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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Neocon who wrote (122022)	12/24/2003 12:47:54 PM
From: Hawkmoon	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

We would have had to have battered down a lot of doors, and detained a lot of civilians, without much discrimination, as well as appearing to sit on the country with more intent to stay. We shouldn't have had to do even that.. 1. Have the necessary financial, humanitarian, and engineering resources to put the population to work DOING SOMETHING, even if only cleaning the streets. Idle hands do the devil's work, as the old cliche goes. We were woefully underprepared for the task required. 2. We should never have let the Special Republican Guard "fade" back into the population without being vetted. We seemed to misunderstand the nature of the Iraqi power structure, with the Sunnis holding almost utter power in the country. The SRG was part of that Sunni system, thus the guarantor that the Sunnis would continue to wield overall power. And hundreds of soldiers have paid the ultimate price for not taking them as POWs. 3. Gather ALL the tribal chieftains together, lay down the law as to who will receive the benefit of US generousity in exchange for cooperation. Don't accept the "premise" that they couldn't control their clans without receiving something to placate them (jobs, money.. etc). Tell those who comply that they will be first to receive those benefits. Furthermore, the local chiefs should have been made responsible for local security in their respective areas of dominance (with "mixed" areas designated by mutual agreement or imposition by CPA). Non-SRG or Baathists could have been hired/reinstated for the police and local army detachments. US forces would have been there to provide "backbone" when serious trouble began. Bottom line.. we were in trouble the minute we failed to assure the Iraqi security system (police, firemen.. etc) that the US would temporarily finance their operations while officers were vetted and the decision made as to their continued employability. People will tolerate dictators when the alternative is social disorder and fear. We know that Saddam used his power and intelligence to intimidate rivals into submitting to him. But he still had to worry about assassinations and coups. It should have been evident that with Saddam gone, the power vacuum that was created would be fought over by every other rival power in Iraq. It was our job to prevent any one of these groups from gaining the upper hand over or powerful groups. It's pretty evident that we were ready for the post-war scenario we experienced. The fact that US military commanders had to rely upon confiscated cash to carry out social, infrastructure, and intelligence operations(informer pay-offs) is blatant proof of the lack of readiness for an occupation. I also believe many US soldiers were not properly briefed on local customs and "dos and don'ts" (like touching women, putting boots on people's heads during raids, etc... etc..) During my time in the military, I found too much of the "ugly american" mentality that made my liasion and security missions particularly difficult. Far too much of the "f*ck them, they're in OUR way" mindset when it came to trying to work around the local civilians.. And I know that one of the weaknesses we've seen in the Army is that many of our Civil Affairs officers are generally combat arms types who have not made the mental transition to their new mission as nation builders, or they are overshadowed by the "bull in the china shop" commanders of many of the combat units who are primarily interested in dominating the population and securing the lives of their own troops (understandably).. Lots of reason Neocon.. but again.. the most glaring was how long it took to get the local Iraqi police and security forces on the payroll. Hawk Firm but fair.

To: Neocon who wrote (122022)	3/31/2004 7:39:25 PM
From: Bilow	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Hi Neocon; Back in December 2003, fresh after the capture of Saddam, you wrote: Neocon, December 24, 2004 However, it was always a matter of time to deal with Saddam and others in the leadership of the Ba'athist Party, to develop intelligence assets sufficient to mount a more aggressive, but tailored, response, and to increase the participation of native security personnel in order to show our good faith in planning to turn things over as the situation permitted. Now, the tide is turning, and we should see much more rapid progress in the next few months. #reply-19627032 Okay. It's been 3 months now but the bloodshed in Iraq continues unabated. I don't see any tide turning, do you? -- Carl