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To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (39182)4/13/2004 7:22:59 AM
From: Lane3  Respond to of 793843
 
David Brooks has written an excellent column

He has, indeed.



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (39182)4/13/2004 7:37:08 AM
From: KLP  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793843
 
Thanks for the David Brooks column. George P. Shultz has an interesting column in the Washington Diplomat this month on terrorism.

George P. Shultz
Former Secretary of State Says U.S.
Must Link Military Power, Creative Diplomacy
by John Shaw
April 2004
washdiplomat.com

George P. Shultz, the former U.S. secretary of state, says that as the international system undergoes tectonic economic, political and military transformations, at least one age-old truth endures: A strong nation can best advance its interests by coupling robust military power with agile diplomacy.

“Strength and diplomacy go together. They are not alternatives. They are complements,” Shultz said in an interview with The Washington Diplomat. “There is an important interplay between strength and diplomacy. Diplomacy without strength is fruitless, but strength without diplomacy is unsustainable. Strength and diplomacy have always gone together and still do.”

The former secretary of state said the world is in the midst of an unusually intense period of change and turmoil that requires the United States to be resolute and firm but also smart and shrewd.

The dangers that the United States and its allies now face are difficult to overstate, Shultz said, citing the twin challenges of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. “We are in a long, difficult war, but with the effective use of strength and diplomacy we will win this war,” he said.

One of America’s most respected political intellectuals, Shultz has vast experience in government, business and academia. He has served as a graduate school dean, the president of a major international company and the secretary of several major governmental departments.

Shultz has advocated a firm, even aggressive, response to terrorism since his days as secretary of state under President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. “We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism was a big problem and we had to take forceful action against it,” Shultz recalled. “But for whatever reasons, we did not respond effectively during the past two decades. Diplomacy without much force was tried. Unfortunately, the lack of effective response encouraged more terrorism.”

Shultz said President George W. Bush’s basic views regarding terrorism are correct: that terrorism should be seen as a war and not as a law enforcement matter, states that support terrorist groups should be held accountable, and the United States should not be content to punish and retaliate when it is attacked by terrorists—but should take steps to prevent attacks.

“Terrorism is a method of choice by an internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress. It is not a matter that should be left to law enforcement with its deliberative process, delays and safeguards,”
he said.

Shultz argues that leaders should aggressively confront terrorist threats that arise in failed states such as Afghanistan and Iraq, in the West, including the United States and Europe, in the Arab and Islamic worlds, in newly vulnerable nations such as Indonesia and hot spots such as Kashmir, and from the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Shultz said terrorists have exploited the eroding international system and have burrowed into decaying nations to attack vulnerable targets. Moreover, terrorists have become adept at hiding behind the privileges and immunities of systems such as nonintervention policies by other nations.

The former secretary of state strongly supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and dismisses charges of American unilateralism in that conflict. “No nation in the history of the U.N. has ever engaged in such a sustained and committed multilateral diplomatic effort to adhere to the principles of international law and international organization within the system,” Shultz said, referring to U.S. actions and policies on Iraq in the United Nations from 1991 to 2003.

He faults French diplomacy last March for splitting NATO, the European Union and the U.N. Security Council, saying it probably convinced Saddam Hussein that he would not face the use of force. Shultz said that the war in Iraq was necessary to demonstrate the world’s resolve against terrorism and to pave the way for political and economic reforms in the Middle East.

“As Iraq stabilizes, the people in the Middle East will see that change for the better is possible,” he said. “The most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism.”

Shultz is critical of past actions by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan to deflect the pressures of militant Islam within their borders and allow terrorists to strike the United States and Israel. He said these nations should now realize that Islamic terrorism will eventually be directed at them unless they confront the threat.

“What we are witnessing is nothing short of a civil war in the Arab-Islamic world,” he said, arguing that the forces of progress and modernity are in a deadly struggle with forces that reject international law and civilized values. “We can help the forces of good by shoring up democracy in Iraq and showing that we support the people of this region, not the corrupt elites.”

Shultz said that progress to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is crucial but cautioned that no productive negotiations can occur without security for Israel. He urges Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan to continue to work to advance peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and he believes progress is possible based on the so-called roadmap that calls for a Palestinian state and security for Israel.

Creative diplomacy from the Quartet (the United States, European Union, Russia and the United Nations) coupled with a strong commitment to peace from Israel and the Palestinians can create a “new reality” in the Middle East, Shultz said.

The former secretary of state also argues that America’s international position would be strengthened by a more farsighted energy policy that reduces America’s reliance on Middle East oil.

Shultz recalled that half a century ago, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned that the United States would endanger itself if 20 percent of its oil supplies were imported. Now, Shultz noted, almost 60 percent of U.S. petroleum is imported.

“We need carefully targeted investments and incentives to develop new energy resources. An economy, for example, with a significant hydrogen component could do wonders for our security and environment,” he said.

Now based at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Shultz remains a respected analyst of international affairs. He was recently invited by the Library of Congress to give the prestigious Kissinger lecture in Washington, and while he was in town, President Bush invited Shultz to attend a major speech in which president announced a new proliferation initiative.

Shultz graduated from Princeton in 1942 with a bachelor’s degree in economics and then served in the Marines for three years during World War II. When he returned from the war, he attended graduate school and earned a doctorate in industrial economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1949.

He taught at MIT from 1948 to 1957, taking a year’s leave in 1955 to work for the Council of Economic Advisers in the Eisenhower administration. In 1957, Schultz became a professor of industrial relations at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. He was appointed dean of the business school a few years later.

Shultz served as President Richard Nixon’s secretary of labor, White House budget director and treasury secretary. He left the government in 1974 to become president of Bechtel Group, a global engineering and construction firm based in San Francisco.

Reagan appointed Shultz secretary of state in 1982, following the brief and stormy tenure of Alexander Haig in that position. Shultz served as Reagan’s chief diplomat for the next seven years and was a key diplomat during the final years of the Cold War.

When Reagan left office in January of 1989, Shultz returned to California and rejoined Stanford University as a professor of international economics and as a fellow at Hoover.

Still heavily involved in the business world, Shultz is a member of the board of directors at Bechtel, the Fremont Group, Gilead Sciences and Charles Schwab & Co. He is also chairman of the International Council of J.P. Morgan Chase and the Accenture Energy Advisory Board.

He was awarded the Medal of Freedom in 1989, the United States’s highest civilian honor, the Seoul Peace Prize in 1992, the Eisenhower Medal for Leadership and Service in 2001 and the Reagan Distinguished American Award in 2002. In addition, the State Department’s state-of-the art training facility, the Foreign Service Institute, was named in his honor in the spring of 2002.

Shultz’s government service, and specifically his tenure at the State Department, has given him strong views about diplomacy. He believes that day-to-day diplomacy is crucial and can be likened to “tending the garden.” Good diplomats, he said, cultivate relationships and pay close attention to emerging ideas and trends, even when there are no dramatic problems to tackle.

Deeply interested in the information revolution and its effect on diplomacy, Shultz said that having ambassadors on the ground is still necessary. “Information technology cannot replace solid diplomatic reporting. The Information Age brings us an overwhelming flood of material, and that’s great. But the job of sorting it out and making sense of it gets harder and harder. You need good diplomats to do that,” he said.

“From my experience, the diplomatic corps in Washington is quite impressive. Countries send only their best to Washington. The ones who are plugged in can play a very valuable role for their countries and for the United States,” he added.

Shultz said the United States should rethink its approach to the Foreign Service, having careers start earlier, end later, and be enhanced by careful training.

“For whatever reason, we encourage our young people to fritter away their 20s and then enter the Foreign Service. We need them to come in sooner and not to leave in their 50s when they are reaching their top effectiveness,” he said. “Foreign Service careers have to make sense in their entirety, from entry to retirement.”

Shultz lavishes praise on current Secretary of State Colin Powell for his diplomatic skills and leadership. He also said that Powell is doing a superb job energizing U.S. diplomats. “Colin Powell has given a tremendous lift to the Foreign Service. He is bringing in new people, giving them excellent training, bringing new life and energy into our diplomacy. He’s terrific.”

John Shaw is a contributing writer for The Washington Diplomat.



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (39182)4/13/2004 8:27:56 AM
From: michael97123  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793843
 
"Step back and you see millions of people who will pick up any stick they can to beat the administration. They're perfectly aware of the cruel uncertainties that confront policy makers, but, opportunistically, they ignore them."

This cuts both ways. There are plenty on this thread wearing rose colored glasses regarding iraq for instance. The execution of the post war plan has been lousy. If this was a corportation, heads would roll. Bush should fire someone over what's going on and not going on now. Having said that there are always Plan B's in war. Whether its more troops or more cooperation with mainstream shiaa leaders I am not sure but some things must change if only to regroup and regain popular support.
Before i left for vacation Bush had the economic issue and the security issues and was faltering on iraq. Now the security issue is neutral, iraq seems to be a mess and only the economy is keeping bush close. If he wants to win, he needs to do a mea culpa of sorts and revamp this admininstration right now. Or he can hope that iraq gets materially better prior to the election. Mike
big PS Nadine, I heard last night that iran was controlling the insurgency in falujah and among the shiaa as well as growing problems in Mosul(near syria). There are iranian agents and proxies everywhere. We certainly cant go to war with iran or syria right now but can we help the iranian democrats to help spark a revolution there? How tight is the Mullahs control in iran?



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (39182)4/13/2004 9:02:32 AM
From: Lane3  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793843
 
The Brooks article sent me off looking for related material and I came up with this piece. It's very long. I've clipped just the first part.

army.mil

The Casualty-Aversion Myth

It's easy to see. . . . People go off to war and the bands play and the flags fly. And it's not quite so easy when the flag is draped over a coffin coming back through Dover, Delaware.
-SENATOR JOHN GLENN, 1997

That is the nature of the American public's sensitivity to U.S. military casualties? How does casualty sensitivity affect the pursuit of American national security objectives?1 The first question is easy to answer: There is no intrinsic, uncritical casualty aversion among the American public that limits the use of U.S. armed forces. There is a wide range of policy objectives on behalf of which the public is prepared to accept American casualties as a cost of success. Squeamishness about even a few casualties for all but the most important national causes is a myth. Nonetheless, it is a myth that persists as widely accepted conventional wisdom.

The second question is more difficult to answer. Avoidance of casualties is an unassailably desirable objective. It is precisely the natural nobility of the argument that makes it susceptible to misuse in the policy-making process, potentially leading to ineffective or inefficient choices. The persistence of the myth also causes adversaries to misjudge the likely reactions of the United States. In both of these ways, the myth of deep-seated casualty aversion among the American public hinders the pursuit of American national objectives.

The evidence indicates that the public response to casualties is a function of leadership and consensus among national policy elites, who have wide latitude in this area. They should not allow concern about casualties to replace thorough consideration of the larger context of costs and benefits. National leaders must not let unsubstantiated assertions of American casualty aversion distort the national security policy-making process or compromise professional military ethics.

This article briefly describes the nature of American casualty sensitivity, identifies some prominent negative effects of widespread acceptance of the casualty myth, and offers recommendations that may produce a more accurate understanding of the American public's casualty sensitivity.

AMERICAN CASUALTY SENSITIVITY

Are the American people in fact reluctant to risk lives? In a superficial and unhelpful sense, the American public is always reluctant to risk lives, particularly if there is some other reasonable way to accomplish objectives. No one wants casualties.

Myth and Conventional Wisdom

We had 500 casualties a week when we [the Nixon administration] came into office. America now is not willing to take any casualties. Vietnam produced a whole new attitude.
HENRY KISSINGER, 1999

It's obvious that there's a political agenda to have low casualties. . . . If my Achilles' heel is the low tolerance of the American people for casualties, then I have to recognize that my success or failure in this mission [in Bosnia] is directly affected by that.
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM L. NASH, 1996

[America is] a nation intolerant of casualties.
EDWARD LUTTWAK, 1995

And the hearts that beat so loudly and enthusiastically to do something, to intervene in areas where there is not an immediate threat to our vital interests, when those hearts that had beaten so loudly see the coffins, then they switch, and they say: "What are we doing there?"
SENATOR WILLIAM COHEN (LATER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

These are just some of the many similar expressions of the conventional wisdom of American public casualty aversion.2 The conventional wisdom is strong among civilian, military, and media elites. Steven Kull and I. M. Destler have recorded many interviews-with members of Congress and their staffs, the media, the executive branch, and leaders of nongovernmental organizations-that support this view.3 Other interviews with members of the media and military leaders also confirm a widespread belief that the American public is unwilling to accept casualties.4

The wellspring of this conventional wisdom is generally understood to be the Vietnam War, as reinforced by experiences in Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993). The tremendous efforts by civilian and military leaders to minimize casualties in other operations-the Persian Gulf War (1991), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999)-can be read as a reaction to the public's purported low tolerance for casualties. Rising casualties in Iraq following the end of "major combat operations" have also been portrayed as an important factor affecting the public's willingness to support the mission. The abandonment of military intervention in several instances in which it was seriously considered has also been attributed to casualty aversion. Examples include the Balkans (before 1995), Rwanda (1994), and Zaire/Congo (1995).

Manifestations of this conventional wisdom are many and widespread-the "Vietnam syndrome," the "Dover test," the "CNN effect," part of the Weinberger/Powell doctrine, the concept of "post-heroic warfare," and a social equity effect attributed to the absence of American civilian elites and their children from military service.

The "Vietnam syndrome" is commonly understood as a general reticence among Americans to use military force abroad as a result of negative lessons of the Vietnam experience. It is "that revulsion at the use of military power that afflicted our national psyche for decades after our defeat."5 It is a comprehensive generalization about the American public's unwillingness to continue to support U.S. foreign military efforts, particularly as casualties rise. This aspect of the Vietnam syndrome relates casualty aversion to the idea that public support for military operations in Vietnam declined because of the human costs of the war.6 A variant attributing the decline in popular support to media portrayals of events in Vietnam has fed negative attitudes toward the media, particularly among many members of the military.

Senator John Glenn's "Dover test" (alluded to in the first epigraph, above) refers to the American public's assumed response to American service people returning to the United States in flag-draped coffins. This oft-repeated image symbolizes the cost in casualties of American military operations. In an interesting response to its presumed visceral effect, the Department of Defense has prohibited media coverage of such events since 1989: "There will be no arrival ceremonies for, or media coverage of, deceased military personnel returning to or departing from Dover AFB [Air Force Base] or Ramstein AFB [in Germany], to include interim stops."7 In a sense, this provides an official endorsement of the presumption that casualties have a powerful effect on the public.

The "CNN effect" refers broadly to the purported impact of certain types of visual images, to include American casualties, when broadcast on the news. Like the Dover test, it suggests that visual images of casualties will elicit an immediate response from the public. Its various formulations convey the idea that the public can respond precipitately to gut-wrenching depictions of human suffering, not only military casualties but starving children and other civilian victims of war.8 This dynamic is also assumed to induce a similar visceral response to such dramatic pictures as those of the body of an American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in 1993.9

The Weinberger/Powell doctrine is a set of six tests, drawn in part from the Vietnam War experience, that, its advocates believe, should govern the use of American military power.10 One test is the presence or absence of the support of the American public and its elected representatives. In policy debates considering the use of force, it is in the framework of this test that assertions about the willingness of the public to handle casualties enter decision making.11

"Post-heroic warfare" is the idea that the scope of casualties resulting from the clash of armies at close quarters is no longer tolerable to the American public. Edward Luttwak asserts that America is "a nation intolerant of casualties";12 he relates this to the decreasing size of American families in the post-World War II era. Luttwak believes that there exists a powerful unwillingness among Americans to permit military operations that might endanger their children.

Finally, sociologist Charles Moskos posits that the American public's sensitivity is a function of inequitable social relations created by the absence of elite members of society or their children in the ranks of the military. "Only when the privileged classes perform military service does the country define the cause as worth young people's blood. Only when elite youth are on the firing line do war losses become more acceptable."13

THE NUANCED REALITY <snip>



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (39182)4/13/2004 11:28:35 AM
From: Ilaine  Respond to of 793843
 
David Brooks certainly can turn a phrase better than I can (Step back and you see millions of people who will pick up any stick they can to beat the administration), and I was with him until the bit about the Humvees.

The wisest military planner of his era, Von Moltke (the Elder), said "no plan survives first contact with the enemy." Improvisation is called for, and America's military shines at improvisation. I think it's fairer to say, in our case, that "no plan survives first contact with one's allies."

You and I both will never forget how difficult Turkey's intransigence turned out for our troops at the beginning of the war. It's a miracle that we were able to improvise around their absolute refusal to allow land passage through Turkey. I am looking forward to the real story on that. Putting everything back on the ships and heading around to the Gulf and then funnelling everything up through Southern Iraq was incredibly difficult, yet we prevailed. Does anybody writing for these newspapers realize that we won the war before we could even get all our troops and their equipment ashore?

OK, relying on Turkey was in retrospect so misguided as to almost be criminal. Who was behind that? Rumsfeld? Powell? I wish I knew.

The other monumentally stupid thing we did, it appears to me, was relying too much on the Iraqi exiles. I can guess who was behind that, Woolsey. Still, when all is known about that, who else did we have?

My point is that I agree that things have gone far from perfectly, but I don't think it's been so much from military planning. I doubt it was the military who pinned so much hope on Turkey or the Iraqi exiles.



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (39182)4/13/2004 12:07:20 PM
From: carranza2  Respond to of 793843
 
We cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations,..

Cannot have been better said.

Elect Kerry and we will have Hamlet in the White House.

Why, let the strucken deer go weep, The hart ungalled play; For some must watch, while some must sleep: So runs the world away.--

Hamlet, Scene II.