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To: unclewest who wrote (19660)12/13/2003 1:44:28 PM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793597
 
New Tools for an Occupation
By PETER MAASS New York Times Magazine

During the invasion of Iraq, the American military displayed amazing technological superiority, firing missiles that flew nearly 1,000 miles before hitting their targets precisely, with a margin of error of just a few feet. Once the occupation of Iraq began, though, the military faced a whole new array of challenges: car bombs, donkey-drawn rocket launchers and improvised explosive devices. And what did the Pentagon pull from its shock-and-awe cupboard then?

The answer, amazingly, is nothing. The cupboard was all but bare of tools to bulletproof American troops against low-tech attacks and other perils of urban warfare. The reason is not that such technology is beyond the reach of military scientists but that development of these technologies has been a low priority. Until recently, the U.S. military was not preparing to fight a guerrilla war.

''If you wanted money, you asked for tanks, you asked for battleships, you asked for jet fighters,'' said Lt. Col. Cynthia Bedell, who is in charge of an Army program for developing soldier-carried sensors. ''We've gotten a lot of money in the past year to bring everything up to speed, but a lot of these questions'' -- questions about guerrilla warfare -- ''didn't start getting asked until we went into Afghanistan.''

In Iraq, the questions are still being asked. Maj. Gen. Raymond Odierno, who heads the Fourth Infantry Division, which patrols the Sunni Triangle, made an unusual plea during an October press conference in Tikrit. ''I'd like a technology that allows me to jam or prematurely explode these improvised explosive devices being used against us,'' he said. So far, however, the Pentagon has no ready-to-use sonar or jamming or sniffing devices to locate and neutralize I.E.D.'s, which are some of the principal weapons of the insurgency.

Up above, in the lighter-than-air realm of spy planes and drones, the U.S. military has an astounding array of surveillance gear, but the data they collect have not been scrutinized in an organized fashion. That's why last summer the Air Force created something called Project Eyes, run by the Checkmate Division, an elite strategy unit in the bowels of the Pentagon that is trying to find ways to better analyze the avalanche of information from existing spy devices in order to predict and pre-empt attacks against coalition forces.

Project Eyes is using one commercially available application, known as WebTAS, which stands for Web-enabled Temporal Analysis System, to scrutinize surveillance data that might otherwise be overlooked. Although details of what they're doing with WebTAS are classified, officers at Project Eyes confirmed that some of their work uses WebTAS to compare surveillance data before and after attacks, so that patterns can be recognized in vehicle and human movements.

When an attack occurs, the system will examine the surveillance records for the site for the 24 hours before the attack took place. ''You would have to do this a number of times to be able to predict'' future attacks, according to the Air Force officer who is in charge of Project Eyes.

The use of surveillance devices is being ramped up, too. One program involves expanding the use of tethered blimps, known as Aerostats, which are loaded with sensors; an additional $38.3 million has been added to that program, according to a letter to Congress in October from Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. The Pentagon is putting $31 million into the purchase of 185 Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, which are far smaller and easier to operate than the well-known Predator drones. The Pentagon is also speeding up development of ''pocket'' U.A.V.'s that are no larger than paper gliders and can be deployed by soldiers as they chase insurgents down a street or into a house.

This whiz-bang technology, cool though it seems, is unlikely to tip the balance in the counterinsurgency war. Even if you had aerial surveillance of every square inch of Baghdad, how would you tell the difference between a covered truck that is filled with bread and one that is filled with explosives? In the cubicles of the Checkmate Division, some of the best minds of military intelligence acknowledge that victory in a guerrilla war requires, most of all, human intelligence -- tips from local residents and spies in the ranks of the enemy.

''Yes, our technology is better, and yes, we have a technological advantage over the enemy, but the technology and warfare discussion has gone on for hundreds of years, since the longbow came along,'' said the commander of the Checkmate Division. ''Technology initially gives you an advantage, and then the enemy adapts and figures out a way to get around it. Hearts and minds -- how are you going to win that with technology? It's back to Mao's theory of war: if the population is willing to disperse into the hills and fight to the death, one I.E.D. at a time, there's not a technological solution to that.''

nytimes.com



To: unclewest who wrote (19660)12/14/2003 2:47:54 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793597
 
He retires next spring.

Officer avoids court-martial
By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published December 13, 2003

Lt. Col. Allen B. West was fined $5,000 by his commanding officer yesterday, closing a case in which the Army charged him with assault for firing his gun to frighten an Iraqi detainee into disclosing a planned ambush.
Neal Puckett, Col. West's civilian attorney, said the officer plans to return to Fort Hood, Texas, where he expects to be granted a full-benefits retirement this spring after a 20-year Army career.
Col. West appeared before Maj. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of the 4th Infantry Division, at his Tikrit headquarters. Gen. Odierno fined him one-half month's pay for two months, or roughly $5,000, Mr. Puckett said. The division's lawyers sought a court-martial, but a hearing officer recommended Article 15, or nonjudicial punishment.
The case has been closely watched by Army officers and military veterans. Col. West's stated motives were to protect himself and his soldiers in the notorious Sunni Triangle, where Americans face daily attacks from Saddam Hussein loyalists. But he admitted bending the rules and the Army chose to file charges rather than handling the case quietly.
With the case closed, civilian defense attorney Puckett harshly criticized the Army.
"The problem with today's Army is that the top brass seem to have become paranoid about making common sense decisions without the 'advice of counsel.' " said Mr. Puckett, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel. "Those counsel usually have no idea what it means to command troops in combat."
Mr. Puckett said that early on in the case, the 4th Infantry's staff judge advocate offered a deal: If Col. West would resign short of qualifying for retirement benefits, the Army would not seek a court-martial. Mr. Puckett rejected the offer.
"Had true Army leaders been allowed to handle this without benefit of counsel, I believe Al West would still be in command, would have been privately congratulated, and told to stay out of the interrogation business in the future," Mr. Puckett said.
"That would have been true Army leadership. Those type of leaders are still in the Army. It's just that they have been subverted by job-justifying lawyers who seek to play a larger role in the command."
The case had a compelling story line.
Col. West, a product of a poor family in Atlanta, graduated from the University of Tennessee in 1983 and joined the Army, an institution that was actively recruiting blacks.
He rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel and won command of an artillery battalion before deploying to Iraq from Fort Hood. His future seemed bright. Perhaps a brigade command was in his future.
While trying to bring democracy to a small town near Tikrit, he received intelligence information that an Iraqi policeman was involved in a plot to kill the officer and his soldiers. When the detained policeman refused to talk, Col. West took him outside and fired two shots near his head. The frightened Iraqi then gave up information on the planned assassination, including those involved.
Col. West informed superiors of his action, which violated Army rules for interrogation. An investigative hearing officer, Lt. Col. Jimmy Davis, recommended this week that Col. West face administrative punishment at what is called an Article 15 hearing. Gen. Odierno agreed.
Col. West had feared the Army would move to court-martial him. If convicted, he would have carried a criminal record. A military jury could have voted to dismiss him from the Army, a sentence that would strip all pension and medical benefits for him, his wife and two children.
The Washington Times, which first reported Col. West's case, obtained Col. Davis' Article 32 investigative report, in which he recommended no court-martial. Some excerpts:
•"Lt. Col. West's impeccable service record in tough jobs combined with his prior unblemished character support this decision. Many of his soldiers testified to his positive, proactive leadership style. The soldiers felt like a team and would go out of their way to support him and many stated they would work for him again.
•"Nature of threat and environment: The immediacy of the threat in Lt. Col. West's mind was his primary concern. His earlier personal ambush experience heightened the hazards. Adding in the assassination plots manifested in the commander's mind that the likelihood of the threat was very high. Risk management procedures called for decisive commander action.
•"There were no improper motives for this incident. Lt. Col. West did not intentionally try to harm the victim. The accused has willingly cooperated and immediately accepted responsibility for his actions. His foibles were that he implicated his soldiers, allowed physical abuse and failed to fully inform his commander. For this reason, Lt. Col. West must be punished for his actions.
"Administrative measures have already been applied and effectively ended Lt. Col. West's career. Dismissing the charges with no action could provide free license and have a contrary effect to good order and discipline. From the soldiers' of [West´s unit] point of view the case is already affecting morale. Administration of quick justice and getting on with prosecuting the war is in the best interest of his unit, the 4th Infantry Division (Mech) and the Army. An Article 15 sends the message of punishment to the force with an element of compassion. Lt. Col. West is allowed some measure of dignity."


washingtontimes.com



To: unclewest who wrote (19660)12/14/2003 3:45:11 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793597
 
Boy, do I agree with this! I have seen troops that look like they are members of a High School Cadet Corps.


DefenseWatch "The Voice of the Grunt"
12-11-2003

End the Army’s ‘Uniform Chaos’

By Ray Starmann
Ray Starmann is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at saber2bravo@earthlink.net.


In June of 1989, while touring then-communist East Berlin, I was stopped by a middle-aged British man and his wife. “Excuse me,” he began in haltingly slow English, “where is Checkpoint Charlie?” I wondered why he was speaking to me so slowly?



“Actually, it’s just several blocks to the left,” I said. He looked at me strangely. “Oh, Christ, you’re an American soldier, I thought you were one of those East German bastards. Why aren’t you wearing khakis?” Before I could answer, the couple strolled away.



I looked across the street and spotted a member of the hated and feared East German Peoples’ Police questioning someone. Interestingly enough, he was wearing almost the exact uniform I was: a light green Class B polyester shirt, olive drab polyester pants, black low quarters, and a dark green saucer cap.



For the last 30 years, the U.S. Army has been in a state of what I call “uniform chaos.” A “wash and wear” mentality has permeated the Army. This has resulted in uniforms that seek to mimic corporate America and replicate the styles of the 1970s.



The Army is in desperate need of uniforms which promote the history and esprit de corps of the world’s finest soldiers. General George “Blood and Guts’ Patton knew the importance of good-looking uniforms. In 1940, he designed a uniform for tankers that consisted of green pants, a double-breasted green jacket with gold buttons and a gold helmet. The Army rejected it, but the original model is on permanent display at Fort Knox.



After 1975, a post-Vietnam practicality contributed to the changes and new designs of Army uniforms. American society was at best, indifferent to the military, and at worst, hostile. It was hoped that the new uniforms would create a quasi-civilian image for soldiers. Old uniforms like the khakis, which represented the Vietnam era, would eventually be phased out. The result; for almost three decades the U.S. Army has worn some of the worst-looking and poorly-designed uniforms of any Army in the last 100 years. Some of the more hideous items in the uniform inventory are:



1. The infamous Class A and B puke-green polyester shirt. Hated by soldiers from Hawaii to Hohenfels, the puke green shirt is an archaic relic of the mid-1970s. It must go.



2. The olive-drab Class A uniform. Designed to resemble a civilian leisure suit, this monstrosity went out of style with the AMC Gremlin and disco.



3. Pre-shined black low quarters. These shoes were designed for civilians to wear at the opera, not for soldiers. If you’re too lazy to spit shine your shoes, then you better out-process now.



4. The black commando sweater. Designed and implemented by Euro-trash armies, this NATO copy is as un-American as Brie Cheese and Hermann Goering.



5. The unisex black cardigan sweater. The cardigan sweater conjures up images of old men with pipes and schoolgirls. It does not portray a martial spirit and must be one of the first items in the Pentagon dumpster.



6. The maternity battle dress uniform. The title itself violates every principle of common sense, good reason and military doctrine. If a pregnant woman can’t deploy to a combat zone, why is she wearing a “maternity battle dress” uniform at all?



7. The tropical whites. Expensive to purchase, seldom worn, and only by personnel stationed in remote places like the U.S. Embassy in Madagascar, the whites really have no place in the Army uniform inventory. Leave the whites to the Navy.



8. The black umbrella. An optional clothing item for female soldiers, the use of an umbrella is as much of a faux pas as walking around with hands in your pockets. Soldiers do not use umbrellas, ever, on any occasion. Get wet and get used to it.



9. The universal black beret. One of the worst decisions the Army has made since 1775, the black beret must be returned to the Rangers and taken off the heads of everyone who is not in a Ranger battalion.



When the black beret was instituted as the primary headgear for the Army, it was hoped that it would enhance morale and pride among all troopers in the lean, green machine. The geniuses in the Pentagon had the right plan, but executed it incorrectly. Here are the changes they should have made:



1. The khakis must be resurrected as the Class A and B uniforms. The summer Class A uniform would include a khaki jacket and a khaki overseas or saucer cap. The winter Class A uniform would consist of khakis with an olive drab jacket, and olive drab overseas and saucer caps. The winter uniform would resemble the old “Pinks and Greens” from World War II. The winter Class B uniform would consist of khakis with an olive drab “Ike Jacket” or for aviators, an A-2 brown leather jacket.



2. The epaulets on the class A and B khaki shirt would have a color stripe where the shoulder seam meets the arm. Each color would represent the branch the soldier serves in.



3. The brown low-quarter dress shoe must be returned. The black low quarter, which resembles an orthopedic shoe, should remain where it belongs, on a shelf in a podiatrist’s office.



4. The camouflage utility cap should once again be the headgear worn with BDUs. A winter version of the utility cap should be created, which has a heavier fabric, similar to the German Army’s M-43 field cap.



On the contrary to the above, the Army’s Dress Blue and Mess Dress uniforms are top-notch. Somehow, these two uniforms survived the disastrous changes of the 1970s and remain to this day the sharpest-looking uniforms in the Army. They represent the glory of the 19th century Army and enhance pride in the organization.



The battle dress uniform, or BDU, is also a superb, but only when worn in the field. I have always wondered why the Army decided to wear the BDUs while in garrison. In the field, the BDU serves the soldier’s needs. In garrison, it is uncomfortable and not practical. Class B’s should be worn in garrison, as they have been in the past.



Finally, the Army needs to change the material of its Class A and B uniforms. Polyester, while popular in 1975, is not a favorite fabric in 2003. The class A and B khakis should be made of light and heavy-weight cotton. A special type of cotton that is treated with an enzyme is available today. This enzyme enables the cotton to be virtually wrinkle-free.



If Army leaders are in doubt about the need for good-looking uniforms and their effects on soldiers’ morale and fighting spirit, they should drop by a unit dining-in or dining-out. Look at the soldiers there, dressed in their blues. See the pride in their faces. They know they look sharp. They also wish that all of their uniforms looked that good. There is no reason why they shouldn’t.

sftt.org