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To: unclewest who wrote (22549)1/2/2004 6:00:27 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793672
 
Ledeen and Hanson are two of my favorite writers.

Support the democratic revolutionaries in Iran and the Iranian-American broadcasters in California. Now, not tomorrow. That is the key to the entire war, in my opinion.

FrontPage Interview: Michael Ledeen
By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | December 30, 2003

Frontpage Magazine: Today, our guest is Dr. Michael Ledeen, a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of the new book The War Against the Terror Masters. Welcome, Dr. Ledeen. It is a pleasure to have you join us.

First, let's talk about the big news: Saddam's capture. Tell us a bit of how and where you heard about it and your initial reaction. What do you think is the significance of this development?

Ledeen: I was on a plane from New York to Tel Aviv when it happened. When I landed I called home and heard the good news. It's very important--I always disagreed with those who said that our failure to get Saddam didn't really matter--above all because it stands as a concrete warning to the other tyrants in the region, and, at the same time, encourages those who wish to be free. It has seriously frightened the likes of Rafsanjani, Khamenei, Assad and Qadaffi, and it has given an infusion of hope to the freedom fighters.

FP: So can we safely say that Qadaffi's new spirit of "co-operation" with the U.S. on WMDs is, in large part, a direct result of the "Saddam effect"? In other words, he has probably been up at night visualizing himself sleeping in a hole in the ground with rats and mice and decided it's all not worth it?

Ledeen: No, I don't think so, since the talks had been going on for many months before Saddam was captured, and indeed I think that Qadaffi has been looking for a way out for many years. Berlusconi reported several months ago that Qadaffi was frightened, very frightened, and the event that intensified his fear was the invasion of Iraq. The first event that focused his mind was obviously when President Reagan bombed Tripoli in 1986.

FP: You have really distinguished yourself in your forceful arguments for "regime change" in Iran and other Mideast rogue states. Tell us a bit about your philosophy in this area. What, for instance, would you advise the U.S. to do right now vis-à-vis Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia?

Ledeen: In almost all my books I have argued that the global mission of the United States is to support freedom and fight tyrants. I think this mission is inescapable, because even when--alas, all too frequently--we shrink from it, the tyrants come after us and force us to do the right thing.

We didn't want to engage in any of the world wars of the last century, but we were dragged in by our tyrannical enemies. Ergo, we should support democratic revolution throughout the Middle East, above all in the countries that support the terror network.

FP: Yes, we must support democratic revolution throughout the Middle East. But in the cases of places like Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran, where the terror network is clearly being fertilized, is there some legitimacy in going in there militarily if "regime change" is taking too long?

Ledeen: There is no general answer to this question, or if there is, I don't know it. You would have to look at each case. On Iran, I suppose the question is whether the West should wait if we believe the mullahs are about to get an atomic bomb.

FP: I would like to ask you a few personal questions about your life if you don't mind. Looking back at your youth, what molded you to become a Conservative?

Ledeen: I lived in Italy for many years, at a time when the Communist Party seemed on the verge of taking power. Watching the Communists up close put an end to any illusions about the Left.

FP: Illusions about the Left? Do you mean that, at one time, as a young man, you had some socialist impulses or interests? Could you talk a bit about these? And how they ultimately came crashing down?

Ledeen: Well, I was a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin in the early sixties, when Wisconsin was the epicenter of the Left. "Studies on the Left" was published in Madison, the great guru of a large part of the New Left, William Appleman Williams, taught there (and we played tennis together a good deal), and the Port Huron Statement that founded SDS was done by Wisconsin students. Many of them were my friends, and I was at the time working on a Master's thesis on Bakunin.

So I was intellectually working through many of those issues. I was opposed to the Vietnam War, indeed I signed a petition against it in 1962, but my opposition wasn't ideological. I agreed with Walter Lippmann that it was a mistake to engage in a land war in Asia. I never cared for the Viet Cong, and was never tempted by communism. My parents were left-wing Republicans. They lived in New Jersey and voted for people like Clifford Case. I think they voted for Eisenhower at a time when I was enamored of Adlai Stevenson, but they didn't like Nixon ever (I was born in Los Angeles and we knew a lot about Nixon that we didn't like) and voted for Kennedy in 1960.

So my own political convictions were, and are, fairly boring. My basic views have remained pretty constant for a long time: I dread mass movements, I hate tyranny, I think small government is preferable to big government even though I believe there are some things government must do, and I believe America must fight for freedom, constantly.

Does that make me a conservative? I dunno. Was Jefferson a conservative? Can one be a conservative and advocate democratic revolution at the same time?

FP: You have been a major player in the shaping of certain American foreign policies, and you were involved in some of the most well-known missions of U.S. diplomacy in the late 20th century. Could you tell us about a few "missions" in which you were involved and that, in retrospect, you are proud of having been a part of?

Ledeen: I was Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for a bit more than a year, when Alexander Haig was Secretary, and my job was really "ambassador at small" (General Walters was ambassador at large, in all respects).

We were having trouble with some of the key players in the Socialist International, especially Willi Brandt, and Haig, in his usual concise way, ordered me to "do something." So I started meeting with Socialist leaders, mostly in Western Europe, to try to find areas of agreement with at least a handful of them, on those questions that were annoying us in Washington.

I was able to develop really good working relations with the likes of Mario Soares, Felipe Gonzales and Bettino Craxi, along with some Israelis and French, and that led to a real change in policy by the West European Bureau of the Socialist International (SI).

The happiest moment came when Brandt denounced me by name, and accused me of having sabotaged SI policy on Central America.

Most of the other happy moments had to do with counter-terrorism, when we were able to work well with many of the same people. The Achille Lauro operation, for example, that led to the capture of some of the murderers of Leon Klinghoffer, would not have been possible without Craxi, with whom I spent most of the night on the telephone working out the arrangements.

At a certain point I had to translate Reagan into Italian during a conversation he had with Craxi, and on two occasions I felt that Reagan would have preferred a slightly different answer, so I did some "creative translation."

The next morning he wrote me a little note to thank me...proving once again that character is the most important quality in a great leader. We would never have been able to issue the arrest warrants without the help of the Israelis, who declassified enormous quantities of sensitive intelligence so that we could take it to a judge in Washington.

All of this convinced me that personal friendship is much more important in international affairs than the intellectuals would have us believe--certainly much more than I believed before getting involved in government--and ever since I have argued strenuously for rewarding real experts in the bureaucracy.

We badly need people who devote decades to a single region, and who grow up with a new generation of leaders, so that we will have these friendships when we need them. I despair at the current practice, which is to move people around from subject to subject and region to region. On Iran, for example, we lack real expertise, and have lacked it for at least twenty-five years. I think we absolutely must have real China experts, young ones, who will get to know young Chinese leaders. And so forth.

FP: Tell us an individual (or some individuals) who played an instrumental role in shaping your intellectual journey/political career. Did you have a mentor of some sort that, in retrospect, you are very grateful to?

Ledeen: I've had several mentors, of whom three were very important for me. The first is Richard D. Heffner, a professor at the New School (where I spent the first semester of my junior year), the editor of the best abridged edition of Tocqueville's "Democracy in America," and the general manager of the first public television station in New York City. I worked for him there the summer after my junior year, and learned a lot about media (he had been one of Edward R. Murrow's fair-haired boys). I wanted to go into public tv, but he insisted I go to graduate school, at least through the Master's. That was a blessing, because he was fired, and I would have been fired along with him.

The second was George L. Mosse, the great historian. He was my major professor at Wisconsin and took me as his research assistant. I worked with him on two fundamental books about National Socialism, and he encouraged me to go to Italy to work on fascism. George was one of the most brilliant, and most tolerant people I have ever known.

The third was Renzo De Felice, the great biographer of Mussolini. Renzo really took me under his wing when I started working in the Fascist archives in Rome, and in those years it was very hard to get the archivists to turn over the most important material unless you had a track record with them. Renzo walked me through the process. A few years later he chose me to be the interviewer for a book called "Interview on Fascism," which was the first serious critique of the Marxist theory of fascism published in post-war Italy. It kicked off a firestorm of condemnation, but in retrospect turned out to have been fundamental in making it possible to treat fascism as an historical phenomenon rather than an ongoing evil.

FP: In looking back at your years in foreign diplomacy, who are some figures that earned your trust and admiration? What American officials do you think did a priceless job in defending and promoting American interests?

Ledeen: The best was Scoop Jackson, and some of his proteges too: Richard Perle and Jim Roche for example. And of course Reagan. Jeane Kirkpatrick did a lot of terrific things.

That said, I don't have many heroes. It's hard to conduct foreign policy in a democracy, and we all come up short most of the time. After living in Italy for a long time, I learned that God placed man on earth so that man would screw up. And so we do.

FP: Could you name an author, or a few authors, who left an indelible mark on your intellectual development?

Ledeen: Lots and lots of them: Walter Lippmann, my childhood hero and still my model for expository writing. Freud and Jung. Elias Canetti and Friedrich Durenmatt. Ray Bradbury, Alfred Bester, J.R. Tolkein and Jonas Huizinga.

FP: What are your own personal future plans? What do you still hope to accomplish?

Ledeen: I'm trying to finish a book on Naples. I would like to play more tournament bridge, and Barbara is very keen to go to Burma.

FP: Let's return to politics now. When we examine the Left's behavior during the Iraq War and in the post 9/11 era in general, we certainly see a frightening pathology at work. What, in your view, is at the root of this horror movie? What do you think explains, for instance, a radical feminist screaming anti-Bush slogans at a rally and siding with enemies who extinguish every feminist right that could possibly exist in their own societies?

Ledeen: It's an Hegelian process. Hegel pointed out that the world changes all the time, and that ideas therefore "age." The Left's ideas no longer explain the world (as they once did) and so they are constantly frustrated and often enraged at their inability to deal with the real problems. They have therefore resorted to character defamation and "the politics of personal destruction" to maintain a grip on the bits and pieces of power they still control.

Finally, the Left has not recovered from the defeat of the Soviet Empire (in which so many of their passions were invested), and they will never forgive those of us who had a role in it.

FP: Tell us how you view, in general, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and what you would advise the Israelis and the U.S. to do.

Ledeen: I don't follow it, as you know. I doubt I have anything much to add to this overpopulated field of pundits.

In general, I don't think it is possible for anyone to do anything meaningful about it until we have defeated the terror masters in Tehran, Damascus and Riyadh, because the terrorism against Israel gets a lot of support from those
evil people.

In other words, you can't solve it in situ, it's part of a regional war.

Maybe, once we have liberated the Middle East and the peoples have a chance to make their own decisions, it will be easier.

But maybe not. Fascism was enormously popular in Western Europe, after all.

FP: If you were asked to describe Yasser Arafat in one sentence, what would you say?

Ledeen: Really, really ugly.

FP: In terms of our post-9/11 war, let me ask you this: (1) what if Gore had become president instead of Bush (2) What if a Democrat, someone like Howard Dean, beats Bush in 2004 and becomes President?

Ledeen: I'm an historian, and I don't do "what ifs."

Look at Dubya: nobody in his right mind could have predicted the amazing transformation of this man, seemingly overnight, from an ambitious and interesting person to a determined and effective leader. I voted for him
without any great enthusiasm, primarily because I feared that Gore would give the Left a stranglehold on the judiciary, from the Supreme Court down. But Dubya's turned out to be a very impressive man in foreign policy, and he was arguably very poorly prepared for that task.

Try explaining that!

It's hard enough to figure out what has actually happened, without consuming our little grey cells on what might have happened.

The same applies to Dean, although it does seem pretty certain that Dean would be even slower than our current administration to prosecute the war against terrorism. And the courts would be in the hands of the Left for a generation--unless somehow the Republicans retained enough of the Senate and developed sufficient will to filibuster, a tough parlay--which truly terrifies me.

FP: Let us suppose that tomorrow you are brought into Bush's inner circle regarding Iraq and the War on Terror. The President asks you what concrete steps he should take next. What do you say?

Ledeen: Support the democratic revolutionaries in Iran and the Iranian-American broadcasters in California. Now, not tomorrow. That is the key to the entire war, in my opinion. There will never be peace in Iraq so long as the mullahs are in power in Tehran, and their favorite Assad reigns in Damascus.

Then tell the Saudis that they have to shut down the global network of radical schools and mosques, or we will make great trouble for them in the Shi'ite regions of the Kingdom (which happen to be the major oil producing regions as
well).

FP: Thank you Dr. Ledeen for joining Frontpage Interview. We are most grateful for you sharing your wisdom and fascinating life experience with us.

You stated earlier that the Left has never forgiven individuals such as yourself for having played a role in the destruction of the Soviet Empire. I would like to take this opportunity to personally thank you for the role you played in that wonderful and joyous historic development. As a son of Soviet dissidents, I don't need to expand on why I have so much admiration and respect for you. Thank you.

I hope you will come back and visit us again soon. Take care for now.

Ledeen: One of the many great things about being an American is the singular pleasure of watching people--especially young people--from tyrannical countries become invaluable contributors to the United States. So it's my pleasure, Jamie.
frontpagemag.com



To: unclewest who wrote (22549)1/2/2004 10:45:28 AM
From: Lane3  Respond to of 793672
 
Accountability worked in every job environment I was ever in.

Accountability and performance management are not the same thing although they are often thought of that way. Teachers are not the only ones who are distrustful of performance evaluation. That's the case all over. To the extent that the two are equated, then the bad taste spills over into fear of accountability. I don't think it's fair, by and large, to infer from a fear of unfair performance management the reluctance to be accountable, only a fear that the accountability mechanism will be similarly unfair.



To: unclewest who wrote (22549)1/2/2004 3:02:34 PM
From: Little Joe  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793672
 
"Vouchers alone will not do it. Why are private schools successful is the compelling question. Which of the things they do differently that contribute to their success can be transferred to the public school systems is an approach that should be looked at closely."

I don't know if vouchers alone will do it, but I am confident the system can't be reformed, just some reasons:

1. Court decisions that have overruled the old law that the school stood "in loco parentis" and given children "rights" have made it impossible for the teacher and principal to discipline children and to make rules. Today if a child is to be suspended or expelled he or she gets a hearing and all of the legal nonsense that goes along with it.

2. Stupid laws such as mainstreaming disabled children, who are not capable of learning and who will never benefit from education, but who are disruptive to class rooms.

3. Inability of public schools to expel disruptve students making it impossible for anyone to learn.

4. Teacher's unions that don't care about kids.

and the list goes on.

The one characteristic of the above is that you can't require accountability while at the same time taking control from the schools.

An example of the kind of nonsense that is going on at the Community College Level, where I have experience as a part time instructor is the current notion that no matter what the student's ability is coming into the course somehow I must teach the student in a way that the student will learn. Unfortunately, many of the students accepted cannot read or write and do not have a level of comprehension of a high school graduate. They literally do not understand any but the most basic of words. Many cannot write a coherent sentence and do not understand the questions on the exam. Compound this with the fact that many miss half or more of their classes.

Is it reasonable to make a teacher "accountable" to teach law courses to such students? I cannot set the standards for entrance. I cannot fail students even if they miss most of their classes because to fail a student is the fault of the instructor. I just stopped teaching. It was impossible.

Little joe



To: unclewest who wrote (22549)1/4/2004 12:13:17 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793672
 
BREAKING RANKS
Shrink Government, the Right Tells the Right
By SHERYL GAY STOLBERG New York Times

WASHINGTON — Sue Myrick set her sights high when she came to Washington in the heady days after the election of 1994. Republicans had reclaimed control of the House after 40 years in the political wilderness, and Representative Myrick was eager to eliminate government programs, balance the budget and cut overall spending- in short, to shrink big government.

Today, with her party in charge of both Congress and the White House, Mrs. Myrick would seem perfectly positioned to achieve those goals. Instead, she and her fellow fiscal conservatives are still fighting to reduce government spending - a battle that pits them against their own party and president.

"We've put up with this spending, very frankly, for the last few years and none of us feel very good about it," said Mrs. Myrick, a North Carolina Republican. "It's very difficult when you have a president of your same party, if they aren't as fiscally conservative as you would like them to be."

These are not easy times for lawmakers who hold dear the notion that, as Ronald Reagan used to say, government should get off the people's backs. The balanced budget of the 1990's, which Mrs. Myrick considers a high point of her Congressional career - is gone, replaced by a record federal deficit. Senator John McCain, the Arizona Republican, complained earlier this year that Congress was spending money like "drunken sailors."

Rather than shrink the role of the federal bureaucracy, fiscal conservatives say President Bush has expanded it, in education, agriculture and through the $400 billion, 10-year Medicare prescription drug bill.

"At this point, I think that conservatives sold out their small government philosophy and replaced it with a philosophy of whatever will get them re-elected," said Brian M. Riedl, a budget analyst at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative research organization. "Neither party is committed to smaller government and less spending. Those who are still standing for fiscal conservatism are frustrated."

That frustration is starting to boil over, and as Mr. Bush prepares his budget for 2005, fiscal conservatives on Capitol Hill are "searching for ways to stop the spending spree," Mr. Riedl said.

Several proposals are floating around. In October, Representative Jeb Hensarling, a Texas Republican, introduced the Family Budget Protection Act, which would require Congress to meet budget targets to eliminate the federal deficit in five years. Representative Paul Ryan, Republican of Wisconsin, wants to reform the government's accounting practices to provide a more accurate picture of federal spending.

"It's safe to say that there is tremendous dissatisfaction and a kind of dawning on people that Bush is not interested in smaller government," said Edward H. Crane, president of the Cato Institute, a libertarian research organization.

Mrs. Myrick, who is chairwoman of the Republican Study Committee, a group of 96 House members committed to fiscal conservatism, said the committee was planning a retreat in Annapolis, Md., at the end of this month to draft a strategy that will then be presented to the entire House Republican caucus. Another study committee member, Representative Gil Gutknecht of Minnesota, says he is optimistic that fellow Republicans will be open to their ideas.

Mr. Bush, of course, has faced a series of events - recession, the bursting of the stock market bubble and, most importantly, the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 - that have pushed up federal spending, particularly on defense and homeland security. Joshua B. Bolten, the White House budget director, says growth has been modest in other areas, just 3 percent in discretionary spending between 2003 and 2004.

"I think the president has actually hewed closely to conservative fiscal principles," Mr. Bolten said.

But Mr. Riedl calculates the growth at 9 percent, not 3 percent, and says federal spending in 2003 exceeded $20,000 per household for the first time since World War II. During the 1990's, he says, it held steady at slightly less than $18,000.

"There is a growing frustration within the House caucus - and it's palpable - of members' saying, 'We can't continue to call ourselves fiscal conservatives with big deficits and growing entitlements,' " Mr. Gutknecht said. "I think the events surrounding Sept. 11 and other international events clouded our vision, but I think those clouds are starting to clear."

But some say the Republican vision was clouded long before the 2001 terrorist attacks. Mr. Riedl of the Heritage Foundation harks back to 1995, when Congressional Republicans shut down the federal government over a budget impasse with President Bill Clinton. The shutdown came off as petty and mean-spirited, and voters blamed the Republicans, led by former House Speaker Newt Gingrich.

"When the government shutdown hurt them politically," Mr. Riedl said, "they declared spending cuts to be the new third rail of Republican politics."

In a recent article in the Cato Policy Report, Mr. Crane goes back even farther, to President Reagan's 1984 re-election effort and its feel-good "Morning in America" campaign, which, he argues, "missed an incredible opportunity to capitalize on an enormously popular president by laying out specific programs to shrink the federal government."

But Mr. Crane blames President Bush for "the philosophical collapse of the G.O.P." He complains that Mr. Bush ran for office in 2000 without calling for a single spending cut- a point that Mr. Bolten, the White House budget director, does not dispute.

"The president campaigned as conservative who favors limited government but activism in those areas where government is going to spend money and has responsibilities," Mr. Bolten said. "I think he has followed through on the philosophy on which he campaigned, which I think is a good conservative philosophy."

On Capitol Hill, Mr. Bush's brand of Republicanism has put some lawmakers in a bind, caught between their loyalty to the president, their party's Congressional leaders and their fiscal principles. Mrs. Myrick, for instance, voted for the Medicare bill, even though she said she was uneasy about it. Mr. Gutknecht was among nine Republicans who voted against it, despite relentless pressure from the Republican leadership. So was Representative Marilyn Musgrave, a freshman Republican from Colorado whose first telephone call from President Bush was a plea for support on Medicare.

"To have to say no is tough," she said, adding, "But it's easier to look yourself in the mirror."

Democrats, meanwhile, are enjoying the divisions among Republicans. "All of the conservatives who spent so much time in the 80's and 90's inveighing against the deficit are demonstrating the worst kind of hypocrisy," said Howard Wolfson, a Democratic campaign strategist.

Yet even Mr. Wolfson conceded that the deficit is unlikely to make a compelling issue for Democrats during the 2004 campaign. And Mr. Bush's conservative critics are aware that they have nowhere else to go. Mr. Crane, for one, laments the absence of a conservative primary opponent for Mr. Bush. Already, he is looking forward to the next presidential race.

"There is going to be a real battle for the soul of the Republican party in 2008," he predicted, ''because the free-market types, the limited government types, realize they have been sold a bill of goods with Bush. And they are not going out without a fight."

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company



To: unclewest who wrote (22549)1/4/2004 10:16:04 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793672
 
Revisionists argue that counterinsurgency won the battle against guerrillas in Vietnam, but lost the larger war. Can it do better in Iraq?
Jeet Heer is a regular contributor to the National Post of Canada and the Boston Globe.

SUPREMELY CONFIDENT in winning conventional wars on the battlefield, the United States military tends to become skittish when combating small-scale insurrections. More than 40 years ago, as the United States was struggling to shore up the faltering regime in South Vietnam, President John F. Kennedy advised West Point graduates that they would have to confront "another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him."

In Iraq today, as rockets are launched from donkey carts and the occupation death toll climbs past that of the war itself, we see exactly the type of conflict Kennedy warned about: American soldiers fighting cloaked insurgents who practice hit-and-run murders before melting into the general population. The Cold War may be over, and the Iraqi rebels may lack significant popular support or even a coherent cause. But as the United States faces the prospect of a drawn-out and unconventional struggle in Iraq, the turbulent history of guerrilla movements -- and the counterinsurgency campaigns mounted against them -- has received new attention.

Last August, the Pentagon screened Gillo Pontecorvo's classic 1965 film "The Battle of Algiers," which portrayed the moral corruption of the French military as it resorted to torture to subdue a nationalist rebellion in Algeria in the 1950s. (The film will be rereleased in select US cities next Friday.) According to the Pentagon flyer, the movie shows "how to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas . . .. Children shoot soldiers at point blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar?"

Although guerrilla warfare doesn't enjoy the chic it had in the 1960s, when leftist radicals and American military strategists alike poured over the writings of Chairman Mao and Che Guevara, many still believe that small but highly motivated irregular forces have the ability to defeat large and lumbering military organizations. Indeed, throughout the 20th century, many wars of national liberation and communist revolutions were in fact won by irregular forces: T.E. Lawrence in Arabia (who aided Arab tribes against the Ottomans), Mao in China, Castro in Cuba, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, the mujahideen of Afghanistan.

Yet some military experts believe the whole idea of guerrilla warfare has been oversold. In his 1973 book, "Autopsy on People's War," political scientist Chalmers Johnson made the startling argument that "none of the people's wars of the Sixties did very well, including the one in Vietnam." More recently, a diverse school of revisionists -- including military analyst Lewis Sorley, former CIA director William Colby, and maverick liberal journalist Michael Lind -- have picked up on the idea that the Viet Cong were in fact defeated as a popular insurrection, although their North Vietnamese ally won a conventional war against exhausted South Vietnamese and American forces.

"The US military has defeated most guerrilla movements it has faced," argues Max Boot, author of "Savage Wars of Peace" (2002), which chronicles US victories in "small wars" against forces ranging from the American Indians ("the best irregular warriors in the world") to the first Sandinista movement in Nicaragua in the 1930s.

With the unfurling of Operation Iron Hammer, which has seen the United States take the offensive on the guerrilla war by bulldozing homes and bombing areas that supposedly house insurgent forces, the US military seems to have adopted the hardline counterinsurgency tactics that emerged in Vietnam in the late 1960s. After the spectacular failure there, can America get it right now?

. . .

Guerrilla warfare has a long history, from the Iberian bandits who harassed the Roman Imperial Army to the Minutemen of Lexington and Concord. But only in the 20th century did fully developed theories of guerilla warfare, usually articulated by communist thinkers, start entering into the canon of military literature.

For Mao, one of its major theorists and practitioners, guerrilla warfare was an extension of politics onto the battlefield. Holding small bits of territory at a time, the guerrilla wins the support of the local population by implementing popular social reforms, often involving the redistribution of land among the peasantry. "A revolution's need for a base area . . . is just like an individual's need for a buttocks," he once observed. "If an individual didn't have a buttocks, he . . . would have to run around or stand around all the time."

More famously, he noted that "the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea," entering into conventional warfare only after a long struggle to whittle down the enemy. Thus it took two decades of fighting before Mao's own forces won in China in 1949.

Mao's ideas were hugely influential even outside the communist world: the National Liberation Front (FLN) which led the Algeria uprising of the 1950s modeled its tactics after Maoist ones. Battling the French colonists, and later the US-sponsored regime in Saigon, Ho Chi Minh also followed Mao's strategy but placed a greater emphasis on using terrorism, especially the assassination of government officials, to undermine enemy morale. (In Iraq today, we see a variation of this policy, with insurgents targeting any Iraqi seen associating with the United States, especially the police force.)

Che Guevara, impatient with the protracted nature of Maoist war, suggested that cells of highly motivated militants (the foco) could ignite mass uprising by flamboyant displays of revolutionary violence without prior support from the peasantry. To make a revolution, he once noted, all you need are revolutionaries. After helping Castro seize control of Cuba in 1959, Guevara's ideas traveled to Argentina, Guatemala, and elsewhere in Latin America, where they invariably ended in bravura flameouts, including Guevara's own assassination in Bolivia in 1967 by a local army assisted by an American counterinsurgency unit.

. . .

Counterinsurgency also has deep roots in history. The American marines, for example, practiced forms of ad hoc counterinsurgency throughout the late 19th and early 20th century as they fought various "bandits" (in fact often popular rebels) in Haiti, Nicaragua , and elsewhere. Yet it was only after World War II, in direct response to the Maoist challenge, that counterinsurgency began to develop a sophisticated doctrine in the Anglo-American world.

The two great practical theorists of counterinsurgency were Sir Robert Thompson and Edward Lansdale. As a British colonial official in Malaya in the 1950s, Thompson helped implement a campaign to clamp down on Maoist guerrillas. In keeping with the time-honored practices of the empire, the British school of counterinsurgency emphasized the importance of draining the "sea" of support for guerillas through political reform. In addition to creating an honest civil service and police force, the British relocated communities into tightly guarded "New Villages" that provided both the carrot of political reform and the stick of surveillance. By the late 1950s, the insurgency had been effectively quashed.

Presidents Kennedy and Nixon often consulted with Thompson, the head of the British mission to Vietnam from 1961 to 1965, on how to combine political reform and security there. Yet in seeking to apply the lesson of Malaya, Thompson was constantly frustrated by the corrupt and incompetent regimes of South Vietnam seemed allergic to reform. Thus the "strategic hamlets" the Diem regime created in the 1960s, where peasants were often forced to labor without payment (against the advice of Thompson), were much more oppressive than their prototypes, the New Villages.

Like Thompson, Edward Lansdale, a San Francisco ad-man turned military intelligence officer, saw counterinsurgency as a political as well as military dilemma. Gifted with imaginative flair, Lansdale often used the techniques of psychological warfare to win popular support for regimes threatened by insurgency. (The colorful Lansdale made it into literature as the inspiration for both Alden Pyle, the antihero of Graham Green's "The Quiet American," and Edwin Barnum Hillandale, the protagonist of the 1958 bestseller "The Ugly American.")

When the corrupt Philippine government of the early 1950s faced a rural uprising, Lansdale decided the country needed a stronger and more legitimate government. Using front organizations, he created a mass movement to win the presidency of the country for Ramon Magsaysay, a former guerilla and businessman who ultimately defanged the insurgent forces with a combination of land reform and a more appropriate military response. Rather than alienate the rural population with the big artillery of conventional forces, Lansdale and Magsaysay broke up the army into a smaller units that would fight the guerrillas on their own level.

Lansdale was first sent to Vietnam in 1954 by the Eisenhower administration. In the mid-1960s, Lyndon Johnson named him head of an interagency group to do political work with the South Vietnamese government. As Daniel Ellsberg, a member of the group, recalls in his 2002 memoir "Secrets," Lansdale was critical of the heavy-handed military approach and idealistic in his commitment to democracy. "The Communists have let loose a revolutionary idea in Viet Nam," Lansdale wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1964, "and it will not die by being ignored, bombed, or smothered by us."

Viewing popular support as the key to guerrilla war, Lansdale could be as flashy and gimmicky as a political spin doctor. He once hired widely followed astrologers in Vietnam to give readings favorable to the American ally Diem and unfavorable to Ho Chi Minh. But like Thompson, Lansdale ran up against a fundamental political problem. Since what little political support the South Vietnamese regime had was based on its ability to deliver favors, the government could not reform itself. In his classic 1977 study, "The Counterinsurgency Era," the late Douglas Blaufarb, a former CIA agent who oversaw counterinsurgency operations in Laos, called this the problem of "self-reform in crisis." Only under favorable circumstances, as in Malaya and the Philippines, where the British and Americans had long-standing ties with local elites and political leverage, could outsiders successfully press for political reform.

Counterinsurgency, with its emphasis on improving social conditions and spreading democracy, was initially a favorite among liberals. The Green Berets and the Peace Corps were emanations of the same restless, reforming spirit. But counterinsurgency's faddish glamour also had its ugly side. "Word went out from the Chief of Staff of the Army that every school in the Army would devote a minimum of 20 percent of its time to counterinsurgency," CIA official Robert Amory once recalled of the Kennedy era. "Well, this reached the Finance School and the Cooks and Bakers School, so they were talking about how to make typewriters explode . . . or how to make apple pies with hand grenades inside them."

This boyish adventure side of counterinsurgency died on the battlefields of Vietnam. As the war ground on, the Americans started echoing the harsher tactics of the Viet Cong, particularly the targeting of enemy collaborators for assassination. In the infamous Phoenix Program that began in 1967, a direct outgrowth of counterinsurgency, the American government paid for the murder of thousands of civilians allegedly tied to the Viet Cong. This was precisely the type of program that turned many Americans against the Vietnam War (though US-backed military forces went on to use similarly bloody techniques elsewhere, notably in Guatemala). Writing in The New Yorker recently, Seymour Hersh worried that the "preemptive manhunting" of insurgents in Iraq may replicate the horrors of the Phoenix Program.

Counterinsurgency might have had some short-term success in Vietnam, but it was a long-term failure. Numbed by years of killing, South Vietnamese peasants adopted a quietist philosophy that rejected both sides of the conflict. When the North Vietnamese launched a conventional offensive in 1975, South Vietnam couldn't rally its own population to resist.

As the specter of protracted guerrilla warfare raises its head in Iraq, it's worth recalling the mixed lessons of the past. Successful counterinsurgency involves a deep familiarity with the local culture, which is difficult to gain on the fly. Gaining political legitimacy is the key to successfully defeating an insurgency, yet building such popular support can take years if not decades. Moreover, there's an inevitable tension between obtaining security for one's troops and winning popular support. Iraq, with its shadowy enemy of uncertain ideology, is very different from Vietnam. However, the troubling legacy of that conflict should cast doubt that there will be any easy or quick solution this time either.

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