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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: kumar who wrote (120685)11/29/2003 10:39:20 PM
From: h0db  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Good point, Kumar,

But the US has treaty obligations with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and possibly Thailand and Singapore. The US also has the Taiwan Relations Act (a US law) which mandates that the United States will ensure that Taiwan can defend itself--the current administration has taken this several steps further, with Pres. Bush's pledge a year ago that the US would "do whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan.

Beyond obligation, the fact is that the US is the dominant military power in Asia and the Western Hemisphere, with bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam; and base access rights with Singapore, and Australia. Nature abhors a vacuum, so if the US military left the region, something else would fill it; if history is a guide, that "something" would be Japan or China, or more likely competition between the two.



To: kumar who wrote (120685)11/30/2003 12:34:59 AM
From: GST  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500
 
Analysis: Are Iraq's Bases the Main Draw?
Sat Nov 29, 7:55 PM ET Add World

Jim Lobe, Inter Press Service (IPS)

WASHINGTON, D.C., Nov 28 (IPS) - Now that the Bush administration has decided to sharply accelerate the transfer of full sovereignty to an Iraqi government, why does it not invite the United Nations (news - web sites) to help with the transition?

At this point, an invitation appears logical. At a minimum, it would give the occupation greater international legitimacy and encourage other countries to contribute both troops and more reconstruction assistance, easing Washington's burden.

Moreover, the world body has much more recent experience than the United States in governing traumatized societies around the world.

It would also go far to heal the wounds opened so painfully between Washington and its western European allies as the administration of President George W. Bush (news - web sites) rushed headlong to war earlier this year, at times showing its general contempt for ''Old Europe."

The move would clearly boost Bush's re-election chances. Two-thirds or more of U.S. voters, according to a string of polls dating back a full year, have consistently supported giving the United Nations control over post-war Iraq (news - web sites). After all, the costs of the occupation in U.S. blood and treasure represent by far the greatest threat to Bush's chances next November.

So why then, the reluctance to ask the world body for help?

Several answers suggest themselves, not least of which is pride. Even though the administration has made a series of U-turns in its management of the occupation, it steadfastly refuses to acknowledge that previous policies might have been mistaken. Policy changes of 180 degrees are instead described as ''mid-course corrections.''

Bush administration hawks also no doubt fear that giving the United Nations responsibility for administering Iraq would create a highly undesirable precedent for future U.S. military action.

Then there is the conviction that the world body is fundamentally incompetent, although it would be very difficult to top the policy zigzags and confusion generated by the excruciatingly isolated Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), as pointed out by Italy's former representative to the CPA, who resigned abruptly in exasperation earlier this month.

The many contracts to big U.S. companies amounting to several billion dollars might also play a role. A U.N. administration could embarrass Bush by confirming the relationship between contracts and political contributions or even force some of the deals to be cancelled.

While most or all these arguments might be contributing to the administration's obstinacy, perhaps the most powerful one is the least discussed.

Is it possible that the most compelling reason for the administration to retain control of the transition is its determination to build permanent military bases in Iraq, bases that it knows would under no circumstances be approved by veto-wielding potential strategic rivals on the U.N. Security Council, namely China, Russia and, according to some neo-conservatives, France.

In other words, by retaining exclusive control over the transition, does the administration believe that its chances of negotiating a permanent military presence in Iraq with a successor government are much greater than if the Security Council were given a say in the process?

Since the New York Times reported in April that the administration was planning to establish and maintain as many as four military bases in Iraq for an extended period of time, much has been written about radical redeployments of U.S. forces in Europe and Asia.

The changes, it has been said, would enhance the forces' ability to strike quickly, lethally and, if necessary, pre-emptively along an ''arc of instability'' that not coincidentally covers both key oil-producing areas from the Gulf of Guinea across the Persian Gulf and into Central Asia and critical points that could be used to contain Russia and China from the Caucasus across to East Asia and the western Pacific.

According to these plans, which are now being discussed formally with affected allies, much of the U.S. military based in Germany and the rest of Western Europe during the Cold War is to be shifted to central Europe and the Balkans, closer to the oil-producing and -transiting Caucasus and Middle East.

Since 9/11, Washington has also established bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan that it used in attacking Afghanistan (news - web sites) and that it shows no sign of leaving. Similarly, forces in Japan and South Korea (news - web sites) might be partly redeployed, while Washington has made clear its interest in re-acquiring access to bases in the Philippines and Australia.



Last week's visit by a U.S. warship to Vietnam--the first since 1975--also suggested a renewed interest in that country, which borders both China and the potentially oil-rich South China Sea.

As to the Middle East and the Gulf themselves, major shifts--most notably the abandonment of a major air force base in Saudi Arabia and the redeployment of U.S. warplanes to Qatar--have also been underway.

But Qatar and even Kuwait, which has acted as a de facto military base for Washington since 1990, could not substitute for the kind of strategic depth and flexibility offered by the four bases identified by the Times as those to which the administration wants permanent access.

They are: the Baghdad international airport; the Talil Air base near Nasariyah; a base in the western desert near Syria; and Bashur air field in the Kurdish region near the convergence of the borders of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq and only 500 kilometers, as F-16s fly, from Baku, the capital of oil-rich Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea.

Pentagon (news - web sites) chief Donald Rumsfeld denied that Washington had plans to build those bases when the Times article was published. But since then, he and his chief aides have been remarkably coy about how long U.S. forces intend to remain in Iraq.

And on his recent emergency trip to Washington, where it was decided to accelerate the transition timetable, CPA chief L. Paul Bremer suggested that whoever takes power in Iraq will undoubtedly want to sign a ''SOFA''--a Status of Forces Agreement that governs the relationship between the U.S. military and host countries.

Despite Rumsfeld's denial, Tom Donnelly, a military specialist at the American Enterprise (news - web sites) Institute (AEI) with close links to Pentagon planners, published an article in the neo-conservative Weekly Standard that took Rumsfeld to task for not ''fess(ing) up'' that bases in Iraq were entirely consistent with changes in Washington's global military posture.

Iraqi airfields in particular, he wrote, ''are ideally located for deployments throughout the region...There's plenty of space, not only for installations but for training'', he said, adding confidently, ''And they are enough removed from Mesopotamia that they would not be 'imperial' irritants to the majority of Iraqis.''

In September, according to Jessica Tuchman Matthews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) who participated in a delegation of foreign-policy specialists the Pentagon took to Kuwait and Iraq after the war, the administration's future basing plans were a major mystery.

''We were told (by senior military briefers) in Kuwait that we needed two billion dollars to improve housing for U.S. troops for, quote, 'enduring' bases in Iraq, but I did not get to ask what ''enduring'' meant'', she said.

In January 2003, she added, ''a senior (administration) official'' had told her that ''we're going to move our forces out of Saudi Arabia into Iraq,'' an account echoed by other sources at the same time.

''The conquest of Iraq will not be a minor event in history,'' noted George Friedman, chairman of the Stratfor.com private intelligence agency in February. ''It will represent the introduction of a new imperial power to the Middle East and a redefinition of regional geo-politics based on that power.''

Building bases in Iraq is consistent with neo-conservatives' long-held argument for invading Iraq in order to both ''remake the face'' of the Middle East and to transform and enhance Washington's global military posture to ensure its domination of key strategic resources.

In the words of a 2000 study by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) such a move would ''project sufficient power to enforce Pax Americana.''

Global peace and stability ''demand American political leadership rather than that of the United Nations,'' asserted the report, charter members of which include Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney (news - web sites), and half a dozen other top national-security officials in the Bush administration.


story.news.yahoo.com



To: kumar who wrote (120685)11/30/2003 8:33:40 AM
From: GST  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
It is not so much a matter of providing security in the middle east as it is a matter of projecting power. Oil is a strategic resource to a country that cannot seem to do anything to curtail oil consumption and we are willing to go to war over oil. Like it or not, the US is still very much an oil-based economy. The invasion of Iraq provides a base to attempt to assert more control over the middle east -- not something I believe we as a sovereign nation should be doing, but it certainly seems to be the agenda of the White House.



To: kumar who wrote (120685)12/1/2003 2:44:12 AM
From: frankw1900  Respond to of 281500
 
I can't recollect that the US has any obligation to be a security guarantor of any place except the US itself.

Since the 19th century US security has depended on projecting influence and power well beyond its borders. The following article summarizes the concern.

carlisle-www.army.mil

See also:

defenselink.mil


It has been US policy since the 19th century that free passage through critical sea lanes be open to all. Such a policy is generally favourable to the interests of all nations.

You find the US establishes relations with most nations bordering critical waterways and attempts to lessen the influence in such areas of nations unfriendly to it. This includes often negotiating establishment of US bases in smaller countries adjacent to these critical waterways - this is often welcomed as the US presence tends to guarantee the security of those nations.

The continued US activities in Western Pacific and SE Asia areas after WW2 and Korean war can be seen as a continuation and extension of the 19th Century policy in the face of Soviet and Chinese communist expansionary effort.

The downside, as we've seen and as Dubya has said recently, sometimes the US presence has also tended to guarantee the survival of repressive regimes in thse countries. The proximity of about half the worlds's known oil reserves to the Straight of Hormuz provides an example of this in Saudi Arabia. Conversely, the US presence in the same area guarantees the survival of smaller nations making an effort to modernize - (eg) Kuwait, Qatar - which suffer pressure from their repressive pre-modern neighbours because of the modernizing efforts.

More broadly, the 19th century policy was supplemented with US leadership of NATO which guaranteed the security of Western Europe's modern countries against Soviet hegemony

In the end, US security depends on the well being of most other countries.

See also,

William Tow: U.S. Bilateral Security Alliances
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