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Politics : GOPwinger Lies/Distortions/Omissions/Perversions of Truth -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: geode00 who wrote (10913)4/20/2004 12:20:55 AM
From: Karen Lawrence  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 173976
 
The Saudis still haven't answered for 9/11. Mercenaries in Iraq: Soldiers And Fortune

Who's the United States' major ally today in Iraq?

Hint: it may not be part of the "Coalition of the Willing." You might instead label them the "Brotherhood of the Extremely Well Paid": mercenaries working for private security firms in Iraq. Estimates of their number run from 5,000 to 15,000.

And while no one really knows how many there are, thousands more are due to join them.

At this extremely critical time, when ill-conceived military action can degenerate into disastrous religious outbursts, who is calling the shots? That question is only now beginning to draw some attention.

For instance, two of the most violent actions in recent days in Iraq were not what we thought they were. A bloody attack by hundreds of Iraqi militia on the U.S. government's headquarters in Najaf last week was defeated not by valiant U.S. soldiers—as the press first was led to believe—but by eight mercenaries from a private American security firm.

According to The Washington Post, that company, Blackwater Security Consulting, even called in its own helicopter to rescue a wounded Marine and re-supply its own men when the U.S. Army failed to show up.

And those four "contractors" who were torn apart in Fallujah a few days earlier? Not hapless civilians, it now appears—they were also hired American mercenaries, also working for Blackwater Security. It currently has some 450 guards working in Iraq, and it is only one of many—which makes Blackwater alone larger than many of the national contingents that comprise the Coalition.

[Note: the mercenaries killed in Fallujah were protecting U.S. missionaries establishing a food distribution center as a part of their goal of converting Muslims to Christianity.]

The mercenaries range from South Africans and Philipinos to Iraqis, Indians and Chileans to former U.S. Navy SEALs and Special Forces—carrying out what, in effect, are military services in Iraq, at salaries many times higher than those of the most skilled U.S. soldiers.

It's the United States that, either directly or indirectly, is picking up the tab for most of these mercenaries, but not all. The Japanese, for instance, also have their own private security contractor.

But who is giving the orders?

Under whose military control are those thousands of fighting men? Who tells them when to attack? When to retreat? When to avoid battle? What happens to those private armies after June 30, 2004, when sovereignty is—in theory, at least—transferred to the Iraqi people?

In a firefight, how on earth do Iraqis distinguish between actions of "private civilian contractors" and the U.S. military?

It's an Enron accountant's wet dream: private contractors taking over so much of what used to be considered military duty. How does Congress figure out, not only what the war in Iraq really costs, but what the real troop levels are? Another convenience for the Bush White House is that those contract casualties—and there have been many—are not included in the official military count.

One such private contractor—we'll call him Jerry—just recently returned from a stint in Iraq. He was paid $174,000 a year, he said, more than four times the officer's salary he was pulling down after 27 years with the military. But he was just one small part of the food chain of private contractors who are making billions of dollars a year in Iraq, supporting the Coalition military.

Jerry was hired by a private security company in Louisiana to provide protection for another private company, U.S.A. Environmental, which has been contracted by the Army Corps of Engineers to get rid of captured Iraqi military supplies at a place called Taji, the largest ammunition dump in Iraq. It's a dangerous place, and to do their job in Iraq, the folks at U.S.A. Environmental have to be protected. That's where the company that hired Jerry and scores of other former troops like him comes in.

But they aren't the only ones. Another of the companies supplying security guards was set up by a former Iraqi army colonel, also cashing in on the Coalition bonanza. He's hired 240 Iraqis, all former soldiers, to help patrol the huge ammunition dump. "Each of them makes $300 a month," says Jerry. "If they got paid $60 a month before they were lucky."

According to Jerry, all those former Iraqi soldiers are well vetted before being hired. How difficult would it be to infiltrate them? That's another question.

Now, normally one would think that the U.S. military would take care of destroying captured weapons and providing security for the demolition experts, just as they would normally handle security for an important official like Paul Bremmer. But not in this Brave New Military World: Bremmer has his own private security force: five former SEALs and one Marine.

By turning such messy tasks over to outsiders—at three or four times the normal military salary—soliders are supposedly freed up to do the real business of fighting. Such humdrum tasks as vehicle maintenance are also contracted out to another private firm; catering and laundry, of course, are handled by Halliburton.

And why shouldn't contractors be used? Well, one reason, Jerry claims, is that the people running his security company really knew nothing about security.

"The first week we got there, I said I'd like to see the Security Plan, and your standard operating procedures. They didn't know what I was talking about. They had non-Special Forces guys running security operations. One of our superiors was an Air Force captain in logistics, another, a guy who had worked in tanks. It was ridiculous, the blind leading the blind. They didn't understand anything."

According to Jerry, although the company made big bucks for its contract, it skimped on vital equipment, "We were out every night patrolling with no night-vision devices. You couldn't see a thing. The machine guns they gave us were much too big. I had to shell out $2,400 for my own body armor. We were always short on ammunition. And we were coming under fire every night." Finally, despite the fancy pay, Jerry quit. Several others have also left recently, he says.

What kind of rules of engagement did they have?

"We had a letter of agreement with the military. If a soldier suspects something, he can move in. If a private contractor suspects something, we have to tell the military. We're only to return fire if first fired upon," Jerry said.

That kind of loose control may work for mercenaries protecting a diamond-mining company in Sierra Leone. But how are those rules of engagement enforced in Iraq? By whom?

Indeed, we discover from the Post's account that "The Defense Department often does not have a clear handle on the daily actions of security contractors because the contractors work directly for the coalition authorities, which coordinates and communicates on a limited basis through the normal military chain of command."

And few of the hired guards are grizzled veterans. According to Jerry, another major contractor also provided security at his location. Many of his employees, he says, lacked the right kind of experience: "Navy SEALs and former Marines, a bunch of hot rodders, wild cowboys, all they want to do is kill people. They had their machine-gun mentality. A little too young, a little too green. Not enough combat experience in my opinion. They had launched bullets, but never had bullets coming back at them."

Last week, seven powerful U.S. senators, including Ted Kenney and Hillary Clinton, sent a letter to Donald Rumsfeld asking some pretty basic questions about those private companies, including how big their combined army really is.

"It would be a dangerous precedent," they wrote, "if the United States allowed the presence of private armies operating outside the control of governmental authority and beholden only to those who pay them."

Amen.

veteransforcommonsense.org



To: geode00 who wrote (10913)4/20/2004 5:27:44 AM
From: Crimson Ghost  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 173976
 
Escape from Iraq

Gwynne Dyer

Jordan Times, Tuesday, April 20, 2004

IT IS still possible for US President George W. Bush to escape from Iraq before it destroys his reelection bid. It is also still possible for Iraq to emerge from all this as a more or less democratic and united country, though that will be trickier. Both things depend on the same man: Bush's chief political adviser, Karl Rove, has to break the stranglehold of the neocons who surround the president and persuade him that to save his presidency he must ditch their policy. There is no sign of it happening yet, and time is running out. US casualties are mounting, and so is Iraqi anger. To Arab eyes, the US Marine assault on the city of Fallujah looks eerily like the Israeli army smashing its way into one of the West Bank cities, complete with gunships firing rockets into houses and mosques.

Meanwhile, the fighting spreads across the Shiite-majority parts of Iraq, as Brigadier General Mark Kimmit, deputy director of operations, declares that “we will attack to destroy the Al Mahdi army (of Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr). Those attacks will be deliberate, they will be precise, they will be powerful and they will be successful.”

The Pentagon says Sadr only has 600 militiamen, but that was before the shooting started: he now commands many thousands of angry young Shiites.

The Bush administration has been promoting the spectre of an Iraqi civil war for months because that provided an excuse for US forces to stay in Iraq, but what is happening is not a civil war at all. It is an uprising against the occupation forces: many Iraqis are openly using the word Intifada. And there is no hope that senior Shiite clergy like Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani will somehow get Sadr under control: they resent the young upstart's attempt to steal their influence in the Shiite community by out-radicalising them, but they also fear his growing influence and dare not take an open stand against him.

Moreover, they share with all the Shiites a deep anger about the way that the US has moved to deny them the dominant position that their numbers would give them in a democratic Iraq. They reject US plans for a “hand-over of sovereignty” to its appointees on June 30, and they will not pull Bush's chestnuts out of the fire for him.

Behind all the nonsense about America's duty to bring democracy to the Iraqi people, the neoconservatives who dominate defence and foreign policy in the Bush administration are still determined to maintain the US position in Iraq. The attack on Iraq was the launch vehicle for their project to establish US global hegemony by demonstrating what happens to countries that defy the United States — that's why they put it on the agenda after Sept. 11, even though Saddam Hussein had no links with terrorists and Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. If they pulled out of Iraq now, their project would die too, so US troops must stay.

But if US troops stay and the uprising grows, Bush probably goes down in November, and it is Karl Rove's job to ensure that this doesn't happen. The president's alliance with the neocons was a marriage of convenience: if they threaten to drag him down, Rove's advice will be to cut loose from them. But can Bush actually do that without Iraq blowing up in everybody's faces?

He could do it if he could persuade other countries to send their troops in to hold the ring as US and “coalition” troops leave. The countries that refused to be implicated in Bush's invasion of Iraq — every major power except Britain, every Muslim country, and most other places, too — will go on refusing to send troops so long as they would be operating under US control, and facing all the resentment that the US occupation of Iraq has generated. But it would be different if the US really handed control over to the UN and pulled out of Iraq.

It should be obvious by now that the biggest security problem in Iraq is the American presence. Iraq is divided by language, religion and tribe, and the various contending groups (all of which have armed militias) would have a hard time putting a civilised and democratic compromise together even if they were free to shape the outcome. Knowing that those decisions will stay in Washington's hands removes any incentive to show restraint and bargain responsibly.

On the other hand, if you make it clear that their own actions will determine their future, and that they will have to live with the consequences for a very long time, they may surprise you by behaving responsibly. There's no guarantee, but there are no better options left in Iraq anyway.

A genuine American withdrawal, rotating US troops out on a fast-paced schedule as UN troops (mostly from Muslim countries) come in, could win Iraqis enough time to agree on a constitution, hold elections, and build an impartial army. It might also end in tears. But it offers a better chance of success than the present mess, and it would let Bush go into the November election with the troops all home and the final outcome in Iraq still open. That's probably what Karl Rove is telling him right now.

The writer is a London-based independent journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries.