SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: RetiredNow who wrote (213875)12/23/2004 9:26:29 PM
From: tejek  Respond to of 1572373
 
If the Iraqis wanted it, they would be out there fighting with us......like the Ukrainians protesting in Kiev's main square day in and day out in the freezing cold. Instead, Iraqis cower in their houses or join the resistance. We are the enemy, not the liberator.

Yes, you have a point there. But what is the alternative now? Would you really pull our troops out right now and abandon the Iraqis to rule by Zarqawi and Al Qaeda? It seems to me that this would be a worse crime than forging ahead.


Yup. Leave the Iraqis to their own manifest destiny.....we have our own to follow.

Twenty Americans got blown up in Mosul. The Iraqi man in the street wishes it was 2000. What more info do you need to know that this is wrong? How many more Americans must die until the hawks see reason and accept that they made an horrific mistake?
Its time to close down the war and move on.



To: RetiredNow who wrote (213875)12/27/2004 7:02:47 AM
From: Taro  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1572373
 
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR, NY TIMES
The Best Defense Is a Good Offense

By ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

Published: December 27, 2004

Washington

AMERICANS cannot see a tragedy like last week's attack on a military mess tent in Mosul, Iraq, without wondering how it could ever have occurred - and how it can be prevented from ever happening again. Like the furor over improved armor for trucks and Humvees, the attack rouses the instinct to make force protection the immediate priority for United States forces in Iraq. No American wants Americans soldiers to be vulnerable.

These instincts, however, are wrong. The United States can win in Iraq only through offensive action. It cannot afford to make every American base a fortress, or to disperse scarce manpower and other military resources in force-protection missions. United States forces have to be mobile and able to redeploy where the threat is - even though such redeployments often mean moving forces to vulnerable areas. If the Pentagon concentrates on protecting troops in the short run, the war will last longer and total casualties will be greater. Worse, the United States will simply never win.

This is not a pleasant message for military families and the ordinary soldier in the field. Senior commanders understand its importance, but no one who has just been wounded or seen a friend die does. Experience also tells us that incidents of this kind lead to immediate political opportunism: members of Congress grabbing headlines, contractors rushing forward to sell in the guise of helping the troops. It also leads to instant news media trials of commanders for failing to protect our troops. This happened after the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and it gave the attackers a major additional victory.

Demanding that American troops keep their distance from Iraqis, or imposing security restrictions that make it difficult or impossible for them to work with the military, is also problematic. The United States cannot possibly achieve its political goals in Iraq - or the goal of reducing its own military presence over time - unless Iraqis are treated as partners. Humanitarian aid, economic assistance, the creation of Iraqi military, security and political forces that can defeat the insurgents and give the new government credibility - all require the cooperation of Iraqis.

War is not about eliminating risks; it is about managing them. America should do everything it can to manage its risks in Iraq, and the military is constantly learning and adapting. So, however, are America's enemies - and they understand they can only win politically, not militarily. This in part explains the attacks earlier this month on Shiites in Karbala and Najaf, which killed 68 Iraqis and wounded about 175. It also helps explain last week's attack in Mosul; the insurgents knew the bombing would receive extensive news coverage in the United States, and they no doubt are aware of the results of recent polls that show rising opposition to the war among Americans. Why not try to divide Americans and Iraqis the way they are trying to divide Sunnis and Shiites?

The brutal reality is that the United States is fighting a "war after the war" that has already killed and wounded far more Americans and Iraqis than the war that drove Saddam Hussein from power. It is an intense war, with some 1,600 to 3,000 incidents and attack attempts a month. Troops are dispersed and sometimes vulnerable. All of this means more attacks are likely before Iraqi elections next month and constant fighting well into 2006. For months and years to come, insurgents and terrorists will continue to try to exploit every fault line in Iraqi society, in American politics, and in regional and international affairs as well.

There is no certainty that the United States will win in Iraq. The war after the war is a far more difficult one than the war against Saddam Hussein. If America overreacts to attacks and lets the enemy drive its agenda, losing the war in Iraq will become not just possible but almost certain.

Anthony H. Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is the author of "The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons."