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Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: unclewest who wrote (28552)	2/10/2004 4:21:54 AM
From: Dayuhan	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793838

I agree with nearly all of what you wrote. I was merely pointing out that the lack of a significant current US deployment to SE Asia does not mean there is not an existing and potent terror threat there. I was speaking less of the lack of a current US deployment than the lack of any even remotely likely scenario. The context was a discussion of the conversion of bases in NK to a role as a “lilypad” for deployments to SE Asia. That doesn’t seem likely to me at all. There’s a lot of talk locally of US attempts to persuade the Philippine Government to accept permanent (or at least long duration, nothing is permanent) bases here. I’m not sure how much basis there is for that, and I hope there’s none. There is where an old program is paying off. Significant numbers of their [Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines] military personnel have been trained in US military schools including the Infantry School at Ft Benning, The Armor School at Ft Knox, The Artillery School at Ft Sill, and the JFK Special Warfare Center School at Ft Bragg. Some have attended special training for foreign officers, others have attended the schools with American students. I can’t say I see much payoff there. These countries are political allies, but as military allies they are more liability than asset. This is particularly true in Indonesia and the Philippines (harder to say in Malaysia and Thailand, since the military forces in those countries face few operational challenges): the armed forces in both countries have proven excruciatingly inept. Corruption is a major issue, and both Philippine and Indonesian armed forces routinely commit major human rights abuses. Soldiers in both countries regularly sell weaponry to terrorists, separatists, rebels, and anybody else who can pay, and we’re not just talking about low-ranking deals here. The material and training we provide for operations against terrorism are very likely to end up directed to other goals. The TNI is more concerned with its brutal crackdown on GAM then about operations against JI. 6 months ago in Manila we had a comic-book coup attempt; many of the soldiers participating had been trained by Americans, and gear that the US had supplied for use against terrorists in Mindanao was prominently displayed. The attitude in both countries toward US military assistance is to talk the talk, take the goods, and go about your own business. Small numbers of US advisors can deploy with them, bringing along special equipment and support to greatly enhance there effectiveness in the woods. The war here actually isn’t being fought in the woods, not to nearly the extent popularly believed. The enemy is more likely to be in towns or villages, blending in with the local populace, than in the jungle. The most productive roles that US advisors play here (they have been little used in Indonesia, for a variety of reasons) are indirect. The presence of advisors makes it harder for the local military commanders to stop cutting side deals with the enemy and forces the local troops to reduce their rate of human rights abuse. It is critically important to realize that the war on terror in SEA is not simply a matter of chasing down and removing the bad guys. There are issues in these places that have to be resolved. Until they are, chaos will remain, and that chaos will be exploited by our enemies. If you read my FA article, of course, you’ve heard more than you’d want to hear on that subject. I believe much of the war on terror is unseen for a variety of reasons. You are right the US Army 4th ID is not on the march in those countries and it is because the US Army prepared them over many years to defend themselves. As of now I can’t say they are doing a terribly good job of it. I wouldn’t go so far as to say that we’re losing the war on terror in SE Asia, but we certainly aren’t winning it.