who questions his decisions.

If you ask why he diverted resources away from hunting Al Qaeda, which attacked us, to invading Iraq, which didn't, he suggests that you're weak on national security. And it's the same for anyone who questions his economic record: "They tell me it was a shallow recession," he said Monday. "It was a shallow recession because of the tax relief. Some say, well, maybe the recession should have been deeper. That bothers me when people say that."

That is, if you ask why he pushed long-term tax cuts rather than focusing on job creation, he says you wanted a deeper recession. It bothers me when he says that.

Of course, nobody says the recession should have been deeper. What critics argued — correctly — was that Mr. Bush's economic strategy of tax cuts for the rich, with a few token breaks for the middle class, would generate maximum deficits but minimum stimulus. "They" may tell him it was a shallow recession, but the long-term unemployed won't agree.

And the fact that even with all that red ink the recovery is still jobless should lead him to wonder whether he's running the wrong kind of deficits.

Instead, however, he's decided to plead with the Chinese for help.

Admittedly, it didn't sound like pleading. It sounded as if he was being tough: "We expect there to be a fair playing field when it comes to trade. . . . And we intend to keep the rules fair." Everyone understood this to be a reference to the yuan, China's supposedly undervalued currency, which some business groups claim is a major problem for American companies.

By the way, even if the Chinese did accede to U.S. demands to increase the value of the yuan, it wouldn't have much effect unless it was a huge revaluation. And China won't agree to a huge revaluation because its huge trade surplus with the U.S. is largely offset by trade deficits with other countries.

Still, even a modest currency shift by Beijing would allow Mr. Bush to say that he was doing something about the loss of manufacturing jobs other than appointing a "jobs czar." And so John Snow, the Treasury secretary, went off to Beijing to request an increase in the yuan's value.

But he got no satisfaction. A quick look at the situation reveals one reason why: the U.S. currently has very little leverage over China. Mr. Bush needs China's help to deal with North Korea — another crisis that was allowed to fester while the administration focused on Iraq. Furthermore, purchases of Treasury bills by China's central bank are one of the main ways the U.S. finances its trade deficit.

Nobody is quite sure what would happen if the Chinese suddenly switched to, say, euros — a two-point jump in mortgage rates? — but it's not an experiment anyone wants to try.

There may also be another reason. The Chinese remember very well that in Mr. Bush's first few months in office, his officials described China as a "strategic competitor" — indeed, they seemed to be seeking a new cold war until terrorism came along as a better issue. So Mr. Bush may find it as hard to get help from China as from the nations those same officials ridiculed as "old Europe."

Sic transit and all that. Just four months after Operation Flight Suit, the superpower has become a supplicant to nations it used to insult. Mission accomplished!

nytimes.com

Rascal @BushtoMakeSpeechPrimeTimeSundayNite8:30.com



To: epicure who wrote (114006)9/5/2003 5:42:22 PM
From: Nadine Carroll  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500
 
I don't think you understand the difference between stoicism and running away. Which is too bad, imo. There is a huge difference. I am sure the terrorists would realize that, even if you can't.

Please show your evidence for believing that. Your surety alone is not enough. I base my analysis on Bin Laden's quoted remarks, such as this:

In 1993, 18 U.S. soldiers, part of a contingent sent on a humanitarian mission to famine-struck Somalia, were murdered by street fighters in Mogadishu. Bin Laden later claimed that some of the Arab Afghans were involved. The main thing to bin Laden, however, was the horrified American reaction to the deaths. Within six months, the U.S. had withdrawn from Somalia. In interviews, bin Laden has said that his forces expected the Americans to be tough like the Soviets but instead found that they were "paper tigers" who "after a few blows ran in defeat."
time.com

Here is David Warren's analysis of the terrorist mindset, which is based on their words and deeds to date. He predicts that their fear is of failure, and that they will continue to hit soft, symbolic targets:

Readers in the West have, usually, no idea of the mindset of our enemy, and are protected from finding out by the scruples of politically-correct journalists, editors, and producers. We both over- and under-estimate the enemy, depending on breaking news.

By Western standards, the Muslim "holy warrior" is a coward, looking only for the sucker punch, and refusing to offer battle when his enemy is even slightly prepared. By his own, of course, he is not.

The terrorists will attack civilians, religious, and other innocents and bystanders, for the very reason they are unprotected. But the idea is not mere tactical surprise. He wins through fear, not force of arms.

He is not afraid of death, as we would more likely be. He is instead, by our standards, almost morbidly afraid of failure. He wishes all observers to believe he is invincible, and will avoid doing what might show he is not. Directly attacked himself, he melts away.

While the Ba'athist "dead-enders" in Iraq begin as secular fanatics; and Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc., are religious fanatics; there is no difference between them in practice, and less and less in theory. That they are in full co-operation is obvious both in their selection of symbolic targets, and their common tactics.

It would now appear, from available information, that the U.N. hit was performed by Saddamites on an Al Qaeda target (the Brazilian diplomat was the man who negotiated the recovery of "Christian" East Timor from "Islamic" Indonesia). Whereas the Najaf hit was performed by imported Wahabi terrorists, but on a traditional target of Saddam Hussein's.

My own "flypaper" thesis -- currently ridiculed on liberal websites in the United States -- assumed this would happen and is proved by it. Iraq has indeed become the flypaper for Wahabi-sponsored terrorists in the region. It is a rare thing when the enemy can be persuaded to behave as we would wish him to behave -- to go where we are most ready to collect him -- but the U.S. presence in Iraq has proved irresistible.

This does not mean that they all go there. It does mean that wherever they are -- and many remain under cover in North America -- their own morale depends on driving the U.S. out of Iraq, and destroying the emerging Iraqi government. As, ditto, in Afghanistan, the previous Wahabi setback.

To their mindset, domestic American targets are not the focus, just now. They think of those as too well protected, as being too far behind the front line. It is striking that no major terrorist hit seems even to have been attempted in the U.S. itself, since 9/11, despite what I take to be the bureaucratic incompetence of U.S. "homeland security", which will not even use racial profiling, or suspend such civil liberties as are normally suspended in wartime, when lives are at risk by the tens of thousands.

Note well: this is the one advantage we have with an enemy inspired by religious and ideological fantasies, if, as the Pentagon has tried, we make a good effort to understand how he ticks. His behaviour will be "rational" according to premises quite different from our own. He is obsessed with symbolic, rather than with strategic targets. He will go where the symbolic action is. But having arrived, his other principle kicks in, which is to hunt exclusively for defenceless targets.

Need I add, that all this could change tomorrow morning, if Islamists are persuaded that the Bush administration is vulnerable to a cut-and-run impulse in U.S. domestic opinion. They work from an acute sense of irresolution in their enemy, and are held back as much invisibly by the public resolution of President Bush, as visibly by specific security measures.

The enemy does not think like us. But that doesn't mean he couldn't defeat us -- by understanding our cowardice better than we understand his.
http://www.davidwarrenonline.com/Comment/Sept03/index160.shtml