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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: JohnM who wrote (114782)9/14/2003 4:16:19 PM
From: quehubo  Respond to of 281500
 
<<The idea seems to be that the French want substantive political concessions, whereas the Russians might be bought off with economic favors -- namely, getting back some of what went down the drain with Saddam. >>

I made prediction similar to this several weeks ago. Putin knows the power of oil and does not share the same grandiose illusions of national greatness that the French government does. Putin may want to be part of the Euro club, but he may find the cost too high and member status illusory. Putin has to worry about sending Saudi's the proper message to stop supporting the Chechen terrorists and also that as far as future investment opportunities in the ME, Iraq is a good alternative to SA.



To: JohnM who wrote (114782)9/14/2003 4:24:53 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Iraq: The Paths of Reconstruction
_______________________________

By Dominique de Villepin
Le Monde
Friday 12 September 2003

Iraq has just turned a page of its history with the fall of the dictatorship and the hope of a better future. However, a tragic sequence of disorder and violence has taken hold. Attacks multiply. Fanaticism and hate strike everywhere: the Jordanian embassy, the United Nations and the Mausoleum of Imam Ali of Nadjaf.

Hereafter, there is a real risk of seeing a chain of failure, fed by the absence of any tangible political prospect. This situation arouses a sense of helplessness in the international organizations on the spot and anxiety among all those who are there on the ground. The most serious danger is the demoralization and despair of the Iraqi people. Only a sudden change, supported by the international community, will permit an exit from this impasse.

The responsibility of each is clear. President Bush demonstrated his willingness to open up and we congratulate him for it. However, the proposed resolution submitted to the Security Council testifies to the still limited progress only in the role allotted to the United Nations. We are in this regard in an ever more paradoxical position. Can one ask the UN to intervene further on the ground without giving it either the ability to act or the indispensable conditions of security? Can the proposed resolution, in fact, be inscribed as a continuation of what has already been done? Is that commensurate to the situation? Is it the sort of thing capable of checking the mechanisms of decomposition in Iraq? We don’t think so.

Far be it from us to minimize the size of the task and its complexity, or to entertain an illusion of facility. However, we have a conviction: by pursuing the present path, we run the risk of entering an endless spiral. Time is limited. Immediately after the war, the direct administration of Iraq by coalition forces aroused, in spite of sustained efforts, a persistent malaise in the population. Putting essential public services back on track, repairs to the infrastructure were delayed. Iraqis’ legitimate expectations were disappointed.

Another path remains possible, putting the Iraqi people in the center of reconstruction processes and appealing to the international community’s responsibility.

We all share the same goal: to establish stability and the conditions for reconstruction in Iraq. France is ready to work with the United States in the Security Council and with the other countries engaged on the ground for Iraq’s benefit. But it’s necessary to depart from the ambiguity that would lead to a failure for the Iraqi people, with the risk of discrediting the international community. That demands a radically new approach.

All the more so as it’s the whole region which is threatened. We are aware that the problem goes beyond the framework of Iraq: the stability of the Arab-Islamic world is in play. In the Middle East, the exclusively security-based option only maintains the cycle of violence and of reprisals with the risk of destroying any political prospects. This approach – let’s have the courage to say it – leads nowhere. Far from promoting stability, it stirs up resentments, misunderstandings, and frustrations. Everywhere terrorist organizations take advantage of the least weakness to reinforce their establishment and feed a violence that concerns us all.

How do we get out of this trap and create the conditions for stability in Iraq? First of all, let us acknowledge that the foreign presence in itself constitutes a point of contention. Whatever the goodwill of each, it crystallizes frustrations, focuses discontents, and distorts the political landscape: all the concerned parties define themselves in relation to it, rather than mobilizing for Iraq’s benefit. The reconstruction effort implies working on clear bases and therefore that the present period of transition have a fixed deadline. That is the key to all progress.

It is, therefore, important above all to respect Iraqi national feeling, nourished by thousands of years of history and the bearer of the country’s future stability. On the other hand, reinforcing particularist or ethnic logics must be avoided.

Iraq is a territory of memory. Its attachments to its traditions and identity have already led it to reject the previously attempted impositions of foreign trusteeships. All during the past century the result has been jolts that have shaken the country to its depths. From revolution to coup d'Etat, Iraq hasn’t been able to find the peace it profoundly aspires to.

Today, it is urgent to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi people themselves, to allow them to completely fulfill their own responsibilities. Then, the different ethnic communities will find the strength, I hope, to work together. Then, a step will have been taken towards a greater justice: it is up to Iraqis, in fact, to make the decisions which commit the future of their country. But it’s also a question of effectiveness: for the different communities, as for the neighboring countries, only the prospect of a sovereign political destiny can feed hope and allow society to reconstitute itself.

Does that mean an immediate departure for coalition forces? Certainly not, and numerous voices have rightly been raised to underline that that would create a worse vacuum than the present situation. These forces could stay under the command of the principal troop contributor. Must their composition be enlarged? The essential, as we see it, is not to add to the number of troops on the ground, but to define their scope through a precise United Nations’ mandate, limited in time, with regular, detailed reports to the Security Council. One of the notable priorities today is to secure the frontiers and stop infiltration. A redeployment of coalition forces could be studied in liaison with the Iraqis in order to respond to this major risk.

Let’s speed up the formation of an Iraqi national army along the lines of what we’re doing in Afghanistan. That implies calling on a part of the demobilized Iraqi forces, whose competence will be indispensable for durably reestablishing security. In the end, we could arrive at a division of tasks more in conformity with Iraqi sovereignty and, no doubt, more efficient: external security in priority for the United Nations’ forces, internal security for the Iraqi authorities.

In this framework and while the negotiation over a new resolution begins in New York, we propose the following sequence.

The present Iraqi institutions, that is, the Government Council and the Ministers recently named, would be considered by the United Nations Security Council as the depositary of Iraqi sovereignty during the transition period. After a very short time, for example, a month, a provisional Iraqi government could be constituted from these elements and executive power, including economic and budgetary activity, would be progressively transferred to it. A personal envoy of the United Nations Secretary General would be mandated to organize consultations with the existing Iraqi institutions and the Coalition authorities and to gather the support of the countries in the region. This personal envoy would report to the Security Council and would propose a timetable defining the gradual transfer of power to the provisional government and the modalities to achieve this political transition.

This timetable ought to anticipate the stages of a constitutional process targeting the submission of a draft text before yearend. General elections could be envisaged for as soon as possible, spring 2004.

France is ready to take on all her responsibilities within this framework. As soon as Iraq’s sovereignty is reestablished, an international conference could be convoked to tackle together all the problems linked to reconstructing Iraq. It would aim to reestablish the coherence and efficiency of international action on Iraq’s behalf. In the domain of security, it would have to decide on the contributions to a future United Nations force, as well as to the formation of the army and the police. In the same way, it would have to define the financial aid commitments and assistance modalities to be brought to restoring the Iraqi administration back to order.

Such is the thrust of the proposals we are presenting to the Security Council. We do so in a spirit of dialogue with the United States, as with all our other partners. From Saturday on we’ll all be together in Geneva, the permanent members of the Security Council and Secretary General Kofi Annan, convinced that the international community can build its unity around a demanding and ambitious project.

This is an unprecedented challenge. It demands our understanding and adaptation to the realities of the terrain. It demands also that each agree to forget the quarrels of the past and to renounce ideological positions. The reconstruction of Iraq is a shared duty.

Dominique de Villepin is the French Foreign Affairs Minister.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Translation: Truthout French language correspondent Leslie Thatcher.

truthout.org



To: JohnM who wrote (114782)9/14/2003 4:48:50 PM
From: Jacob Snyder  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Those polls:

Sept. 13 — A new Newsweek poll finds that 51 percent of Americans say they oppose President Bush’s request for $87 billion in additional funding for U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. And nearly half of those polled—46 percent—say the United States should reduce the number of troops in Iraq and begin bringing military personnel home. Meanwhile, 48 percent believe the Bush administration did not have a well thought-out plan for establishing a stable government in Iraq. msnbc.com

...more Americans said that, if Congress decides to approve the additional money (87B$), lawmakers should roll back the president's tax cuts to pay for the increased spending, rather than add to the federal budget deficit or cut government spending.

While seven in 10 women oppose Bush's $87 billion request, a slim majority of men -- 53 percent -- rejects it.

The public's judgment of the way Bush is handling international affairs has never been lower, the Post-ABC News poll found. Slightly more than half -- 53 percent -- approve of the president's policies abroad, a precipitous fall from 67 percent barely two months ago.

The overwhelming majority of Americans believe the United States should stay in Iraq, even if it means suffering continued military casualties, but the proportion who favor getting out has increased from 27 percent to 32 percent since late August. At the same time, a 55 percent majority doubts Bush has a clear plan about what to do in Iraq, and more than eight in 10 -- 85 percent -- now fear the United States will get bogged down in a long and costly peacekeeping effort there, up from 76 percent in less than three weeks. washingtonpost.com

Do you think the Bush administration does – or does not – have a clear plan for handling the situation in Iraq?
2003 Sep 8-10
Yes, does 40%
No, does not 59%
usatoday.com (lots of other intesting results here)

My comment: Bush still has majority support, but just barely. Overall, Americans think he is still doing a good job in the "war of terror". But every question specifically about Iraq, shows a huge slippage in support and approval for the President. Americans still think it was a good idea to go into Iraq, but they think the President has bungled the occupation.