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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: carranza2 who wrote (131609)	5/5/2004 4:35:02 PM
From: cnyndwllr	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Carranza2, that's an excellent post. It's well written, it's addressed to the point of my post and it's convincing in it's sound logic. I appreciate that. If you'll reread my posts, however, I think you'll see that I was making the point that this kind of prisoner-procured information is too valuable and too critical to the mission for the methods of it's extractions to be left to the independent actions of a few guards. In fact I think that most careful analysts would agree that this intelligence procurement must have been understood and designed at the highest levels. Either that or the Army and civilian authorities in Iraq are running such a poorly organized effort that the head doesn't know what the arms are doing. I'm certainly not saying that I can name names. What I am saying is that I've been around long enough to make some pretty good projections on how things work. I'd be happy to entertain any logical explanations of how this kind of information from prisoners could have been forthcoming without any intelligent and informed higher level leader being in the knowledge loop? Absent that, I think I'll stay with the view that it was very probable that these torture methods were sanctioned at the highest levels or, absent that, were ignored by those that wanted to know without being accountable for knowing. Because, after all, people don't turn against those they've fought with and against the ideas they've fought for within a few hours or days unless they have some pretty good incentives. Torture is a pretty good incentive and I can't think of what else could have been expected to work.

To: carranza2 who wrote (131609)	5/6/2004 12:50:42 AM
From: Bilow	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Hi carranza2; Re: "During pre-trial testimony of the contractor who built the columns, we learned for the first time that the top supports of the columns into which load-bearing beams were to be installed were put in backwards by the contractor, destroying the engineer's design intent. No one, unbelievably, caught this error. All of a sudden, my client is innocent, the contractor is in the soup, and the guns train on him instead of on the engineer." Probably because of the devastating nature of its mistakes, the military lives with a higher standard level for those in command. The basic principle is that those in command are generally responsible for the actions of those they command. There is a similar principle in engineering, and in any good company, probably. When a disaster occurs, after the "sinner seeking" has run its course, all should consider what they could have done that would have avoided the disaster. This is best done without the lawyers present. In the case of the backwards installed load bearing beams, the engineer could have done a number of things that would have reduced the probability of this particular error, such as: (a) not using components that are easily confused, (b) adding notes that indicate that they must be installed carefully, (c) providing for a test plan to measure the structure's resistance to failure, (d) writing an inspection plan for this sort of eventuality, (e) actually inspecting the building as it was being built, (f) adding fabrication holes in the component so that they cannot be installed upside down, etc. It usually takes a lot of people to make a disaster. The lawyers find a "black and white" case against some culprit, but it's not always the right one. Most real world situations are more grey than that. An engineering plan is not really enough to make a product. One also needs to take into account the capabilities of the people who will be doing the assembling. Undoubtedly a better contractor could have seen the error and avoided it. But a better engineer could have made a design that would be safe for a mediocre contractor to build. This principle, that critical engineering designs should be set up so that they only go together one way, is the only reason I am willing to fly in commercial aircraft. -- Carl