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To: TobagoJack who wrote (51233)	6/24/2004 4:20:19 AM
From: TobagoJack	Respond to of 74559

Saudi Amnesty Offer: A Desperate Move? Jun 23, 2004 stratfor.biz Speaking on state television June 23, Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler Crown Prince Abdullah offered Islamist militants a limited amnesty. The offer applies only to militants who turn themselves in within the next month. Abdullah said those not responsible for hurting anyone would not be prosecuted and that those who accept amnesty will not be put to death. The offer follows a string of militant attacks against Westerners, which culminated June 18 in the brutal slaying of American defense contractor Paul Johnson. The offer of amnesty will do little to win over the militants or reassure a terrified expatriate population. Instead, it makes the regime appear weak and frightened -- and desperate to negotiate rather than fight back. Abdullah did warn that those who didn't accept the amnesty would feel the "full might" of a security crackdown. So far, however, the country's security forces have scarcely shown themselves capable of containing the militants. Hence, Abdullah's repeated threats seem empty and desperate rather than sincere or threatening. In addition to today's speech, Abdullah has made the following statements: May 2, 2004: "The kingdom will eliminate terrorism no matter how long it takes." Aug. 14, 2003: "In the battle between powers of good and powers of evil, there is no room for neutrality or hesitancy ... He who protects or sympathizes with a terrorist is himself a terrorist and will receive his just punishment." May 14, 2003: "We promise that the nation is capable ... of putting an end to this corrupt band and its supporters so severely that they will not be able to rise again." From the militants' viewpoint, Abdullah is all hot air. Security forces have proven incapable of dealing with them, and several cops and military officers have been killed in shootouts with militants. Raids on militant hideouts are conducted almost as extra-judicial killings: Security forces rush in, guns blazing, with no attempt to capture the militants alive. The reason for this approach, Stratfor sources inside the kingdom say, is that security forces are relying on the element of surprise to survive the raids -- not risking the chance the militants will have time to fight back. In the streets of Riyadh, security personnel often are killed when suspected militants are stopped at checkpoints. Most of the country's police force has little or no experience with violence or combat and is considered inept due to lack of training and lack of will. The Saudi military and national guard also have little experience in live-combat situations. Another recent concern is the support militants likely are receiving from security forces: Interior Minister Prince Nayif has been accused of being sympathetic to the militants and/or actually supporting them. Washington will be less than convinced about Abdullah's latest threat of a crackdown and less than happy about even a limited amnesty. Neither is likely to work, and the time wasted in giving the militants a chance to repent is instead one more advantage al Qaeda can exploit for pursuing its offensive inside the kingdom. Copyright 2004 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.

To: TobagoJack who wrote (51233)	6/24/2004 4:21:41 AM
From: TobagoJack	Respond to of 74559

Al-Zarqawi's Threat, Iraq's Future Jun 23, 2004 stratfor.biz Summary An audiotape attributed to known militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi threatened the life of interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi on June 23 – a credible threat, in light of recent attacks. In response, the United States and the Iraqi government are taking steps to improve security. Should Allawi be killed, the United States would have a difficult time replacing him. Analysis An Islamist Web site published an audiotape June 23 that has been attributed to known militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in which the speaker threatened the life of interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and called him a puppet of the United States, like Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Given the poor security within Iraq, there is little doubt that al-Zarqawi and his Jamaat al-Tawhid and Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) group could follow through with the threat. Both the U.S. military and the interim Iraqi government are taking steps to improve security. However, improvement will not come immediately, and al-Zarqawi could strike against the government. If he kills Allawi, the United States will have a difficult time finding a suitable replacement for the prime minister. Al-Zarqawi proved that he was capable of successfully strikes against the highest levels of Iraqi leadership when his group assassinated the leader of the now defunct Interim Governing Council, Izz al-Deen Saleem, on May 17, and recent hostage crises show that al-Zarqawi and his group remain operational. In response, the U.S. military announced June 22 that it was prepared to assume security responsibilities for the Iraqi government following the June 30 transfer of power. Allawi also has said that he is prepared to declare martial law in efforts to improve security. Allawi was chosen as interim prime minister for two reasons: First, he is one of the few remaining secular Iraqi Shiite leaders that the United States trusts. Second, he has ties to the Baath party and its Sunni roots. If he is removed, the slim list of replacement candidates could engender more power struggles in Iraq. As far as the United States is concerned, Allawi’s replacement would have to be Shiite. Elevating a Kurd to prime minister would be tantamount to endorsing a separate Kurdish state in Iraq. However, it is conceivable that Deputy Prime Minister Bahrem Saleh – a Kurd – would be temporarily elevated to the post. A Sunni prime minister would only further enrage the Shiite majority, which already feels marginalized by recent developments. Putting another Shiite in the position seems to be the only logical solution, one that would be welcomed by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Only two possible replacements fit the criteria of secular Shia who aren’t completely in the pocket of al-Sistani: Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, leader of Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI); and Muffawaq al-Rubaie, former IGC member and current national security adviser to CPA chief L. Paul Bremer. Both men have ties to al-Sistani, and both have displayed a willingness to work with the United States -- factors that make them agreeable to both the U.S. and the Shiite religious leadership, as each seeks to counter the other’s influence in the new Iraq. Having been sidelined in the formation of the new Iraqi government, al-Sistani would likely welcome the removal of Prime Minister Allawi as an opportunity to regain influence in Baghdad. The political machinations that could occur following Allawi’s removal might stir up another lingering problem for the United States -- Muqtada al-Sadr. Theoretically, an interim Iraqi government granted sovereignty by the United States could elect Allawi’s successor in the event of his death. The uncertainty of that choice would likely prompt the United States to intervene in the replacement nomination process, perhaps through U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. U.S. influence in the election would add more fuel to Iraqi militant arguments that their new government is anything but sovereign. Al-Sadr and other hardliners would almost certainly exploit it as a reason for continued insurgency against the United States, its allies and the Iraqi government. This course of events would bolster the legitimacy of men like al-Sadr -- who has resisted cooperation with the United States -- over al-Hakim, al-Rubaie, al-Sistani and others viewed as collaborators. None of these scenarios will come to pass if Allawi remains in power until elections are held in January 2005 -- which makes it likely that the United States will strengthen security for the Iraqi government leadership. This prospect makes al-Zarqawi’s comparison of Allawi to Hamid Karzai all the more relevant, given that the Afghan leader is under heavy U.S. guard. Copyright 2004 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.

To: TobagoJack who wrote (51233)	6/24/2004 4:22:52 AM
From: TobagoJack	Respond to of 74559

Iraq: Al-Sadr's Political Play Jun 23, 2004 stratfor.biz Summary Radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr rejected an invitation from the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) on June 23 to attend next month's national conference. Cognizant of his strong position, al-Sadr is trying to extract as much political recognition as possible. Given ties to Iran via his mentor Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Kadhim al-Husseini al-Haeri, al-Sadr's move is also a signal from Tehran to Washington that the Islamic republic still holds the key to U.S. plans for Iraq. Analysis Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr has turned down an invitation to participate in a national convention that will choose an advisory body to Iraq's new Cabinet. The Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) offered only one seat at the conference to al-Sadr's large movement. An aide said June 23 that he turned down the invitation after three days of deliberations. Al-Sadr knows that his current political position is both secure and strong. By turning down the offer, he is trying to exert maximum political influence. To produce the desired results in any future elections, al-Sadr needs leverage in the IIG -- and since he is not an IIG member himself, he must be able to exert strong influence over it through the advisory body that will oversee the cabinet led by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Aside from securing his own position with regards to Iraqi domestic politics, al-Sadr's moves also benefit Iran at a time when it is involved in a brewing crisis with the United States. Like nearly all Iraqi Shiite political actors, al-Sadr is closely connected with Tehran. His move signals that Iran can create problems for Washington if it needs to. Given al-Sadr's popularity among Iraq's majority Shiite community, the invitation to the national convention appears to be a move by Washington and its Iraqi allies to contain the leader. The timing of al-Sadr's rejection -- and the fact that he took three days to deliberate upon the invitation -- indicates that his response was not a local decision. After all, he could have rejected the invitation immediately. It is well known that al-Sadr regularly seeks political advice from his marjiya, the Qom (Iran)-based Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Kadhim al-Hussein al-Haeri. He took three days to respond to the offer because Iran needed the time to evaluate how it could leverage the move for further posturing against United States. The future composition of a post-Hussein government is one of the premier foreign policy concerns of the clerical Iranian regime. Therefore, it is unlikely that al Haeri is acting without official indulgence from Tehran. Iran needs proxies such as al-Sadr and other sundry Shiite players in southern Iraq. Likewise, these Iraqi Shiite players -- including Hawza leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the leaders of Hizb al-Dawah, Iraq's largest Shiite political group -- need Iran to bolster their positions. This interdependence has only increased since the U.S. decision to ignore the Shia in its political maneuverings within Iraq. After being recognized by both interim Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawar and interim Prime Minister Allawi -- and even U.S. President George W. Bush -- al-Sadr feels sufficiently comfortable politically to reject his first tangible offer of inclusion in mainstream Iraqi politics. This rejection also represents a friendly reminder from Iran that the United States should refrain from creating problems for Tehran. Otherwise, Iran has the means to return the favor. The IIG will likely give in and allow al-Sadr's group to send more delegates to the convention. Al-Sadr's broad popularity in Baghdad and the Shiite cities of Karbala, Al Kut and An Najaf could potentially bring thousands out for mass street protests -- something that neither the United States nor the IIG wants during the few remaining days before the handover of power. The Shiite leader has also recently built a tentative alliance with al-Sistani -- a move that strengthens his negotiating hand. Copyright 2004 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.

To: TobagoJack who wrote (51233)	6/24/2004 4:23:58 AM
From: TobagoJack	Respond to of 74559

U.S. and Iran: Beneath the Roiled Surface Jun 23, 2004 stratfor.biz By George Friedman We are in a pattern of escalating confrontation between Iran and the United States and its allies. Two issues have surfaced. There is the question of Iran's nuclear program. And there is the more urgent question of Iran's capture of three British patrol boats along the Iraq-Iran frontier. Neither of these surface issues is trivial, but the underlying issues are far more significant. The fact that they have surfaced indicates how serious the underlying questions are, and points to serious tensions between the Iranians and the United States. Iran has historically faced two threats. Russia has pressed it from the north; during and after World War II, the Soviets occupied a substantial part of Iran, as did the British. The other threat has come from the west -- from Iraq, from its predecessor states or from states that have occupied Iraq, including Britain. The collapse of the Soviet Union has gone a long way toward securing Iran's northern frontier. In fact, the instability to Iran's north has created opportunities for it to extend its influence in that direction. Iraq, however, has remained a threat. Iraq's defeat in Desert Storm decreased the threat, with the weakening of Iraq's armed forces and constant patrolling of Iraqi skies by U.S. and British warplanes. But what Iran wanted most to see -- the collapse of the hated Saddam Hussein regime and its replacement by a government at least neutral toward Iran and preferably under Iranian influence -- did not materialize. One of the primary reasons the United States did not advance to Baghdad in 1991 was the fear that an Iraqi collapse would increase Iran's power and make it the dominant force in the Persian Gulf. Iran Develops a Strategy Subsequently, Iran's goals were simple: ....

To: TobagoJack who wrote (51233)	6/24/2004 4:25:47 AM
From: TobagoJack	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 74559

Geopolitical Diary: Tuesday, June 22, 2004 Jun 23, 2004 stratfor.biz Kim Sun Il, a South Korean hostage in Iraq, was beheaded by his al Qaeda-linked captors June 22. The beheading follows those of Americans Paul Johnson in Saudi Arabia on June 18 and Nicholas Berg in Iraq on May 11. Two other hostages have been killed recently in Iraq -- Lebanese Hussein Ali Alyan, who was killed June 11 in what was described as a "grisly" manner (with some reports that his throat was slit or he was beheaded), and Italian contractor Fabrizio Quattrocchi, whose April 15 execution was so "brutal" that Al Jazeera refused to air the videotape of it (there is speculation he was shot and then beheaded). The use of beheading in hostage situations is a growing trend among al Qaeda-linked groups in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the incidents mentioned above, during the May 29 militant raid in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, for example, several foreigners had their throats cut by the attackers -- incidents that were later discussed in detail by the attackers on the Internet. The message that such methods sends is one of fear and hopelessness for the kidnap victims -- and for their respective governments. This is in part the reason for using such tactics. In the cases of Berg, Johnson and Kim, all three of whom appeared on videotape in orange jumpsuits similar to those worn by detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the militants issued specific demands for the release of the hostages. For Berg, they called for the release of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison; for Johnson, it was the release of al Qaeda prisoners in Saudi Arabia and the withdrawal of U.S. and other Western workers in the kingdom; and for Kim it was the reversal of South Korea's decision to deploy approximately 3,000 additional troops to Iraq. The militants knew their demands would not be met, but they were targeting the general population with their message. Al Qaeda and its militant allies are attempting a variation on the Madrid attack -- which they saw as a viable way of stirring a people against their government. Support for the war in Iraq is waning in the United States, something of which al Qaeda and the U.S. administration are very keenly aware. While Washington seeks to minimize military casualties in Iraq between now and the November election, al Qaeda is seeking to increase the number -- or at least the notoriety -- of such killings in an effort to further split the U.S. population from the administration. While the chances of success are limited in the United States, the prospects are much better in South Korea. Anti-American sentiments in South Korea are already at one of their cyclical high points, playing off of the U.S. troop redeployment, the North Korean nuclear crisis talks and the war in Iraq, which remains rather unpopular. Seoul's decision to deploy additional troops to Iraq -- enough to soon make South Korean troops the third largest contingent in the country behind the United States and Britain -- has little support among the general population, and what support there was began slipping away when news of Kim's abduction emerged. While the South Korean government remains committed to the troop deployment -- albeit less as a way to appease Washington than a way to establish a more independent position in the Middle East -- the popular support that swelled for President Roh Moo Hyun during his impeachment proceedings is declining. Even the ruling Uri Party is fracturing over the deployment, further weakening Roh. But anti-U.S. sentiments are being exploited by progressive factions in South Korea even more than anti-Roh sentiments, and much of the anger is being directed against U.S. President George W. Bush and the U.S. government. The blame for the kidnapping and death are being laid at U.S. feet. While this is an emotional response, it affects the tenor of relations between the two nations. At a time when nuclear talks with North Korea are once again breaking down before they start due to differences between the United States and South Korea, and at a time when South Koreans are questioning the motives of the U.S. force restructuring in South Korea, the killing of Kim is resonating across the Peninsula. This, for al Qaeda, will be seen as a tactical victory in the ongoing international campaign. While U.S.-South Korean relations will not be irrevocably damaged by the incident, the South Korean government will find it difficult in the short term to balance domestic pressures and the need to redefine a clear and cooperative relationship with the United States. Copyright 2004 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.

To: TobagoJack who wrote (51233)	6/24/2004 4:29:45 AM
From: TobagoJack	Respond to of 74559

<<Contrarians, put you money where your mouth is isx-iq.net >> ... hmm, outnumbered, no clue, no suitable weapons, fuel in danger, financing is if-ish, too hot and too tired, never bothered with Plan B, assets are highly valued, no chance for investment returns, no end in sight ... or in imagination ... ... so, what are we waiting for? must be time to try for speculative gains on the NYSE where issues are uncertain and some investments in the isx-iq.net where all the risks are known and priced in ;0) Chugs, Jay