Page 1/2 -- IRAN’S MISSILE AND NUCLEAR CHALLENGE: A CONUNDRUM FOR RUSSIA
pircenter.org
Vasily Lata
Anton Khlopkov
[Outstanding find, carranza2. This is the way we 'used to post'. :o) --fl]
The news of a uranium enrichment plant in Iran, which arrived in September 2002, has
not only elicited the serious concern of the United States and Israel, but also came as an
unpleasant surprise for Russia. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei’s visit to
Iran in February 2003 confirmed the considerable progress Iran has made in constructing
a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant. It has become obvious that Iran has moved
considerably further in the development of nuclear power engineering than was thought
earlier. If just one year ago Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle seemed more virtual than real, given
that nearly all stages in the cycle were absent, the information of recent months has made
clear that it now has developed into a coherent whole.
The findings of this study, based on Iranian, American and Russian sources, do not claim
to be completely accurate. However, they make it possible to gain some insight into the
degree to which Iranian nuclear physics knowledge has progressed, the time required for
the country to acquire the materials and technologies needed to create nuclear weapons,
as well as the danger this may present for Russia. The paper also contains
recommendations on how Russian policy towards Iran should be formulated in the given
circumstances.
The Iranian Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Uranium Mines
Iran’s first uranium mines were opened in 1985, in Yazd province.1 Previously, it was
thought that they covered an area of some 100-150 km2, and contained reserves of
approximately 5,000 tons (t) of low grade ore, with a grade of just 0.1% uranium.
Data from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) that has recently become
available indicate that uranium reserves are considerably smaller than estimated earlier,
and total about 850 t, while the ore on average contains just 0.05% uranium (that is, 100
kg of ore yield just 50 g of uranium – the rest is dirt). According to estimates made by the
IAEA in 2002, there are about 500 t of proved ore reserves, and about 900 more tons of
probable reserves (with regard to which only rough estimates have been carried out).
At present, according to the AEOI, work is being conducted at two uranium deposits. The
first is estimated to have some 785 t of uranium reserves, while the second has reserves
of about 70 t. The first deposit occurs at a depth of 300-400 m. This, together with its
low uranium content, will affect the cost of nuclear power plant fuel production. The
IAEA estimates that this cost will be unacceptably high, exceeding current world prices
by some three to five times. The cost of nuclear fuel from uranium mined at the second
site, despite the relatively shallow depth of the deposit, will not be less expensive, given
the miniscule quantity of reserves by the standards of nuclear power engineering. If Iran
decides to use these proved uranium reserves for a nuclear power plant (NPP), one
operating WWER-1000 reactor will completely use up the reserves in just six years.
At various times specialists from Argentina, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Russia have been employed in the investigation of Iran’s uranium deposits. The greatest
contribution was made by Chinese specialists, who were part of a joint working group in
the early 1990s consisting of 600 Iranian and Chinese specialists working on rotation. At
present there are 23 Iranian experts and 77 engineers and laborers doing preparatory work
at the deposits. Before industrial exploitation of the mines begins, plans call for
increasing the number of personnel to 233. 2
Uranium Ore Processing Plant
Large-scale studies of the process whereby ore is separated from dirt (mechanical
processing) were begun soon after the end of Iran-Iraq war. In 1989 Iran announced the
signing of a contract worth $18 million with Argentina for the construction of a whole
series of structures near the uranium deposits, including a plant for processing uranium
ore. However, under pressure from the United States, the contract was voided three years
later. In the mid-1990s, Russia prepared technical designs for the construction of a plant
with the capacity to process 100-200 t of ore per year. However, the project was never
realized. According to available data, after that date Chinese specialists assisted in the
creation of an ore processing plant near the city of Ardakan; it is scheduled to be put into
operation in 2005.
Taking into account the volume of uranium reserves (about 850 t), and also the AEOI
estimate that after the mines begin industrial operation in 2005 it will take 17 years to
exhaust their resources,3 it is possible to conclude that, most likely, the planned ore
processing plant is designed to obtain 50 t of natural uranium per year, while the
preparation of fuel for one WWER-1000 reactor requires three times more.
“Yellowcake” Production Plant
In 1992 a pilot milling plant for the production of uranium concentrate (“yellowcake”)
was built at Saghand University’s Hydrometallurgical Research Center, located in Yazd
province, where the uranium deposits are found. The purpose of the pilot plant was the
determination of the optimum parameters and technical characteristics for an industrialscale
yellowcake production plant. In 1995, according to AEOI information, the plant
was reconstructed and considerably extended with the aid of a Russian institute.
Simultaneously, a design for an industrial plant was developed. According to a February
2003 statement by Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's representative to the IAEA, the yellowcake
production plant located in Yazd province, not far from the uranium mines near the city
of Ardakan, is ready.4
Uranium Conversion Plant
During the course of IAEA inspections in November 1996 at the Isfahan Nuclear
Research Center, Iran informed the Agency of plans to construct a uranium conversion
plant at the Center. The plans called for Chinese specialists to provide a facility for the
conversion of uranium oxide (U3O8) into uranium hexafluoride (UF6), which is a gaseous
substance used in centrifuge enrichment. A year later the transaction was cancelled by the
Chinese under pressure from the United States. In a letter to U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright on 30 October 1997, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian
Qichen promised to end plant construction. However, technical documentation on the
plant, including a blueprint, was probably transmitted to Iran, allowing Iranian specialists
to independently finish building the facility. Later, in 1998, the two countries conducted
negotiations regarding the delivery of hydrofluoric acid (HF), which is used in uranium
conversion, to the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center.
According to a statement by Iranian vice president and AEOI head Gholamreza
Aghazadeh, the plant was to begin operation in the summer of 2003. The commissioning
of the plant opens a direct route for Iran to enrich uranium. Plans call for the latter to
occur at a plant in Natanz (located in central Iran, 40 km from Kashan and 150 km from
Isfahan).
Uranium Enrichment Plant
Iran’s interest in centrifuge enrichment first became known in 1995, when Iran requested
that the possible delivery of enrichment technology to Iran be added to the protocol of
negotiations between Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor N. Mikhailov and AEOI
head Reza Amrollahi. Obviously, at the time Iranian specialists did this they were guided
by the Russian-Chinese agreement on the construction of a centrifuge enrichment plant,
signed three years earlier. After the Russian minister’s return from Iran, Moscow made
the unconditional decision to halt discussions on the centrifuge issue and conduct no
further negotiations with Iran on the subject. At the same time, it cannot be excluded that
Chinese specialists transmitted technical information on the Russian centrifuges, which
began to operate in China in 1996. Other information suggests that the development of
gaseous centrifuge technology in Iran was accomplished with the assistance of Pakistani
specialists in the first half of the 1990s, and the aid of North Korean specialists during the
second half of the decade.5 In the latter case engineering may have been conducted in
North Korea with the participation of Iranian specialists, and using Iranian funds. The
two countries used this method for work on missiles. Iran financed the design of a new,
modified version of the Scud-B missile in North Korea on the condition that a significant
number would be delivered to it. 6 The fact that information about the presence of
centrifuge enrichment programs in North Korea and Iran appeared at approximately the
same time – in October and December 2002, respectively – is quite suggestive.
According to IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, who visited the uranium
enrichment plant under construction in Natanz, the pilot centrifuge enrichment plant is
nearly ready for operation.7 At that time, according to the IAEA inspectors’ data, about
160 centrifuges were operational and there were components for another 1,000. In all,
according to press releases, 5,000 centrifuges are planned for the facility by 2005.8 At
the same time, according to some estimates, the production of enough nuclear fuel for
seven 1,000-megawatt (MW) power units9 requires ten times more;10 that is, the planned
number of centrifuges will not be enough for the operation of even one Russian WWER
reactor.
During the course of a year, these 5,000 centrifuges will presumably be able to produce
enough highly enriched uranium for not more than two nuclear explosive devices, which,
given the United States’ “close attention to the site” and the fact that the plant will be put
under IAEA safeguards, makes its use for these purposes unlikely, since a shift of half of
the facility’s capacity from peaceful to military purposes under the circumstances is
improbable. According to experts, one could conceal on average up to 1% of the nuclear
material under IAEA monitoring under the terms of the safeguards agreement based on
INFCIRC/153, 11 from which it follows that the possibility of concealing from
international inspectors nuclear materials of sufficient volume to create one explosive
device would require the presence of 250,000 centrifuges, while the Natanz complex is
large enough for about 50,000 centrifuges.
Iran’s centrifuges most likely are built out of aluminum alloy. It is possible that a Russian
consignment of this high-strength material, which was sent in the beginning of 2001 for
aircraft production, was used for the centrifuges. The production of aluminum centrifuges
is quite simple, but they are the least productive in the industry. More advanced
centrifuges are made from titanium alloys or alloyed steel, while the most recent (sixth)
generation of centrifuges are made of fiberglass reinforced with graphite threads. An
examination of Iran’s sources of materials for centrifuge construction should also
mention the March 1998 detention on the Azerbaijani-Iranian border of a consignment of
22 tons of alloyed steel, which certain persons were attempting to illegally export to Iran.
The steel had come from Russia and was transiting Azerbaijan on the way to Iran.
The enrichment plant, which is being actively built in Natanz, is apparently supposed to
become an industrial-scale uranium enrichment facility. The plant under construction is
partially underground and has, according to media reports, 2-3 meter thick walls, which
Iranian specialists believe should be able to protect it in the event of a preventive strike.
Fuel Fabrication Plant
At present there are a series of laboratories for the study and production of nuclear fuel at
the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center. One of them, according to the AEOI, is producing
experimental fuel for WWER reactors.12 According to the same source, the construction
of an industrial-scale fuel fabrication facility is already planned. There is no reliable
information about the location or stage of construction; however, the facility will
probably be located near Isfahan.
Fuel Element Cladding Production Plant
In the mid-1990s, China promised to build a plant to make zirconium pipes in Isfahan.
These pipes are used to fabricate cladding to encase nuclear fuel rods. When China
promised the United States that it would cease cooperation with Iran in the missile and
nuclear spheres, it said its specialists nevertheless would complete construction of the
zirconium production facility in Isfahan. 13 The plant was originally scheduled to be
finished by the end of 1999. However, as of May 2003 construction was continuing, but
was close to completion.14
Even the most preliminary survey of nuclear fuel cycle facilities completed or under
construction in Iran indicates that the nation has made considerable progress in the
creation of a complete nuclear fuel cycle. According to current estimates, if all of the
planned facilities (see Table 1) are brought into industrial use Iran will be able
independently to produce NPP fuel by 2005. At present the only aspect of the closed fuel
cycle about which there is no information concerns the location where a spent nuclear
fuel (SNF) reprocessing facility might be constructed.
TABLE 1. Iran’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Enterprises
Facility
Location
Stage
Uranium mines
Ardakan, 200 km from Isfahan
Bore-hole drilling has begun. The beginning of operations is planned for 2005
Ore processing plant
Ardakan
May begin operation in 2005
Yellowcake production plant
Ardakan
Ready for operation
Uranium conversion plant
Isfahan
The beginning of operations is planned for summer 2003.
Uranium enrichment plant
Natanz, 150 km from Isfahan
A pilot cascade may begin operations in the near future.
Fuel fabrication plant
Isfahan (presumably)
There is no information on this facility. However, a research laboratory in Isfahan is
already producing experimental fuel.
Fuel element cladding
Isfahan
Plant construction is nearing completion.
There are, however, a large number of contradictions between the technical
characteristics of the nuclear facilities that have been constructed, or the construction of
which is nearly complete, and the declared goals of Iran’s nuclear energy development
program.
1. When brought into operation, the uranium mines and ore processing plant will only
be able to provide one third of the uranium needed for a WWER-1000 reactor.
2. If the problem of insufficient ore processing capacity is solved and Iran decides to use
its own uranium ore for NPP fuel, one WWER-1000 reactor will use up proved
uranium reserves in six years.
3. The planned capacity of the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant is not enough to
produce fuel for even one WWER reactor.
Thus, the productivity of the facilities under construction are not only incapable of
satisfying Iran’s demands for nuclear fuel in the long term (plans call for the construction
of seven 1,000 MW reactors by 2021), but even in the short term, when a single WWER1000
reactor will come online at Bushehr. This raises a question regarding the aims of
creating these nuclear fuel cycle facilities if they are not going to be used for energy
production, and the nuclear fuel that they create costs some three to five times more than
the average world price. Another question concerns the justification for a heavy water
production plant, now under construction in Arak, since Iran only has one research
reactor, located at the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center, that uses heavy water, and very
little at that. The construction of Canadian CANDU reactors in Iran in the near future is
very unlikely, despite Iran’s interest in them.
It is well known that for two decades Iran has been trying to acquire a heavy water
reactor, and that this is the type of reactor most suitable for the production of weaponsgrade
plutonium. In the mid-1980s, the construction of a 10 MW heavy water-moderated
Indian research reactor was considered. In the early 1990s, Iran acquired a heavy-water
reactor from China of near-zero capacity, which was not suitable for plutonium
production, but which made it possible to simulate the operation of a large-scale heavywater
reactor. In the second half of the 1990s, AEOI conducted negotiations regarding
the purchase of a heavy-water research reactor (according to some sources, a 40 MW
reactor) from Russia. Iran’s original argument for the construction of this type of reactor,
that Iran was not interested in the development or purchase of enrichment technologies
and therefore wished to purchase a heavy-water reactor, cannot be taken seriously given
the on-going construction of an enrichment plant at Natanz.
There are several possible explanations for this sort of contradiction between Iran’s stated
nuclear power development aims and the facilities currently under construction.
The first is that Iran does not plan to create a large-scale closed nuclear fuel cycle, which
would ensure the self-sufficiency of the country through the operation of seven 7,000
MW nuclear power reactors. In this case the active development of the nuclear industry
aims at the acquisition of technology and high-technology equipment without the creation
of industrial-scale uranium production, uranium conversion, and the fabrication of
nuclear fuel for NPPs.
The renunciation of industrial nuclear plant construction, particularly of facilities of
proliferation concern like a uranium enrichment plant, could be an attractive bargaining
chip, primarily with the United States, on the “North Korean model.” Repayment for the
renunciation of an enrichment complex could consist of removing the one-sided
American sanctions against Iran, developing valuable trade and economic cooperation,
including large investments in the Iranian economy, and providing Iran access to peaceful
nuclear technology. By imitating the creation of a closed nuclear fuel cycle, the present
government of reformers is simultaneously pursuing domestic political goals. Given the
current fragile balance between moderate and hard-line forces in the country, moderate
Iranian leaders may be able to use successes in this high-tech branch to strengthen their
position among the population at large. It is no accident that the main Iranian reformer,
President Mohammad Khatami, announced the results achieved in the nuclear sphere on
the anniversary of the Islamic revolution. Minatom estimates favor this last explanation.
In the words of Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valery Govorukhin, the Iranian
statement regarding the beginning of uranium deposit exploitation “is, most likely,
political in nature, since it cannot be reinforced by the country’s technological and
financial capabilities.”15 At the same time, the goal of increasing the country’s status in
the region can be pursued.
The second explanation is that the country is developing nuclear technologies in order to
acquire the technical capabilities to build nuclear weapons. If this is the case, Iran could
go quite far without violating its international obligations. In particular, Iran has the right
to produce highly enriched uranium and generate, separate and store weapons-grade
plutonium under IAEA supervision. In this scenario, Iran would be able to obtain the
technical and material ability to build a nuclear weapon just several months after having
accumulated sufficient quantities of weapons-grade nuclear materials. The political
decision to use the accumulated reserves of nuclear materials for the creation of a nuclear
weapon might be made if Iranian-American relations worsen further and the United
States prepares for an operation to overthrow the current regime in Iran, or as a result of
the U.S. or Israeli bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities; that is, if scenarios that the
present U.S. administration has not excluded are realized.
The fact that Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle facilities, from the uranium mines to the uranium
enrichment plant, are concentrated around Isfahan (within a radius of 200 km) further
supports this second explanation. Launchers for the Scud-B, Scud-C, and Shehab-3 attack
missiles, which have a range of 300 to 1,300 km, are located in the same region.16
The study of open source information, primarily from the AEOI, poses a whole series of
questions regarding the aims of nuclear energy development. These questions demand
answers from Iranian experts. The first question is where and for what purposes will the
ore, which is soon to be mined near Ardakan, be used? Its use for nuclear fuel production
is extremely uneconomical.
The second question is for which reactors will the fuel at the plant in Isfahan be produced?
As indicated above, the planned nuclear fuel cycle facilities cannot produce the quantity
of fuel needed for even one power unit at Bushehr. In addition, Iran’s representatives
themselves have stressed that Russia will supply the fuel for the Bushehr NPP.17
The third question is where will the heavy water that will be produced in the Arak plant
be used?
Iranian specialists will answer many of these questions if Iran signs the Additional
Protocol. At least, it obligates them to do so.
Strengthening IAEA Safeguards In Iran
For several years, in parallel with its development of nuclear technologies, Iran has
repeatedly come out in support of strengthening IAEA safeguards. Proposals for the
strengthening of these safeguards include the signing of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol
and the broadening of technical collaboration between member states and the Agency
itself. Iran’s position is that both must be realized simultaneously, in order to raise the
level of confidence between member states and the IAEA and increase the transparency
of member states’ nuclear power programs on the one hand, and contribute to the
development of nuclear power engineering in these countries on the other. The
maintenance of a balance between the IAEA’s roles of “controller” and “assistant” is a
necessary condition for strengthening the safeguards regime. Further, Iran takes the
position that there must be a proportional increase in the funding of Agency technical
assistance programs along with the strengthening of safeguards.
One more issue that Iran regards as crucial when considering how to strengthen IAEA
safeguards is the need for a nondiscriminatory approach to nuclear power engineering
cooperation, as well as the nondiscriminatory and uniform application of the Additional
Protocol to the nuclear facilities of all countries, including nuclear-weapons states, and
also of those countries that are not parties to full-scope IAEA safeguards, including Israel
first and foremost. In Iran’s opinion, the question of the universality of the safeguard
system, and of the nonproliferation regime as a whole, is one of the major problems
standing in the way of strengthening the IAEA.
For several years Iran has spoken out in favor of strengthening safeguards, but at the
same time held back from signing the IAEA Additional Protocol.
The question of Iran’s signing the Additional Protocol was one of the central issues
during the visit of IAEA representatives to Iran in February 2003. According to Agency
Director-General ElBaradei, “Iran has developed a fuel cycle program sophisticated
enough to warrant that the IAEA obtain as much authority and as much information with
respect to Iranian nuclear research, as possible.”
However, during his visit to Tehran he was not able to persuade Iran’s representatives to
sign the protocol. AEOI head Aghazadeh said that too few countries had signed the
protocol. Earlier, Iran’s representatives had announced that Iran would be neither the
first nor the last in the region to join the Additional Protocol.18 At the time, Aghazadeh
said that the Iranian program “will be under the oversight of the IAEA, but we will leave
the road open to the Additional Protocol in the future.”19
Russia has consistently raised the question of Iran’s signing the Additional Protocol
during the course of bilateral talks. For instance, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Georgy Mamedov indicated the necessity of Iran’s joining the Additional Protocol as
soon as possible in his meeting with Gholamreza Shafei, Iran’s ambassador to Russia, on
April 14, 2003. 20 The importance of strengthening IAEA safeguards also were
emphasized in the joint statement by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Iranian
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi on March 12, 2003.21
It is indicative that Iran’s reservations regarding the Additional Protocol are no longer
fundamental in nature. The question that remains concerns the preferences the country
will obtain from its signature. Thus, according to Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman
Hamidreza Assefi, “many countries want Teheran to sign this document, and we are
ready to conduct negotiations in this area. However, it is necessary to clarify the benefits
that Iran will receive.”22 It is very much likely that Iran will have signed the Additional
Protocol prior to the IAEA General Conference meeting in September 2003, but it is very
unlikely that Iran will ratify the Protocol soon.
During his visit to Iran, ElBaradei was able to make some progress with respect to Iran’s
preliminarily informing the Agency about its plans to construct new nuclear plants. AEOI
representatives agreed to declare their facilities at an earlier stage.
In accordance with the Subsidiary Arrangement to the Agreement with the IAEA for the
Application of Safeguards, to which Iran acceded in 1974, time limits were established
within which the Agency had to be given information regarding new installations. Iran
was obligated to provide such information not less than 180 days prior to the introduction
of nuclear material into the installation. Thus, from a formal point of view, Iran’s
construction of an enrichment complex in Natanz does not violate the country’s
obligations to the Agency, since nuclear materials have not yet been delivered to the plant,
and preliminary information regarding plans to build the plant were sent to the IAEA in
August 2002, or more than six months ago. However, during the February 24-26, 1992
session of the IAEA Board of Governors, a number of other measures for strengthening
safeguards were examined besides the Additional Protocol. In part, the decision was
made that member states should inform the Agency about new installations as soon as a
decision regarding their construction is made. Until recently Iran did not adhere to this
Board of Governors decision. The change of the Iranian position on this issue achieved
during ElBaradei’s visit to Tehran should be recognized as an important breakthrough
that will strengthen IAEA safeguards in Iran.
If Iran signs the IAEA Additional Protocol, according to Article 2.a.(x) of the Model
Additional Protocol, within 180 days from the moment the Protocol enters into force Iran
will have to present an expanded declaration to the Agency that contains its “general
plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel
cycle (including planned nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities)
when approved by the appropriate competent authorities.”
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