Saudi Arabia: The Shift Toward Precision Strikes
By Fred Burton
Summary
Islamist militants in Saudi Arabia increasingly are targeting the
housing
compounds and corporate offices of Western expatriates. The tactics
used in
the recent killings at the Oasis compound in Khobar indicate what is
likely a
new trend: Militants forsaking the spectacular attack for the precise.
Analysis
Last week, Stratfor's Terrorism Intelligence Weekly focused on the
likelihood
that al Qaeda sleeper cells are in place within the United States, and
what
countersurveillance operations could do to pre-empt an attack. We now
turn
our attention to Saudi Arabia -- where recent events also highlight the
importance of effective countersurveillance techniques.
Tactical Evolution
U.S. counterterrorism sources recently have told Stratfor they believe
new
attacks against expatriate housing compounds in Saudi Arabia are highly
probable -- a scenario that, in fact, was borne out early June 2, with
a
shooting outside a compound in Riyadh.
The Saudi government so far has not shown any ability to curb militant
activity effectively. Given the sophistication of, and striking
operational
similarities between, the recent attacks against Westerners in Yanbu
and
Khobar -- and the fact that the militants appear to have sharpened the
deadliness of their tactics since the Yanbu strike in early May -- it
appears
the militants are outpacing the Saudi security services.
In both cases, small -- four-man -- tactical groups carried out the
assaults,
employing a high degree of stealth and precision. In Yanbu, at least
some of
the gunmen were employees of ABB Lummus; they gained unfettered access
to the
target through long association and the cover provided by their
company-issued uniforms. In Khobar, the assailants wore military
uniforms --
a tactic that would have aided their entrance into the Al-Khobar
Petroleum
Center, the offices of Arab Petroleum Investments Corp. and also their
final
destination, the Oasis compound. Uniforms likely also aided their
escape from
the scene.
The targets themselves represent both a departure from attacks
traditionally
associated with Islamist militants, and what might be the ideal target
for
future operations abroad.
The energy-related facilities in Yanbu and Khobar were selected for two
reasons: First, they were symbols of Western business and influence in
the
Muslim world, and they were relatively .soft. targets -- company
offices and
residential compounds.
Symbolism -- as we have long been aware -- ranks high among al Qaeda.s
targeting priorities: Major attacks are planned with the goal of
capturing
the attention not only of Westerners, but of the Muslim world.
Symbolism
might have been on the minds of the militants when they dragged the
body of a
Briton from Khobar behind a vehicle for more than two kilometers -- a
scene
reminiscent of Mogadishu, Al Fallujah and Yanbu, and imagery that is
difficult to shake from the Western consciousness. By striking at the
heart
of the Saudi oil industry, the militants also sent a message to
sympathizers
who resent what they see as the theft of Arab wealth by foreign
infidels.
From another perspective, the Oasis housing compound and oil offices in
Yanbu
were lacking in security -- enhancing their attractiveness to
terrorists,
because ideal targets like embassies and military installations have
increased security significantly since the Sept. 11 attacks. Assailants
have
been forced to seek out large concentrations of Westerners elsewhere --
and
the security at places like the Oasis housing compound is no match for
the
sophistication the militants displayed.
Sophisticated Strikes
Judging from the details of the attacks and anecdotal evidence from the
survivors, both the Yanbu and Khobar strikes involved high levels of
pre-operational surveillance: Militants displayed intimate working
knowledge
of the facilities. layouts and the routines of security guards.
. In both cases, the attacks took place in the morning -- when the
day.s
activities were just beginning to get under way and, at the Oasis, when
gates
were crowded with early-morning commuters.
. In the Oasis incident, militants set off a small explosive device at
the
main gate as a diversion. They opened fire on vehicles at the
compound.s
entrance, then moved toward the houses.
. Once inside the compound, militants literally went door-to-door,
seeking
out Westerners for execution. As in Yanbu, they were careful to
separate out
Muslims and anyone of Middle Eastern origin: for instance, a Christian
woman
was allowed to go free after proving she was Lebanese, and an Iraqi
American
man lived to tell the tale of being asked to prove he was a follower of
Islam. Similarly, in Yanbu, a militant passed by a Filipino native,
saying,
.You are not what we are looking for..
One of the key differences between the Yanbu and Khobar incidents
points to
the likely shape of future attacks: Precision strikes.
Although the Yanbu killings were carried out by a local Islamist
militant
group, they were praised by al Qaeda.s top leader in the kingdom, Abdel
Aziz
al-Muqrin, as a good example to follow in targeting Westerners in Saudi
Arabia. Days before the May 29 Khobar attack, al-Muqrin endorsed the
use of
four-man cells in precision attacks. This statement meshed with
al-Muqrin.s
writings in previous weeks and months that focused on several tactical
themes: strikes within cities, strikes against corporations,
assassinations
and kidnappings.
Notably, the Khobar attacks were claimed by al-Muqrin himself -- a sign
that
al Qaeda not only approves small-scale, precision strikes, but is
adapting
its operations.
A Matter of Security
There is little that governments, businesses or expatriates in Saudi
Arabia
can do to protect themselves from these kinds of attacks, other than
stepping
up security around housing compounds and offices. And that in itself
could be
a questionable solution, if local -- mostly government -- security
forces are
employed.
At the Oasis compound, the gate guards -- who were unarmed -- fled at
the
first sign of violence. Afterward three of the four gunmen managed to
escape
arrest, even though they were surrounded by Saudi security forces -- a
fact
that suggests either incompetence or complicity on the part of the
security
forces, and certainly does nothing to alleviate fears of follow-on
attacks.
Tactically speaking, aggressive countersurveillance measures will be
necessary if further attacks are to be thwarted. Because the militants
obviously employed extensive pre-operational surveillance of the
targets in
Yanbu and Khobar, security services would be needed to watch for any
signs of
such activity around other Western-oriented facilities. An aggressive
countersurveillance program -- by trained security personnel -- can be
very
effective in disrupting militant plans. Once surveillance is noted, the
Saudi
authorities ideally would be contacted immediately to investigate and
intercede as necessary.
That said, it is difficult to understand why, in the aftermath of
Yanbu, a
permanent Saudi police presence was not in place at the Oasis compound
in
Khobar. It is possible that the kingdom.s security officials believed
threats
were limited to Riyadh and, to a lesser extent, the Red Sea coast.
However,
the recent trend has demonstrated that militants have a much wider
geographic
reach -- possibly nationwide -- and it would be surprising if security
is not
heightened around other Western facilities and neighborhoods throughout
the
kingdom. If government and local security services continue with
business as
usual, the militants will be able to as well.
Given the blows that Islamist militants have struck -- against both
Westerners and, by extension, the Saudi regime -- in recent weeks, the
support they have garnered from al Qaeda and the inability of the
security
infrastructure to deal with the threat, Stratfor sees an inevitable
increase
in the use of small assault teams in strikes against Western assets in
the
kingdom and beyond. Given the success rate of such actions so far --
compared
to recent failures to carry out large-scale suicide attacks in Jordan,
and
the manpower, investment and false starts that went into recent
successful
suicide bombings in Riyadh, this methodology of precision over
fire-power
easily could be adapted to many circumstances and theaters of operation
in
which Islamist militants have a vested interest in striking at the
West. |
