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Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: unclewest who wrote (20594)12/20/2003 6:55:24 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793587
 
The replacement for all will be the NATO Blue helmet liner.

Naah. Since we will need permission from the French, we will issue them a French Beret. :>)



To: unclewest who wrote (20594)12/20/2003 6:58:10 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793587
 
"Nice Kadaffi! Down boy, just lick my hand."

Analysis
Two Decades of Sanctions, Isolation Wore Down Gaddafi

By Robin Wright and Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, December 20, 2003; Page A01

Libya's stunning decision yesterday to surrender its weapons of mass destruction followed two decades of international isolation and some of the world's most punishing economic sanctions. In the end, Libyan leader Col. Moammar Gaddafi was under so much pressure that he was forced to seek an end to the economic and political isolation threatening his government -- and his own survival, according to U.S. and British officials and outside experts.

The turning point in Gaddafi's undoing may have been the U.S. intelligence investigation that eventually tracked a tiny piece of the bomb that blew up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people, back to two Libyan intelligence agents, U.S. and British officials say. The evidence mobilized the world and produced an international effort that may now peacefully disarm Libya.

"What forced Gaddafi to act was a combination of things -- U.N. sanctions after the Lockerbie bombing, his international isolation after the Soviet Union's collapse . . . and internal economic problems that led to domestic unrest by Islamists and forces within the military," said Ray Takeyh, a Libya expert at the National Defense University.

Whether by coincidence or fear that Libya might be targeted, Gaddafi's envoys approached Britain on the eve of the Iraq war to discuss a deal, U.S. officials said.

"The invasion of Iraq sent a strong message to governments around the world that if the United States feels threatened by weapons of mass destruction, we are prepared to act against regimes not prepared to change their behavior," said a senior State Department official who requested anonymity.

In a strange reversal of status, Libya is now being touted by the United States and Britain as the new example of how to succeed in ridding a nation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles. It provides the model, they said, for how to move forward with Iran, North Korea, Syria and potentially others.

"Leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them will find an open path to better relations with the United States and other free nations," President Bush said in his surprise announcement. "When leaders make the wise and responsible choice, when they renounce terror and weapons of mass destruction, as Colonel Gaddafi has now done, they serve the interest of their own people, and they add to the security of all nations."

Reflecting the dramatic shift, Gaddafi, in a statement carried by the official Jana news agency, said Libya's "wise decision" showed his country "plays an international role in building a world free of weapons of mass destruction and all sorts of terrorism." Another senior official in Libya went as far as to demand that all countries in the Middle East and Africa eliminate equipment, products and programs involved in producing weapons of mass destruction.

Although the United States has exerted the most pressure and imposed the most punitive actions against Libya, Britain took the lead in the initial negotiations. The two nations divided the roles of good cop and bad cop, U.S. and British officials said. All the negotiations were in London and involved a Libyan diplomat in Europe and Libyan intelligence agents.

Despite Libya's long history of prevarication and procrastination, Tripoli has provided so much access to facilities and so much specific data on its programs that Bush and Blair agreed they had confidence that Gaddafi was sincere.

"The Libyans were quite open. They provided access to facilities. They provided substantial documentation about their programs. And we were able to take samples and photographs and other evidence," said a senior administration official in a White House briefing after Bush's announcement.

A British official added: "Libya's admission of its activities is of clear political significance and encourages confidence."

For all the Bush administration's focus on deadly arms, however, the United States may have missed an opportunity to act earlier because of its preoccupation with Afghanistan and then Iraq, said U.S. officials familiar with earlier overtures.

"Within months after September 11th, we had the Libyans, the Syrians and the Iranians all coming to us saying, 'What can we do [to better relations]?' We didn't really engage any of them, because we decided to do Iraq. We really squandered two years of capital that will make it harder to apply this model to the hard cases like Iran and Syria," said Flynt Leverett, a former Bush administration National Security Council staff member now at the Brookings Institution.

The Clinton administration tried a similar strategy -- offering Libya's needy government a diplomatic carrot if it agreed to accept responsibility for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, end its support of terrorism and surrender weapons of mass destruction. Gaddafi did turn over the two intelligence agents, after lengthy negotiations, for a trial under Scottish law at The Hague, where one Libyan was convicted and one acquitted in 2001.

The United States first imposed sanctions on Libya in 1986 in response to terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna. "Gaddafi deserves to be treated as a pariah in the world community," President Ronald Reagan said at the time. After evidence proved Libya's link to the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, the United Nations also imposed broad sanctions in 1992, which were lifted after Tripoli accepted responsibility for the midair bombing and began to pay compensation to victims' families. Washington, however, has yet to lift sanctions.

In the late 1990s, Gaddafi stopped support of at least some terrorist groups and, in 1999, deported the notorious Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal, who had a residence in Libya since 1987, U.S. officials said. Abu Nidal died in Baghdad a few months before the Iraq war.

Gaddafi, once one of the region's most fervent hard-liners, has simultaneously begun to distance himself from the ideologies that originally defined his unusual government, outlined in his famous "The Green Book."

"It's not a dramatic turnaround. It's part of a trend that has been underway for 10 years -- of reforms and trying to reintegrate with Europe, mainly for business reasons," said Joseph Cirincione, an arms specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Gaddafi has turned away from radical Arab nationalism of the 1970s and 1980s toward programs geared toward economic development that require Western investment and markets, which means coming into line with international norms," he added.

Ironically, Libya may not have had large quantities of weapons of mass destruction by the time the deal was struck with the United States and Britain.

"Libya's program did not have a sophisticated enough infrastructure for a very viable program, and they haven't had it for years," Takeyh said.

washingtonpost.com



To: unclewest who wrote (20594)12/20/2003 7:02:12 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793587
 
A little revenge going on. Saves a lot of trials. I can hear the "Hand Wringers." "Oh, this will create another cycle of violence!" Nothing wrong with the Mosaic Code.

"We are an Eastern, tribal society with the principle of vengeance. Revenge will be exacted,"

Iraqis Exact Revenge on Baathists
Police Shrug Off Killings of 50 Hussein Loyalists by Unknown Gunmen

By Alan Sipress
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, December 20, 2003; Page A01

BAGHDAD -- Basil Abbas Taee never saw the slip of paper entitled Final Warning.

The note, which his sons said was tossed over the gate of his house in southeast Baghdad, cautioned that he was being watched. "If you go out of your home or have connections with other Baathists, you and all your family will be killed as a lesson to all criminal Baathists," the message threatened. It was signed the Committee for Retribution.

Taee, 59, a former local official in Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, had received an earlier written warning in September and menacing phone calls, his brothers recalled. But after two months of staying home, he began to brave the streets again. When his wife found the final warning note in late November, she hid it from him, afraid it would aggravate his ailing kidneys and high blood pressure.

Two weeks ago, as Taee sat alone in his small real estate office, a lone gunman shot him in the chest, according to his brothers, citing witness accounts. He died before reaching the hospital.

His death was one of the latest in a series of murders of former Baath Party officials in this city. Iraqi sources with contacts among former and current security officials estimate that about 50 senior figures in Hussein's intelligence, military intelligence and internal security organizations have been gunned down in recent months. There has been an even larger toll among neighborhood party officials, such as Taee, who are blamed for having informed on the local community during Hussein's rule, these sources said.

Neither the morgue nor officers in Iraq's new police force -- who concede they have little interest in probing these deaths -- have tallied the figures. But the phenomenon is citywide, according to a survey of police stations, with numbers varying widely from one district to another.

In the Shiite holy city of Najaf on Friday, officials said an angry crowd attacked and killed Ali Zalimi, a former Baath Party official. Zalimi was believed to have played a role in crushing the Shiite uprising in 1991 after the Persian Gulf War.

The massive settling of scores that some U.S. and Iraqi officials had predicted did not initially materialize after Hussein's government fell in April. Sporadic killings occurred during the following months, notably in the southern city of Basra. But only in recent weeks did the tempo of attacks accelerate as Iraqis, frustrated with the slow progress of the court system and fearing that Baathists may be seeking to reorganize, have increasingly taken justice into their own hands, according to Iraqi security and political sources.

"We are an Eastern, tribal society with the principle of vengeance. Revenge will be exacted," said Maj. Abbas Abed Ali of the Baya police station in southwest Baghdad. He said at least six Baathists have been murdered in his district since late November.

In Sadr City, a sprawling, hardscrabble neighborhood in eastern Baghdad, police reported that the assassinations began about three weeks ago and now number at least one or two a day, perhaps more. They said some families do not disclose that the victims were Baathists.

"This is absolutely organized, but we don't know precisely who's behind it," said Capt. Awad Nima, who heads police administration in Sadr City. "These killings are a vendetta for the killings by the Baath Party. . . . Would you expect those people who lost their sons not to take any action?"

Nima said the assassinations have centered on Hussein followers implicated in violence, not all former party members. The murders seem meticulously planned, and the perpetrators leave behind no clues, he said. With few leads, detectives have made little progress in figuring out who is killing the Baathists, but Nima said this does not trouble him.

"There's only a limited number of them. Once they're all dead, this will have to end," he said.

Another of those killed was Ismail Hassan Saadi, 50, who ran the personnel and management department in one of Sadr City's Baath offices. His sons described him as a devout Muslim, respected in the community for using his party position to intervene with the government on behalf of those who had been wrongly arrested or were wanted for deserting the army. Neighbors, however, said Saadi was deeply involved in repressing local Shiite groups and was known for coercing local men into joining the army.

One morning this month, Saadi left his home along a side street deep with standing water and headed on foot for a local office to see about a passport, according to an account by his grown sons, Ashraf and Zain Abidin.

Moments later, they heard a shot. They scrambled to their father, discovering him crumpled by the wall of a large warehouse, fatally wounded with a gunshot to the back. At the same time, they spotted a blue Opel with three men inside and no license plates racing from the scene.

"There are some who want to cleanse this area of ex-Baathists," said Ashraf, 26. The brothers softly recounted their father's tale, seated cross-legged on the carpeted floor of their dimly lit home, their checkered headdresses pulled down over their ears in mourning.

"If we find out who did it, all of us, our family and our tribe, will take our revenge," Ashraf said.

They might not be alone. The traditional death notices of Baghdad society -- black banners inscribed with the names of the deceased and their relatives -- are proliferating along the walls of Sadr City.

Victims' families and some Iraqi security officials have alleged that Shiite political parties, relentlessly repressed by Hussein's government, are behind the killing spree. They point in particular to the Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which are both represented on the Iraqi Governing Council.

Senior officials from both groups denied any involvement. "It's not our policy to take revenge and execute people," said Adel Abdel-Mehdi of the Supreme Council.

Many of those killed were former intelligence and internal security officials who had been assigned over their careers to countering the activities of Shiite political groups and their sponsors in neighboring Iran, according to sources close to current and former security officials.

One such victim was Maj. Gen. Khalaf Alousi, the former head of internal security for Baghdad.

"He spent his whole career dealing with the Dawa Party and other Islamic parties, so he amassed many enemies," said Capt. Ahmed Suleiman of the Yarmouk police district in central Baghdad, where Alousi was killed. "This guy was involved with the executions of members of other parties. Now the other parties are in power and there's a settling of accounts."

Alousi, 50, was gunned down shortly before midday on Dec. 6 after he took his wife to visit a house he was having built in the Yarmouk neighborhood, according to his brother, Raid Alousi. When they entered the house, a stranger was waiting, and pulled out a gun. Alousi's wife leapt between the attacker and her husband, but the gunmen reached above her and fired, Raid said. Another man appeared, shooting from behind. The two continued firing bullets into Alousi's body even after he collapsed.

The killings of Baath security officials have revealed fissures in Iraqi society, not only between supporters and opponents of the Hussein government but also between some Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Most of the security chiefs were Sunnis like Hussein; the suspected killers are Shiites.

Sunnis increasingly view the bloodletting in sectarian terms. At the memorial reception for Alousi, dozens of mourners gathered in two facing rows of chairs arrayed under a tent. Young men moved among them with cups of sweet tea, trays of cigarettes and a bottle of rose water perfume. The guests whispered among themselves, sharing details of Alousi's death, passing news about other murders and musing about revenge.

"For each one they kill," said a mourner, "we'll kill four."

washingtonpost.com



To: unclewest who wrote (20594)12/20/2003 8:02:15 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793587
 
Think Global, Fight Local
Military bureaucracy is hindering the war in Afghanistan.

BY ROBERT D. KAPLAN
Saturday, December 20, 2003 12:01 a.m.
Mr. Kaplan, a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, is the author of "Soldiers of God" (Vintage, 2001).

Two years ago this month, fewer than 100 men of the Army's Fifth Special Forces Group, based out of Fort Campbell, Ky.--almost all of them noncommissioned officers--essentially took down the Taliban regime on their own. Along with a handful of Air Force special-ops embeds, they succeeded where the British and the Soviets before them in Afghanistan had failed, because they had been given no specific instructions. The bureaucratic layers between the U.S. forces and the secretary of defense were severed. They were told merely to link up with the "indigs" (indigenous Northern Alliance and friendly Pushtun elements) and make it happen.
The result was that they grew beards and rode horses from one redoubt to the next, even as their team sergeants called in air strikes without first seeking written approval. Because Fifth Group was allowed to operate independently of the vertical, Industrial Age hierarchy of the Pentagon, and because it combined 19th-century warfare with 21st-century close air support, the Fifth Group achieved the very postindustrial military "transformation" that elites in Washington are incessantly talking about, but don't seem to understand--because real transformation, which involves the dilution of central control, would make many of these elites themselves redundant.

But now, military transformation is receding behind us in Afghanistan. With Saddam Hussein in custody, the Pentagon is focusing on the capture of Osama bin Laden, who may be in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. Yet success against bin Laden means going back to what we did right two years ago.

Of the roughly 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan, only a fraction of them are doing anything directly pivotal to the stabilization of the country. The rest are either part of a long support tail or part of newly created layers of command at Bagram Air Base, north of Kabul, which micromanage and complicate the work of a relatively small number of Army special forces troops (Green Berets) located at various "fire bases."
Instead of powering down to a flattened hierarchy of small, autonomous units dispersed over a wide area--what the 1940 Marine "Small Wars Manual" recommends for fighting a guerrilla insurgency--we have barricaded ourselves into a mammoth, Cold War-style base at Bagram that drains resources from the fire bases. It is ironic that just as the Pentagon is proposing a more light and lethal world-wide basing posture (with many smaller footprints rather than a few large ones in Korea and Europe), in Afghanistan, whose mountains and tribes make it the most unconventional of battlefields, we have reverted to such an antiquated arrangement.

Half of the U.S. soldiery in Afghanistan is garrisoned at Bagram, creating a footprint so large, so vulnerable and so beside the point of why we are there in the first place that terms like "Westmorelandization," "Sovietization" and the "self-licking ice cream cone" come to mind when describing the place and what it represents. I make these harsh statements after a month embedded at various special forces fire bases in Afghanistan, speaking to dozens of noncommissioned and middle-level officers, and drawing upon my own experience of covering the mujahideen insurgency against the Soviets in the 1980s.

Because of the present U.S. force structure in Afghanistan--with its emphasis on conventional military and support personnel as opposed to small detachments of Green Berets, civil affairs units and other special-ops teams--I met no one on the ground doing the fighting who believed that merely increasing the number of troops in the country would accomplish anything except make these problems worse.
Surprise searches of suspect mud-walled fortresses and "presence patrols" over the Afghan countryside require the approval of a CON-OP, a written "Concept of Operation" proposal. Two years ago--in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when the emphasis was on results rather than on regulations--CON-OPs were de-emphasized. Indeed, again as recommended in the Marine "Small Wars Manual," verbal orders had replaced written ones. But now it can take days for commanders in far-flung parts of Afghanistan to get CON-OPs approved; and even then often in diluted, risk-averse form. The result is that suspicious compounds are assaulted hours and days after they should have been, so they that they turn up to be "dry holes" rather than "gold mines" of weapons and MVTs (middle value targets), the al Qaeda and Taliban subcommanders who exist between the terrorist leadership and the foot soldiers.

The search for HVTs (high value targets) such as bin Laden has not been similarly compromised. That is because the various "Delta" and other "black" special-ops elements hunting down the HVTs have air support at near the battalion level. These commandos operate more like Fifth Group did in 2001, cut loose from Bagram's and the Pentagon's dinosaurian organizational structure--in the manner of the most innovative corporations, which are deliberately kept weak at the center.

But even the search for HVTs is hurt by the overly regulated approach of hunting down the MVTs and LVTs (Low Value Targets). For it is the hunt for MVTs that constitutes the real bread and butter in the war on terrorism. If the hunt for MVTs remains snarled in bureaucracy, the MVTs will fill the positions of any HVTs who happen to be killed or apprehended. More importantly, MVTs hold the key to capturing the HVTs. It's the subway turnstile phenomenon. When New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani began arresting kids for jumping turnstiles, a percentage of them turned out to be wanted for more serious crimes, or they had information on those who were. To wit, it was MVTs who proved crucial in the capture of Saddam. Thus, we need to be capturing more MVTs. We can only do that by giving Army special forces the same autonomy and air support that Delta has.

Demanding more troops without a thorough consideration of these issues is irresponsible: It would only encourage a longer support tail and more bureaucracy. (A similar caveat applies to calls for more NATO stabilization troops to help provide basic security to the population, an increase that would be appropriate if NATO is prepared to decentralize its forces and its command structure in Afghanistan.)

Some in the field recommend scaling back Bagram, and moving some functions over the border to Khanabad-Kharshi (K2) in Uzbekistan. As Bagram contracts, the number of fire bases should proliferate, even as they become more independent. In particular, we need more and smaller Advanced Operating Bases in southwestern Afghanistan close to the Iran border. At the moment, fewer than 100 Green Berets are covering southern Afghanistan in armed convoys: the addition of just another 100 or so of them would have a substantial force-multiplier effect.

We also need more Provincial Reconstruction Teams--mobile civil affairs units working the soft, humanitarian side of unconventional war. As with the Green Berets, the addition of a relatively small number of these personnel will have dramatically positive consequences.

Like the Soviets, we face dispersed, small groupings of insurgents attacking us from rear bases over the border in Pakistan. Thus, we have to make the Pakistani tribal agencies the next laboratory of Unconventional War. The model to be used should be that of the southern Philippines in 2002, when the First Special Forces Group--based out of Okinawa, Japan and Fort Lewis, Washington--flushed Abu Sayyaf insurgents off the island of Basilan without firing a shot. The Green Berets built schools, dug wells and provided medical assistance to a downtrodden Muslim population, while giving the credit for this humanitarian work to the Philippine army. In this way, the Green Berets severed the link between the insurgents and the indigenous inhabitants. We need to do something similar with the Pakistani military inside the tribal agencies.
We are fighting a world-wide counterinsurgency, and you don't hunt down pockets of insurgents over vast swaths of the earth with large bases, large infantry columns, and central control. Operation Iraqi Freedom only shaped the battlefield for the war in Iraq, which is of a small, unconventional kind. Because insurgencies vary from country to country, and even within countries, it is necessary to divest power from places like Washington and Bagram to the edges of the command structure, where noncoms at Advanced Operating Bases constitute the sensitive, fingertip points of defense policy--tailored to the particular situation in their respective microregions. For example, while the U.S. seeks to fold the Afghan Militia Forces into the newly created Afghan National Army, in some provinces these same militias are vital to the security of our special forces fire bases. Therefore, decisions about integrating these forces must be left to individual base commanders, who are familiar with local personalities.

The U.S. military is the world's best because its sergeants and warrant officers are without equal. It is a matter of better utilizing them. Mistakes will occur, like the children killed recently near Gardez, but remember that Green Berets have been regularly saving the lives of young mine victims in rural Afghanistan.

In El Salvador in the 1980s, 55 special forces troops beat back a guerrilla insurgency while gradually integrating renegade militias into a newly professionalized national army. They had advantages, though. A force cap kept the number of uniformed Americans in the country from mushrooming, and except for some basic guidelines they were given relatively limited instructions. So the question is: Can we find our way back to 2001 in Afghanistan and to 2002 in the Philippines, when the Fifth and First Special Forces Groups led the way to military transformation?