Here...check them out. Your first assertion is entirely false.
You should be ashamed of lying like that.
An examination of the Bush military files within the context of US Statutory Law, Department of Defense regulations, and Air Force policies and procedures of that era lead to a single conclusion: George W. Bush was considered a deserter by the United States Air Force.
After Bush quit TXANG, he still had nine months of his six-year military commitment left to serve. As a result, Bush became a member of the Air Force Reserves and was transferred to the authority of the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) in Denver, Colorado. Because this was supposed to be a temporary assignment, ARPC had to review Bush’s records to determine where he should ultimately be assigned. That examination would have led to three conclusions: That Bush had “failed to satisfactorily participate” as defined by United States law and Air Force policy, that TXANG could not account for Bush’s actions for an entire year, and that Bush’s medical records were not up to date. Regardless of what actions ARPC contemplated when reviewing Bush’s records, all options required that Bush be certified as physically fit to serve, or as unfit to serve. ARPC thus had to order Bush to get a physical examination, for which Bush did not show up. ARPC then designated Bush as AWOL and a “non-locatee” (i.e. a deserter) who had failed to satisfactorily participate in TXANG, and certified him for immediate induction through his local draft board. Once the Houston draft board got wind of the situation, strings were pulled; and documents were generated which directly contradict Air Force policy, and which were inconsistent with the rest of the records released by the White House.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
Organization of the Air Reserve Forces
Bush’s Service Requirements
Bush’s Record as a Member of the Texas Air National Guard
BUSH, THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD, AND THE AIR FORCE
THE RECORDS OF A DESERTER
“FAILURE TO SATISFACTORILY PARTICIPATE”
ALL ROADS LEAD TO A MEDICAL EXAMINATION
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEPTEMBER 15TH
A CONVENIENT WORD FOR “DESERTER”
HOUSTON, YOU HAVE A PROBLEM
THE REHABILITATION OF GEORGE W. BUSH
DID BUSH’S REHABILITATION REALLY HAPPEN?
APPENDIX 1: THE “NOT OBSERVED” OETR, AND THE UNIFORM MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORD
APPENDIX 2—THE “NON-LOCATEE” ADDRESS SEQUENCE
APPENDIX 3—THE SIXTH MONTHS EXTENSION OF SERVICE CONTROVERSY
INTRODUCTION
For the eighteen months prior to his quitting the Texas Air National Guard (TXANG), George W. Bush had ignored his obligations to the US Military, statutory and regulatory US Law, and Air Force regulations and policies. And for as long as he was being “supervised” by TXANG, he got away with it.
Very little attention has been paid to the period of Bush’s “service” after he left Texas and was assigned to the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) in Denver, Colorado. But it is during this period that Bush’s dereliction of duty—including his failure to participate in mandatory training, and his failure to maintain his flight status—came home to roost.
Unlike TXANG, ARPC took America’s national security—and the role played by Guardsmen and Reservists in maintaining US security—quite seriously.
The proof of this is the “ARF Retirement Credit Summary” dated January 30, 1974, which shows that Bush was placed in an “Inactive Status” effective September 15th, 1973. This document is the proverbial “smoking gun” which proves that the Air Force considered George W. Bush to have been a deserter.
ARF RETIREMENT CREDIT SUMMARY (AF Form 526) for 1973-74 “RETIREMENT YEAR”
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From AFM 35-3, Chapter 19, Para 19-2
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Under Air Force policy in force at that time, the only way that someone in Bush’s position could be placed in an “Inactive Status” was if they were being “completely severed from military status.” And the only way that could happen is if someone had become permanently disabled, or deserted. Bush was not disabled.
Instead, consistent with contemporaneous laws, regulations, and procedures, ARPC had reviewed Bush’s records, and found that he had failed to “satisfactorily participate” as a member of TXANG. Bush was then ordered to active duty, for which he did not show up. ARPC then certified him for immediate induction as a “non-locatee” (e.g. a deserter) through the Selective Service System.
This is the only explanation that is consistent with Bush’s military records and Air Force policy of that era.
It is also clear that the Bush records were tampered with to hide this fact. Many documents were thrown out that should have been kept, and there is indisputable evidence that at least one key document has been altered.
The documentary evidence also strongly suggests that when news of Bush’s situation reached Texas, strings were pulled that resulted in Bush being “rehabilitated” in a manner completely inconsistent with Air Force policy.
The paper trail is incomplete, and in some cases ambiguous. But “clerical error” is not sufficient to explain the anomalies, because the level of “coincidence” required for a “clerical error” explanation is well beyond any rational possibility.
Because Bush’s records are incomplete, a full understanding of what Bush’s records represent, and how they must be interpreted, can only be achieved through an understanding of what each document means within its specific context.
BACKGROUND
(Note: What happened after Bush quit the Texas Air National Guard was based in large part on what Bush did as a member of TXANG. For a more detailed explanation of Bush’s military obligations, see BUSH'S ATTENDANCE OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY. For fuller details concerning reassignments between Air Force components THE RELOCATING GUARDSMAN: A PROCEDURAL PRIMER. Scanned copies of the relevant US Statutes, Department of Defense regulations, and Air Force policies and procedures cited in this article are linked at the SOURCE DOCUMENTS page.)
Organization of the Air Reserve Forces
The “Reserve” component of the US Air Force was known as the Air Reserve Forces (ARF) and was divided into two primary components, the Air National Guard (ANG) and the United States Air Force Reserve (USARF).
From: 32 USC 501a (National Guard Training)
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Overall policy was set by the ARF, and policy differences between the two components were minor. This was true, in no small part, because United States Statutory law required that Air National Guard discipline and training had to “conform to that of the Air Force.”
The main differences were procedural; ANG units were under the (titular) control of the States, while USARF units were controlled directly by the Federal government. Decisions concerning ANG personnel had to go through a state hierarchy before being “recognized” by the US government.
The Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) in Denver Colorado was where personnel policies for ARF were administered. In general, it appears that ARPC did not micro-manage the affairs of ANG units. But when something especially egregious occurred, ARPC took notice.
ARPC also “commanded” reservists who were not affiliated with either USARF or ANG units.
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The Obligated Reserve Section (ORS) is where obligors (military personnel who had an unfulfilled Military Service Obligation—the minimum term of military service as required under Federal Statutory law) were assigned who were not assigned to a specific National Guard or Air Force Reserves unit with which they could train. ORS is where Bush was transferred to when he was discharged from TXANG. ORS was a “Ready Reserve” section of ARPC, containing those members who were required to be ready to immediately report for active duty if the President declared a national security emergency.
The Non-Affiliated Reserve Section (NARS), was the “active status” Standby Reserve, consisting of members who were subject to an involuntary active duty call-up if Congress acted (e.g. declared a state of war, and/or authorized the mobilization of Stand-by Reservists ). Members were assigned to NARS because of hardship, because they were unfit for duty, or because they were special case “excess personnel”.
NARS-A was the section in which non-obligors would be assigned, and NARS-B was where obligors were assigned. (Bush wound up in NARS-B, but there is no document which explains how he got there.)
The Inactive Standby Reserve List Section (ISLRS) of ARPC was where those who were in “inactive status” (which meant they were no longer effectively affiliated with the Reserves) were assigned.
The term “Ready Reserve” refers to those who had a “Ready Reserve Service Agreement” (RRSA) in effect. This was a contract that Reservists with an MSO were required to sign, agreeing to be called up for active duty in the event a national emergency was declared.
The RRSA was one of the ways that the ARF exercised control over the ANG. “Federal recognition” of ANG members was contingent upon their having an RRSA in place, and without “Federal recognition” the Federal government would not issue you a paycheck or reimburse the state government for your training. A current RRSA was also required to maintain draft-deferred status.
Bush’s Service Requirements
The regulations and requirements to which Bush was subject were based on his status as an “obligor” with an RRSA. Bush’s MSO referred to the length of his required service, his RRSA defined the terms under which he would serve.
Although personnel policies are full of exceptions, those policies can be divided into two main categories.
1) Policies concerning Reservists and Guardsmen with a “unfulfilled” Military Service Obligation (MSO). This was the requirement to serve for a certain number of years upon enlistment, based on US Statutory law[1]. (Bush had a six year MSO which ended on May 26, 1974).
2) Policies concerning Reservists and Guardsmen who had completed their MSO.
From: 10 USC 262 (Purpose of Reserves)
The purpose of the National Guard was to “provide trained units and qualified individuals available for active duty…as the national security requires.” In order to fulfill its purpose, specific criteria was established for both “training” and “qualifications”.
Chief among these criteria was the requirement that Bush “satisfactorily participate” as a member of the Air Reserve Forces, and the requirement to “conform with the standards and qualifications” established for his position (his AFSC or Air Force Specialty Code.) .
From: CFR Title 10, Sec. 101.2 (Training Requirements)
The criteria for “satisfactory participation” for Guardsmen were established in the US Statutes and Code of Federal Regulations. This included mandatory participation in 48 scheduled four-hour periods of “inactive duty training” with their units (Unit Training Assemblies, or UTAs) per fiscal year. (Until 1977, the fiscal year ran from July 1 to June 30.) UTA weekends were held on one weekend each month, with two UTAs schedules on Saturday and two on Sunday.
From: CFR Title 10, Sec. 101.3(b)(2) (no more than 10% "unexcused absences") )
A missed UTA for which substitute training had been performed was considered an “excused absence.” Any missed period for which no substitute training was performed was defined by law as an “unexcused absence”. If at any point during a given fiscal year, a Guardsman had more than four unexcused absences (more than 10%), he had “failed to satisfactorily participate” as defined by law.
Among the “standards and qualifications” that Bush was required to conform to was the requirement to maintain his flight status by accomplishing an annual physical, as well as maintaining the skills and knowledge required for his AFSC by training as a pilot with his unit.
A Guardsman who failed to meet the requirements was subject to various punitive measures. Chief among these was an involuntary call to active duty for up to 24 months. A Guardsman or Reservist who failed to “satisfactorily participate” could also lose his draft-deferred status and be certified for immediate induction into the Armed Forces through the Selective Service System. This latter provision, however, was only implemented when an Air Reserve Forces member failed to show up for “involuntary active duty” as ordered, and could not be located.
Bush’s Record as a Member of the Texas Air National Guard
There is no question that Bush “failed to satisfactorily participate” as defined under law. In fiscal year 1971-72, Bush had “unexcused absences” from his mandatory unit training in May and June, 1972 . (Until 1977, the fiscal year ran from July 1 to June 30.) In fiscal year 1972-73, Bush had “unexcused absences” for three months of mandatory training (June, July, August, 1972.) (See The Points Scam and The Payroll Scam.)
There is also no question that Bush failed to “conform to the standards and qualifications” established for his AFSC. Chief among those qualifications for a pilot was maintaining one’s flight status, and training with his unit of assignment. Bush’s failure to maintain his flight status for the last 13 months of his tenure with TXANG, and his failure to participate in training with his unit for at least 13 of his last 17 months with TXANG, demonstrate conclusively that Bush was not meeting the standards for a pilot set by the Secretary of Defense.
BUSH, THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD, AND THE AIR FORCE
Even before Bush was transferred to ARPC (ORS), he had been brought to the attention of ARPC on two occasions. The first was when Bush tried an “end run” around his training and participation requirements (“Training Category A”) by attempting to get a transfer to a “Training Category G” unit (the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron). The 9921st was a special kind of unit which neither offered, nor required, the kind of training that Bush was obligated by law to perform[2].
ARPC’s response was short and to the point, and demonstrated that the Air Force took Reserve Training seriously. TXANG was told the obvious; that the regulations forbade the scam that Bush was trying to pull. (see The Transfer Scam).
ARPC rejection of Bush’s request to transfer to an Air Reserve Squadron
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Bush was next brought to the attention of ARPC when his superior officers submitted Bush’s annual “Officer Effectiveness Training Report” (OETR) claiming that Bush “has not been observed at this unit” for an entire year, stating that Bush had been doing “equivalent training in a non-flying status” with a unit in Alabama.
This was, to say the least, a highly unusual OETR. Not only had a pilot not shown up for a year with his assigned unit, he had spent the entire year not flying. In addition, “equivalent training” meant that Bush had been on active duty on the days that his Texas unit had its mandatory scheduled monthly weekend of inactive duty training (“Unit Training Assemblies” or UTAs). But the section of the OER where Bush’s “raters” were supposed to show the number of active duty days (and inactive duty training periods) attended by Bush was left blank.
In other words, this OETR was highly irregular , which provides the context in which to view the ARPC’s response (Figure 4). If, as the documentary evidence strongly suggests (see Appendix 1), ARPC had done even a cursory examination of Bush’s records, they would already know that there was something seriously awry at Ellington Air Force Base in Texas. They also would have known that their instructions that TXANG obtain an evaluation[3] of Bush’s performance from the 187th in Alabama would be impossible to carry out.
ARPC response (dated 6/29/73) to TXANG’s “not observed” Officer Effectiveness Report on Bush
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What may be most remarkable about this document is that APRC uses this “Notice” for more than just getting a “corrected” training report. Instead ARPC directly criticizes TXANG’s action with concern to Bush, letting Texas know that allowing Bush to train as anything other than a pilot is unacceptable as long as TXANG permitted Bush to call himself a pilot, and making it clear that TXANG was responsible for Bush’s conduct.
This “Notice of Correction” demonstrates once again that the Air Force took Bush’s training requirements very seriously. Unlike with TXANG, there is no evidence that suggests that the Air Force would not enforce the laws, regulations, and policies to which Bush was subject.
The ARPC’s actions with regard to Bush during his tenure with the Texas Air National Guard provide the context in which the documents concerning Bush’s last year of his MSO must be interpreted. These documents show that once Bush was placed in the hands of ARPC, he was not allowed to continue to ignore the laws of the United States, and Air Force regulations and policies, and that ARPC would take the steps necessary to ensure that prescribed policies and procedures were followed. (For a more detailed look at the OETR controversy, see The OETR Scam.)
THE RECORDS OF A DESERTER
From AFM 35-3, Chapter 12, Para 12-16b
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Whenever a member of the Air National Guard was discharged to ARPC, his record of service was reviewed. (See The Discharge Scam.) For this review to be accomplished, the personnel office of Bush’s TXANG unit (Consolidated Base Personnel Office, or CBPO) was required to transfer his Unit Personnel Record Group (UPRG) files to ARPC.
Yet, according to documents in the Bush files, this automatic records transfer did not take place. Thus, APRC was not able to begin its full review of his records. However, ARPC would have access to its own files on Bush. And those files would have included the Notice of Missing or Correction of Officer Effectiveness Training Report issued dated June 29,1973, demanding more information from Bush’s unit (the 111th Fighter Interceptor Squadron) on Bush’s whereabouts and training. This “Notice” had a “suspense date” (the date by which a response was required) of August 6, 1973. By mid-October, TXANG had failed to supply ARPC with the required information.
ARPC’s apparent response to the 111th’s repeated failure to supply ARPC with required information was to demand that information directly from the head of Texas Air National Guard.
Bush’s records were not transferred to ARPC until November 15, 1973.
Records Transmittal Form from the TXANG Chief of Military Personnel, dated 11/15/03
The Record Transmittal Form demonstrates the extraordinary nature of what was happening in Bush’s records. The bottom of the form contains a section in which the accuracy and completeness of the records are verified “BY LOSING CBPO/GSU.” This phrase is printed on the form, indicating that this verification is supposed to be done by a member’s “personnel office.” Yet this phrase is crossed out on the form, in order to indicate that Major Charles K. Shoemake, the head of Personnel for TXANG was responsible for the records.
On the same date (November 15, 1973) that Bush’s Unit Personnel Records Group was being transferred to ARPC, Shoemake signed a memo on behalf of the head of the TXANG. The message was “Basic communication complied with.” The subject of the memo was the “Notice of Missing or Correction” that had never been responded to. Attached to the memo was an AF Form 77a (a “Supplemental Sheet” to the Officer Effectiveness Training Report).
Shoemake memo sent to ARPC dated 11/15/73
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The AF Form 77a that was attached to this memo told ARPC that Bush’s unit could not provide any information regarding the training which Bush was required to perform for an entire year.
TXANG had reported that Bush had been training in Alabama for a full year. Under ordinary circumstances, whenever a Guardsman was assigned to another unit for training, the “training unit” automatically supplied the Guardsman’s unit an AF 77a, which would be submitted along with the annual training report from the Guardsman’s unit.
ARPC told TXANG that an “AF Fm 77a should be requested from the training unit so that this officer can be rated”. TXANG did not do so. Instead, it told ARPC that Bush could not be rated for an entire year, and that the required training report for an entire year would not be forthcoming “for administrative reasons.”
In essence, TXANG told ARPC that Bush had been AWOL for an entire year.
TXANG acknowledges it cannot account for Bush’s training for an entire year
From 10 USC 1163 (Limitations on Dismissal)
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That Bush was considered AWOL is confirmed by the fact that under Federal law, as a commissioned officer Bush could not be “dismissed” from the Armed Forces unless he was either court-martialed, or had been determined to be AWOL for at least three months. Because Bush could only be placed on inactive status if he was being “completely severed from military status”, it would have been impossible under US Statutory Law for ARPC to change Bush’s status to “Inactive” if Bush had not considered AWOL.
“FAILURE TO SATISFACTORILY PARTICIPATE”---more........... |
