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To: Maurice Winn who wrote (20460)12/19/2003 5:18:56 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793600
 
Lindy, has anyone mentioned Neville Chamberlain, or used the word appeasement lately?

I knew that column would tick you off, Mq. But I agree. I think the Taiwan Prez has gone over the line of Asian reality. He is running the country as he sees fit. Don't pull on the Tiger's tail.



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (20460)12/19/2003 6:58:23 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793600
 
Everybody is guessing.

December 17, 2003
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Saddam Is Ours. Does Al Qaeda Care?
By BRUCE HOFFMAN - New York Times
Bruce Hoffman is a terrorism expert with the RAND Corporation.

WASHINGTON — While President Bush was careful to remind Americans that even with Saddam Hussein behind bars, "we still face terrorists," the White House and Pentagon have characterized the arrest as a major victory in the war on terrorism. But is Iraq really the central battleground in that struggle, or is it diverting our attention while Al Qaeda and its confederates plan for new strikes elsewhere? There's strong evidence that Osama bin Laden is using Iraq the way a magician uses smoke and mirrors.

News reports that Al Qaeda plans to redirect half the $3 million a month it now spends on operations in Afghanistan toward the insurgency in Iraq lent credence to the view that it is turning Iraq into center stage for the fight against the "Great Satan." That might actually be good news: Iraq could become what American military commanders have described as a terrorist "flytrap."

But there's a better chance that Osama bin Laden is the one setting a trap. He and his fellow jihadists didn't drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan by taking the fight to an organized enemy on a battlefield of its choosing. In fact, the idea that Al Qaeda wanted to make Iraq the central battlefield of jihad was first suggested by Al Qaeda itself. Last February, before the coalition invasion of Iraq, the group's information department produced a series of articles titled "In the Shadow of the Lances" that gave practical advice to Iraqis and foreign jihadists on how guerrilla warfare could be used against the American and British troops.

The calls to arms by Al Qaeda only intensified after the fall of Baghdad, when its intermittent Web site, Al Neda, similarly extolled the virtues of guerrilla warfare. In urging Iraqis to fight on, the site invoked prominent lessons of history — including America's defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet Army's in Afghanistan.

But as useful as Iraq undoubtedly has been as a rallying cry for jihad, it has been a conspicuously less prominent rallying point, at least in terms of men and money. The Coalition Provisional Authority may be right that thousands of foreign fighters have converged on Iraq, but few who have been captured have demonstrable ties to Al Qaeda. Nor is there evidence of any direct command-and-control relationship between the Qaeda central leadership and the insurgents.

If there are Qaeda warriors in Iraq, they are likely cannon fodder rather than battle-hardened mujahedeen. In the end, Qaeda's real interest in Iraq has been to exploit the occupation as a propaganda and recruitment tool for the global jihadist cause.

While America has been tied down in Iraq, the international terrorist network has been busy elsewhere. The various attacks undertaken by Qaeda and its affiliates since the occupation began have taken place in countries that are longstanding sources of Osama bin Laden's enmity (like Saudi Arabia) or where an opportunity has presented itself (the suicide bombings in Morocco in May, Indonesia in August and Turkey in November).

In fact, Saif al-Adel, the senior Qaeda operational commander who was credited with writing the "Shadow of the Lances" articles, is widely believed to have been behind the May attacks that rocked Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, but he has yet to be linked to any incidents in Iraq.

And even if Osama bin Laden has now decided to commit some new funds and Qaeda forces to Iraq, it is unlikely to be a significant drain on his wallet or the vast reservoir of operatives trained in Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen and elsewhere. According to a Congressional report on the 9/11 attacks, an estimated 70,000 to 120,000 jihadists passed through those training camps. So even if a few thousand are sent to Iraq, Osama bin Laden will retain a healthy reserve capable of sustaining his global jihad.

As we bear down on Iraq, Al Qaeda is bearing down on us. Chatter on Web sites affiliated with Al Qaeda reveals that the jihadists are constantly monitoring America, studying and gauging our reactions to intelligence we gather on them and adapting their plans accordingly. One recent posting read: "The enemy has set up special bodies to analyze and correlate all this information and deduce the conclusions from them. If we know the importance of the information for the enemy, even if it is a small piece of information, then we can understand how important are the information that we know."

For America, the fundamental challenge remains our willingness and our ability to fight our adversaries across several fronts. Turning Iraq into a viable democracy is of course important, but we must not be drawn into concentrating on one battleground to the exclusion of all others.



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (20460)12/19/2003 9:46:53 AM
From: Ilaine  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793600
 
Is New Zealand committed to providing troops and materiel in support of Taiwan in the event of a war between Taiwan and China? Interesting, I wasn't aware of that.



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (20460)12/20/2003 5:38:20 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793600
 
The China Threat?
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF

SHANGHAI

Is China a threat to the rest of the world?

Perhaps, for rising powers have always spelled trouble for their neighbors, even in the case of democracies like Athens (the Peloponnesian War) and the U.S. (we managed to invade Canada and Mexico in the 1800's.

Yet what worries me about China isn't its upgrade of its nuclear arsenal and its military acquisitions to project power beyond its borders. China's military doctrine is cautious, and President Hu Jintao is leading China toward an increasingly constructive role in international affairs.

No, what troubles me, as one who loves China and is rooting for it to succeed, is the growing nationalism that the government has cultivated among young people.

Americans saw a hint of that when enraged mobs attacked our embassy in Beijing after the U.S. bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and when Chinese students reacted to the horror of 9/11 by filling Internet chat rooms with delighted cheers of shuang — roughly equivalent to "Wow, so cool!"

But it's in attitudes toward the Japanese that we see a leading indicator of the instability that blind nationalism can cause. This fall, three Japanese students in the central Chinese city of Xian performed a bawdy skit, wearing red bras over T-shirts and throwing the stuffing at their audience — and word spread that the Riben guizi, Japanese devils, were mocking China. So a mob of 1,000 people rampaged through town, looking for any Japanese to attack.

In the same vein, fury had erupted around the country a few weeks earlier because of reports that Japanese businessmen had engaged in an orgy with Chinese prostitutes in the southern city of Zhuhai. The Chinese rage was hypocritical in a country where hundreds of thousands of prostitutes blatantly ply their wares — in Zhengzhou last year, an army of prostitutes practically battered down my hotel room door as I cowered inside.

Even the Chinese recounting of history has become hysterical. Take the Rape of Nanjing in 1937, which was so brutal that there's no need to exaggerate it. One appalled witness in the thick of the killing, John Rabe, put the death toll at 50,000 to 60,000. Another, Miner Searle Bates, estimated that 12,000 civilians and 28,000 soldiers had been killed. The Chinese delegate to the League of Nations at the time put the civilian toll at 20,000. A Communist Chinese newspaper of the period put it at 42,000.

Yet China proclaims, based on accounts that stand little scrutiny, that 300,000 or more were killed. Such hyperbole abuses history as much as the denial by Japanese rightists that there was any Rape of Nanjing at all. It nurtures nationalism by defining China as a victim state, the world's punching bag, that must be more aggressive in defending its interests.

What does this add up to? The rising nationalism warps Chinese decision-making and risks conflicts with Japan over, for example, the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. It also forces the government to be tough in international disputes — particularly in the case of Taiwan, where a miscalculation could conceivably lead to a war with the U.S.

"Some Chinese military leaders are saying that Japan is secretly behind Taiwan's moves toward a referendum and independence," warned a well-connected Chinese who knows that this is nonsense. "They say it is all a Japanese plot to steal Taiwan from China."

The reasons for rising Chinese nationalism are complex and include a justified anger at Japan's reluctance to apologize for war atrocities. But one factor is the way the Chinese government has been pushing nationalist buttons in an effort to create a new national glue to hold the country together as ideology dissolves. By constantly excoriating the Japanese nationalists of the 1930's, they are emulating them.

One of the lessons of 1930's Japan and Germany is that ferocious nationalism is a real global security risk, and it's a matter that the U.S. and other countries should respectfully raise with President Hu. To their credit, some farsighted Chinese intellectuals are calling for changing China's "victim mentality," recognizing that it is one of the greatest obstacles to China's maturing into the global leader that it should be.

Meanwhile, we in the West are bashing China, unfairly and demagogically, over its exports. But we're missing the risk in China's rise. The menace isn't in its trade policies, but in its nationalist psychology.
nytimes.com



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (20460)12/24/2003 7:21:18 PM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793600
 
Bush's balancing act: Taiwan and China
• John Hughes, editor and chief operating officer of the Deseret Morning News, is a former editor of the Monitor.

SALT LAKE CITY - Back in the 1980s, when I was doing a stint in government, my boss, US Secretary of State George Shultz, sat down at a small private dinner in Hong Kong with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

At some appropriate pause in the evening, Mrs. Thatcher dropped her bombshell. She had been in negotiations with officials on the Chinese mainland to transfer the British colony of Hong Kong to Beijing's communist regime.

I sat stunned in my chair. I could not believe that Thatcher, whose strength I greatly admired, had succumbed. Earlier I had spent six years based in Hong Kong as a foreign correspondent. It flourished as a glittering bastion of free enterprise. It was an inspiring contrast to the drab dictatorship of communist China. Were its people now to be returned to a communist government from which many of them had fled?

Though the heart ached then, over time my head has come to accept the inevitability of events. A good chunk of the Kowloon Peninsula and additional land on the mainland was actually under a lease to the British, due to expire in 1997. Without it, Hong Kong island was not a viable entity. British resistance to the Chinese by force was unthinkable. "They could," as one British military officer told me, "take it any time they want with a phone call."

As it has happened, over the years China, although still repressive, has become less communist. It has permitted Hong Kong to retain much of its free enterprise character.

The lesson in all this is that governments make decisions both idealistic (Britain going to war over the Falklands) and realistic (Britain ceding Hong Kong to China).

So I was not as outraged as some of President Bush's more conservative supporters when he recently took the pragmatic course and warned Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian to quit the Taiwan independence talk. On the face of it, that seems like a contradiction of everything Mr. Bush feels about democracy and freedom. A haven for many Chinese refugees from communism, Taiwan, like Hong Kong, is a stunning economic success and enjoys freedoms that set it distinctly apart from communist China.

There are strong US emotional ties to Taiwan. Many Americans, and their representatives in Congress, admire and support its people. But pragmatism requires the Bush administration to engage, and seek a stable relationship with, a mainland China that is undergoing change and is an increasingly forceful player in Asia. China, for instance, is playing a critical role in negotiations to curb North Korea's nuclear-weapons development, a key objective in the US campaign against terrorism.

Thus the US must maintain a delicate juggling act between China, with which it has strong economic and political interests, and Taiwan, to which it is more ideologically and emotionally attuned.

It has done this through a smoke-and-mirrors policy designed to preserve the "status quo" between the two. Status quo means that the US formally recognizes China but maintains a healthy informal relationship with Taiwan. For its part, China claims Taiwan is actually part of China. Taiwan, though it has little hope of recapturing the mainland, would argue philosophically that its authority should prevail there. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait bristle with weaponry of the respective protagonists, but trade and other contacts between the two have been growing, and war has been avoided.

What rattles the status quo arrangement is any move on the part of Taiwan to go beyond its present freedoms and declare independence. That starts the war drums banging in Beijing and raises the specter of an explosion in Asia which the US does not need or want.

It is just this issue of independence that Taiwan's President Chen has surfaced. He did so in an election campaign pledge to hold a referendum demanding that China pull back its missiles aimed at Taiwan and commit to a peaceful resolution of the cross-straits issue. Concerned about rising tensions, President Bush in strong words deplored the Chen initiative as one that threatened to upset the delicate status quo.

But while pragmatism dictates that the US work toward a better relationship with emerging China, no administration in Washington, either Republican or Democratic, could afford to forsake Taiwan. Public opinion would surely require US intervention in defense of Taiwan should China threaten force against it.

As China evolves over the years, who knows how the China-Taiwan issue will play out. In the meantime, Bush must maintain his delicate juggling act.



from the December 24, 2003 edition - csmonitor.com



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (20460)1/5/2004 2:56:46 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793600
 
Those coal fired plants around Bejing keeping ya coughing, Mq?

China's Dark Days and Nights
Industrial Growth Exceeds Supply of Electrical Power

By Peter S. Goodman
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, January 5, 2004; Page A01

HANGZHOU, China -- In a country gaining dominance in the production of electronics, 9-year-old Sheng Minjie sat down one recent evening to do his math homework. First, though, he had to solve a physics equation: How many candles did he need to illuminate his work?

Like thousands of other households in this city on China's east coast, Sheng's family was without electricity, his apartment dark and cold. The city had cut the power to his neighborhood as part of a series of rolling blackouts imposed as China struggles to cope with power shortages afflicting much of the country. At one point last month, the city's traffic lights were turned off for two days. A ban on lighted advertising has created the peculiar spectacle of a Chinese metropolis largely devoid of flashing neon.

China's relentless industrial development has outstripped its supply of power. The government forecasts shortages of 10 to 15 percent in key manufacturing areas, estimating that China needs about $108 billion worth of new generating capacity to close the gap. Factories are now cutting production, while hotels and restaurants dim lights and switch off heat. Some worry that the scarcity could shackle enterprises that have become critical employers at a time when millions of government-supported jobs are being eliminated by the country's transition from Communism to the free market.

"These power shortages are extremely serious," said Scott Roberts, an analyst at Cambridge Energy Research Associates in Beijing. "In some areas they have been crippling for economic growth."

The shortages testify to the complexities of managing China's economic transformation. China's government has in recent years liberalized much of the economy, allowing markets to determine how much factories produce and at what price, with individuals and businesses free to consume as much as they can afford. But the supply of energy remains tightly regulated. The construction of new power plants requires the permission of bureaucrats in Beijing. They have fundamentally misjudged the demand.

Erwin Sanft, an oil and gas analyst for CLSA Emerging Markets, a Hong Kong-based research firm, recalled meeting with officials in Beijing in 1998. "They were forecasting 3 percent growth in demand for electricity," he said. Since then, growth has been in the double digits, with a jump of 15 percent in 2003. This past summer, China exceeded the consumption once forecast for 2005.

China is now in the midst of a building boom in power plants, though most will not be completed for two or three years. The Three Gorges Dam -- the largest hydroelectric project in history -- is beginning to provide power, though it will not be completed before 2009. And even as these facilities come on-line, China confronts a fundamental energy deficit: Despite the vastness of its landmass, it has nowhere near enough reserves to meet its needs, necessitating a widening stream of imports. Beijing has turned its sights outward in a global quest to secure reliable stocks of energy.

More than 80 percent of China's electricity is produced in coal-burning plants. Many mines have been shut in recent years amid a series of horrific accidents as well as concerns about worsening urban air quality. But as coal shortages have emerged, the government has reinvigorated mining. Joe Zhang, an energy analyst at UBS in Hong Kong, predicts that China -- long a major exporter of coal -- will become a significant importer within four years.

China's oil and gas reserves satisfy a bare fraction of its demands. Production at its largest proven oil field near the northeastern city of Daqing is declining. Experts are skeptical about estimates for China's greatest potential oil and gas area, the Tarim Basin in the northwestern province of Xinjiang, a semi-autonomous region beset by ethnic strife.

Only a decade ago, China was a net exporter of oil. Now, it is the third-largest importer, behind only the United States and Japan. Imports leaped nearly a third during the first 10 months of 2003. By the government's reckoning, China will need as much as 600 million tons of oil annually by 2020, more than three times its expected output.

More than half of China's oil imports now come from the Middle East, stoking fears in Beijing that the country's economic stability is overly dependent on access to the world's most volatile region. To hedge its bets, China has been seeking to tap sources in other parts of the world. In 2002, China National Offshore Oil Co. became the largest offshore producer in Indonesia when it bought a stake from the Spanish firm Repsol. The company also signed a $12 billion, 25-year contract to purchase liquefied natural gas from Australia's Northwest Shelf project.

But China's grandest overseas energy visions have so far gained little besides painful lessons in the intensity of competition for the world's most crucial resources.

In May, President Hu Jintao visited Russia, where he presided over the signing of a contract between state-owned China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) and the Russian oil giant, Yukos. They were to build a 1,400-mile-long-pipeline to deliver crude oil from Angarsk in eastern Siberia to refineries in Daqing. Oil was to begin flowing in 2005, supplying as much as 30 percent of China's imports by 2030.

But the prosecution and jailing of Russian tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who controlled Yukos, has iced that plan. Meanwhile, Japan is aggressively wooing Moscow with an offer to pay for a more expensive pipeline reaching the Russian port Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan, enabling easy shipment to the archipelago-nation. That route would bypass China. Though a spur could still be built to Daqing, Japanese demand might absorb all or most of the pipeline's oil.

In June, President Hu presided over another contract signing in Kazakhstan: CNPC and state oil-and-gas company Kazymunyagas pledged to build a 2,000-mile-long pipeline to carry oil to western China. But that project only makes sense if China taps into sufficient volumes of Kazakh oil, a prospect that dimmed when U.S. and Japanese firms edged out China's bid for a larger slice of the enormous Kashagan field on the Caspian Sea.

Some say these setbacks are less a problem than an opportunity: They apply pressure on China's government to adopt conservation policies. Many factories and distribution networks are highly inefficient, spoiled by years of access to subsidized state power. China's most prosperous cities are now under the spell of the automobile, as a consumer-minded nouveau riche takes to a suburban lifestyle featuring shopping outings in the family sedan.

"The shortages will relieve the pressure on China's environment," said Qu Geping, a former chief of the state Environmental Protection Bureau, who now heads a non-government advocacy group. "Coal users in particular will be forced to improve their efficiency."

China is now tightening auto emissions standards, while limiting credit for the auto industry, which consumes enormous amounts of energy.

Power shortages first emerged last in summer in the coastal provinces at the center of China's export boom -- Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangsu as well as the city of Shanghai. They have since spread. Today, 19 of 31 provinces are rationing electricity, according to state media reports.

In Hangzhou -- a city in Zhejiang famed for its lake ringed with pagodas -- officials last month forced most factories to limit production to four days a week. They barred virtually all production during peak hours of household demand, while forcing the biggest energy consumers such as cement- and brick-making factories to halt altogether.

At the Hanggang-Changxing Electrical Arc Furnace Steel-Making Co., production has been slowed by nearly one-fifth. "The effect is huge," a companyofficial said. "Every day, our profits are reduced by 150,000 renminbi," or more than $18,000.

For now, most analysts foresee marginal impact to China's economy, with the greatest consequences confined to the hungriest users of energy. "It could take five percentage points off production growth rates for industrial products," said Sanft, the CLSA analyst.

But if the problem persists, it could frighten away foreign investment -- particularly in energy-intensive industries such as semiconductors and petrochemicals.

"The absolute worst thing that can happen in modern manufacturing is for the lights to go off," said an executive for a multinational company who spoke on condition of anonymity. "The raw materials freeze up and the capital equipment is destroyed. Not only is this a threat to existing players, it also decreases the incentive to invest. This is potentially very serious."

The biggest casualty of the shortages so far is the momentum for market-embracing reform. Energy was once a key target for liberalization, in part because China's producers are so inefficient, but also because the industry has been rife with corruption. In 2002, the State Power Corp., which once dominated the industry, was broken into two companies with pieces of the transmission grid, and four separate power-producers. The theory was that competition within the generating business would force the building of more efficient plants. Then the state could stop setting prices and planning for future generation capacity, ceding that role to the market.

But much as the energy shortages in California sparked a rethinking on deregulation, China's troubles have sown doubts about the virtues of its reforms. "The question raised by many now is whether the reform of the power industry is a factor influencing the security of national power," said Zhang Guobao, vice-chairman of the State Development and Reform Commission, addressing reporters in Beijing.

Local officials have traditionally coaxed factories to agree to long-term power purchasing arrangements, locking in a guaranteed profit margin for plant operators -- the sort of government orchestration that the reforms have aimed to eliminate. Now, say industry sources, provincial authorities are again stepping in to ensure sufficient local supply: They are encouraging the swift development of new power plants by brokering long-term power purchasing deals.

So much so, in fact, that some now predict the process will yield an outcome currently difficult to imagine -- a glut of energy.

"We're going to have an overcapacity problem," the multinational executive said. "That is the pattern in China, because it's not really a market system."

Special Correspondent Wang Ting contributed to this report.

© 2004 The Washington Post Company