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To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 4/10/2004 6:14:32 PM From: stockman_scott   Respond to of 281500   tb: It would be quite a miracle if we had a president who would actually take responsibility for his Administration's actions. -s2@AccountabilityMatters.com

To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 4/10/2004 6:22:04 PM From: stockman_scott   Respond to of 281500   No Apologies _______________ Condi never expressed remorse during her 9/11 testimony. And Bush can’t bring himself to admit he was wrong about Iraq. Welcome to a quagmire By Eleanor Clift Newsweek Updated: 2:31 p.m. ET April 09, 2004 April 9 It would have been nice to hear an apology or even some remorse from Condoleezza Rice. But that’s not this administration’s style. She stuck to the party line that President Bush did all he could before 9/11, a position that is not supported by the facts. Rice appeared rattled when Watergate prosecutor Richard Ben-Veniste confronted her with the title of the presidential daily briefing (PDB) forwarded to Bush at his Crawford ranch on Aug. 6, 2001: “Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States.” Rice called it “historical information based on old reporting” that did not warn of new attacks. Ben-Veniste countered that it established a pattern of suspicious activities and challenged the administration to declassify the memo so the American people could decided its relevance for themselves. The exchange is reminiscent of the country music song “My Lyin’ Eyes,” where the cuckolded husband has to decide whether he believes what he sees or what he’s being told. Even if the memo is a rundown of bin Laden’s greatest hits, it arrived in the midst of a summer when terror czar Richard Clarke and others in the intelligence community were warning the White House something big was about to happen. Even if Rice’s explanation is legitimate, keeping the memo from the public and the press gives the impression the administration is hiding something. With U.S. Marines dying in Iraq and the administration’s postwar policy in shambles, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s reassurances that American forces would prevail met with skepticism on Capitol Hill. “Baghdad Bob could be working for the Coalition,” said a Senate aide to a senior Republican. “The scary thing is, the administration doesn’t know how bad it is, or they know it’s bad and they’re misleading the public. They’re telling congressional leaders this is a minor flare-up.” There are those lyin’ eyes again. Reporters on the ground in Iraq describe a wider uprising among the Shiite population than Rumsfeld acknowledges. He clings to the notion that the insurgency is primarily a function of Saddam holdovers, foreign fighters and common criminals. But to say the majority doesn’t support the uprising misses the point. All that’s needed is a determined minority fueled by religious zeal. The spreading insurrection is reminiscent of Iran in the late 1970s when the Shiite followers of Ayatollah Khomeini filled the vacuum after the shah fell. This is the week Iraq spun out of control. And where is Bush? He’s on a weeklong spring break at his ranch. He seems increasingly disengaged. Perhaps behind the scenes he’s calling Rumsfeld and demanding to know what’s going on. When he finds out, he owes the country an explanation, and not just a speech, a full-blown news conference where he engages the press and lays out what is happening. The Iraqi people are supposed to be our friends. We liberated them. Why are they fighting us? And, Mr. President, it’s not enough to say, “They don’t love freedom.” The Iraqi police are fleeing and militias loyal to Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr are tightening their grip in cities that are the center of the country’s religious life. The June 30 deadline looms to turn sovereignty over to the Iraqis. But it’s meaningless, says an analyst on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Instead of a puppet government that doesn’t pretend to be a government, we’ll have a puppet government that pretends to be a government. Neither has the support of the Iraqi people.” If the definition of a quagmire is the more you struggle, the more you get pulled in, Iraq qualifies. It’s a loaded term because it evokes Vietnam. Sen. Joseph Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the explosion of violence this week in Iraq reminded him of the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam in the sense that it awakened the public to a failed policy. It took a change of presidents and several more deadly years before America cut its losses and withdrew from Vietnam. Withdrawing from Iraq now is not an option, leaders in both parties agree. But if it is a quagmire, what is the way out? “Somebody has to toss you a rope,” says the foreign-policy analyst. “If we flail around on our own, we keep sinking.” Persuading the United Nations, NATO and the other Arab countries that a stable Iraq is in their interest, and getting them to help shoulder the burden is the only reasonable exit strategy. “Republicans laugh at the idea that foreign leaders have more confidence in [Democratic presidential contender John] Kerry, like it’s treasonous, but they’re the ones who will throw us the rope,” says the aide. Candidate Kerry has not yet found his voice in saying clearly what he would do in Iraq. But his election in November would offer a clear break from the past and an ability to reassess. Short of regime change here and at home, the prospects of sharing the burden are bleak. Bush would have to go before the U.N. and do a major mea culpa, not a smirking "mistakes were made." He would have to present himself as a humbled man from a humbled country. Rice’s testimony gave no indication that Bush is ready to descend from the pedestal his aides built from the ashes of September 11. © 2004 Newsweek, Inc. msnbc.msn.com

To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 4/11/2004 10:19:24 AM From: carranza2   Respond to of 281500   Perhaps you're right, I don't know. It's a very touchy, emotionally-charged issue full of political considerations, especailly at this particular time. On reflection, I really don't fault anyone for apologizing or failing to do so, just as I don't see the value in pointing fingers for the tragedy. I definitely see the value in fact-finding and public hearings, but my belief that they should be free of politics is clearly utopian.

To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 4/12/2004 2:41:49 AM From: KLP   Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500   Our Government and our citizens have know of AQ, and OBL since at least 1997, according to the PBS Timeline I posted a couple of days ago. So knowing that, how does the concept of contributory negligence fit in here....??? Bush and group had 233 DAYS....Clinton and group had several YEARS to do something about it. Bush left in place many of the Clinton group, and who knows how many career people in the CIA and FBI as well as other agencies. BUT the biggest question I think we should all ask and answer ourselves is: IF we knew the same Aug 2002 memo were in hand tomorrow morning....we just as many, and as few specifics....Exactly what should be done to prevent another 9-11 in the 5 or so weeks we had then..... What....Stop ALL the airlines from flying? Arrest people because "we think" something is wrong? And all the etcs.... Don't forget, Bush and group were still following the Clinton plan until the new policy was adopted. And yes, I know you know that.

To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 4/13/2004 9:41:03 AM From: stockman_scott   Respond to of 281500   Neo-Cons "Out?" Realists "In?" realisticforeignpolicy.org Written by Leon Hadar Tuesday, 13 January 2004 American Pundits have been speculating recently that the neoconservative intellectuals who were the driving force behind the Bush Administration’s Iraq adventure, its alliance with Israel’s Likud government and the ambitious U.S.-led Democratic Empire project, are being forced to play defense these days in the bureaucratic-political game in Washington. Indeed, the grand designs that the neocons had cooked up in their Washington think tanks, and the expectations raised by the editorials published in their glossy magazines--that American would be welcomed as "liberators" in Iraq, that Mesopotamia would be transformed into a liberal democracy and that it would be become to be a model for the entire Arab Middle East--are proving to be nothing more than intellectual fantasies. According to press reports, the escalating attacks by insurgents against U.S. troops have forced the Bush Administration to back away from several of its more ambitious initiatives to remake Iraq’s political and economic system and to accelerate the timetable for ending the civil occupation of that country. Hence, the Americans have dropped plans to privatize Iraqi’s state-owned businesses and to write a constitution before a transfer of sovereignty. Moreover, the demands by the Kurds in northern Iraq for the creation of a semiautonomous governing body to represent them and the expectations that a general election in the country would bring to power Shiite Islamic figures hostile towards the West, suggest that Iraq could be drawn into a bloody civil war and be torn into three separate mini states, representing the Arab Shiites, the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds. The mess that the neocons, led by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, have created in Iraq explains the reemergence in Washington of the Realpolitik types that had played the leading role in the making of foreign policy of the Elder George Bush. "The grown-ups are being recalled to clean up the put things back in order," is the way one Washington "insider" puts it, referring to the decision by the White House to send former Secretary of State James Baker on a diplomatic mission to persuade America’s allies to agree to forgive tens of billions of dollars of Iraq's foreign debt. Another foreign policy "realist" who came back to Washington is former U.S. Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, who has been asked to serve as the National Security Council's (NSC) Coordinator for Strategic Planning, with his chief responsibility being U.S. policy in Iraq. There are also some indication that the Iraq’s Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) chief, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, has been distancing himself from the neoconservative cadre in the administration. At the same time, Wolfowitz is planning to leave the administration and return to academia early next year, according to Newsweek magazine. But the collapse of the neoconservative project goes beyond Iraq. After all, the pundits from the American Enterprise Institute and the Weekly Standard, and their ideological allies who now dominate top foreign policy jobs in the Pentagon and the Vice President’s office, have proposed that 9/11 and the ensuing war on terrorism would permit the United States to formalize its dominant position around the globe. Hence, the establishment of the Democratic Empire in the Middle East would lay the foundations for a global imperial scheme in which U.S. military power would leave other players, ranging from "rogue states" like North Korea and Iran, to major powers like the European Union (EU) and China, with no choice but to bow to American dictates. Even before 9/11, the neocons were arguing that Washington should adopt a strategy of "containing" China and forcing it to accept the reality of an independent and democratic Taiwan. But the reality is turning out to be quite different. Just recently, President Bush rolled out the red carpet in Washington for Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao and warned Taiwan to refrain from antagonizing Beijing by challenging the "One China" policy. China has also been playing a leading role in a multilateral effort to diffuse the North Korean nuclear crisis. And a similar multilateral strategy has been advanced by Washington in dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. That is, when it comes to the other two members of the "Axis of Evil" President Bush has rejected the neoconservative confrontational approach. Or, to put it differently, the White House is recognizing the limits of the U.S. military and is not prepared to execute a "regime change" in Tehran, Pyongyang or Damascus. And while the neocons are "spinning" the recent move by Libya’s Muhammar Khaddafi to open its weapons-production facilities to international inspections, that development should be regarded as just another example of the Bushies adopting a more realistic foreign policy by agreeing to make a deal with a military dictator committed to radical Arab nationalism. Against the backdrop of the earthquake in Iran, the Bushies have been sending signals that they were ready to pursue a policy of détente with the fundamentalist Islamic leaders in Teheran. In short, the model of military confrontation that was employed in Iraq (and Afghanistan) is turning out to be the exception to the rule. Diplomatic engagement is the norm for advancing U.S. security interests abroad. But those elements in the Bush Administration and Congress who are encouraged by the signs that the White House is re-embracing a more realistic approach to world affairs recognize that there are powerful forces in Washington, including the neoconservative officials in the Pentagon, who will resist the new trends. Indeed, the neocons are not "out" yet. They are certainly starting to lose some of the political battles in the U.S. capital. But the only person who could strike a real and final blow to their influence in Washington is the occupant of the Oval Office. Whether he decided to do that would be the most important move he will make in 2004, and one that could determine his chances to get to spend four more years as President. _____________________________ Leon Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.

To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 4/18/2004 12:56:13 PM From: stockman_scott   Respond to of 281500   US strategy condemns it to failure theaustralian.news.com.au 14apr04 THE recent uprisings prove not just that the Iraq project was more difficult than George W. Bush realised but that the US's global strategy against terrorism should be reassessed. The starting point is the realist critique of Bush's policy put before and after the fall of Baghdad by various critics, George H.W. Bush's former chief adviser Brent Scowcroft, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in their persuasive case against the war (Foreign Policy, January-February 2003) and Owen Harries in his recent Boyer lectures. The prewar realist argument was that Bush exaggerated the threat from Saddam Hussein, that creating a pro-Western democracy in Iraq was a daunting call and that military action to remove Saddam could prejudice the war on terrorism. Bush must get the best outcome he can from this point – that demands fortitude and more international support. But the supreme message from Iraq is its proof of the limits to US power. Bush underestimated the task in Iraq and, as his military said from the start, more troops were needed. Before the war, Harvard's Michael Ignatieff said the question "is not whether America is too powerful but whether it is powerful enough". It is time to answer Ignatieff's question: the US is not powerful enough to fight and win the war on terrorism as defined by Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy. A modification of US war aims is essential for America's own interest. This demands a deconstruction of the threat arising from September 11. What is the threat to the US? Bush said on September 14, 2001, that the US would "rid the world of evil". The NSS says the US "is fighting a war against terrorism of global reach" but "the enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism." The NSS says no distinction would be made between terrorists and those nations that harboured them. It said rogue states (naming Iraq, Iran and North Korea) were potentially prepared to use any WMD capacity, which meant deterrence was ineffective. Therefore, the US must act pre-emptively to stop its enemies from striking first. This represents a conflation of threat where moral clarity substitutes for strategic clarity. It puts the US into a situation of open-ended, virtually unlimited conflict with all terrorists and several states. The most recent realist critique of Bush's policy comes from Jeffrey Record, of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, in Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (December 2003). Record summarises Bush's war aims: destroying al-Qa'ida; defeating any terrorist group of global reach; ultimately eradicating terrorism as a phenomenon; transforming Iraq into a stable democracy; changing the Middle East status quo to a region of self-government and opportunity; and halting, by force if necessary, WMD proliferation to hostile states. He says these aims, in total, are "unrealistic and condemn the US to a hopeless quest for absolute security. As such, the global war on terrorism's goals are also politically, fiscally and militarily unsustainable." He calls for a "deconflation" of the threat. This means deconstructing the merger of the US war against nuclear profilerators with its war on terrorism. It also means separating the real threat from the moral position. There are several propositions at the heart of Record's analysis. First, the US is wrong to lump together terrorist organisations and rogue states. They are different in character and different as threats. Al-Qa'ida is an undeterrable transnational movement at war with the US. But states "are subject to effective deterrence and therefore do not warrant status as potential objects of preventative war and its associated costs and risks". North Korea is a (so far) deterrable (and destroyable) state. Record says that al-Qa'ida would have used a nuclear weapon on September 11 if it had such a weapon. But no rogue state has used weapons of mass destruction against an adversary capable of inflicting extensive retaliatory damage. The past behaviour of Saddam and North Korea is best explained in terms of successful deterrence. Pre-emption is a better option, at less risk against terrorists such as al-Qa'ida with no assets to protect than against a state. Second, the war should be re-focused on al-Qa'ida, its allies and homeland security. This remains the core threat. Not rogue states, not other terrorist groups. The Iraq intervention has been a detour. Opponents of the Iraq war, such as former national security advisers Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, said the war of choice against Iraq weakened the war of necessity against al-Qa'ida. Third, accept the logic of deterrence. This means US policy must shift from preventing rogue state WMD acquisition to preventing rogue state use of WMDs. This is unpalatable yet realistic. Record argues that a declared US policy of preventative war encourages WMD proliferation, since rogue states want this capacity to deter the US. Witness Iran and North Korea. Fourth, seek rogue state regime change by methods short of war. Even when regimes can be destroyed quickly, such as Iraq, the costs and risks in creating a new regime are immense. US policy has probably incorporated this position since overthrowing the regimes in Iran or North Korea is not feasible. Remember, Iraq was done because it was the weakest. Finally, in opposing the Middle East status quo, the US should be prepared to settle for stability rather than democracy. The former is the best outcome but the violence involved may dictate settling for second best. Record wants a better definition of war aims so US forces know what they are trying to do. He says the US may be able to defeat al-Qa'ida, but it cannot achieve the war aims as presently defined by Bush. © The Australian

To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 4/21/2004 12:42:08 AM From: stockman_scott   Respond to of 281500   Why They Hate Us, Really _________________________ By WALTER RUSSELL MEAD OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR THE NEW YORK TIMES April 21, 2004 nytimes.com For the last five weeks I have been traveling through the Middle East, meeting diplomats, officials, policy experts, military leaders, students and ordinary citizens. I learned something very important: the greatest single cause of anti-Americanism in the Middle East today is not the war in Iraq; more surprisingly, it is not even American support for Israel, per se. Rather, it is a widespread belief that the United States simply does not care about the rights or needs of the Palestinian people. "The Palestinian issue is really what discredits the United States throughout the region," a senior Western diplomat with years of experience in the Middle East told me. Or, as one student after another put it after the university lectures I conducted across the region: "Why do Americans have to be so biased?" In Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and other countries, the large majority of people I spoke with are ready to tolerate the Jewish state — most even understand that the final boundaries of Israel will include some of the heavily settled areas beyond the pre-1967 borders. They also understand that few if any Palestinians will return to the homes they lost after the war that erupted when Israel declared its independence in 1948. And they are prepared to accept, though not to relish, America's close relations with Israel. Beyond that, they want increased American support for their domestic political reforms and for initiatives to enhance regional cooperation for economic growth and fighting terrorism. But one thing sticks in their craw: Why doesn't America care more about the Palestinians' future? They have a point. America's Middle East policy is unnecessarily zero-sum. We can be more pro-Palestinian without being less pro-Israeli. Indeed, to the degree that American policies help create support for compromise among Palestinians, pro-Palestinian initiatives can help Israel too. Take compensation. United Nations resolutions call for financial compensation for Palestinians who cannot return to their family homes in Israel. Israel's position that it cannot accept millions of refugees and their descendants is reasonable enough, and the Bush administration's support of it is nothing new. But we should be equally clear about compensation. Many questions need answering: where can Palestinians go to have their claims for lost property adjudicated and certified? What tribunal will hear these claims? What principles will guide its deliberations? Where will the money come from to pay the claims when peace is finally made? The United States can and should take the lead in building an international consensus on the compensation issue and, working with allies in Europe and elsewhere, help raise money to ensure that it is more than a pious wish. There is more we can do. Millions of Palestinians are now stateless. (Jordan has integrated the refugees within its borders; other countries have not.) When peace comes, all Palestinians should be citizens of some state with full economic and social rights. The new Palestinian state will need financial help to absorb many of these refugees; and neighboring states who agree to integrate Palestinians should also receive international aid. In addition, while many Palestinians are well educated, many others are poor and lack skills. They depend on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for basic services and support. Who takes the agency's place when peace comes and the Palestinians aren't refugees anymore? Taking the lead on these and other issues vital to the Palestinians would not bring quick progress toward peace in the region, nor would it undo overnight the consequences of decades of suspicion and resentment. But it would help to reduce anti-Americanism in the Muslim world and beyond, as well as to advance the cause of peace. __________________________ Walter Russell Mead is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Power, Terror, Peace and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk."

To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 4/25/2004 11:09:01 AM From: stockman_scott   Respond to of 281500   Sell It Softly ________________________ Persuasively promoting American values and culture will work better than either carrots or threats to influence the Middle East By Joseph S. Nye Jr. Editorial The Los Angeles Times April 25, 2004 CAMBRIDGE, Mass. — Power, simply put, is the ability to influence others to get what you want. Nations need power because without it they have a difficult time advancing their goals. But there are ultimately three main ways for a nation to achieve power: by using or threatening force; by inducing compliance with rewards; or by using "soft power" — attracting followers through the strength of a country's values and culture. When a country can induce others to follow by employing soft power, it saves a lot of carrots and sticks. This is a lesson the United States needs to keep in mind. We won the Cold War in part by deterring Soviet aggression with our hard military power. But the Soviet Union's final dissolution came only after we also began to effectively employ soft power. Ultimately, people in Eastern Europe and Russia were attracted to Western values through exchange programs, better diplomatic relations and broadcasts that penetrated the Iron Curtain. Since Sept. 11, it has become commonplace to say that the United States is engaged in a war of ideas for the hearts and minds of moderate Arabs. To win that war, we will have to become more adept at wielding soft power in the region. The greatest challenge to the United States today comes from radical Islamist ideology, in particular from the fundamentalist Wahhabi sect, which originated in 18th century Saudi Arabia and has grown more powerful in recent decades. Radical Islamists are expert in the use of soft power, attracting people to their ranks through charities that address basic needs and through religious institutions that form the backbones of communities. Support for radical Islam has been consistently provided by Saudi Arabia, where the ruling family agreed to propagate Wahhabism as a means of placating clerics. The royal family's support of Wahhabism was itself an exercise in soft power. Because Saudi funding came from both government ministries and private charities, it is practically impossible to estimate the total amount of payments. One expert testified to Congress that the Saudis had spent roughly $70 billion on aid projects after the oil boom of the 1970s, much of it funneled through radical Islamic groups, and others report that the Saudis sponsored 1,500 mosques and 2,000 schools worldwide, from Indonesia to France. These institutions often displaced more-moderate and less-well-funded interpretations of Islam. Even if the numbers are heavily inflated, they dwarf the $150 million that the U.S. spends annually on public diplomacy in the Islamic world. Soft power is not a panacea, of course. It is difficult to control — as the Saudi royal family has discovered — and can have unintended consequences. Organized religious movements of all stripes, including Christian, Buddhist and Muslim, have used soft power for centuries to attract millions of people to their teachings. But soft power can also attract people to malevolent religious organizations and networks. Ultimately, the soft power of Wahhabism has not proved to be a resource that the Saudi government can control or use to obtain favorable outcomes. It has become a Frankenstein's monster, returning to haunt its creator. The radicals regard the royal family as corrupt and in league with Western infidels. They aim to overthrow or disrupt the government, as demonstrated by the 2003 terrorist attacks on residential compounds and the bombing that ripped apart a police headquarters in Riyadh last week. The royal family's bargain with the Wahhabist clerics backfired because the soft power of Islamic radicalism has flowed in the direction of Osama bin Laden and his goal of overthrowing the Saudi government. A snapshot of this situation was captured by polls taken shortly after the Iraq war. Pluralities in Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Morocco and the Palestinian Territories said they had a lot or some confidence in Bin Laden to do the right thing regarding world affairs. In those same countries, more people had more confidence in Bin Laden than in George W. Bush or Tony Blair. The fact that Bin Laden inspires confidence sends a clear message to Americans about the soft power of our sworn enemy. Hard military power is not a sufficient response. Soft power must also be fought with soft power. Americans and others must find better ways of projecting our soft power to attract moderate Muslims. Effective public diplomacy requires three strategies. First, we need to respond much more quickly with American interpretations of events. The establishment of Arabic language broadcasting units like Radio Sawa and satellite television channel Al Hurra, both of which intersperse news with popular programming, was a good first step for the U.S. Now we must learn to work more effectively with Arab news media such as Al Jazeera, which is a trusted news source for many Arabic speakers. Second, like any entity trying to get a message out, we have to decide which key strategic themes to emphasize. One real need is to better articulate American policies and to explain how they relate to the values of moderate Muslims. For example, the charge that U.S. policies are indifferent to the killings of Muslims can be addressed by pointing to American interventions that saved Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as assistance to Islamic countries to foster development and combat AIDS. As Assistant Secretary of State William Burns pointed out last year, public diplomacy must be accompanied by "a wider positive agenda for the region, alongside rebuilding Iraq; achieving the president's two-state vision for Israelis and Palestinians; and modernizing Arab economies." Finally, and most important, we must develop a long-term strategy of cultural and educational exchanges aimed at creating a richer and more open civil society in Middle Eastern countries. The most effective spokespersons for the United States are not Americans but indigenous surrogates who understand America's virtues as well as its faults. Visa policies that have cut back on the number of Muslim students in the United States do us more harm than good. Much of the work of developing an open civil society can be promoted by corporations, foundations, universities and other nonprofit organizations, as well as by governments. Companies and foundations can offer technology to help modernize Arab education. American universities can establish more exchange programs for students and faculty. Foundations can support the development of American studies in Muslim countries, or programs that enhance the professionalism of journalists. Governments can support the teaching of English and finance student exchanges. Only when we learn to combine this type of soft power with our hard power will we succeed in meeting the challenge of Islamist terrorism. ________________________ Joseph S. Nye Jr. is dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and author of "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics." latimes.com

To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 4/27/2004 9:36:16 PM From: stockman_scott   Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500   Foreign policy elites hate Bush's war ________________________________ By James O. Goldsborough Columnist SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE April 26, 2004 Americans, even the most patriotic, have an innate feeling something is wrong about the war in Iraq. But how do they explain their gut feeling, translate it into words? In the latest CBS News poll, President Bush's handling of the war has fallen to a low point, with only 37 percent of Americans now believing it is worth the price. More than pragmatism is at work against Bush's war. There is a rising intellectual and psychological distress with it, even among Republicans. The causes of this distress can be traced back across debates this country has had about foreign policy for more than 200 years. The situation is particularly vexing for foreign policy elites. For example, Henry Kissinger, who once symbolized "realism" in foreign policy (and was opposed by "idealists"), must truly hate Bush's war with its Christian and moral connotations. But Kissinger, now a businessman, is silent. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who opposed Kissinger's "realistic" negotiations with Moscow during the Cold War, today is transformed into a realist and eloquent opponent of Bush's war. Opportunism may explain these two flip flops, but Brent Scowcroft, who served President Bush I, is consistent. Less political than Kissinger or Brzezinski, Scowcroft, a classic realist, hates this war and makes no bones about it. The discomfort over Iraq stems from the war's character. Pre-emptive wars followed by bloody occupations against nations that do not pose a serious threat are not our style. Americans who gave Bush the benefit of the doubt at first have begun to ask questions. Bush says he'll never "cut and run" from Iraq, but that's not the question. Americans ask – why are we in Iraq? If it's not working, why stay? Kissinger apart, realists (or pragmatists) hate Bush's war because it violates so many traditional principles. Realists don't make war because they don't like a foreign leader or to make some country democratic. For a realist, the question is – will this action enhance U.S. power or weaken it? Wars can weaken nations. Vietnam weakened U.S. power, which is why Hans Morgenthau, the dean of realist thinkers, opposed it. U.S. policy to arm Afghanistan's muhajadeen in 1979 was designed to "induce a Soviet military intervention," in Brzezinski's words, which it did, weakening Moscow, contributing to Soviet demise. For Morganthau, America's most influential foreign policy thinker, Vietnam depleted U.S. power. "Instead of embarking upon costly and futile interventions for the purpose of building nations and viable economies abroad," he wrote in 1969, "the United States ought to concentrate its efforts upon creating a society at home which can again serve as a model for other nations to emulate." If that statement seems to apply to Iraq, try this: "The deficiencies of policy in Vietnam result from faulty modes of thought rather than from defects of personality or errors of execution." The realist school of foreign policy remains strong in America but is absent from the Bush administration. Colin Powell was once a realist, but has been co-opted. Bush's neoconservatives are above all crusaders, people who see the world in terms of black and white, good and evil. These people are driven by morality, not national interest. Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction were a pretext for war, but the real neoconservative goal was to persuade Bush that war was God's will, and he was the instrument. Bush consulted with God on war, he told Bob Woodward. The gulf between what Bush said a year ago and what he says today contributes to our rising doubts, as does evidence that things are not going well on the ground. Even an idealist-moralist foreign policy needs success. If you bomb the communists to smithereens and they surrender, maybe you can claim success. If they keep on fighting, you have a harder case. Realism in American foreign policy is not dead. It played a dominant role in the Bush I administration, which may be why Bush II refused to consult his father on Iraq. Bush I, Scowcroft and James Baker are realists, as they demonstrated in the Gulf War, in ending support for Nicaragua's Contras and in keeping America out of Balkan conflicts on their watch. George Kennan, 100, a guiding light throughout the Cold War, wrote two books on realism as a nonagenarian. Despite Kissinger's defection, Morganthau's legacy is carried on by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz at Columbia and John Mearsheimer at the University of Chicago. Out of favor now, they will be back in vogue, as was Morganthau during Vietnam, as the Iraq quagmire grows deeper. The trouble with a morality-based foreign policy, Kissinger liked to explain during the Cold War, is that it makes war inevitable. If each side believes God is with it and the devil with the other, agreement is impossible. Policy based on national interest is a more sensible and historically more successful way to proceed. We should know that by now. Says Mearsheimer: "Realists tend not to draw sharp distinctions between 'good' and 'bad' states, because all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system or who runs the government." ___________________________________ James O. Goldsborough is foreign affairs columnist for The San Diego Union-Tribune and a member of the newspaper's editorial board, specializing in international issues. Goldsborough spent 15 years in Europe as a correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune, the International Herald Tribune and Newsweek magazine. He is a former Edward R. Murrow Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. signonsandiego.com

To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 5/4/2004 8:51:10 AM From: stockman_scott   Respond to of 281500   Former U.S. Diplomats Denounce Bush's Mideast Policy (Update1) quote.bloomberg.com May 4 (Bloomberg) -- A group of former U.S. diplomats wrote a letter to President George W. Bush denouncing his policy for dealing with the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, saying it is harming American credibility abroad. The letter, posted on the American Educational Trust Web site with 16 signatures, applauds a similar letter former British diplomats sent to Prime Minister Tony Blair last week criticizing his Middle East policy. The Web site solicits more support, and Reuters said more than 50 ex-diplomats have now signed. The former U.S. diplomats' concern focuses on Bush's support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's unilateral plan to evacuate Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip while retaining major West Bank enclaves. Bush and Sharon's talks on the plan last month excluded the Palestinians. Bush's stance ``reverses longstanding American policy,'' the group said. ``By closing the door to negotiations with Palestinians and the possibility of a Palestinian state, you have proved that the United States is not an even-handed peace partner,'' the former diplomats, led by Andrew Kilgore, ambassador to Qatar from 1977 to 1980, said in the letter. ``You have placed U.S. diplomats, civilians and military doing their jobs overseas in an untenable and even dangerous position,'' the group said. ``Your unqualified support of Sharon's extra-judicial assassinations, Israel's Berlin Wall-like barrier, its harsh military measures in occupied territories, and now your endorsement of Sharon's unilateral plan, are costing our country its credibility, prestige and friends.'' `Historic Moment' Bush last month described Sharon's proposal as an ``historic moment'' on the road to peace. The withdrawal would remove 7,000 Israelis from Gaza, the coastal strip that is home to 1.3 million Palestinians, and keep some of the larger groups of settlements in the West Bank, where 2.5 million Palestinians and 220,000 Israelis live. Sharon's Likud Party on Sunday rejected the Gaza plan, prompting him to seek the advice of political allies on his next steps. The Sharon proposals agreed upon by Bush also rule out the return of Palestinians who left before 1948 to what is now Israel. Greg Thielmann, a former head of the U.S. State Department's Office for Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs and a signatory to the letter, today told the British Broadcasting Corp. that Likud's rejection may create ``the worst of all possible worlds'' for the future of the region. `Irretrievable Damage' ``We've probably done irretrievable damage in the eyes of the Arab world and yet we will not even accomplish what seemed to have been at least one positive part of the Sharon plan,'' Thielmann said, referring to the proposed Gaza withdrawal. Other letter signers include former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Akins, former Ambassador to Syria Talcott Seelye, former Ambassador to Egypt Richard Nolte and Richard Curtiss, former chief inspector of the U.S. Information Agency. ``This letter represents the tip of the iceberg in terms of those who have served extensively overseas and have a good feel for the consequences of this action and a feel for the way that foreign policy should be made and the importance of following through on national commitments in a consistent and predictable way,'' Thielmann said. The American Educational Trust, with which some of the signatories are associated, scheduled a news conference on the letter for noon today in Washington. Sharon's office today declined to comment on the letter. A call to the State Department seeking comment wasn't immediately returned. To contact the reporter on this story: Heather Langan in London at hlangan@bloomberg.net. To contact the editor of this story: Peter Torday at ptorday@bloomberg.net. Last Updated: May 4, 2004 06:12 EDT

To: tekboy who wrote (128863) 5/4/2004 8:59:14 AM From: stockman_scott   Respond to of 281500   The Cult That's Running the Country _________________________ By Joseph Wilson Salon.com Monday 03 May 2004 [Joseph Wilson blasts the secretive neoconservative cabal that plunged America into a disastrous war, in this excerpt from his new book.] truthout.org <<...Whether the motivation behind the leak was to discredit me or to discourage intelligence officials from coming forward, or both, is immaterial at this stage. What matters is that, as of this writing, the senior administration officials who took it upon themselves to protect a political agenda by exposing a national security asset are still in place. They still occupy positions of trust; they continue to hold full national security clearances. The breach of trust between the administration and its clandestine service will not be healed until they are exposed and appropriately punished. That no real outrage has been expressed by either the president or Republicans in Congress raises the question of whether our secrets are safe in this administration's hands. By the end of February 2004, efforts to launch congressional inquiries had been voted down in three House committees. Henry Hyde, Republican chairman of the International Relations panel, claimed, "It would be irresponsible for the committee to ... jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation." On the contrary, according to congressional sources of mine, Republicans, pressured by the White House, have simply refused to exercise oversight responsibility on this national security matter. It's a far cry from the days when the House Government Reform committee, chaired by Indiana congressman Dan Burton, held frequent hearings on alleged Clinton administration misdeeds. At a time when all experts on national security agree that we need to strengthen our ability to collect human intelligence, the unwillingness of some to seriously address this act of betrayal is surely damaging that effort. But as with all cover-ups, such as Watergate and Iran-Contra, the revelation of the whole truth in this matter will likely be a long time coming, and have repercussions none of us can anticipate...>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Joseph Wilson was a career Foreign Service officer and ambassador from 1976 to 1998. truthout.org

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