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To: jim kelley who wrote (87577)1/4/2004 12:56:13 PM
From: jim kelley  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 93625
 
Criminal anti trust matters are transferred to the DOJ by the FTC

usdoj.gov

"2. Criminal Referrals

When a matter is before the Federal Trade Commission and the Commission determines that the facts may warrant criminal action against the parties involved, the Commission will send a written notice to the Antitrust Division and make available to the Division the files of the investigation following an appropriate access request. See infra Section A.3. The Director of Criminal Enforcement, through the Premerger Notification Unit/FTC Liasion Office, will refer the matter to the appropriate section, task force, or field office for review of the materials and for determination as to whether the matter should be presented to a grand jury. Determination should be made by the section or field office within 30 days of the referral, so that the Division can inform the Commission of its position in timely fashion.

If the Division determines that a matter should be referred to a grand jury, it will request that the Federal Trade Commission transfer the matter. If, on the other hand, the Division decides not to pursue the matter with a grand jury, then the Commission may proceed with its own investigation. "

The testimony collected by the FTC is directly transferrable to the DOJ. It is also available to the Grand Jury.

This explains the effort by the Dramurai to seek as many protective orders as they could.

Nevertheless, there is already ample evidence of criminal antitrust behavior on the part of Micron. That is why the heat is on Micron and the rest of those companies.



To: jim kelley who wrote (87577)1/4/2004 3:36:56 PM
From: blake_paterson  Respond to of 93625
 
"THIS INVESTIGATION HAS TO DO WITH RDRAM "

I agree.. the following courtesy of stkhawk:

In November of 2000, Jack Robertson of EBN began reporting that Rambus orders were lagging for Pentium 4 systems.
ebnews.com
The message being, that three of four major DRAM suppliers contacted said they were receiving few OEM orders for RDRAM.

Mr Robertson went on to report that:

”Hyundai and Micron each said the companies have largely stopped Direct RDRAM production and will not make more chips until customer orders materialize. Infineon, which claims to have manufactured several million Direct RDRAM chips a month this summer, said it was left with inventory and also has stopped making the chips.”

However, based on evidence collected by Rambus during FTC discovery, we now learn that at least two major PC OEM's, Compaq and Dell, were demanding RDRAM but lost hope it would reach high volume production levels or the price would sufficiently approach SDRAM.

From FTC documents
ftc.gov

Compaq's Story

1545. Intel's selection of RDRAM was also significant to the PC OEMs. For example, Compaq, one of the largest producer of personal computers in the world stated in a November 1998 Compaq Memory Update states that Compaq was planning to
incorporate RDRAM into all Compaq products. (RX 1302 at 8). Jacquelyn Gross, the
Director of Memory Procurement at Compaq (Gross, Tr. 2265), testified that Compaq was planning to transition all of its products - desktops, workstations, etc. - to RDRAM at rate higher than it had ever changed memory technologies before. (Gross, Tr. 2324-27). As described in Compaq's documents, this was the “[m]ost aggressive, cross divisional
memory technology shift ever planned at Compaq.” (RX 1302 at 8). This was planned,
even though Compaq considered RDRAM to be “revolutionary.” (Gross, Tr. 2327).

1546. Similarly, an October 1998 internal presentation reflects Compaq's sentiment at the time that “Rambus is the clear next generation memory.” (RX 1287 at 4). As Ms. Gross explained, the reason for this belief was that Intel had told Compaq that it was going to produce chip sets for RDRAM. (Gross, Tr. 2317-18). This was important to Compaq because 90% of Compaq's PC applications used Intel chipsets. (Gross, Tr. 2317-18).
1578. In response, DRAM manufacturers agreed to manufacture RDRAM in larger volume. For example, in 1998, Hyundai committed to produce 30,000 RDRAM units for Compaq. (RX 1302 at 6). Similarly, Micron committed to produce 15,000 RDRAM units for Compaq. (RX 1302 at 6). Neither company, however, met these commitments. (Gross, Tr. 2327-29). According to Ms. Gross of Compaq, the DRAM manufacturers would not “increase their output at the rate at which we needed to support our systems.” (Gross, Tr. 2345-46).

1595. The “baby” was indeed killed. Jacquelyn Gross of Compaq testified that
because the price of RDRAM did not decrease and because Compaq did not believe that it would decrease in the future, Compaq decided to abandon its plans and to shift to DDR. (Gross, Tr. 2339).

Dell's Story

1597. The Dell story is the same. In a February 2000 e-mail asking Micron to supply it with RDRAM, Dell stated that it was “committed to Rambus” but that its ability to incorporate Rambus devices in its PC's was “clearly limited by supply.” (RX 1560 at 1). Looking ahead to the second half of 2000, Dell projected that with lower pricing, fully 40% of its market demand would be satisfied with RDRAM technology. (RX 1560 at 1).

1598. By May 2000, however, the situation had not improved, and Dell was considering moving into “a low key Rambus mode.” (RX 1636 at 1). The Dell “message” was “pretty straightforward:”
“Dell has booked our products over the last year around the assumption that RDRAM prices would decline and close on SDRAM. This would help us create demand . . . the memory vendors have shown no desire to drop prices, therefore we are reevaluating out strategies . . . so the message to them is drop prices or we will continue to decrease our RDRAM forecasts and we will architect next generation systems around DDR . . . we will give the memory vendors till the end of May to reply to our request . . . if they still have no desire to drop prices, we should push ahead rearchitecting chipsets around DDR.”
(RX 1636 at 1). Prices did not come down, however, and Dell too shifted its roadmap to DDR.

Now obviously, one news article does not prove there was a conspiracy to control the media against Rambus and influence the perception of RDRAM, but I find it very interesting that one hour before the above article was released to the public, the following article hit the news

Micron, Hyundai ask FTC to charge Rambus on antitrust violations
ebnews.com

Or maybe it's just the pattern of headlines that makes me suspicious

DRAM industry considers lodging FTC antitrust complaint against Rambus (07/10/2000)
ebnews.com

Rambus ties strained as Intel, DRAM makers ponder FTC antitrust suit (7/17/2000)
siliconstrategies.com

Micron takes offensive with legal challenge of Rambus patents (08/29/2000)
ebnonline.com

Micron's suit accuses Rambus of trying to trick DRAM makers (8/29/2000)
siliconstrategies.com

Update: Hyundai joins effort to invalidate Rambus patents (08/30/2000)
ebnonline.com

Rambus targeted by FTC probe (02/02/2001)
ebnonline.com

In addition, one really has to wonder what the redacted material is as referenced below:

1600. There is also evidence that after RDRAM failed to achieve marketplace success, the DRAM manufacturers felt able to raise DDR prices substantially, and that they did so through concerted action. In a November 26, 2001 e-mail entitled “OEM meeting update,” a Micron manager named Kathy Radford described the efforts of Infineon and Samsung to raise DDR prices, and stated that Micron intended to try to raise its prices to “all of the OEM customers.” (RX 1922A at 1). Ms. Radford then reported that “[t]he consensus from all suppliers is that if Micron makes the move, all of them will do the same and make it stick.” (RX 1922A at 1) (emphasis added).

1601. Prices did, in fact, increase substantially in the months after Mr. Radford's email. On March 1, 2002, {IN CAMERA MATERIAL REDACTED}