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To: michael97123 who wrote (22282)12/31/2003 9:41:25 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793677
 
Russia and the Rich Western Neighbors: A Cold Peace
By STEVEN LEE MYERS - New York Times

MOSCOW, Dec. 30 — "By their mentality and culture, the people of Russia are Europeans," President Vladimir V. Putin said in an interview this fall, addressing the centuries-old choice here between East and West.

The real question, however, is whether Russia is — or even wants to be — part of today's Europe.

There is increasing evidence that the answer is no.

In the last few months, Russia and Europe have found themselves at odds, sometimes pointedly, over a raft of diplomatic, political and economic issues, belying the widely held notion that the collapse of the Soviet Union would herald Russia's ever-deepening integration into all parts of a new world order.

No diplomat likes to say it, but the European Union's expansion next year — along with NATO's — is etching a new frontier across the Continent, enveloping the former Soviet republics of the Baltics and the former satellites of Eastern Europe into the elite clubs of democratic states.

The curtain across Europe may be less iron-clad than in the past, but there is no dispute that Russia is on the other side of it, not just politically and economically, but perhaps psychologically as well.

"Russia remains beyond the expanding West," Dmitri V. Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote this month in Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

In recent negotiations over joining the World Trade Organization and ratifying the Kyoto treaty on climate change, Russia has clashed fundamentally with Europe's vision on free markets and the environment.

In its internal affairs, Russia has angrily dismissed European criticism of its gruesome war in Chechnya — criticism more strident than any recently from the United States, which is more accepting of Mr. Putin's view that Russians in Chechnya are under attack from foreign Islamic militants.

Europe has also criticized the prosecution of the oil tycoon Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky and of its parliamentary elections earlier this month, which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe said raised doubts about "Russia's willingness to move towards European standards for democratic elections."

These are political — and in some cases purely economic — disputes, but something more profound is happening.

To many Russians, Europe is more than just a geographic place. It is an idea. In Soviet times, it represented democracy and freedom, if also capitalist decadence. It is still the standard by which Russia is measured, almost always unfavorably.

Increasingly, though, Europe is seen as little more than a source of money and goods, which have turned Moscow and other cities into oases of consumption and even luxury in a country still besieged by poverty and despair. After a tumultuous decade of painful economic reforms, more and more Russians seem willing to reject Europe as a democratic idea or model.

In his four years in office, Mr. Putin has governed with an authoritarian hand, increasing the role of the security services, consolidating state control over television and business and otherwise rolling back some of democracy's basic, if messy freedoms. And he is overwhelmingly popular, heading into a re-election campaign next year essentially unchallenged. In the elections this month, the party defined by its fealty to him cruised to victory, crushing not only the Communists, but also two parties with liberal, pro-Western images and ideas, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces.

The election's biggest surprise was the success of two nationalist blocs, the Liberal Democratic Party led by the outlandish xenophobe Vladimir V. Zhironovksy, and a milder, more respectable version of it, Motherland.

Dmitri O. Rogozin, a leader of Motherland, said in a post-election interview that Russians have grown disenchanted with a decade of democratic experiment and what he called the broken promises of Europe.

"When democratic reforms were taking place in our country, people were willing to take on losses, such as the destruction of the Soviet Union," he said.

"Everyone thought that this would lead to very close relations with the West, when everyone would live well, that there would be European standards of living, freedoms," he went on. "However, tomorrow has arrived, and it has turned out to be just as gloomy as yesterday."

What divides Russia and Europe is unlikely to become a chasm or start a new cold war. Russia, like the rest of the world, is susceptible to globalization. After its expansion, the European Union will account for more than half of Russia's foreign trade, making cooperation, if not integration, essential.

Sergei O. Sokolov, head of the Foreign Ministry's department for European relations, called the disputes with Europe — over everything from duties to visas — the inevitable growing pains of closer relations. But he added that Russia drew a distinction between integration "with" Europe and integration "into" it, one meaning cooperation, the other membership.

The Russia he described will be an independent power, a proud nation that expects to be treated as an equal of Europe, not a part of it.

Mr. Trenin, in his article, agreed, but warned that Russia was creating the foundations for "a new isolationism," though not necessarily within its own borders.

In recent months, Russia has aggressively wielded its diplomatic and economic influence in its traditional dominion along the arc of Europe's new frontier.

In Georgia, Russia has provided succor to two separatist enclaves. In Moldova, Mr. Putin tried to broker a settlement of another separatist conflict that would ensure the presence of Russian troops indefinitely. In Lithuania, President Rolandas Paksas faces an impeachment battle over accusations that he became susceptible to Russian influence.

Russia's actions abroad, like those at home, have raised concerns in Europe, deepening distrust of Mr. Putin's commitment to a democratic course. In the near future, Mr. Trenin wrote, Europe and the United States "will treat Russia as though the Soviet Union has been replaced by its czarist predecessor."

If Europe is keeping Russia at arm's length, so is Russia keeping Europe.

"More and more, Russian leaders are viewing the West as a source of resources for modernization and geopolitical challenges — not as a common home where Russia itself may find its proper place," Mr. Trenin said.

Mr. Putin, in the interview, completed his answer by emphasizing, twice, that Russia had no intention ever to join the European Union. Whatever its cultural ties to Europe, Russia's relations will be limited up to what he called the "historic horizon."

"It is up to a new generation of decision makers in Russia," he said, "to see to it how the relationship between Russia and the European Union develops."

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company



To: michael97123 who wrote (22282)12/31/2003 11:20:32 AM
From: MSI  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 793677
 
Hold on there...

The question isn't whether a counter-attack should be made. It's who should be hit and how?

Bin Laden had nothing to do with Iraq. The stories in Weekly Standard are at odds with everything else we know from intel and DOD, and certainly the rest of the world.

Hitting Afghanistan made some sense, had bin Laden's chiefs not been allowed to escape, along with OBL himself.

Remember, the bottom line is freedom from terror, not how massive we can counter-attack. As the Rumsfeld memo reveals, there is a real growth of terrorist recruits from military attacks. To ignore that is to spiral down into a war of attrition with large numbers of suicide warriors. What do you think the costs to America will be of a war of attrition?

Ignoring the obvious reality means submitting America to decades of Israel-like terrorism and martial law, complete destruction of the American way of life. It's the same temptation as Curtis LeMay's plan to preemptively nuke the USSR. Imagine the world after that had happened.

When you undertake the "kill them all and let God sort them out" type approach, you play into their hands, escalating the fight into millions or hundreds of millions.

As tough as it is, we have to maintain a deliberative "slog", in a much more open gov't process that we now have, which leads to cover-ups and suspicions. The mistake we make is going it alone simply because we can. The neocons drunk with power need to be replaced with diplomatic adults who know how to use power responsibly, who will bring in international participation. Every country needs to have skin in the game, or else it will be America against the rest of the world. That's neither wise nor moral nor practical.

We certainly have the power to lay waste to large sections of the world. That we don't do that is a more important force to creating peace in the world than doing it.

There is a technological trend making overwhelming force a self-defeating policy - Bill Joy's "The Future Doesn't Need Us" describes the processes by which smaller and smaller numbers of people can create larger and larger damage in the world. This process will continue to the point where a couple kids in a basement can cobble a Black Plague virus.

Moral authority, technical oversight, transparency in governance and deserved, verifiable trust in governance are the only counters to what technology has in store. Preemptive violence and overwhelming force are useless to punish a small number of suicidal actors. That's fighting the last war.