To: SBHX who wrote (150050 ) 10/31/2004 5:31:46 PM From: Win Smith Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500 You seem to be putting a lot of faith in a process that W's people sort of made up on the fly, for reasons having nothing in particular to do with what might actually work in the long run. Langewiesche's account, from theatlantic.com or techstocks.com Something similar happened in Washington, D.C. The President's advisers realized that the occupation strategy had failed. Concerned that the ongoing debacle in Iraq could cost George W. Bush the 2004 election, suddenly only a year away, they exhibited fast reflexes and strong instincts for self-preservation. Duck and cover. Though this was vehemently denied, in the fall of 2003 responsibility for the occupation was eased away from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his Pentagon brain trust and placed in the hands of the White House staff—particularly National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Henceforth the big decisions were apparently driven not by ideology or geopolitical considerations but by domestic political calculation—including, no doubt, a cold assessment of journalistic dynamics and the American public's attention span. Gone was the presumption of a long-term occupation, the very basis of action at the CPA until that time. The idea now was to limit American casualties, or the perception of them, and to "accelerate" the handover of sovereignty to Iraq by the end of June—an adequate four months before the U.S. elections. Bremer's freedom of operation would not be restricted so much as radically lopped off; he could come home before the summer, cool down at his new house in Vermont, and maybe write a book. Iraq would no longer be his problem, and by extension it would be less of the President's. The Green Zone would become an "embassy." And with Iraqi sovereignty would come some measure of Iraqi responsibility and blame. Politically the plan worked remarkably well. To be sure, there were challenges along the way: the televised images in March of the mutilated corpses of four American contractors in Fallujah, and the political requirement to bear up and respond militarily; the frustrations of the resulting Marine Corps siege; the mutinies of the new Iraqi forces; the various episodes of sustained fighting ever since; the revelations of torture at Abu Ghraib; the difficulties of assembling an Iraqi government to which the mantle of power could be passed; the very need to return to the United Nations for help, and with smiles in the form of gritted teeth. But having gone through all that, by the end of this summer it was possible to see the slow fading of media coverage, and an important part of the American electorate turning away. Why the current plan, such as it is, should work out better than the previous plan is, well, pretty much a matter of faith, I guess. W signed off on it, you got to believe.