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Politics : Idea Of The Day -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (44545)	9/8/2003 3:19:26 AM
From: IQBAL LATIF	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 50167

Rumblings in the army Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi Greater attention has to be paid to the middle and junior level officers, who are the product of an era when public display of Islamic orthodoxy and conservatism was an asset; for some it was a method of career advancement Pakistan Army sources confirmed a couple of days ago that three or four officers of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and below were under investigation for possible links with militant Islamic groups. The Afghan government spokesman announced on September 2 the arrest of three Pakistanis ‘believed to be military personnel in Zabul, [Afghanistan]’. No further information is available on the Afghan claim. Unofficial sources and especially the international press have talked of dozen or so commissioned and non-commissioned officers under investigation for active linkages with Taliban and Al Qaeda. This news is however denied by the Pakistan Army authorities. In the post September 2001 period, concern was expressed in the West, especially in the US, about linkages that might exist between the Pakistan Army personnel and the militant Islamic groups, especially the Taliban. This issue was raised because of the long-standing Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) connections with the Afghan mujahideen groups going back to 1979-1980. The Taliban were also known to have linkages with the ISI and some Pakistan-based Islamic groups and seminaries. General Pervez Musharraf’s military government opted to join the US-led global efforts to contain terrorism and transnational terrorist groups. This raised a question about the disposition of the Pakistani Army personnel serving with the ISI who had interacted with the Taliban in the last couple of years. Have they severed their links with the Taliban or are they quietly helping the latter through their linkages in Pakistan? Pakistan’s official sources maintained that the military government’s decision to pull away from the Taliban government in Kabul in September 2001 was implemented effectively. There is no concrete evidence suggesting that the ISI as a state-entity has helped the Taliban after their fall in November 2001. However, the possibility of some person(s) in the Army or the ISI expressing sympathy for the Taliban or Al Qaeda in his individual capacity cannot be ruled out. This could take the form of material help to Taliban through their linkages in Pakistan. There were press reports earlier this year of some Army personnel proceeding on leave to join the Taliban. Another report indicated that when an Al Qaeda militant was arrested from the house of a Jamaat-i-Islami activist in Rawalpindi, the latter’s brother who served in the Army was detained for investigation. In September 1995, a couple of officers, including a major general and a brigadier, were arrested for planning the takeover of the Army headquarters and the civilian government in order to establish a strict Islamic system in Pakistan. These officers were convicted by an army court martial. Some Islamic parties attempted to politicise the issue but their efforts did not evoke any support for these officers in the Army or in the political circles. Islam is integral to the Pakistan Army’s ideology. It is emphasised as an identity, source of guidance for individual and collective behaviour and a motivational force. However, the emphasis on Islam has always been coupled with professionalism and discipline. It is viewed as part of professionalism rather than a substitute for it. Traditionally, the military projected a moderate and liberal face of Islam. Whether a person strictly observed Islamic teachings and rituals or not was viewed as a matter of personal choice in the Army. Islam’s relation with the Army underwent a change in the 1980s due to domestic and external factors. Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Ziaul Haq, who assumed power in July 1977 by overthrowing a civilian government, used Islam and conservative Islamic groups to legitimise his military rule and undercut the opposition to his rule. He pampered conservative and orthodox Islamic groups in the political and cultural domains and encouraged Islamic orthodoxy and conservatism in the Army. For the first time, Islamic groups like the Tableeghi Jamaat and the Jamaat-i-Islami were quietly allowed to make inroads into the Army. General Ziaul Haq was the first Army Chief and head of state to attend the annual congregation of the Tableeghi Jamaat at Raiwind. Encouraged by this many officers began to openly associate with the Tableeghi Jamaat and publicly demonstrated their religiousness, something Army personnel avoided in the past. Other religious groups also cultivated links with the army personnel. This fitted in with the Zia regime’s identification with conservative and orthodox Islamic values and the rise of Islamic conservatism in society. The external factor contributing to these trends was Pakistan’s active involvement with the Afghan resistance against Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (1979-89) and the subsequent activism of the Afghan mujahideen. The struggle against Soviet troops in Afghanistan enabled conservative Islamic groups to obtain acceptability and material resources: they were armed during this period. The ISI’s active role in support of the Afghan resistance brought Pakistan Army personnel in contact with conservative Islamic groups who were engaged in armed struggle against the Soviet (a non-Muslim State) occupation of Afghanistan. This popularised the strategy of armed struggle in support of Muslim causes. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the ISI maintained contacts with some Afghan mujahideen groups; the Taliban being the last of them. These factors adversely affected the delicate balance the Army had traditionally maintained between Islam and professionalism. Many officers and men were attracted to radical Islamic ideology and thought that it could take precedence over professionalism. They talked of ‘Jihad’ as a legitimate political strategy for the state of Pakistan. This line of thinking persisted as Pakistani military and civilian authorities encouraged some militant Islamic groups to pursue Pakistan’s official policy of supporting insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. Given the role of some militant Islamic groups in Kashmir, the Pakistani authorities adopted a soft attitude toward their activities within Pakistan. The Army top brass were conscious of the fact that some elements in the Army had adopted Islam-oriented activism that was affecting Army professionalism and discipline. Since 1991, they have attempted to push back the politicised Islamic elements in the Army and reassert the Army tradition of keeping Islam and professionalism together, and treating the former as a component of the latter. The selection process for the higher echelons of the Army is rigorous with a strong emphasis on service record and professionalism. This minimises the chances of an officer given to political activism or having linkages with extremist groups reaching the senior command level. Furthermore, the Army looks after the material interests of its senior officers in service and after retirement, which dissuades most from giving in to extraneous religious or political influences. A well-known method of establishing contacts between militant Islamic groups and ordinary citizens is the holding of a ‘preaching session’ or ‘preaching tour’. This provides a safe cover to militant groups mobilising support or recruiting people for their organisations. Even the annual congregation of Tableeghi Jamaat has now become an important contact point for militant Islamic elements. If any officer or man of the Army goes to any such ventures, he may be asked to report back the details of the visit and the names of persons he interacted with. This will discourage interaction between militant Islamic groups and Army personnel. Discipline and professionalism are the hallmarks of Army organisation. However, greater attention has to be given to the middle and junior level officers, who are the product of an era when public display of Islamic orthodoxy and conservatism was an asset; for some it was a method of career advancement. They should be made to understand that activism based on any ideology other than the military ideology and professionalism is not acceptable. Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst dailytimes.com.pk

To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (44545)	9/8/2003 2:27:30 PM
From: IQBAL LATIF	Respond to of 50167

The weekly organ of the Iraqi Communist Party, Tareeq Al-Sha'b, wonders in its editorial how it is that the Arab countries and Arab media tout the terror activities in Iraq as "'patriotic resistance," but "massacred such 'resistance' when it happened within their borders..." ...They [the Arab countries] are trying to use it to cover up even worse positions in the past in which they supported the regime of mass graves. They are dreaming about its return [the Saddam regime] to obliterate what is left of our Iraqi people and its human resources, but a dream such as this will only bring them shame and defeat." A new batch of Iraqi editorials in translation now available from MEMRI: Link posted by Steven : 2:25 AM