To: aladin who wrote (121733 ) 12/17/2003 11:38:24 AM From: Win Smith Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500 I don't believe in analogistic warfare in general, but the local Godwin's Law demonstrations started long before the war, they seemed to be an integral part of the prewar propaganda campaign. To the best of my knowledge, the quagmire thing didn't start until things started looking like, you know, a quagmire. The Roosevelt / W thing was my own little extension to your personal Godwin demonstration, no big. More seriously, I'd refer you to the credentialed guy on the ground quoted in Packer's New Yorker article, newyorker.com , if you're interested in something more than propaganda points:I sought out Erdmann in part because his dissertation adviser had been Ernest May, an authority on historical analogies. I was interested in the analogies that Erdmann was carrying around in his head for his new job of nation-building: The British in colonial Iraq? The Americans in postwar Germany? Lying on a cot in the trailer and fiddling with a Swiss Army knife, his feet propped on an Army duffelbag, his desk littered with water bottles, empty packets of Meals Ready to Eat, and unread books on the Middle East, Erdmann flashed a self-mocking grin. “I can’t think historically—there’ve been times when I don’t even know what I did forty-eight hours before,” he said wryly. “I try. It’s like a test for myself. Can I remember what I did the day before? I eventually can, but it takes effort. That’s not a good situation. You should be able to remember what you did in the last twenty-four hours.” Hanging on the wall of Erdmann’s office was a sign that reminded him of his mission. It read, “end state: a durable peace for a united and stable, democratic iraq that provides effective and representative government for and by the iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing market economy; and no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or international security and is able to defend itself.” Erdmann believed in this goal, but he was wary of the lofty rhetoric. One of his favorite books, which he was trying to find time to reread in Baghdad, is the French historian Marc Bloch’s “Strange Defeat,” a firsthand account of the collapse of France in 1940. Bloch served in the French Army in both world wars and then joined the Resistance before his capture, torture, and execution by the Nazis. Erdmann, in talking about his own efforts in Iraq, more than once cited a passage from “Strange Defeat”: “The ABC of our profession is to avoid these large abstract terms in order to try to discover behind them the only concrete realities, which are human beings.” Another bit from that article, not so much on analogies but extremely relevant on the broader Cheney / Rumsfeld / neocon latter day great gaming front:But an accelerated timetable for Iraqi elections, along with the C.P.A.’s hurried attempts to recruit a new Iraqi Army, suggests that the hunt is on for an “exit strategy” as America enters its own election year. There is no reason to think that turning things over to divided Iraqi politicians and inexperienced troops will lead to a better outcome. If the Administration hastily adopts policies in order to claim success in Iraq, it will have returned to the wishful thinking that helped make the occupation a continuous crisis. “Iraq needs to be liberated—liberated from big plans,” Salamé said. “Every time people mentioned it in the last few years, it was to connect it to big ideas—the war against W.M.D.s, solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, the war against terrorism, a model of democracy. That’s why all these mistakes are made. They’re made because Iraq is always, in someone’s mind, the first step to something else.”