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To: LindyBill who wrote (30504)2/20/2004 5:45:18 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793840
 
Good comment on Krauthammer's wonderful Lecture.


Against Illiberal Internationalism

By Carroll Andrew Morse Tech Central Station

In his recent Irving Kristol Lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, Charles Krauthammer laid out four foreign policy choices for the United States. Three of the four choices bear familiar names. There is the always present but presently rejected isolationist choice; there is the realist choice of pure power politics; and there is the liberal internationalist choice of multilateral legalism. Krauthammer argues that none of these traditional rubrics is adequate for dealing with the post-September 11 world. These single phrase summaries of America's major foreign policy schools of thought do not do justice to the insight conveyed in Krauthammer's argument. (Please read his lecture for yourself if you have the chance.)

To these traditional schools, Krauthammer adds a fourth choice. He labels this choice -- the foreign policy of the Bush administration -- democratic globalism. The essential difference between democratic globalism and the more traditional schools of thought is the unabashed addition of a moral component to foreign policy. Krauthammer does not claim that democratic globalism is a new force in American foreign policy -- it was arguably a force in the Truman administration -- he claims that it has never previously been called by name. Democratic globalism has never (until Krauthammer's lecture) been concisely articulated in its own right, never properly distinguished from its rivals.



Schools of Thought



Is the naming of a "new" foreign policy school of any importance? Does it matter what you call what you do, so long as you go ahead and do it? Despite the usual clichés about avoiding labels, within a democracy, the classification of ideas is important. Within a democracy, the governing and the governed must share ideas about what policies to pursue. There must be some broad societal agreement about which goals justify the sacrifice of blood and treasure.



The body politic forges its agreements using categories it is familiar with. It prefers the names it knows from the past. Framing the debate in terms of a realist/liberal internationalist dichotomy has created a blind spot in the public debate about the means and the ends of American foreign policy. Conservatives with realist tendencies (see George Will, for instance) have viewed democratic globalism as a form of liberal internationalism. They fear democratic globalism leads to an unsustainable foreign policy of Wilsonian nation building. Liberal internationalists, on the other hand, pigeonhole democratic globalism as a form of realism. They fear that democratic globalists are using democratic rhetoric as an excuse to expand the power of America whenever the power calculus says such expansion is convenient.



These views are understandable, if you accept that every foreign policy option is a manifestation of either realism or liberal internationalism. But, as Krauthammer argues, these choices are not the only choices for engaging the world. Democratic globalism allows for a different path, a path that is neither realism's never-ending accumulation of power, nor liberal internationalism's unenforceable legalism. Recognizing the moral component to foreign policy that makes democratic globalism unique leads America down a different path to different ends than either realism or liberal internationalism would.



The identification of democratic globalism as a unique school of thought makes Krauthammer's speech important. Krauthammer's taxonomic structure for foreign policy thought is equally as impressive. The best classification schemes transcend mere explanation of the previously observed; they point to possibilities yet to be identified. In the natural sciences, the classic example of this was the prediction of new chemical elements to fill the gaps in the original periodic table of elements. In political science, a good classification scheme helps fill gaps in the prevailing worldview. By extending Krauthammer's categories, we can identify a fifth school of coherent American foreign policy thought -- an influential school of that has escaped scrutiny because it has never been called by an accurate name.



Illiberal Internationalists, Oligarchic Globalists



Krauthammer's categories of "liberal internationalist" and "democratic globalist" suggest a natural extension. They imply the existence of internationalists and globalists who are neither liberal nor democratic, "illiberal internationalists" or "oligarchic globalists." Starting from Krauthammer's description of liberal internationalism, where he generously suggests that liberal internationalists are not motivated by "anti-Americanism, or lack of patriotism or a late efflorescence of 1960s radicalism," but seek "to turn the state of nature into a norm driven community. To turn the law of the jungle into the rule of law," we can identify a school of thought that fits into an illiberal internationalist or oligarchic globalist category.



Despite their high-minded rhetoric, respect for the rule of law and the expansion of humanitarian norms is not the most important item for many contemporary internationalists. The de facto primary goal of the present international system is ensuring that the world's borders do not change. When this goal is assured, the next highest goal is the protection of continuity of government within the existing borders -- even when that means defending the legitimacy of brutal totalitarian states. The protection of individual freedom and democracy places a distant third, at best. Occasionally, in a Liberia or a Haiti, when civil government utterly collapses, the international community will call for coordinated action, but these cases are the exception, not the rule. Humanitarian goals are pursued only when they can be done without interfering with the decidedly illiberal goal of preserving existing state structures at any cost.



Ultimately, a school of thought that claims that "rights" of states trump the rights of individuals cannot claim the mantle of liberalism. A true liberalism would find means to act against massacres of individuals perpetrated by the governments of Iraq and Zimbabwe, to remedy chronic violations of human rights perpetrated by the governments of Saudi Arabia and Cuba. This does not require supporting war in each case, necessarily, but it does require advocating something more effective than waiting for dictators to die and hoping that something better replaces them.



Perhaps this model of global engagement is the twenty-first century heir to isolationism. In past centuries, isolationism was the policy of choice of those who dreaded foreign entanglement. Recognizing that isolationism is practically impossible and that America cannot fully disengage from the world, those who fear further entanglement now attempt to freeze the international system in its present state.



Though no American leader, at least in the foreseeable future, will openly admit to belonging to an illiberal internationalist/oligarchic globalist school of thought, many will base their foreign policy on its principles. There will be no doubt that these leaders are willing to engage the world; they will proudly accept an internationalist or globalist label. Their utter refusal, however, to challenge the permanence of any existing state or the legitimacy of any existing government will limit their terms of engagement to winning the approval of as many states as possible.



In an international system that insists all are states are equal, that there is no meaningful difference between tyrannies, oligarchies and democracies, this is the death of a liberal and democratic internationalism. Consensus based on meaningful respect for international law and humanitarian norms is impossible -- too many states show blatant disregard for such norms in their treatment of their own populations. The only way to guarantee consensus is to choose a path that subordinates freedom and democracy to the international community's only truly agreed upon norms -- border stasis and continuity of existing government at any price. America must be wary of unthinkingly carrying out a foreign policy specifically designed to please undemocratic governments, of unwittingly subscribing to an illiberal and oligarchic school of thought.



The author is a frequent TCS contributor. He last wrote for TCS about the ACLU.

Copyright © 2004 Tech Central Station - www.techcentralstation.com



To: LindyBill who wrote (30504)2/20/2004 5:45:41 AM
From: D. Long  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793840
 
Problem is, as we see in San Francisco, this issue won't respect even State's Rights. It's all or nothing.

Derek



To: LindyBill who wrote (30504)2/20/2004 5:50:31 AM
From: Lane3  Respond to of 793840
 
Gay Marriage and Ambivalent Conservatives

That was a good and thoughtful analysis.

I was pleased to see my point in there about what I call the existing corruption in the institution.

<<Still others think the institution of marriage has changed so much that, from a legal standpoint, there are no good reasons left to prohibit gays from marrying.>>



To: LindyBill who wrote (30504)2/20/2004 11:09:11 AM
From: Ilaine  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793840
 
A while back I posted that I thought that states did not have to recognize gay marriages performed in another state - I know that many challenge this, but the Washington Post recently published an essay by a Yale law professor on this issue that essentially agrees with my position:

>>A Marriage License Only Goes So Far

By Lea Brilmayer

Sunday, February 15, 2004; Page B01

The news that gay and lesbian couples will be able to apply for marriage licenses and marry legally in Massachusetts starting May 17 pits the rights of states to formulate their own family law policies against their conflicting obligations to recognize legal relationships entered into in other states. Consider what will happen to two women who marry in Massachusetts and then return to, or later move to, another state that does not allow two women, or two men, to get a license. Does Massachusetts law fix their rights, or do their rights depend on the laws where they live?

The practical implications of this question are enormous. Can the lesbian couple get divorced in their new state if their relationship breaks up? If not, then by what legal process would they divide their property? What would it mean to the rights of any children involved if the marriage falls apart after the family settles in another state? If one spouse dies, does the other automatically inherit her property? Are they married or single for purposes of tax laws? In answering any of these questions, it may well matter whether the two were long-term residents of Massachusetts at the time of the marriage or whether they had gone to the Bay State with the sole intention of evading their own state's more restrictive law.

Even if Massachusetts goes ahead with a controversial state constitutional amendment that would end same-sex marriage there in 2006 or later, what will happen to couples who marry in the meantime? Whatever one thinks about the morality of the underlying issue, it hardly seems possible to announce retroactively that children born to or adopted by the couple have overnight become legally illegitimate. But then, that result is no worse than having children's status change back and forth between legitimate and illegitimate as their families drive across the country. And yet that is the direction in which we seem to be headed, given that 38 states have already made clear they don't intend to respect the legal validity of marriages entered into elsewhere.

These questions are new and largely unresolved, and yet their answers will depend on the application of a legal principle, known as "conflict of laws," that is as old as American law itself. Conflict of laws deals with the overlapping and sometimes conflicting rights and obligations created by the 50 states and by the federal government. It comes into play when a court decision or legislation announced in one state (or in a foreign country) must be recognized in other jurisdictions.

The central guiding principle in resolving such questions derives from Article IV of the Constitution, which says that each state must give "full faith and credit" to the "public acts, records, and judicial proceedings" of the others. With the full faith and credit clause, the drafters of the Constitution tried to reconcile the desire for diversity (different states should be allowed to choose different laws) with mutual respect for differences of opinion (sister states should respect each other's choices).

But there is no clear definition of how much deference the "full faith and credit" clause requires. The states are not required to obey everything the others do. Supreme Court decisions suggest that states have some latitude to exercise their own judgment and to consider their own laws and mores in deciding whether a sister state's decisions have to be enforced, but the extent to which they can do this is unclear. The Constitution gives Congress power to legislate on the subject. But mostly it has been left for the state and federal courts, not Congress, to figure out.

Almost since the beginning, the Supreme Court's interpretations of the clause have been peppered with exceptions to the generalized requirement of mutual respect. For example, the clause has never much applied to legislation. It has been applied almost exclusively to judicial decisions: As a general matter, judgments announced in one state are strictly enforceable in all the others; state legislation is not.

People tend to assume that a marriage is like a court judgment; if it's valid in the place where it is celebrated, it has to be honored everywhere. This doesn't necessarily follow. From the rather unromantic position of a conflict of laws specialist, celebrating a marriage is something halfway between signing a contract to buy a car and applying for a driver's license. If you enter into a contract or are granted a driver's license in one state, then other states will probably respect it. But they needn't, constitutionally, and sometimes they don't. Such disregard for sister state decisions wreaks havoc with the principle of respect for decisions made by other states, not to mention the practical needs of the people involved who want their legal rights to be steady and predictable.

If states care about legal certainty and mutual respect, they give full faith and credit to the decisions of other states even without any constitutional compulsion -- as well they should. If they don't care, in particular because they are hostile to the public policy of the other state, the Constitution lets them override existing legal relationships by applying their own law. Over and over, the Supreme Court has recognized that many different states can have simultaneous conflicting policies regarding the same transaction or legal relationship. Then, which law applies to settle legal disputes turns largely on the random happenstance of which state's courts happen to hear the case. For same-sex marriage, what that is likely to mean is that if a marital dispute is heard in a Massachusetts court, one result will follow; if it is heard in Ohio -- where the state legislature, in response to the Massachusetts decision, took a particularly strong stance this month against same-sex marriage -- expect the opposite.

The uncertainty is probably greater in family law than any other area; everyone agrees that certainty is important for commercial relationships, but states are less likely to defer to other states when dealing with sensitive questions about marrying and raising families. States are willing to ignore marriages entered into in another state by couples who are trying to avoid their home state's restrictive marriage laws, or marriages that the state considers fundamentally objectionable and therefore invalid. I have no doubt that the same pattern will follow with same-sex marriages.

A prime historical example -- one that will surely make opponents of same-sex marriage uncomfortable -- is marriage between people of different races. As recently as the 1930s, it was generally understood in the (white) legal community that interracial marriages might be considered "odious" and that it would be understandable if other states chose not to enforce them. Indeed, many pressing social issues have been fought out on the battleground of conflict of laws. In the 19th century the issue was slavery and the status of slaves taken temporarily to the north; the question was framed in terms of whether a "contract" enforceable in one state had to be honored in others. Back then the liberal position was to be opposed to recognizing other states' contracts. A hundred years later, a burning issue was divorce, and whether an unhappy spouse might travel to Nevada (the only state in the country with lenient divorce laws) to dissolve the union.

Marriages, in other words, have not been treated as automatically recognized by other states. Its opponents fear that same-sex marriages will have to be respected all over the country. That is completely unrealistic. In fact, nationwide enforceability is less real now than ever, as a result of the most recent federal statute on the subject. Passed in 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) specifies that no state has to recognize a same-sex marriage entered into in another state. Dozens of state legislatures have leaped on the bandwagon, taking advantage of this invitation by providing, with state DOMAs, that their states will not recognize same-sex marriages from places like Massachusetts.

But for some opponents of same-sex marriage, even the federal and state DOMAs are not reassurance enough. Some of these people worry that the federal law may someday be invalidated as inconsistent with the full faith and credit clause. That's why they seek an amendment to the Constitution. But the law is probably not unconstitutional. (Granted, that is not a very high recommendation.) Even if constitutional, it is a silly law, motivated by nothing but political grandstanding. That's not a defect that can be cured by enacting it into the Constitution. President Bush would be well advised to shelve his election-year proposals for a constitutional amendment.

There are far more nuanced methods for reconciling diversity and uniformity of laws in this country than a constitutional provision. For example, decades ago, when Nevada's lenient divorce law was creating problems for other states, the Supreme Court came up with a solution that was quickly nicknamed "divisible divorce." Nevada could dissolve a marriage but could not decide rights to property or child custody without the absent spouse's participation. So, after getting a divorce in Reno, the husband (as it usually was) had to then go home and decide the future of the children and the property in the courts of the marital domicile.

That wasn't intellectually tidy, certainly, but when confronted by burning social issues the Supreme Court has rarely thrown itself upon its sword for the sake of intellectual tidiness. If faced with parallel issues from same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court would probably craft a similar solution. And it would do so without the need for a cumbersome new statute or constitutional amendment. One can only hope that it will do so with greater concern for the rights and interests of the couples themselves, and their innocent children, than the states that are so quick to take a stand against the same-sex marriages that may soon be entered into in Massachusetts and beyond.

Lea Brilmayer is the Howard Holtzmann Professor of International Law at Yale University School of Law, and the author of several books on conflict of laws issues. <<
washingtonpost.com