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Politics : Just the Facts, Ma'am: A Compendium of Liberal Fiction -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: cirrus who wrote (19450)10/27/2004 11:53:37 AM
From: Oeconomicus  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 90947
 
LOL. It is not an Oliver Stone movie - it is a fact. Saddam Hussein actively supported terrorism. You need look no farther than his bounties paid to families of suicide bombers attacking Israeli civilians.

The air must be thin up there - your mind is disfunctional.



To: cirrus who wrote (19450)10/28/2004 8:06:11 AM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 90947
 
Saddam Funded Terrorists

Captain Ed

The Scotsman, doing yeoman work on the Duelfer report on the Iraq Survey Group investigation, reports that recently uncovered documents reveal a series of payments to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The PFLP is a PLO splinter group that has spent most of the time since Oslo setting off car bombs to derail the peace processes, such as they are:

<<<The PFLP, whose history of terrorism dates back to the "black September" hijackings of 1970, was personally vetted by Saddam to receive oil vouchers worth £40 million.
The deal has been uncovered by US investigators, trawling millions of pages of documents showing a network of diplomats bribed by Saddam’s regimes, and political parties who qualified for backhanded payments from Baghdad.

The Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which is still working its way through 20,000 boxes of documents from Saddam’s Baath party discovered only recently, found a list of pressure groups bankrolled by Saddam.

Using the United Nations’ own oil-for-food scheme - ironically intended as a sanction to control the behaviour of his dictatorship - Saddam gave Awad Ammora & Partners, a Syrian company, two million barrels of oil.

Documents handed over to US authorities by a former Iraqi oil minister only four months ago show that this was a front for the PFLP - which was then embarked on a spate of car bombings aimed at Israeli officials.>>>

Unlike other deals listed in the Oil-For-Food program, the AAP deal was completed, meaning the money went to the PFLP as planned. Forty million pounds sterling went from Saddam directly to terrorists, and long-standing terrorists at that. The PFLP accomplished the spectacular simultaneous hijacking of four American jets in 1970, an eerie foreshadowing of 9/11 and likely an inspiration for the al-Qaeda operation. They've focused more on bombings targeting Israel in the past few years, and just announced this week that they would merge with Hamas.

Not only does this show how the UN allowed money to flow through Saddam to our (other) enemies, aided and abetted by our so-called allies that some feel are essential to approving our national-security initiatives, it demonstrates that Saddam had no qualms about funding and supporting terrorists. Bear in mind that these payments went out while Saddam was supposedly "contained" and "in his box", as John Kerry likes to put it. Saddam never had it so good, we now know; he could rely on his European enablers to veto any attempt to enforce UNSC resolutions and to turn a blind eye to the massive corruption that allowed the UN to feed Saddam's iron grip on Iraqi oil revenue. Saddam, in turn, spread the wealth around to terrorists like the PFLP.

Perhaps now the American media will finally start telling the truth about Saddam. Or perhaps they'll continue to wait until November 3.



To: cirrus who wrote (19450)10/28/2004 8:10:48 AM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 90947
 
HusseinandTerror.com

Introducing a new resource.

NRO
October 20, 2004, 8:55 a.m.

Americans who still believe Saddam Hussein had no ties to terrorists in general or al Qaeda in particular should visit husseinandterror.com. This website is adapted from a speech I delivered on September 22 at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. Husseinandterror.com includes photographs of Baathist-supported terrorists, pictures of the mayhem they have perpetrated, and portraits of those they have killed, including American citizens. It offers disturbing proof that Saddam Hussein and his regime operated a one-stop-shop for terrorists, including cash, diplomatic assistance, safe haven, training, and even medical care.

Readers may be startled to see, among other things, copies of checks given to the families of Palestinian homicide bombers in Israel. Perhaps for the first time (not the case for NRO readers), they will read the words of former Italian prime minister Bettino Craxi explaining that terrorist Abu Abbas — ring leader of the October 1985 Achille Lauro cruise-ship hijacking — was freed from Italian custody because he traveled on an Iraqi diplomatic passport.

There also is a web image of an online CBS News story headlined, "Court Rules: Al Qaida, Iraq Linked." It discusses a May 7, 2003 decision by Clinton-appointed U.S. District Judge Harold Baer Jr. to award the families of two September 11 victims $104 million in damages after their attorney proved that Saddam Hussein's government provided "material support" to al Qaeda in the September 11 massacre. So much for Senator John Edwards's claim in the October 5 vice-presidential debate that "there is no connection between Saddam Hussein and the attacks of September 11th — period."

With the generous and able assistance of journalist, web designer, and fellow Twin Towers rebuilding advocate Justin Berzon, I have backed this evidence with 22 footnotes and suggestions for further reading on this subject, including links to 15 of my previous writings on this topic, all but one of them previously published on National Review Online.

The only mystery deeper than Osama bin Laden's home address is why the White House never has assembled a website, brochure, DVD, or even a speech presenting the overwhelming evidence of Saddam Hussein's philanthropy of terror.

Highlighting the clear and extensive links between Hussein and global terrorists, including al Qaeda, would help Americans understand this key rationale for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Communicating this message with Americans and audiences abroad would generate cheers rather than jeers for President Bush's decision to lead more than 30 countries in dislodging Saddam Hussein in March 2003.

While Team Bush discusses this vital issue in whispers, at best, I hope husseinandterror.com will help Americans learn how Saddam Hussein operated Grand Terror Terminal, and why handcuffing him last year was then, and remains today, the right thing to have done.


nationalreview.com



To: cirrus who wrote (19450)10/28/2004 8:18:39 AM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 90947
 
ABC News: Saddam, Al-Qaeda Linked Through Al-Zarqawi

Captains Quarters blog

ABC News posted a story to its website yesterday on the hunt for Ayman al-Zarqawi, the al-Qaeda leader whose attacks in Istanbul and the beheading of Nicholas Berg have catapulted him to the forefront of the war on terror. According to their final section of the story, titled "Training Under Bin Laden," ABC reports (hat tips RantingProfs, Blogosapien):

During the 1990s, Zarqawi trained under bin Laden in Afghanistan. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to northwestern Iraq and worked with poisons for use in potential attacks, officials say.

During the summer of 2002, he underwent nasal surgery at a Baghdad hospital, officials say. They mistakenly originally thought, however, that Zarqawi had his leg amputated due to an injury.

In late 2002, officials say, Zarqawi began establishing sleeper cells in Baghdad and acquiring weapons from Iraqi intelligence officials.

Late 2002? That preceded the American effort to get UNSC
Resolution 1441 passed, as well as our presentations to
the Council demonstrating Iraqi links to al-Qaeda.

Certainly, Saddam's willingness to allow Zarqawi to live in Baghdad demonstrates his affinity for promoting terrorism (just as his hosting of Abu Nidal and payment to families of suicide bombers). Surely Saddam would not have countenanced Zarqawi's establishment of sleeper cells and the transfer of weapons by the IIS to his groups without ensuring that he and Zarqawi were working together. In light of the discovery of the binary sarin shell, one has to wonder what other weapons Saddam may have transferred to al-Zarqawi. How about all those chemical weapons Zarqawi tried to use in Jordan, for example?

The only conclusion? Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda were active allies and Hussein provided material support for AQ's terrorism. That certainly supports the argument for war in Iraq and underscores the Bush contention this week that Iraq is the central front in the war on Islamofascist terror. However, don't expect the media to pursue ABC's lead on this story. As Cori Dauber puts it:

So, to review: the latest intelligence says that Zarqawi got ready for this period with help from Saddam's people -- before -- the war.
And ABC suddenly became a lot less skeptical of that claim today, either because it helped them get where they wanted to go, or because they have some reason to find this intell pretty damn good. But if it's the latter, they sure as hell weren't going to trumpet the fact that a key administration argument before the war is starting to look pretty good right now.

It also seems that the rest of the media doesn't care to trumpet it, either. Any idea why?

UPDATE: A well-respected blogger, one of my favorites, asks me why this is relevant given that we had committed to a "disarm or else" policy by late 2002 in the form of UNSC Resolution 1441. Good point, of course (I won't name the blogger as the question came by e-mail), but here's my answer: This revelation shows that 1441 itself was pointless, even if you hold that Saddam's involvement with al-Qaeda began at this point. All 1441 did was tip off Saddam that the jig was up and that we were going to get serious about enforcement of the cease-fire and the disarmament resolutions.

It also shows that al-Qaeda involvement in Iraq didn't
come about because of the American invasion of Iraq but
predated it, with Saddam's blessing.

Actually, the French tried to warn us in January 2003 that the proposed 18th UNSC resolution was a bad idea, politically as well as strategically, but the British insisted on trying to get it for domestic political reasons, according to a Vanity Fair article in May (as reported by the Guardian in March, which I blogged at the time). Realistically, Bush needed to go back to the UN for our own domestic politics too, although he certainly doesn't get credit for it now.

captainsquartersblog.com



To: cirrus who wrote (19450)10/28/2004 9:06:27 AM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 90947
 
9/11 Commission Report: Iraq

Posted by Jon Henke

While Iraq is certainly not central to the 9/11 Commission Report. I thought it could be interesting to see what they have to say about it.

Holy crap.

While certainly not conclusive evidence of extensive collaboration, the 9/11 report seems to give a great deal of weight to the charges that there were "ties" between Iraq and Al Qaeda. It also rains on the parades of one Mr Clarke, who had claimed Iraq was a diversion, that there was "absolutely no evidence that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda, ever". In fact, it is quite devastating on that point, using Clarke's own words. We'll get to it.

The important Iraq references....

Page 58 - Bin Laden built his Islamic army with groups in various countries, including Iraq.

Bin Ladin now had a vision of himself as head of an international jihad con federation. In Sudan, he established an “Islamic Army Shura” that was to serve as the coordinating body for the consortium of terrorist groups with which he was forging alliances. It was composed of his own al Qaeda Shura together with leaders or representatives of terrorist organizations that were still independent. In building this Islamic army, he enlisted groups from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea.

Page 61 - Bin Laden willing to explore a relationship with Iraq.

Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda—save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against “Crusaders” during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army.

Page 61 - Bin Laden agrees to stop supporting activities against Saddam; Reports indicate Saddam may have supported, or at least tolerated, Ansar al-Islam.

To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad’s control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin’s help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.

Page 61 - Bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, and asked for assistance. No evidence of an Iraqi response. This was not the last attempt.

With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request.55 As described below, the ensuing years saw additional efforts to establish connections.

Page 66 - Iraq took the initiative to contact Al Qaeda.

In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin’s public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin’s Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air attacks in December.

Page 125 - Clarke points out that Iraq had discussed hosting Bin Laden.

Clarke commented that Iraq and Libya had previously discussed hosting Bin Ladin, though he and his staff had their doubts that Bin Ladin would trust secular Arab dictators such as Saddam Hussein or Muammar Qadhafi.

Page 128 - Clarke suggests that a chemical factory is probably the result of an Iraq-Al Qaeda agreement. Chemical evidence backs that up.

The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had “reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.”109 This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was “probably a direct result of the Iraq–Al Qida agreement.” Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the “exact formula used by Iraq.”110 This language about al Qaeda’s “understanding” with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998.

Page 134 - Clarke discusses the possibility--even likelihood--that Bin Laden would move to Baghdad, if attacked in Afghanistan, and cooperate with Saddam.

[Clarke] wrote Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick that one reliable source reported Bin Ladin’s having met with Iraqi officials, who “may have offered him asylum.” Other intelligence sources said that some Taliban leaders, though not Mullah Omar, had urged Bin Ladin to go to Iraq. If Bin Ladin actually moved to Iraq, wrote Clarke, his network would be at Saddam Hussein’s service, and it would be “virtually impossible” to find him. Better to get Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, Clarke declared.134 Berger suggested sending one U-2 flight, but Clarke opposed even this. It would require Pakistani approval, he wrote; and “Pak[istan’s] intel[ligence service] is in bed with” Bin Ladin and would warn him that the United States was getting ready for a bombing campaign: “Armed with that knowledge, old wily Usama will likely boogie to Baghdad.”135 Though told also by Bruce Riedel of the NSC staff that Saddam Hussein wanted Bin Ladin in Baghdad, Berger conditionally authorized a single U-2 flight.

Page 334 - Clarke's report found anecdotal evidence of an Iraqi link to Al Qaeda, but no compelling case that Iraq was involved in 9/11.

Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke’s office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled “Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.” Rice’s chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. The memo found no “compelling case” that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons.

Page 335 - The Camp David discussions....

According to Rice, the issue of what, if anything, to do about Iraq was really engaged at Camp David. Briefing papers on Iraq, along with many others, were in briefing materials for the participants. Rice told us the administration was concerned that Iraq would take advantage of the 9/11 attacks. She recalled that in the first Camp David session chaired by the President, Rumsfeld asked what the administration should do about Iraq. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made the case for striking Iraq during “this round” of the war on terrorism.

Page 335 - DoD presents the three priorities: al Qaeda, the Taliban, Iraq

A Defense Department paper for the Camp David briefing book on the strategic concept for the war on terrorism specified three priority targets for initial action: al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. It argued that of the three, al Qaeda and Iraq posed a strategic threat to the United States. Iraq’s long-standing involvement in terrorism was cited, along with its interest in weapons of mass destruction.

Page 335 - Bush did not accept that Iraq was an immediate priority.

Secretary Powell recalled that Wolfowitz—not Rumsfeld—
argued that Iraq was ultimately the source of the
terrorist problem and should therefore be attacked.66
Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his
belief that Iraq was behind 9/11. “Paul was always of the
view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with,”
Powell told us. “And he saw this as one way of using this
event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem.” Powell said
that President Bush did not give Wolfowitz’s argument
“much weight.”67 Though continuing to worry about Iraq in
the following week, Powell said, President Bush saw
Afghanistan as the priority.

Page 335 - Bush decides Iraq is off the table, barring new information.

President Bush told Bob Woodward that the decision not to invade Iraq was made at the morning session on September 15. Iraq was not even on the table during the September 15 afternoon session, which dealt solely with Afghanistan.69 Rice said that when President Bush called her on Sunday, September 16, he said the focus would be on Afghanistan, although he still wanted plans for Iraq should the country take some action or the administration eventually determine that it had been involved in the 9/11 attacks.

Page 335 - A WoT Phase Two could include Iraq, if necessary.

At the September 17 NSC meeting, there was some further discussion of “phase two” of the war on terrorism.71 President Bush ordered the Defense Department to be ready to deal with Iraq if Baghdad acted against U.S. interests, with plans to include possibly occupying Iraqi oil fields.

Page 335 - Wolfowitz continues to push for Iraq.

Within the Pentagon, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz continued to press the case for dealing with Iraq. Writing to Rumsfeld on September 17 in a memo headlined “Preventing More Events,” he argued that if there was even a 10 percent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum priority should be placed on eliminating that threat. Wolfowitz contended that the odds were “far more” than 1 in 10, citing Saddam’s praise for the attack, his long record of involvement in terrorism, and theories that Ramzi Yousef was an Iraqi agent and Iraq was behind the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.73 The next day, Wolfowitz renewed the argument, writing to Rumsfeld about the interest of Yousef ’s co-conspirator in the 1995 Manila air plot in crashing an explosives-laden plane into CIA headquarters, and about information from a foreign government regarding Iraqis’ involvement in the attempted hijacking of a Gulf Air flight. Given this background, he wondered why so little thought had been devoted to the danger of suicide pilots, seeing a “failure of imagination” and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities.

Page 336 - Blair asks about Iraq; Bush tells him Iraq is not the immediate problem.

On September 20, President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the two leaders discussed the global conflict ahead. When Blair asked about Iraq, the President replied that Iraq was not the immediate problem. Some members of his administration, he commented, had expressed a different view, but he was the one responsible for making the decisions.

Page 336 - CENTCOM/General Franks wanted to plan for possible movement against Iraq. Bush rejected it.

Franks told us that he was pushing independently to do more robust plan ning on military responses in Iraq during the summer before 9/11—a request President Bush denied, arguing that the time was not right. (CENTCOM also began dusting off plans for a full invasion of Iraq during this period, Franks said.) The CENTCOM commander told us he renewed his appeal for further military planning to respond to Iraqi moves shortly after 9/11, both because he personally felt that Iraq and al Qaeda might be engaged in some form of collusion and because he worried that Saddam might take advantage of the attacks to move against his internal enemies in the northern or southern parts of Iraq, where the United States was flying regular missions to enforce Iraqi no-fly zones. Franks said that President Bush again turned down the request.

Page 502 - Iraqi Fedayeen member not involved with 9/11 plot.

We now know that two other al Qaeda operatives flew to Bangkok to meet Khallad to pass him money. See chapter 8. That was not known at the time. Mihdhar was met at the Kuala Lumpur airport by Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national. Reports that he was a lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi Fedayeen have turned out to be incorrect. They were based on a confusion of Shakir’s identity with that of an Iraqi Fedayeen colonel with a similar name, who was later (in September 2001) in Iraq at the same time Shakir was in police custody in Qatar.

Page 559 - Clarke and Bush dispute versions of post-9/11 meeting. Clarke's secretary claims they did meet, but Bush's manner was not "intimidating".

President Bush told us that Clarke had mischaracterized this exchange. On the evening of September 12, the President was at the Pentagon and then went to the White House residence. He dismissed the idea that he had been wandering around the Situation Room alone, saying, “I don’t do that.” He said that he did not think that any president would roam around looking for something to do. While Clarke said he had found the President’s tone “very intimidating,” (“Clarke’s Take on Terror,” CBSnews.com, Mar. 21, 2004, online at www.cbsnews.com/stories /2004/03/19/60minutes/printable607356.shtml), President Bush doubted that anyone would have found his manner intimidating. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004), Roger Cressey, Clarke’s deputy, recalls this exchange with the President and Clarke concerning Iraq shortly after 9/11, but did not believe the President’s manner was intimidating.

Page 559 - No credible evidence of Iraqi involvement in 1993 WTC bombing.


qando.net



To: cirrus who wrote (19450)10/28/2004 9:11:25 AM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 90947
 
Case Closed

From the November 24, 2003 issue: The U.S. government's secret memo detailing cooperation between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden.


by Stephen F. Hayes
11/24/2003, Volume 009, Issue 11

OSAMA BIN LADEN and Saddam Hussein had an operational relationship from the early 1990s to 2003 that involved training in explosives and weapons of mass destruction, logistical support for terrorist attacks, al Qaeda training camps and safe haven in Iraq, and Iraqi financial support for al Qaeda--perhaps even for Mohamed Atta--according to a top secret U.S. government memorandum obtained by THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

The memo, dated October 27, 2003, was sent from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith to Senators Pat Roberts and Jay Rockefeller, the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
It was written in response to a request from the committee as part of its investigation into prewar intelligence claims made by the administration. Intelligence reporting included in the 16-page memo comes from a variety of domestic and foreign agencies, including the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Much of the evidence is detailed, conclusive, and corroborated by multiple sources. Some of it is new information obtained in custodial interviews with high-level al Qaeda terrorists and Iraqi officials, and some of it is more than a decade old. The picture that emerges is one of a history of collaboration between two of America's most determined and dangerous enemies.

According to the memo--which lays out the intelligence in 50 numbered points--Iraq-al Qaeda contacts began in 1990 and continued through mid-March 2003, days before the Iraq War began. Most of the numbered passages contain straight, fact-based intelligence reporting, which in some cases includes an evaluation of the credibility of the source. This reporting is often followed by commentary and analysis.

The relationship began shortly before the first Gulf War. According to reporting in the memo, bin Laden sent "emissaries to Jordan in 1990 to meet with Iraqi government officials." At some unspecified point in 1991, according to a CIA analysis, "Iraq sought Sudan's assistance to establish links to al Qaeda." The outreach went in both directions. According to 1993 CIA reporting cited in the memo, "bin Laden wanted to expand his organization's capabilities through ties with Iraq."

The primary go-between throughout these early stages was Sudanese strongman Hassan al-Turabi, a leader of the al Qaeda-affiliated National Islamic Front. Numerous sources have confirmed this. One defector reported that "al-Turabi was instrumental in arranging the Iraqi-al Qaeda relationship. The defector said Iraq sought al Qaeda influence through its connections with Afghanistan, to facilitate the transshipment of proscribed weapons and equipment to Iraq. In return, Iraq provided al Qaeda with training and instructors."

One such confirmation came in a postwar interview with one of Saddam Hussein's henchmen. As the memo details:

4. According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, Iraqi intelligence established a highly secretive relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and later with al Qaeda. The first meeting in 1992 between the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and al Qaeda was brokered by al-Turabi. Former IIS deputy director Faruq Hijazi and senior al Qaeda leader [Ayman al] Zawahiri were at the meeting--the first of several between 1992 and 1995 in Sudan. Additional meetings between Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda were held in Pakistan. Members of al Qaeda would sometimes visit Baghdad where they would meet the Iraqi intelligence chief in a safe house. The report claimed that Saddam insisted the relationship with al Qaeda be kept secret. After 9-11, the source said Saddam made a personnel change in the IIS for fear the relationship would come under scrutiny from foreign probes.

A decisive moment in the budding relationship came in 1993, when bin Laden faced internal resistance to his cooperation with Saddam.

5. A CIA report from a contact with good access, some of whose reporting has been corroborated, said that certain elements in the "Islamic Army" of bin Laden were against the secular regime of Saddam. Overriding the internal factional strife that was developing, bin Laden came to an "understanding" with Saddam that the Islamic Army would no longer support anti-Saddam activities. According to sensitive reporting released in U.S. court documents during the African Embassy trial, in 1993 bin Laden reached an "understanding" with Saddam under which he (bin Laden) forbade al Qaeda operations to be mounted against the Iraqi leader.

Another facilitator of the relationship during the mid-1990s was Mahmdouh Mahmud Salim (a.k.a. Abu Hajer al-Iraqi). Abu Hajer, now in a New York prison, was described in court proceedings related to the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as bin Laden's "best friend." According to CIA reporting dating back to the Clinton administration, bin Laden trusted him to serve as a liaison with Saddam's regime and tasked him with procurement of weapons of mass destruction for al Qaeda. FBI reporting in the memo reveals that Abu Hajer "visited Iraq in early 1995" and "had a good relationship with Iraqi intelligence. Sometime before mid-1995 he went on an al Qaeda mission to discuss unspecified cooperation with the Iraqi government."

Some of the reporting about the relationship throughout the mid-1990s comes from a source who had intimate knowledge of bin Laden and his dealings. This source, according to CIA analysis, offered "the most credible information" on cooperation between bin Laden and Iraq.

This source's reports read almost like a diary. Specific dates of when bin Laden flew to various cities are included, as well as names of individuals he met. The source did not offer information on the substantive talks during the meetings. . . . There are not a great many reports in general on the relationship between bin Laden and Iraq because of the secrecy surrounding it. But when this source with close access provided a "window" into bin Laden's activities, bin Laden is seen as heavily involved with Iraq (and Iran).

Reporting from the early 1990s remains somewhat sketchy, though multiple sources place Hassan al-Turabi and Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden's current No. 2, at the center of the relationship. The reporting gets much more specific in the mid-1990s:

8. Reporting from a well placed source disclosed that bin Laden was receiving training on bomb making from the IIS's [Iraqi Intelligence Service] principal technical expert on making sophisticated explosives, Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed. Brigadier Salim was observed at bin Laden's farm in Khartoum in Sept.-Oct. 1995 and again in July 1996, in the company of the Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti.

9 . . . Bin Laden visited Doha, Qatar (17-19 Jan. 1996), staying at the residence of a member of the Qatari ruling family. He discussed the successful movement of explosives into Saudi Arabia, and operations targeted against U.S. and U.K. interests in Dammam, Dharan, and Khobar, using clandestine al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia. Upon his return, bin Laden met with Hijazi and Turabi, among others.

And later more reporting, from the same "well placed" source:

10. The Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti, met privately with bin Laden at his farm in Sudan in July 1996. Tikriti used an Iraqi delegation traveling to Khartoum to discuss bilateral cooperation as his "cover" for his own entry into Sudan to meet with bin Laden and Hassan al-Turabi. The Iraqi intelligence chief and two other IIS officers met at bin Laden's farm and discussed bin Laden's request for IIS technical assistance in: a) making letter and parcel bombs; b) making bombs which could be placed on aircraft and detonated by changes in barometric pressure; and c) making false passport [sic]. Bin Laden specifically requested that [Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed], Iraqi intelligence's premier explosives maker--especially skilled in making car bombs--remain with him in Sudan. The Iraqi intelligence chief instructed Salim to remain in Sudan with bin Laden as long as required.

The analysis of those events follows:

The time of the visit from the IIS director was a few weeks after the Khobar Towers bombing. The bombing came on the third anniversary of a U.S. [Tomahawk missile] strike on IIS HQ (retaliation for the attempted assassination of former President Bush in Kuwait) for which Iraqi officials explicitly threatened retaliation.

IN ADDITION TO THE CONTACTS CLUSTERED in the mid-1990s, intelligence reports detail a flurry of activities in early 1998 and again in December 1998. A "former senior Iraqi intelligence officer" reported that "the Iraqi intelligence service station in Pakistan was Baghdad's point of contact with al Qaeda. He also said bin Laden visited Baghdad in Jan. 1998 and met with Tariq Aziz."

11. According to sensitive reporting, Saddam personally sent Faruq Hijazi, IIS deputy director and later Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, to meet with bin Laden at least twice, first in Sudan and later in Afghanistan in 1999. . . .

14. According to a sensitive reporting [from] a "regular and reliable source," [Ayman al] Zawahiri, a senior al Qaeda operative, visited Baghdad and met with the Iraqi Vice President on 3 February 1998. The goal of the visit was to arrange for coordination between Iraq and bin Laden and establish camps in an-Nasiriyah and Iraqi Kurdistan under the leadership of Abdul Aziz.

That visit came as the Iraqis intensified their defiance of the U.N. inspection regime, known as UNSCOM, created by the cease-fire agreement following the Gulf War. UNSCOM demanded access to Saddam's presidential palaces that he refused to provide. As the tensions mounted, President Bill Clinton went to the Pentagon on February 18, 1998, and prepared the nation for war. He warned of "an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers, and organized international criminals" and said "there is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein."

The day after this speech, according to documents unearthed in April 2003 in the Iraqi Intelligence headquarters by journalists Mitch Potter and Inigo Gilmore, Hussein's intelligence service wrote a memo detailing coming meetings with a bin Laden representative traveling to Baghdad. Each reference to bin Laden had been covered by liquid paper that, when revealed, exposed a plan to increase cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda. According to that memo, the IIS agreed to pay for "all the travel and hotel costs inside Iraq to gain the knowledge of the message from bin Laden and to convey to his envoy an oral message from us to bin Laden." The document set as the goal for the meeting a discussion of "the future of our relationship with him, bin Laden, and to achieve a direct meeting with him." The al Qaeda representative, the document went on to suggest, might provide "a way to maintain contacts with bin Laden."

Four days later, on February 23, 1998, bin Laden issued his now-famous fatwa on the plight of Iraq, published in the Arabic-language daily, al Quds al-Arabi: "For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples." Bin Laden urged his followers to act: "The ruling to kill all Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."

Although war was temporarily averted by a last-minute deal brokered by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, tensions soon rose again. The standoff with Iraq came to a head in December 1998, when President Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox, a 70-hour bombing campaign that began on December 16 and ended three days later, on December 19, 1998.

According to press reports at the time, Faruq Hijazi, deputy director of Iraqi Intelligence, met with bin Laden in Afghanistan on December 21, 1998, to offer bin Laden safe haven in Iraq. CIA reporting in the memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee seems to confirm this meeting and relates two others.

15. A foreign government service reported that an Iraqi delegation, including at least two Iraqi intelligence officers formerly assigned to the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan, met in late 1998 with bin Laden in Afghanistan.
16. According to CIA reporting, bin Laden and Zawahiri met with two Iraqi intelligence officers in Afghanistan in Dec. 1998.

17. . . . Iraq sent an intelligence officer to Afghanistan to seek closer ties to bin Laden and the Taliban in late 1998. The source reported that the Iraqi regime was trying to broaden its cooperation with al Qaeda. Iraq was looking to recruit Muslim "elements" to sabotage U.S. and U.K. interests. After a senior Iraqi intelligence officer met with Taliban leader [Mullah] Omar, arrangements were made for a series of meetings between the Iraqi intelligence officer and bin Laden in Pakistan. The source noted Faruq Hijazi was in Afghanistan in late 1998.

18. . . . Faruq Hijazi went to Afghanistan in 1999 along with several other Iraqi officials to meet with bin Laden. The source claimed that Hijazi would have met bin Laden only at Saddam's explicit direction.

An analysis that follows No. 18 provides additional context and an explanation of these reports:

Reporting entries #4, #11, #15, #16, #17, and #18, from different sources, corroborate each other and provide confirmation of meetings between al Qaeda operatives and Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. None of the reports have information on operational details or the purpose of such meetings. The covert nature of the relationship would indicate strict compartmentation [sic] of operations.

Information about connections between al Qaeda and Iraq was so widespread by early 1999 that it made its way into the mainstream press. A January 11, 1999, Newsweek story ran under this headline: "Saddam + Bin Laden?" The story cited an "Arab intelligence source" with knowledge of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. "According to this source, Saddam expected last month's American and British bombing campaign to go on much longer than it did. The dictator believed that as the attacks continued, indignation would grow in the Muslim world, making his terrorism offensive both harder to trace and more effective. With acts of terror contributing to chaos in the region, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait might feel less inclined to support Washington. Saddam's long-term strategy, according to several sources, is to bully or cajole Muslim countries into breaking the embargo against Iraq, without waiting for the United Nations to lift if formally."

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS about the nature of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda from mid-1999 through 2003 are conflicting. One senior Iraqi intelligence officer in U.S. custody, Khalil Ibrahim Abdallah, "said that the last contact between the IIS and al Qaeda was in July 1999. Bin Laden wanted to meet with Saddam, he said. The guidance sent back from Saddam's office reportedly ordered Iraqi intelligence to refrain from any further contact with bin Laden and al Qaeda. The source opined that Saddam wanted to distance himself from al Qaeda."

The bulk of reporting on the relationship contradicts this claim. One report states that "in late 1999" al Qaeda set up a training camp in northern Iraq that "was operational as of 1999." Other reports suggest that the Iraqi regime contemplated several offers of safe haven to bin Laden throughout 1999.

23. . . . Iraqi officials were carefully considering offering safe haven to bin Laden and his closest collaborators in Nov. 1999. The source indicated the idea was put forward by the presumed head of Iraqi intelligence in Islamabad (Khalid Janaby) who in turn was in frequent contact and had good relations with bin Laden.
Some of the most intriguing intelligence concerns an Iraqi named Ahmed Hikmat Shakir:

24. According to sensitive reporting, a Malaysia-based Iraqi national (Shakir) facilitated the arrival of one of the Sept 11 hijackers for an operational meeting in Kuala Lumpur (Jan 2000). Sensitive reporting indicates Shakir's travel and contacts link him to a worldwide network of terrorists, including al Qaeda. Shakir worked at the Kuala Lumpur airport--a job he claimed to have obtained through an Iraqi embassy employee.

One of the men at that al Qaeda operational meeting in the Kuala Lumpur Hotel was Tawfiz al Atash, a top bin Laden lieutenant later identified as the mastermind of the October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole.

25. Investigation into the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 by al Qaeda revealed no specific Iraqi connections but according to the CIA, "fragmentary evidence points to possible Iraqi involvement."

26. During a custodial interview, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi [a senior al Qaeda operative] said he was told by an al Qaeda associate that he was tasked to travel to Iraq (1998) to establish a relationship with Iraqi intelligence to obtain poisons and gases training. After the USS Cole bombing in 2000, two al Qaeda operatives were sent to Iraq for CBW-related [Chemical and Biological Weapons] training beginning in Dec 2000. Iraqi intelligence was "encouraged" after the embassy and USS Cole bombings to provide this training.

The analysis of this report follows.

CIA maintains that Ibn al-Shaykh's timeline is consistent with other sensitive reporting indicating that bin Laden asked Iraq in 1998 for advanced weapons, including CBW and "poisons."

Additional reporting also calls into question the claim that relations between Iraq and al Qaeda cooled after mid-1999:

27. According to sensitive CIA reporting, . . . the Saudi National Guard went on a kingdom-wide state of alert in late Dec 2000 after learning Saddam agreed to assist al Qaeda in attacking U.S./U.K. interests in Saudi Arabia.

And then there is the alleged contact between lead 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague. The reporting on those links suggests not one meeting, but as many as four. What's more, the memo reveals potential financing of Atta's activities by Iraqi intelligence.

The Czech counterintelligence service reported that the Sept. 11 hijacker [Mohamed] Atta met with the former Iraqi intelligence chief in Prague, [Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir] al Ani, on several occasions. During one of these meetings, al Ani ordered the IIS finance officer to issue Atta funds from IIS financial holdings in the Prague office.

And the commentary:

CIA can confirm two Atta visits to Prague--in Dec. 1994 and in June 2000; data surrounding the other two--on 26 Oct 1999 and 9 April 2001--is complicated and sometimes contradictory and CIA and FBI cannot confirm Atta met with the IIS. Czech Interior Minister Stanislav Gross continues to stand by his information.

It's not just Gross who stands by the information. Five high-ranking members of the Czech government have publicly confirmed meetings between Atta and al Ani. The meeting that has gotten the most press attention--April 9, 2001--is also the most widely disputed. Even some of the most hawkish Bush administration officials are privately skeptical that Atta met al Ani on that occasion. They believe that reports of the alleged meeting, said to have taken place in public, outside the headquarters of the U.S.-financed Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, suggest a level of sloppiness that doesn't fit the pattern of previous high-level Iraq-al Qaeda contacts.

Whether or not that specific meeting occurred, the report by Czech counterintelligence that al Ani ordered the Iraqi Intelligence Service officer to provide IIS funds to Atta might help explain the lead hijacker's determination to reach Prague, despite significant obstacles, in the spring of 2000. (Note that the report stops short of confirming that the funds were transferred. It claims only that the IIS officer requested the transfer.) Recall that Atta flew to Prague from Germany on May 30, 2000, but was denied entry because he did not have a valid visa. Rather than simply return to Germany and fly directly to the United States, his ultimate destination, Atta took pains to get to Prague. After he was refused entry the first time, he traveled back to Germany, obtained the proper paperwork, and caught a bus back to Prague. He left for the United States the day after arriving in Prague for the second time.

Several reports indicate that the relationship between Saddam and bin Laden continued, even after the September 11 attacks:

31. An Oct. 2002 . . . report said al Qaeda and Iraq reached a secret agreement whereby Iraq would provide safe haven to al Qaeda members and provide them with money and weapons. The agreement reportedly prompted a large number of al Qaeda members to head to Iraq. The report also said that al Qaeda members involved in a fraudulent passport network for al Qaeda had been directed to procure 90 Iraqi and Syrian passports for al Qaeda personnel.

The analysis that accompanies that report indicates that the report fits the pattern of Iraq-al Qaeda collaboration:

References to procurement of false passports from Iraq and offers of safe haven previously have surfaced in CIA source reporting considered reliable. Intelligence reports to date have maintained that Iraqi support for al Qaeda usually involved providing training, obtaining passports, and offers of refuge. This report adds to that list by including weapons and money. This assistance would make sense in the aftermath of 9-11.

Colin Powell, in his February 5, 2003, presentation to the U.N. Security Council, revealed the activities of Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Reporting in the memo expands on Powell's case and might help explain some of the resistance the U.S. military is currently facing in Iraq.

37. Sensitive reporting indicates senior terrorist planner and close al Qaeda associate al Zarqawi has had an operational alliance with Iraqi officials. As of Oct. 2002, al Zarqawi maintained contacts with the IIS to procure weapons and explosives, including surface-to-air missiles from an IIS officer in Baghdad. According to sensitive reporting, al Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells in Baghdad to be activated in case of a U.S. occupation of the city, suggesting his operational cooperation with the Iraqis may have deepened in recent months. Such cooperation could include IIS provision of a secure operating bases [sic] and steady access to arms and explosives in preparation for a possible U.S. invasion. Al Zarqawi's procurements from the Iraqis also could support al Qaeda operations against the U.S. or its allies elsewhere.

38. According to sensitive reporting, a contact with good access who does not have an established reporting record: An Iraqi intelligence service officer said that as of mid-March the IIS was providing weapons to al Qaeda members located in northern Iraq, including rocket propelled grenade (RPG)-18 launchers. According to IIS information, northern Iraq-based al Qaeda members believed that the U.S. intended to strike al Qaeda targets during an anticipated assault against Ansar al-Islam positions.

The memo further reported pre-war intelligence which "claimed that an Iraqi intelligence official, praising Ansar al-Islam, provided it with $100,000 and agreed to continue to give assistance."

CRITICS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION have complained that Iraq-al Qaeda connections are a fantasy, trumped up by the warmongers at the White House to fit their preconceived notions about international terror; that links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden have been routinely "exaggerated" for political purposes; that hawks "cherry-picked" bits of intelligence and tendentiously presented these to the American public.

Carl Levin, a senior member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, made those points as recently as November 9, in an appearance on "Fox News Sunday." Republicans on the committee, he complained, refuse to look at the administration's "exaggeration of intelligence."

Said Levin: "The question is whether or not they exaggerated intelligence in order to carry out their purpose, which was to make the case for going to war. Did we know, for instance, with certainty that there was any relationship between the Iraqis and the terrorists that were in Afghanistan, bin Laden? The administration said that there's a connection between those terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. Was there a basis for that?"

There was, as shown in the memo to the committee on which Levin serves. And much of the reporting comes from Clinton-era intelligence. Not that you would know this from Al Gore's recent public statements. Indeed, the former vice president claims to be privy to new "evidence" that the administration lied. In an August speech at New York University, Gore claimed: "The evidence now shows clearly that Saddam did not want to work with Osama bin Laden at all, much less give him weapons of mass destruction." Really?

One of the most interesting things to note about the 16-page memo is that it covers only a fraction of the evidence that will eventually be available to document the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. For one thing, both Saddam and bin Laden were desperate to keep their cooperation secret. (Remember, Iraqi intelligence used liquid paper on an internal intelligence document to conceal bin Laden's name.) For another, few people in the U.S. government are expressly looking for such links. There is no Iraq-al Qaeda equivalent of the CIA's 1,400-person Iraq Survey Group currently searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction.

Instead, CIA and FBI officials are methodically reviewing Iraqi intelligence files that survived the three-week war last spring. These documents would cover several miles if laid end-to-end. And they are in Arabic. They include not only connections between bin Laden and Saddam, but also revolting details of the regime's long history of brutality. It will be a slow process.

So Feith's memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee is best viewed as sort of a "Cliff's Notes" version of the relationship. It contains the highlights, but it is far from exhaustive.

One example. The memo contains only one paragraph on Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, the Iraqi facilitator who escorted two September 11 hijackers through customs in Kuala Lumpur. U.S. intelligence agencies have extensive reporting on his activities before and after the September 11 hijacking. That they would include only this brief overview suggests the 16-page memo, extensive as it is, just skims the surface of the reporting on Iraq-al Qaeda connections.

Other intelligence reports indicate that Shakir whisked not one but two September 11 hijackers--Khalid al Midhar and Nawaq al Hamzi--through the passport and customs process upon their arrival in Kuala Lumpur on January 5, 2000. Shakir then traveled with the hijackers to the Kuala Lumpur Hotel where they met with Ramzi bin al Shibh, one of the masterminds of the September 11 plot. The meeting lasted three days. Shakir returned to work on January 9 and January 10, and never again.

Shakir got his airport job through a contact at the Iraqi Embassy. (Iraq routinely used its embassies as staging grounds for its intelligence operations; in some cases, more than half of the alleged "diplomats" were intelligence operatives.) The Iraqi embassy, not his employer, controlled Shakir's schedule. He was detained in Qatar on September 17, 2001. Authorities found in his possession contact information for terrorists involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 embassy bombings, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, and the September 11 hijackings. The CIA had previous reporting that Shakir had received a phone call from the safe house where the 1993 World Trade Center attacks had been plotted.

The Qataris released Shakir shortly after his arrest. On October 21, 2001, he flew to Amman, Jordan, where he was to change planes to a flight to Baghdad. He didn't make that flight. Shakir was detained in Jordan for three months, where the CIA interrogated him. His interrogators concluded that Shakir had received extensive training in counter-interrogation techniques. Not long after he was detained, according to an official familiar with the intelligence, the Iraqi regime began to "pressure" Jordanian intelligence to release him. At the same time, Amnesty International complained that Shakir was being held without charge. The Jordanians released him on January 28, 2002, at which point he is believed to have fled back to Iraq.

Was Shakir an Iraqi agent? Does he provide a connection between Saddam Hussein and September 11? We don't know. We may someday find out.

But there can no longer be any serious argument about whether Saddam Hussein's Iraq worked with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to plot against Americans.


Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard.

theweeklystandard.com



To: cirrus who wrote (19450)10/28/2004 9:22:38 AM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 90947
 
An Intelligent Democrat . . .

From the December 15, 2003 issue: on the Senate Intelligence Committee.

by Stephen F. Hayes
12/15/2003, Volume 009, Issue 14

A LEADING DEMOCRAT on the Senate Intelligence Committee has reiterated his support for the war in Iraq and encouraged the Bush administration to be more aggressive in its preemptive measures to protect Americans. Evan Bayh, a Democrat from Indiana and a leader of moderates in the Senate, responded to questions last week on the war in Iraq and a memo detailing links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden sent to the committee in late October by Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith and later excerpted in these pages.

"Even if there's only a 10 percent chance that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden would cooperate, the question is whether that's an acceptable level of risk," Bayh told me. "My answer to that would be an unequivocal 'no.' We need to be much more pro-active on eliminating threats before they're imminent."

Asked about the growing evidence of a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, Bayh said: "The relationship seemed to have its roots in mutual exploitation. Saddam Hussein used terrorism for his own ends, and Osama bin Laden used a nation-state for the things that only a nation-state can provide. Some of the intelligence is strong, and some of it is murky. But that's the nature of intelligence on a relationship like this--lots of it is going to be speculation and conjecture. Following 9/11, we await certainty at our peril."

The comments came days before several Democratic presidential candidates intensified their caustic attacks on the Bush administration's foreign and defense policies. Senator John Kerry, in a speech last week to the Council on Foreign Relations, said that "the Bush administration has pursued the most arrogant, inept, reckless, and ideological foreign policy in modern history. . . . The global war on terrorism has actually been set back."

Democratic frontrunner Howard Dean went further, even giving credence to a conspiracy theory that Bush was forewarned of the September 11 attacks by the Saudis. In an interview on National Public Radio, Dean allowed that this was "nothing more than a theory, it can't be proved." Nonetheless, he called it the "most interesting theory" he has heard as to why the Bush administration isn't cooperating more fully with the commission looking into the September 11 attacks.

Bayh declined to speak about any of the 50 specific Iraq-al Qaeda links cited in the Feith memo, and said the intelligence community reported before the war that intelligence on the links to "9/11 and al Qaeda" was the weakest part of the justification for war in Iraq.

"Look, there were multiple reasons to remove Saddam Hussein, not the least of which was his butchering of his own people--that's the kind of thing that most progressives used to care about. We were going to have to deal with him militarily at some time in the future. The possibility--even if people thought it unlikely--that he would use weapons of mass death or provide them to terrorists was just too great a risk."

Still, Bayh rejects the conventional wisdom that cooperation between Hussein and bin Laden was implausible because of religious and ideological differences. "They were certainly moving toward the philosophy that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend.' Both were hostile to us, and while they historically had reasons not to like each other, that historical skepticism is overridden by the enmity and mutual hostility toward us. These are not illogical ties from their perspective."

Bayh has long been concerned about overlap of rogue or collapsed states and international terrorists--a nexus that he says remains "the biggest risk" to the United States. Indeed, it was Bayh's question about links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda that prompted CIA Director George Tenet last October to declassify some reporting on the relationship in an October 7, 2002, letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee:

Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information we have received comes from detainees, including some of high rank.

--We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda going back a decade.

--Credible information indicates that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression.

--Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad.

--We have credible reporting that al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire W.M.D. capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs.

--Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al Qaeda suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action.

The intelligence committee's review of prewar intelligence may soon be finished--at least at the staff level. "The staff hopes to have it done by the end of the year," says Senator Christopher Bond of Missouri, a Republican member of the committee. "When the members chew it over and spit it out is unclear."

Relationships between Democrats and Republicans on the committee have been strained since the disclosure in early November of a political memo drafted by Democratic staffers for Vice Chairman Jay Rockefeller, the West Virginia Democrat. The memo suggested ways in which the Democrats could extract partisan advantage from the ongoing review. Saxby Chambliss, a Republican from Georgia who sits on the committee, says several of his Democratic colleagues have since "stepped forward privately" to express concern about the memo and politicization of the intelligence oversight process. "I regret that Jay hasn't done that publicly."

Says Chambliss: "The Democratic memo took a shot at the chairman [Senator Pat Roberts, a Kansas Republican] and took a shot at undermining the intelligence on Iraq. . . . The memo to me did not sound like Jay [Rockefeller]. I've always suspected that the Democratic leadership put lots of pressure on him to politicize this process."

Bayh, for his part, hopes that the intelligence community will look carefully at reporting on the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. Bush administration officials have argued that such a review is appropriate, but should wait until after fighting in Iraq has subsided. "The reason [a review] is important is the guidance it gives us prospectively," says Bayh. "I understand the administration's position, but to retrospectively look at these connections gives us that guidance and I think that's a very useful undertaking."

"There's obviously a lot of smoke," says Bayh. "The real question is how much fire was there. The best case--it certainly looks as if there were many contacts, some kind of relationship there. I guess the best answer is that this is a developing story and we'll know more soon."


Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard.

© Copyright 2003, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.

weeklystandard.com



To: cirrus who wrote (19450)10/28/2004 9:47:17 AM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 90947
 
The Senate Intelligence Committee & the links between Iraq
and al Qaeda; Saddam & Terrorism....


The Senate Intelligence Committee Report

by Dan Darling at July 11, 2004 01:22 AM

I spent the better part of Friday slogging through all 521 pages of the report and identifying the relevant sections of it for Michael Ledeen, which is something that I would seriously recommend that anybody who is genuinely interested in what went wrong on the subject of Iraq do as well.

Even the partisan hacks. Especially the partisan hacks
.

Ledeen is going to have an NRO piece up on a good chunk of this at some point, but in the meantime I thought I'd convey my own impressions of the document with respect to the terrorism aspects of it, seeing how I know far more about terrorism than I do about WMD, as well as perhaps some other things that you might find interesting. Because I'm accessing this report in PDF form, I can't do the whole copy/paste thing to provide quotations so instead I'll be providing page references.


Joe Wilson

Now, Onto The Red Meat...

Iraqi Support for Terrorism

Al-Qaeda

Pressure on the CIA

The Report's "Additional Views"

The Bottom Line

So, about Joe Wilson ...

I see Instapundit as well as both the Associated Press and the Washington Post has already beaten me to the punch on this one, but it's a point that needs to be made.

Joe Wilson is a liar and not a particularly good one at that.

As the report
, starting on p. 39 and going through p. 47 very carefully explains, the claims that Wilson during his media blitz and subsequent canonization as a representative of all that is righteous and pure within anti-war circles were every bit as misleading if not factually inaccurate as anything that one may charge that the administration had done.

Even more so, I would argue, if only for the fact that he was making claims about a number of issues, for example the forged documents referring to Niger, of which he had no actual knowledge - a very polite way of saying that the man was blowing smoke out his ass.

In conventional anti-war mythology, the name of Wilson's wife was leaked to the press in order to punish him for having "debunked" the administration's claims with respect to Iraq attempting to purchase uranium from Africa. As the report very clearly indicates, this was simply not the case and while it is indeed puzzling why the administration allowed him to go on as long as he did during his 15 minutes of fame without airing some of this information to the public given the considerable damage that he did to the president's reputation during this period.

In any case, Wilson's trip to Africa did not "debunk" the administration position that Iraq was attempting to purchase uranium from Niger - in fact it strengthened this position on the basis of Wilson's claim that an Iraqi delegation had traveled to Niger in 1999 and that Niger officials believed that they were interested in buying uranium.

Oh, and might I add that nowhere in the entire Niger section of the report is there any evidence whatsoever to assert that Michael Ledeen forged the Niger documents, as has been peddled by any number of folks with an axe to grind against the man. No doubt apologies will be pending from all those who have accused him of complicity in this will be pending ...

Now, onto the red meat ...

Most of my own personal attention within the report, as most people can probably find understandable, is based around statements concerning Iraq's ties to al-Qaeda.
The report notes on p. 305 the difference of opinion within the CIA between the Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC) and the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis (NESA) as far as the Iraqi relationship with al-Qaeda that I've written about here before. In other words, the CTC believed (and still does) that there were definite ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda, whereas the NESA is far more skeptical on this count. One might reasonably guess where our pal Mike "Anonymous" is working these days on the basis of his opinion of the relationship.

The CTC position was essentially that a relationship
between Iraq and al-Qaeda developed over time to where it
was prior to the war, whereas the NESA saw the contacts as
more of a sporadic, wary phenomenon. As I wrote in my last
special analysis, the evidence is frequently such in these
types of instances where reasonable people can conclude
things one way or another entirely without any accusations
of warmongering or bad motivations. If these are going to
come up every time someone takes a different position on
these issues, then we may as well scrap our intelligence
services altogether.

Feith's office also gets added into the equation on p. 307 and basically states the same as what I've said before on the subject and I would also note the instance of the DIA detailee on p. 308 as well with regards to finding various pieces of information that fell through the bureaucratic cracks in the CIA analysis but were subsequently incorporated into the broader intelligence picture as a direct result of the work of Feith and his people over at the Pentagon. The complaint listed on p. 309 that the CIA (in particular the analysis wing) was relying on requiring "juridical evidence" concerning ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda is an entirely valid one to make with regard to the issue of intelligence. In many cases what you have to go off of is not going to be of the same standard that one would use in a court of law - this is simply the way that intelligence works.

The idea that the CTC, NESA, NSA, and DIA should review its information with what Feith's people had come up with through their alternate means of analysis on p. 310 is likewise entirely reasonable under the circumstances. As the report shows, they compared evidence and there was some disagreements, this is far from the "Feith cooked the intelligence books" claims that have been floating around in the press for the better part of the last 2 years.

The committee is going to evaluate Feith's work in the
next phase of its review and given how phenomenonally
wrong that the press coverage has been in this particular
area
(as demonstrated by this report, I would argue) I
would strongly recommend that journalists allow the
committee to do its work unless they get a chance to
actually see or at least read a summary the data that
Feith looked at and the conclusions that he reached with
respect to issues like Iraq and al-Qaeda. Sounds
reasonable enough, yes?

What we already knew about Iraqi support for terrorism


From p. 315-317, we get a nice review of the failed attempts by the Mukhabarat to perpetrate terrorist attacks against US targets during the first Gulf War as well as assassination attempts carried out against Iraqi dissidents and opposition leaders living in Jordan and Iraqi Kurdistan well into the mid-1990s. Of particular interest is p. 316's summary of the Iraqi plans to bomb Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Prague from 1998-2003, which would tend to rather strongly contradict Richard Clarke's claim that Iraq had not been involved in anti-US terrorism since the failed 1993 plot to assassinate the first President Bush in Kuwait. Page 317 also covers attempts by the Mukhabarat to go after US installations in Turkey and Azerbaijan in late 2002, though I notice they blacked out info on a plot that was actively thwarted.

From p. 317-19, we get a nice recap of a number of known Iraqi proxies ranging from the PLF, 15 May, MEK, Abu Nidal Organization, and the PFLP-GC, though they blacked out the reports concerning Iraq assisting the PFLP-GC in its attacks on Israel during the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada.

Hamas rebuffed the Iraqi overtures to attack the US
because they already had their hands full with fighting Israel, whereas Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad were ordered to decline Saddam's overtures at the behest of their Iranian backers. All the same, had the Iraqi efforts in this regard been successful Saddam Hussein would have put together quite a formidable terrorist coalition to aim at the US.

Al-Qaeda

The report, starting on p. 322, goes through what we already know concerning the poor intelligence that the CIA had on both the Iraqi and al-Qaeda leadership as well as a general summary of the ideological differences between the two, including a number of human intelligence reports noting Saddam Hussein's suppression of Wahhabism inside Iraq and his initial efforts to prevent Iraqi youth from joining al-Qaeda. On the al-Qaeda side of the equation, we have contradictory reporting from al-Qaeda leaders now in US custody, with some claiming that the organization hated Saddam Hussein and others claiming that they were more than happy to work with him to fight the United States. My own suspicion would be that the organization's alliance with the Baathists was a rather compartmentalized secret within the network (indeed, I've seen al-Qaeda recruiting videos which refer to Saddam Hussein as a bad Muslim), which is apparently also the way that Ansar al-Islam operated according to a leader within the group now in custody by the name of Qods ("Jerusalem").

The idea of a debate among the al-Qaeda leadership over the wisdom of working with al-Qaeda (Saddam) would seem quite plausible, though it would appear at least that the more pragmatic leaders within the terrorist network won out in the end.

At least some of the censorship that went into the report would appear to be somewhat shifty in my view, since among the detainees being referenced on the al-Qaeda relationship with Iraq are Ibn Sheikh al-Libi and Moammar Ahmed Yousef
at the top of p. 324. The p. 324-325 recounting of Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's interrogations on the subject of an alliance between Iraq and al-Qaeda also completely contradicts what various opponents of administration policy have attempted to caricature to as far as the press is concerned, as neither man denied the existence of a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda or even stated that the two were blood enemies.

Abu Zubaydah told the CIA that Abu Musab Zarqawi and others were known to have good relationships with the Mukhabarat, but that bin Laden would never ally with the Iraqi regime in the sense of something akin to what Abu Nidal had done in order to retain his operational independence, which tracks exactly with what is stated in the Feith memo.

The second detainee, whose name and statements are blacked
out, is none other than Ibn Sheikh al-Libi, the head of al-
Qaeda training program in Afghanistan who gave US
interrogators a detailed account of how Iraq had trained
al-Qaeda in poison gases
.


Isikoff and Hosenball from Newsweek have attempted to caricature al-Libi as a source of dubious credibility by noting that he has recently changed his story, but I would just note that if that's considered to be the test for credibility we would have long ago thrown out just about everything that any these high-level detainees say.

We also learn quite a bit more about Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed with respect to his exact status within al-Qaeda.
While I would be interested to note which definition
of "al-Qaeda" the CIA is using here (it certainly isn't
the International Front) when it claims that Mohammed
didn't join the organization until the late 1990s despite
his position as among the first of bin Laden's bodyguards
circa 1991 and did not assume a position of administration
within the group until well after 9/11.

The next section
from p. 326 to 329 deals specifically with the meetings between the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda officials as far back as Sudan up into the late 1990s in Afghanistan and the caveats about taking the claims from governments and exile groups opposed to the Iraqi regime at face value are very much to be noted, a far cry from the whole "Chalabi suckered us all" canard that's been floating around the press. The training aspects of the report, beginning on p. 329, notes that there is indeed evidence that Iraq trained al-Qaeda fighters, and while the sources of the reporting concerning Iraq having provided assistance to Project al-Zabadi (al-Qaeda's WMD program) are indeed of varying credibility (of the 12, 2 reports were based on hearsay, 4 were merely accusations, and but the other 6 reports seem to have held up under scrutiny despite all the caveats), there are more than enough of them to have caused considerable worry within the intelligence community.

They also blacked out the section that deals specifically
with the al-Shifa plant in Sudan on p. 331.

On the issue of Salman Pak
from p. 332-333, there appears
to be a good deal of smoke there with respect to reports
about al-Qaeda fighters being trained there alongside
other Iraqi-sponsored terrorist groups since at least
1999, but the CIA censored the final analysis of what
exactly was going on at Salman Pak
.

The safe haven stuff
from p. 334-338 is also quite juicy. A good chunk of it was censored, but it appears that Saddam Hussein issued a standing offer of safehaven for bin Laden in 1999, possibly in response to bin Laden's attempt to see how open the Iraqi government would to such an offer in the summer of 1998 in case he had to flee Afghanistan in the wake of the embassy bombings.

The Iraqi envoy in Afghanistan in 1999 was of course Farouk Hijazi and it seems that he was not authorized to discuss safe haven (which would tend to contradict some reports claiming that bin Laden turned down his offer of it) but instead turned the discussion back to areas of mutual cooperation.

All of the stuff on Ansar al-Islam is censored, though the individual referenced on p. 336 who was identified by Ansar al-Islam detainees captured by the PUK as a Mukhabarat associate is none other than Abu Wael. It also appears, judging from the wording of the CIA report on p. 337, that the Mukhabarat could have sought to oppose the al-Qaeda presence in northern Iraq in some fashion but apparently chose not to.

A word on the issue of their being a formal agreement between the two parties
, however. In Iran and Syria, for example, one can easily locate the offices of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, PFLP, PFLP-GC, and any number of other nasty organizations. These groups operate openly inside these states with both government sanction and funding, which was, clearly, not what al-Qaeda was doing inside Iraq by all accounts.

However, if one considers this the standard by which state sponsorship or harboring of terrorists is to be judged by, I suspect that one will have an extremely difficult time of convincing anyone that Pakistan or Saudi Arabia were ever active in terrorist activities. And if you believe that, well, let's just say that I have a bridge to sell you ...

The information on Zarqawi's stay in Baghdad and medical treatment at the Olympic Hospital is almost completely censored, as is the size and composition of his entourage. The idea that Zarqawi expanded his organization inside Iraq between 2002 and 2003 almost certainly suggests the tacit acquiescence from the Iraqi security forces, whom as earlier reports have noted were quite ruthless in hunting down and eliminating Iraqi Wahhabis believed to constitute a threat to the regime. That last sentence on p. 337 is partially censored, but it's talking about the nature of the support Zarqawi and his entourage would have received from the Iraqi government during his stay in Baghdad, probably a reference to reports that Zarqawi received weaponry from the Mukhabarat during that period.

On the issue of the operational cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda that starts on p. 338, the CIA notes that it refrained from asserting such a link between the two entities not because they had anything substantively refuting such a link, but rather because of the nature of poor intelligence on the Iraqi regime.

Iraq certainly did not possess command and control over al-Qaeda, which I very much doubt that anyone outside of perhaps Laurie Mylroie and her circle of followers seriously believes. I also very much doubt that one could ever demonstrate that the Taliban ever possessed command and control over al-Qaeda and they were almost certainly doing so.

However, one important element can be found in the middle
of p. 339 that is well worth reading, which states that
there are provocative elements in the 1993 WTC bombing,
the 9/11 attacks, and the Foley assassination which appear
to suggest Iraqi involvement in any one of them as well as
evidence that runs counter to these beliefs.

This is an important thing to recognize, I would argue, because it means that people who hold to one position or another are not quite the kooks, obstructionists, political hacks, ect. that they've been painted as over the better part of the last several years. I'm not going to spend much time on all three of these because most of the alleged Iraqi connections and evidence against them in these particular because most of this has been known to the general public for some time now with the exception of the Foley assassination.

Unfortunately, the CIA chose to classify most of the commission's conclusions with respect to the nature of Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda are classified, leaving us pretty much in the same position that we were going into all of this, abeit with some new information
. However, the report doesn't end there, as p. 350-356 deal with how the intelligence community's HUMINT assets were hampered as far as understanding the nature of Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda, forcing them to rely in many cases on detainee information and foreign government information for their HUMINT understanding of the relationship.

Oh yes, about all that pressure ...

It has likewise become something of a centerpiece of anti-war mythology that the CIA was deliberately pressured by the administration into manipulating intelligence data with respect to the nature of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. According to the findings in the report on p. 358, not only did no cooking the books occur but it was not once even attempted! The questioning of analysts on the Iraqi connection to al-Qaeda was, as the ombudsman investigation revealed, quite reasonable under the circumstances. In other words, nobody changed their analysis to conform to administration policy and nobody in the administration ever even sought for them to do so. Feith's office was likewise completely innocent on this count, according to p. 361-375, and apparently the intelligence folks who were present at the meeting in August 2002 in which they suggested additions to the draft of Iraqi Support for Terrorism all stated to the Committee that Feith's people all contributed to discussion, which is rather far cry from Josh Marshall's claim that what they said "didn't pass the laugh test" during his effort to shoot down the Feith memo when it got published in the Weekly Standard.

Unfortunately, the final conclusions of the committee on what the people in Feith's office added to the discussion have all be classified so we don't know anything more than this except to say that they weren't involved in politicizing intelligence or pressuring analysts.

Also, from p. 366-370, we learn that everything that Powell said at the UN Security Council with respect to Iraq and al-Qaeda was vetted through CIA and nothing he said differed very much from anything that the broader intelligence community was saying at around the same time.

No doubt apologies will be forthcoming from all those who have accused the administration and the people in Feith's office of engaging in any number of deplorable behaviors ...

The Additional Views


I'll be quite honest and say that most of these strike me as rather polemical in nature and seems more or less designed to set up the next phase of Washington politicking, with both Republican and Democratic senators making claims that, truth be told, are not supported or are in certain cases directly contradicted by the actual text of the document in question. I'll be quite honest and say that if one reads simply the additional views but not the body of the report that they're going to be left with an extremely skewed view as far as what the report actually says or the conclusions that were reached within it on a number of key points.

The bottom line

Everything Powell said at the UN regarding Iraqi ties to
al-Qaeda (which is pretty much the same as what President
Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld,
and others said going into the war) appears to have
reflected the consensus of the broader intelligence
community.

Joe Wilson's claims
(along with, I suspect, his reputation
within Democratic circles) have more or less gone down in
flames, as have claims that intelligence analysts were
pressured into making certain conclusions.

The claim
on p. 328 that "Wali Khan" (i.e. Wali Khan Amin
Shah, one of Ramzi Yousef's two lieutenants in the proto-9/11
Oplan Bojinka plot) and Jamal al-Fadhl (whose name is blacked
out in the last sentence in that paragraph) identified Abu
Hajir al-Iraqi
(aka Mamdouh Mahmoud Salim, a high-ranking
al-Qaeda leader who was arrested in the wake of the 1998
embassy bombings and later stabbed a NYC prison guard with
a comb in his left eye in an attempted prison break in
2000) as the chief liaison between Iraq and al-Qaeda is
sure to keep Mylroie enthusiasts around for quite some
time at any rate.


In general, this document is a lot better than that Staff
Statement No. 15 that was churned out by the 9/11
commission. One other thing to be mentioned, incidentally,
is that this report specifically undercuts some of the
9/11 Commission's key findings with respect to Iraq and al-
Qaeda. It cites post-1999 contacts between Iraq and al-
Qaeda, which the 9/11 commission claims to possess no
information on. Perhaps someone should hand the commission
members a copy of the Senate Intelligence Committee report?

Also, this demolishes 2 of Richard Clarke's key claims
with respect to Iraq: that there was no Iraqi involvement
in terrorism post-1993, and that there is no evidence
whatsoever of Iraqi support for al-Qaeda. Both of these
claims, to put it quite simply, can now be shown to be
factually untrue.


As I said, no doubt apologies will pending from all those
concerned.


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